I first met Matt Stopford when I came to 2nd Bn in 1988 through Bush Thornhill (now I am dating myself). And I served in 'A' Coy in Yugo (1993) when he was in 'B' Coy. As much as I liked Matt I heard that he had endangered his troops several times unnecessarily (and this is from guys I know to be otherwise level headed). Alot of this had to do with weapons cache drag nets (in the end the OC got charged for similar things). All this is to illustrate that how people act in-country does not necessarily illustrate how they act in-theatre. In the end almost everyone I talked to while on-tour thought Matt was doing as good a job as could be expected: not exemplary but not bad (especially <<<moderator edit for PERSEC>>>).
However, knowing Matt, and the soldiers who liked and disliked him, the idea of poisoning him is utterly unacceptable and unprofessional. First, not only are there chains-of-command to go through but many of the Sr NCO's would have been friends of Matt, and friends that Matt would have listened too had things actually gone 'too' far (a subjective line if ever there was one). Second, the idea of 'fragging' (or any of its variants) is one that may be discussed-out of frustrations or stress more often than naught-but isn't one carried out...at least in Canadian situations. The 'fragging' story is, in my opinion, just that: a story. It is, unfortunately, one that has reached mythic proportions.
This is not to say that Matt wasn't poisoned. Rather it is just a comment on the quick resort to these things as happening as relatively commmon occurrences. If Matt was poisoned, even this late in the game, medical inquiry could narrow thie likelihood of this down or not. Now why this isn't being investigated medically, and, admittedly, this may be due to my own ignorance, is the question I find vexing.
On a different note: One responder wrote wondering whether incidents like these would affect soldier's confidence in their hierarchy. The answer to this is quiote simple: it utterly undermined it. Anyone who was around for the year following Yugo (and the hushing up of Medak) knows this. As RegF soldiers (no offence to the PRes but it is different in this regard) we absolutely HAVE to believe in our leadership. When you are asked to take human life, as we were in Medak (and in other incidents seemingly forgotten on that tour), you NEED to believe that why you did so-as determined by those who make the decisions-are making sound judgements. We didn't question this so much in Medak or on the tour but, because of how we were (mis)treated by our own people, in Battalion and higher, many of us were left wondering about our actions on that tour. In this regard when the pitch came to our senior staff in Battalion no one was at, or went to, bat for us-we were left to our own devices. The moral in the unit plummeted and I don't think it was recoverable-at least not in the foreseeable future.
The PRes pers we received were not of the higst calibre. Before biting my head off or thinking I am pro-RegF and anti-PRes allow me to say that this is a genralisation and woefully misrepresents the many excellent PRes guys we did have (and many of them got f****d over when we got back). The level of trg was poor and disorganised and, to be perfectly clear, I dont think this was the fault of the PRes. For example, many good soldiers from the East Coast were sent back due to politics (a certain rich Colonel from Alberta helped alot in this regard-to name but one). When we were trg the PRes guys it was incredible how many failed their basic wpns handling drills. What also shocked many of us was the Marine style 'gung-ho' or 'hoowah' attitude of the PRes guys (and, yes, this did exist elsewhere in the forces but not in this unit at this time...perhaps just luck and timing). Again, this is not the fault of the young guys coming to us.
Another aspect of the PRes issue was the sheer amount of them that we HAD to take (some one's pet project or so it was told to me). No matter how well trained attachment soldiers may be they cannot represent a larger number than the core of a unit or you lose unit integrity. This isn't an insult to the PRes it is just common, perhaps tactical, sense. 2 PPCLI had to take close to 50% (the exact number eludes me at this point-my apolgies). The lack of unit cohesion began to show when we deployed to Fort Ord and Fort Hunter-Ligget in California. This was discussed and sent up through the chain-of-command and all we got back was silence. During the tour this mish-mash was made apparent in even how the companies were manned. 'A' Coy, during the planning phase, was going into the hottest area at the time (Pakrac). Now before individuals serving with the other Coy's bite my head off please note that this was a planning decision. I enjoyed serving with 'A' Coy but I do not think it was some form of Spec Ops or Super Coy-that's BS. But we were 'stacked' none-the-less. This was told to many by not only the OC but the CO (and it caused some consternation amongst, well, everyone...and justifiably so!).
I want to reiterate once more that this is not a slag against the PRes guys who were with us-many of them were excellent but many more were not (and our own in-house problems were not of the calibre of the problems we had seen with the PRes nor with the problems seen elsewhere in the CF...in fact, we had many ex-2 CDO guys come back to us that year BECAUSE of the BS that was going in the Airborne). Finally, many of these commments on the PRes issue (only for this tour and 2nd Bn) are a matter of public record-see the inquiries that occurred afterward (SCONDVA I believe they were called).
So, when we returned, went through the heck that was post-Op life for the more or less abandoned and left to our own devices 2 Bn, we then received a warning order stating that we were going back to Yugo AND that, because the PRes augmentation worked so well, we would do it all over again the same way. Whther this turned out to be the case many 2nd Bn guys never found out. I, like many, many others, decided enough was enough. The system had failed us miserably (and the poor ******* PRes guys who served with us and were subsequently and unceremoniously dumped upon our return-that was BS) and it was clear our chain-of-command even within the Bn had also failed. How can you go into another combat zone (we didn't know it was going to settle down as much as it did then) knowing this? How can you see what you see and act as you act-both necessarily violent in places liek Yugo- all while never being sure if what you are doing is the right thing because you can see little or no reaosn to trust or respect those who are making the decision...you can't.
Perhaps the decision I made was just as much a statement on what I needed to do-which was leave the CF-as it is an idictment of that system. but, in the end, the idictment stands, in my opinion. The CF leadership (read: officers) failed us then as it is failing Matt now.
It is a sad and sombre state-of-affairs that has left me, and others, questioning their actions...then and now.
Cheers guys-apoligies for the length...guess I had some 'issues' bottled up
(MODERATOR EDIT - Altered one reference of "f-stick" - this isn't the place to be slagging others; Infanteer)
