The future of Light Arty (105 mm) (From: Mortars)

[Allgunzblazing]

This is a question for those in the know -

What is the reason that the equipment and training is different between the two components of the CF? For example - 105 mm Light Gun is only used by the Reserves vs the M777, five weeks BMQ vs the Reg Force version of BMOQ/ BMQ, etc.

I'm just an applicant, so I don't know how things work within the organization. It just makes sense to me that if the training and equipment is the same, then the resulting force will be much more battle ready. At any given time, there will be fully trained individuals (in the Reserves) who can be called up in case of an emergency without the need for further training.

jeffb pointed out that militia units don't have the infrastructure for the M777. One solution could be to have even one gun per brigade, which could be shared by all Res Arty units within the brigade. The same goes for all the other equipment used by the Reg Force - Coyotes, Leopards, etc.

I make these points in this thread, because (in my opinion) the future of any piece of equipment has to be seen with respect to the big picture. Not just for any particular component.

 

[FJAG]

... Today few people see more than a limited mobilization and perhaps the creation of a special force, although the fleshing out of the regulars with individual augmentation is a more realistic proposition.

... but how do we compel individuals sub-units of various militia units to report for duty without a compulsary call up? The chances of any Canadian government being willing to pay the political price for resorting to compulsion in any situation sort of Armageddon is slim to say the least. The hard-eyed bean counters who scrutinize budget items would shoot holes in the plan in a heartbeat.

...The future of the reserve gunners is very much in doubt and while I wish it was not so, but I do not see an easy solution! 

At the risk that you're doing this just to push my buttons I feel a need to respond.

A reserve force that no one is prepared to use compulsorily is a waste of money. The military is a force of last resort and to rely on them to come voluntarily when needed is a suicidal policy.

If this is truly a 'political' issue then its time to get over the conscription crisis - that was so last century.

My belief is that politicians here don't even have an understanding what the existing powers are. We have the legislation in place although I admit we are woefully behind in job protection legislation, financial hardship benefits, wounded warrior support etc.

The problem in my mind remains within both NDHQ and the CF who are stuck within a particular military model mindset.

The US has consistently used reserve call ups to increase their force size when necessary. One can argue about how effective Nat Guard units and formations may be but they continue to form a significant role on deployed operations without the US government having paid any political price.

In the UK right now the government is increasing the Territorial Army strength from 15,000 to 30,000 while cutting the regular army by 20,000 because they understand the massive cost savings involved. They know there will be challenges not the least of which is from within the regular force leadership. Their govt is not going to pay a political price for this because the public appreciates that cost cutting measures are necessary.

I see our military leadership's timid approach to the role and utilization of reserves in the same way that the US conventional military leadership addressed the use of special forces in the 80s and 90s. It took a politician - Rumsfeld - to finally get them off the dime.

Don't sell our political leadership short on a per forma basis. If given reasonable and viable options they will most probably go the right way. At present we give them no real options and as a result we get what appear to be arbitrary budget cuts.

If the future of the reserve gunner is in doubt then I would lay that directly at the feet of the army - including artillery - leadership. I see simple and effective solutions. What I don't see is a leadership that will do it.

(Just as an on-point aside. I just saw a perfectly good M109A4 going up as a memorial at a local legion - how's that for a leadership decision?)

 

[GnyHwy]

Do we need an ultra light weight towed 105mm howitzer?  No.  Get away from Titanium and costs drop, and maintainabiltiy goes up.

Perhaps not, but we really, really, really want one.  Especially the gunners in the light role that may fill the dispersed role. 

If we view the 105mm as a gun for training and ceremonial, we can save a lot of money, and have only a small delta training bill when it's time to roll out the ultra gee whiz titanium 155mm.

I agree.  Maybe we can build our own.  If it is just for training and ceremonial, then it doesn't have to be that advanced.

It's not rocket science (unless you add in rocket propelled projectiles.  And even rocket science is just "plumbing on steroids" according to John Carmack)

I will abstain somewhat, because he is a lot smarter than me, but he doesn't have to drop a rocket next to anyone either.

What is the obession with a 105mm Gun/howitzer?

Gunners will always be partial to howitzers, perhaps to a fault.  Asking a gunner to prefer a mortar over a howitzer is like asking a tanker to prefer an MGS to a tank.

