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The Defence Minister's viewpoint on the Military Budget

KevinB is exactly right - it can be done, but it needs an operational requirement to justify.

The problem with very high levels of readiness is that they are extremely expensive.  We learned from OP APOLLO, for example, what just what it meant to keep a battalion - a light battalion with artificially limited numbers of vehicles - at 10 days NTM.  Recall lists had to be maintained, personnel could not proceed out of the geographical area (which meant no instructing in Gagetown, or Borden, or Kingston - with all that means), all pers DAGs had to be complete, including needles specific for where a deployment "might" happen, etc., etc..  Worse, all vehicles had to be "lined up" for an air deployment.  This meant weighed, purged, quarantined and manifested for air movement and lined up on the asphalt waiting to go to the APOE.  If we're using US airlift, they need the manifests well in advance, translated to their system.

Moreover, the pallets have to be 90% ready to go.  This means having the entire battalion's worth of stores, consumables, POL, etc. inspected, palletized and loaded up.  A simple item like a Coleman stove has to be purged, inspected and certified for air transport - especially if we're using contracted aircraft.

The CDS is leaning towards a 10 day NTM for the new CEFCOM Standing Contingency Task Force.  It's important to realize just what that means; it will take a major effort to reach  IMHO, the CF did not take readiness very seriously before 11 Sep 01 and we're only now beginning to grasp how resource-intensive it is.

I don't mean to naysay.  I believe we need a battalion, with supporting arms and services, at 10 days NTM on a rotating basis at all times - separate from assigned IRU tasks.  Anything less is foolish in these troubled times.  However, we need to take a close look at the resources needed to do that.

Cheers,

TR
 
TR,

At the risk of telling you people how to do your job, has anyone reviewed the preparation cycle for the AMF(L) battalion group, which was (supposedly) maintained at seven days ntm? Now, this was a bit of a different situation, as the AF(L) was designed to demonstrate NATO solidarity, not necessarilly land and start fighting. Furthermore, our area of operations was either Denmark or North Norway, so we didn't have to fly halfway arond the world - it just seemed like it in the back of a Herc.

We had to maintain the usual stuff - medicals including shots, documentation, etc and had a DAG procedure based on a seven day timetable. We also had a lot of kit that had to be prepared as you described and we did manage to deploy successfully in exercise scenarios in winter and summer both. BTW, we managed to eat up a lot of flying hours - if I recall correctly, we required seventy or so Herc and five or six 707 chalks, each way.

I will also admit that the rest of the CF didn't take the readiness requirement all that seriously, and we were subject to all the taskings and jacking around that was the norm in those days, and maybe still is, for all I know.
 
That seems to be the way I remember the years from 78-86 in D Bty AMF[L]. I remember a Cpl and a M/Cpl having to jump through hoops because they wanted to live in Beachburg and the "management" decided that was too far away to meet the snowball requirements.....
 
Old Sweat said:
TR,

At the risk of telling you people how to do your job, has anyone reviewed the preparation cycle for the AMF(L) battalion group, which was (supposedly) maintained at seven days ntm? Now, this was a bit of a different situation, as the AF(L) was designed to demonstrate NATO solidarity, not necessarilly land and start fighting. Furthermore, our area of operations was either Denmark or North Norway, so we didn't have to fly halfway arond the world - it just seemed like it in the back of a Herc.

We had to maintain the usual stuff - medicals including shots, documentation, etc and had a DAG procedure based on a seven day timetable. We also had a lot of kit that had to be prepared as you described and we did manage to deploy successfully in exercise scenarios in winter and summer both. BTW, we managed to eat up a lot of flying hours - if I recall correctly, we required seventy or so Herc and five or six 707 chalks, each way.

I will also admit that the rest of the CF didn't take the readiness requirement all that seriously, and we were subject to all the taskings and jacking around that was the norm in those days, and maybe still is, for all I know.

Well, 3 PPCLI was at a nominal notice to move on 11 Sep, as it was the IRF(L) at the time - the successor to AMF(L).  It was not resourced to maintain the mandated notice to move and (IMHO) the commitment was not taken overly seriously; after all, it never went anywhere, right?  Sounds like things haven't changed much in that regard.  At any rate, AFAIK none of the required preparations were done before the balloon went up in Oct 01.

The difference between AMF(L) and what we're talking about is the injection of a known theatre, with prepositioned supplies and airlift of much greater reliability.  Having a known theatre simplifes things considerably, and IIRC AMF(L) was designed to fall in on stocks positioned in Norway.  Makes a big difference, even if you're bringing a lot of your own kit.

You mention the chalks - scraping together 70 Herc chalks now would be a major challenge