The Mortar offers
-High angle of fire
-120mm HE is more lethal than 105mm HE
-Quick to put into action
-Relatively light compared to 105
-Does better illum than 105

I realize 105 has more range and can do direct shoots, but me (speaking as a former mortar man) I say 120mm Mortar is fine.

Cheers

A howitzer will beat or compete in all categories above except weight.  Your last statement I put in yellow would be one of my main arguments for a howitzer.

Allgunz,  your question is valid, but your potential solution is not realistic at all.  When you get in and do some time, you will see.

Lastly, I realize the current budget dictates that we will be throwing T-flashes and arty sims for a few years, and most of us did it in the 90s.  This topic is the "Future of Light Arty", the discussion should be focused on 5-20 years

 

[Petard]

FJAG, you are so far off the mark I don't even know where to begin
The problem with equipping the reserves was not stymied by any kind of political mindset against them, but in the growing complexity of the systems themselves. The availability of reservists to become trained on these systems is limited, except for those deploying with Reg F units, who can get it during work up training to high readiness. Even then there are limits. Nevertheless, in the past decade, the CF has relied actually more and more on the Reserves for sustaining deployed forces. Artillery units have gained quite a bit of capability over the past  decade, but no PY growth, and indirectly there was a reduction in capability with the elimination of mortar capability in infantry Bn's. All of which resulted in the Artillery in particular leaning on its Reserve units. This pattern was certainly seen during recent Ops when reservists were making up to 30% of any Artillery unit deploying. The pattern is one based on FG individuals (and the CF does need this depth) and not unit mobilization.

There will still be a need for P Res Arty units for some time, IMO, and there are many good people in these units, but the question is how much do you give them to train with before the skill level is simply not achievable because the limited training time available. The greatest gap right now, between P Res and Reg F units, is in their respective comm's systems. Reg F Artillery units are going more to networked fire control systems, and the reserves remain in the old fashioned voice system. Trying to close this gap can only be done with an increase of training time, and I would argue they're already having trouble now with availability without increasing the complexity of the system.

So the main need is to have viable P res force that can FG individuals, with as minimal training required as possible before they are deployed. The requirement to equip them with a fleet that is not necessarily deployable is a pattern we can see already with acquisition of the MilCOT fleet of vehicles. Even so, the remote possibility does exist that such a fleet could be deployed (certainly true of the Lg1). The basic intent, near as I've ever seen, is to provide P Res units with a training fleet that is less expensive to operate than the system used for full spectrum Ops, but in certain situations could be used on Ops.

I'm no longer in DLR, so some of my opinion is based on dated info, but it is a qualified one, and it's also based on what was presented during the last AAB

So here goes my  :2c: in response to some of the other comments already made:

- the decision to get rid of the M109 was made some time ago, and once in motion it was going to be difficult to reverse that decision and sustain what in world terms is an obsolete system. Giving them to P res would involve O & M, infrastructure, and tech support costs that would be well above what can be justified for the P Res purpose of FG in support of Reg F units

- 155 ammo isn't cheap, and the danger areas make it diffcult to use in many training areas that have typically multiple users and little real estate (Val Cartier, Petawawa, and Meaford). Even so, there was some research done to possibly acquiring M198 systems for the P Res since there are a lot of them on the market and do not have a high cost vehicle component like a SP system would

- there are many manufacturers tracking Canada's situation WRT replacing the C3 fleet, some of them make very good and reliable systems. These can have old fashioned optic sight, digitzed to various levels, and potentially can be deployed where the lift capability might be more strained.

- 105 does fit this bill better because of the pattern of activity related to a towed gun system, and the range it can achieve. This would result in P res units operating a a system which at least has some similarity to the pattern of activity in Reg F units they're FG to. IRT the possibility of operationally deploying the system, since AOR's can be potentially quite large, and fire support assets possibly more centralized, and/or held to FOBs for protection, than range is an important factor 

- I often hear the comment about how viable the 120 is, but besides the shorter range limitation, there never seems to be much mention of just how expensive it is to implement a new ammo type. I worked on a project to get a SP 120 system, and the biggest cost (and one of the show stoppers) was the ammunition cost, even the bill just to qualify its use was virtually prohibitive. Any talk about replacing 105 should also look at the massive cost to demilitarize the 105 ammo stocks (especially the considerable amounts of C132 still around).

- just about any indirect fire system can be digitized at relatively low cost. If it is a stand alone, i.e. non networked system, it does not take long to train someone on a system like this. The obvious pay off is an increased skill level for P Res deploying with Reg F unit with minimal increase in training time.  But without the networking capability it does limit its deployability. There was and, far as I know, still is a project that is intended to deliver a digitized system with whatever replaces the C3, but it would not necessarily plug into LCSS (nor should it)

- it looks like most P Res units outside of the Altantic area are going to left with 81s, which are not that new either (many, if not most, are near the end of their life expectancy). Even with some kind of sustained 81 replacement program, the system itself is very limited in what can provide in training value for soldiers that might be tasked to a towed gun Bty. These systems belong in infantry Bn's (see the miles of discussions elsewhere on this site on this topic)

This, in my mind, means the 105 is still a viable system, the 120 mortar not so much, and the 81 doesn't come even close to the over all need, but if we are to believe the primary purpose of P Res units is to FG for Reg F units then they need some project to meet this need within the next 5-10 years as their obsolete weapon systems eliminate themselves

 

[a_majoor]

Having "reserve only" capabilities seems to be part of the CF anyway, one can look at PRes armour or the RCN's use of reservists to man the Kingston class ships to see this in practice. The question of how you can reliably "force generate" units and sub units from the Reserve is a good question, although experience in former Yugoslavia and Afghanistan seems to indicate there are plenty of willing people, so perhaps the answer may lie in "tweaking" existing rules and legislation rather than suggesting compulsion.

In one thread a poster had a realistic plan for raising units and subunits out of reservists by offering a long term Class C contract (the details escape me, but I think the idea was 6 months workup, one year deployed and six months post deployment). If this measure was taken, then each year a "deployment battery" would be formed, volunteers enrolled and the process started. At the same time, a "deployment battery" that was raised two years ago would finish post deployment, turn in the cleaned and repaired kit and everyone would disperse back to their respective regiments.

Combining this with some sort of kit with a small PY and O&M footprint and I think you have a winner. My personal suggestion would be the 120mm mortar given the ability to cover long ranges, provide heavy weight of fire (and terminal effects using smart rounds) towed behind a military utility vehicle in the HMMVW class, or alternatively a BV 206 type vehicle to provide maximum ability to move cross country (the Artillery would then also have a secondary ability to provide mobility in disaster relief and DOMOPS scenarios quite apart from their ability to provide firepower). Using systems that can be deployed and fired by 3 or 4 man crews would keep the footprint small, although there might have to be a larger maintainence troop/battery to keep the systems going, so PY's may be a wash.

 

[Infanteer]

First off, this is a great, fascinating discussion about equipping artillery regiments, both regular and reserve, with many thought provoking and informed posts.  Well done.

I remain interested in the debate between a 105mm ULWPH and a 120mm mortar.  From my understanding, the 105mm ULWPH wins in all categories of effects delivered.  It appears that a 120mm mortar along the lines of the USMC EFSS has advantages in portability and crew requirements.  The EFSS can be driven around on those two prime movers with 30 rounds of ammo by 4 mortarmen.  That package can be packed into the back of a helicopter.

I guess I have a few questions here for the resident gunners and mortarmen:

1.  In looking at a 105mm ULWPH vs a 120mm mortar, how many PYs do we want to dedicate to the capability?  What's the crew size on a ULWPH?  Does crew savings mean the possibility of more manned systems (and possibly greater potential effects on target?)

2.  What is easier to deploy, especially in an expeditionary setting.  This could be the kicker.  Where would you deploy a 105mm where you wouldn't deploy a 155mm howitzer?  If a battalion went out the door on a, say, a NEO mission, it would probably be quite easy to push out a troop of 4 x 120mm systems similar to the EFSS to provide an indirect support capability in a pinch.

3.  Which leads naturally to the next question - what does a 120mm provide that an 81mm doesn't?  Using the same example, is the NEO battalion just as well served by having its own 81mm indirect capability restored?  Is there enough of a delta between a (currently nonexistent) infantry 81mm capability and the artillery 155mm capability to warrant another system?

 

[McG]

Back in the 70s NATO tried to de-standardize 105mm as too small; okay sure, but it fits in a number of roles well and it's cheaper than 155, which is good for armies like ours.

So, maybe we consider drawing from markets of some newer NATO members on the Eastern side of the alliance.  If 105 mm is too small while 155 mm is too big & expensive, then maybe we look at some 122 mm options.

... Of course, such an idea needs to be addressed in the context of the following question:

...  Is there enough of a delta between a (currently nonexistent) infantry 81mm capability and the artillery 155mm capability to warrant another system?

 

[Cardstonkid]

If there is a decision in the near term to provide new (ish) equipment to replace the C3's it must, for budget reasons, be a newer 105 mm system. If this decision is not made soon, all or most Reserve units will become 81 mm mortar units. 

That being said, the chances of a newer 105 are slim to none, and slim is putting his boots on. The costs of using the 81 mm, the fact that it does not require arty tow qualified drivers, or gun tractors, that there is more flexibility in use of training areas, and that it pushes Reserve Arty units into a more generic soldier role more suited for UN actions, makes the 81 mm mortar solution the most likely.

The 81 mm is also the choice if no decision is made soon. For these reasons I would suggest the direction, even if it is not planned, will be 81 mm mortars.

As has been mentioned previously, the 120mm sounds nice, until you add up all of the costs associated with it. I suspect there is no appetite for a new weapons system that does not  increase the capability of the Army at a low cost. We have 81 mm mortars in the system, we have the ammo, we even have trained mortar members in Reserve units, so dropping the 105mm still gives reason for Reserve Arty units to exist.

I recognize that this changes the training and interoperability relationship between Reserve gunners and their Reg force counterparts, but I suspect this will be dealt with more easily than investing in a new 120mm mortar system. The 81 mm offers the lowest possible cost, even if the 81mm needs to be replaced with a newer model. What this means for interoperability is a significant question, but I suspect it will be secondary question to the overall cost issue.

As for new 105's, the M119 is likely the only realistic 105mm option for Canada. It is in production through 2013, it is well suited to cold weather, and the latest model has the inertial navigation system. If we are going to get a new gun, I think this will be it. I don't think it is going to happen, but I am hoping. Maybe someone could tell slim to hold on for a bit.

 

[FJAG]

The problem with equipping the reserves was not stymied by any kind of political mindset against them, but in the growing complexity of the systems themselves. The availability of reservists to become trained on these systems is limited, except for those deploying with Reg F units, who can get it during work up training to high readiness. Even then there are limits. Nevertheless, in the past decade, the CF has relied actually more and more on the Reserves for sustaining deployed forces. ... All of which resulted in the Artillery in particular leaning on its Reserve units. This pattern was certainly seen during recent Ops when reservists were making up to 30% of any Artillery unit deploying. The pattern is one based on FG individuals (and the CF does need this depth) and not unit mobilization.

Sorry Petard but don't your observations prove my point?

Since Korea, we have stood up a large and expensive regular army/artillery which never went to war until Afghanistan. Even during the first Gulf war we did not send artillery to participate. Our will to commit conventional combat forces was and remains low yet we, as taxpayers, we pay a significant amount to still maintain an arguably large branch which sees, and is predicted to see, only minor operational commitment.

In Afghanistan many branches had large reserve components and they all had long work up sessions before deployment. In my mind that is very much part of the new model of operational deployment and it leaves room to take reservists with fundamental skills to the level needed for operations.

I don't believe in reserve unit mobilization. That's capability hasn't existed since the early 1960s.

I'll go further. In my mind there should be no reserve 'units'. Units are regiments and while we use the term for our reserve organizations they are in fact frequently undermanned and over ranked batteries.

What I see are reserve battery gun lines headed by a regular force captain and a cadre of regular force personnel for maintenance and key leadership positions. (No BC, no FOOS, no FSCC - leave those with the reg f) These batteries would come under the command of the existing regular force regiments and are to be administered and trained by them and plug into their overall establishment and operational role.

Why keep Reserve LCols and Majs many of the Capts, CWOs and MWOs in reserve units that rarely exceed a hundred all ranks. How many of them went to Afghanistan? Not enough to justify a career structure. Not to denigrate them but they are frequently in civilian employment that makes deployment difficult and their skill levels aren't up to the tasks they would need to do in combat. Get rid of these ranks and you can fund another twenty or thirty gunners per battery.

My reg v res model has always been to identify those jobs that you don't need day-to-day and build a viable reserve system around them. Reservists should have only a very minor career path. They should be doers. If they want a 'career' in the military they should component transfer. Young reserve gunners do not join with the aim of being the RSM. They join to fire the guns and get their hands on cool gear. Give them that and give them good leadership and their skill levels will blossom.

I don't for a minute believe there is any equipment we have which is too complex for reservists as a group to use. Its all a matter of the right training and exercise model. If comms systems are really that complex now then leave those as a reg f job.

My approach is one based on redoing the model from scratch based on what so far is an operational deployment model that rarely exceeds a battle group and that always has time for work-up training. If we do need a true quick reaction force as part of our defence mandate then that can be pure regular force. My guess is that it will never exceed a BG either so the one battery gun line per ref f regiment is more than adequate for that need - in fact with that model you could QRF a whole three gun regiment if needed.

As for the M109s, I didn't advocate those for the reserves per se. I think we should have kept them in storage as a strategic resource or leave one Brigade (and its reservists) fully equipped with them so that we do not loose a heavy capability. I know at the time we were getting rid of tanks and Chinooks as well and look what happened there. We've also gotten much better with heavy strategic airlift since then. Quite frankly if the operational environment becomes less permissive, and the armoured and infantry have tanks and LAVs or whatever the CCV may be, do you really want to have towed 155s? Personally I'd rather have them take a few weeks to get them out of storage than go to PWGSC to go rent us a bunch.

I know 155 ammo is not cheap. With that in mind we need better and more realistic simulation at the gun end. Why don't we have training ammunition that lets the gun line do all their drills but without a projectile actually leaving the barrel. Live firing is very important but much basic and refresher training can be done without it.

My point isn't that there is a political mindset against the reserves. (Although there is. The whole Limited Liability v Unlimited Liability fiasco is evidence of that) My point is that there is a mindset that can't see beyond the existing reg/res structure because that's what they've been used to their entire careers and they don't want to lose their existing reg f PYs.

The time for tweaking a poor system has expired. Governments have to deal with massive deficits and are having a hard time seeing why it costs us billions and billions of dollars every year to be able to keep one battle group in the field. We need to come up with innovative ideas that will reduce costs and yet still allow us to field a credible force when required.

If I can be honest, this whole business with 155s v 105s  v mortars, old v new strikes me as almost unseemly for what has always been the King of Battle.

We have artillery with guns so that we can quickly mass fire across a large front of the battlefield while infantry battalions had mortars for fast guaranteed fire within their immediate areas. Guns and mortars in their specific place have been proven by battle over and over again for over a half century.  They are complimentary weapons systems.

Moving mortars out of battalions and giving them to the artillery is, IMHO, PY counting/bean counting at its worst. I only pray that there aren't going to be a whole bunch of grunts that will pay the ultimate price at some time because the fire support they needed wasn't there. (Take a look at Op ANACONDA for an example of what happens when grunts go in without guns and mortars)

The argument as to which weapon delivery system we should use should never be primarily predicated on how easy is it to use, do we have ranges to use it on, will it fit in the armoury etc. It should be based on what will the supported arms be needing in the way of fire support and what terminal weapon's effects do we have to put in the target area to fulfill that need. Once we determine that, everything else will logically fall into place.

Haven't got this worked up over artillery issues for almost three decades.    Nice to be chatting again with people that actually know the difference between a gun and a mortar. The legal branch has been a bit boring.

 

[McG]

FJAG & others,
Let's keep this on the topic of light artillery.  If you want to talk reserve roles, orgs & purposes, then we have a whole other thread for that:  http://forums.army.ca/forums/threads/24381.0.html

Cheers,
The staff.

 

[Petard]

Leaving aside the "what shall we do with reserves" tangent, and that possibly it is a good idea to keep a towed artillery capability in our P Res units, here are a few options (fodder for this discussion)

Chile has a version of M101/33, or C3 as we call it, in service. Their gov't workshops are able to sustain theirs and do not have any problems with manufacture of recoil components (a major obstacle in sustaining our fleet). They have 92 in use, they might be able to assist in sustaining our fleet, or even possibly selling them should they become surplus
http://articles.janes.com/articles/jdu2000/Chilean-M101-33-howitzers-in-service.html

There are countries with surplus L118/119's, they might be a possibility too, albeit they would be second hand and in most cases not the improved version the US has in service (parts would not be as easy to come by) A good prosepct might be Australia as they complete transition to the M777
http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/australias-a-450m600m-land-17-artillery-replacement-gets-goahead-01928/

Nexter still makes the LG1, in fact they recently sold an improved version, the digitzed Mk III, to Columbia.
www.armyrecognition.com/france_french_army_light_and_heavy_weapons_uk/105_lg_mk_iii_nexter_systems_digital_towed_artillery_canon_howitzer_french_france_technical_data_she.html
P Res units in LFAA will be using this gun for some time now that servicing agreement worked out with GD OTS

South Africa has an excellent gun system too, although it fires a unique ammunition that would be diffcult to qualify and support
http://www.army-guide.com/eng/product1940.html

 

[FJAG]

I've had a long look at the options and the current organization in order to see whether there is a continuing role for light artillery.

Firstly the options.

In my view artillery needs to standardize on guns and not get involved in mortars. As I've mentioned before, the ability to mass fire over large areas is paramount. The range guns offer and the ability to concentrate fire while dispersing guns makes this possible. Terminal effects of rounds is also critical. Round for round a 105mm HE offers two to three times the weight of steel and high explosive as the 81 and 105. While mortars might increase the amount of fragment output through increase burst rates, the projectiles do not offer the same penetration power into fortifications. Lower angles of fire, shorter times of flight and even direct fire capabilities are also a distinct advantage.

As far as guns are concerned, in my mind the best option is to standardize on the 155 mm M777. It provides range, a sophisticated ammunition mix and air transportability. Standardization is the best administrative solution as we would have only one training, maintenance and ammunition supply chain to deal with. On the down side, is the cost of the additional guns and training ammunition costs. - I'll give a nod to the nay sayers and admit that these two items will probably make this a option a non starter. If we won't get more M777s then there is no need to consider any other 155 gun for the same reasons.

That leaves us with a 105 mm solution by default.

How do the primary 105 mm options compare? Range is one issue but they are negligibly different with the L118/M119 having a small edge. Weight for air transportability is the second key factor. Here the LG1 comes in at appx 1,500kg and the C3 at 2,500kg the heaviest. I won't get into digitization or ease of use. All these choices are capable of improvement.

When we look at the means of transport we have the Griffon with at best a 2,000kg load and the Chinook with a 12,700kg. I have no experience with Griffons lifting LG1s but assuming we have done that then I would presume we would need three choppers for 1 for the gun, 1 for the crew and 1 for a pallet of ammo. (I've done that with L5s and the old Hueys and C1s with the old CH113 Voyageurs and CH47s - believe me the Voyageur was the better vehicle and the Chinook the vastly superior choice) I would think using Griffons to move guns would be the exception rather than the rule and that Chinooks would be our standard airborne gun tractor in which case any of the three guns (and the M777) are airmobile.

Do I really see an airmobile role? I guess I do.

Quite frankly the current organization of the regular force leaves me puzzled. Rather than organizing two mech brigades and one light brigade, we've gone egalitarian and ensured that every infantry regiment gets two mech bns and one light bn while our tanks are also penny packeted around the country. In short while there is a light role it doesn't seem to be organized at the brigade level meaning artillery support at each brigade must be capable of support to mech and light. (I've already made my feelings known about the demise of the M109 and won't beat that dead horse again). The M777 can adequately support both mech and light (again a clear signal for standardization)

Do we need a 105 mm for operational support? No. The M777 can provide both mech and light operational modes. Do we need more M777s for operational deployments? Only if we deploy more than a brigade. We will have the ability to field at least 4 batteries of M777s operationally. I doubt if we will ever deploy more than a brigade based on our past experiences.

Where does that leave us? Ceremonial and basic training needs. The C3 is adequate for that. Its the no new capital funds solution.

So. Unless someone can find a new Defence of Canada role that can't be met by existing M777s, LG1s or C3s, I think we're stuck with what we got.

Doing mortars is a big mistake. Yes the thing goes bang but you are dumbing down all of the artillery skills that make artillery what it is. While having artillery personnel man mortars in Afghanistan may have been fine - we had only a few people there and could pick up the slack for the grunts, a less permissive environment could lead to disaster when we can't find the people to man both mortars and all the arty stuff like guns and CM radars and UAVs and forward observers and FSCCs and air defence etc etc.

 

[ArmyRick]

FJAG

"..pick up the slack for the grunts.." . What? We had mortars taken away from us in protest. Believe me, arty and infantry can agree on one thing. In a perfect world, arty mans guns and infantry mans mortars. We want our tubes back, but thats another story.

Penny packing the tanks? Last I heard, they are being concentrated in Edmonton and some at the school in Gagetown.

 

[Infanteer]

Good post FJAG, and I concur with most of your points.  At this point, Occam's Razor indicates the best course of action.

Quite frankly the current organization of the regular force leaves me puzzled. Rather than organizing two mech brigades and one light brigade, we've gone egalitarian and ensured that every infantry regiment gets two mech bns and one light bn while our tanks are also penny packeted around the country. In short while there is a light role it doesn't seem to be organized at the brigade level meaning artillery support at each brigade must be capable of support to mech and light. (I've already made my feelings known about the demise of the M109 and won't beat that dead horse again). The M777 can adequately support both mech and light (again a clear signal for standardization)

Yup - Force 2013, trying to please everybody by doing everything half-heartedly and nothing well.  Our Army is conceptually fixed by the Afghanistan battle group.

Penny packing the tanks? Last I heard, they are being concentrated in Edmonton and some at the school in Gagetown.

1/3 of the armoured force is in Gagetown while the rest of it is consolidated in Edmonton, and yet promised to everybody around the country (meaning that the LdSH will continue to be a capability manager).  We need to admit we only have enough tanks for a single Brigade, figure out what that means and sacrifice the Combat Team Commander's Course to the cut-back gods.

 

[FJAG]

Apologies ArmyRick. I didn't know the details of what happened there. I'm still in shock that it's going on at all. I remember the Airborne Battery used to have L5s and 81s but that was a very special situation.

My understanding was that there was a PY struggle with a need for more rifles with the sections and something in the Bns had to go. I didn't mean that the infantry in general was desiring to give them up but that somewhere in the back halls of Ottawa a decision was made that the infantry leadership signed off on. In retrospect the term "picking up the slack" isn't even suitable for that thought.

Re tanks: The latest documents I read still indicated a squadron going to each of Pet and Val. If the tanks are concentrating with the Strathconas I'm glad to hear it.

 

[Infanteer]

Re tanks: The latest documents I read still indicated a squadron going to each of Pet and Val. If the tanks are concentrating with the Strathconas I'm glad to hear it.

A squadron is going to Gagetown and it'll be a composite 12 RBC and RCD squadron....

 

[Infanteer]

...and, quite on time, the Journal of Military Operations delivers an article concerned with the future of British artillery.  (Sign up is free)

https://www.tjomo.com/article/8/Down_The_Tubes_A_View_on_the_Future_of_Field_Guns_Using_United_Kingdom_Artillery_as_the_Example/

The author essentially states:

1.  Everything the 105mm can do the 155mm can do better;

2.  The 155mm howitzer like the M777 is the best "middle-ground" weapon - more deployable than a SPH but more effective than a 105mm ULWPH.

3.  Old artillery structures (3 Batteries with Gun Troop, HQ, and Observation elements) may be obsolete.  FOOs may be concentrated in their own regiment and may not consist of exclusively gunners.

Interesting read.

 

[Bruce Monkhouse]

  FOOs may be concentrated in their own regiment and may not consist of exclusively gunners.

I would venture as far as saying that except for large battle plans no FOO parties are required and the Infantry/Armoured folk should all be fluid in this skill...........no matter what the old guard might say it really isn't that hard.

 

[ArmyRick]

The aussies are going with a single and large gun battery in each regiment, plus 2-3 OP/FOO batteries. Whats everybody's take on this? Gunners, your thoughts?

 

[George Wallace]

I would venture as far as saying that except for large battle plans no FOO parties are required and the Infantry/Armoured folk should all be fluid in this skill...........no matter what the old guard might say it really isn't that hard.

Agreed.  Part of TQ3 (really dating myself) Armour was to call in Fire Missions.  It was also part of Armour Officer Phase Trg.  The use of puff tables (and later their new fangled electronic big screen imagery version) in the Arty School was always part of those courses. 

At the same time, FAC trg was also introduced on Officer Phase Trg, with the acknowledgement that a more formal crse and qualification would be necessary to be a FAC.  There is no need for a FAC to be Arty or Pilot.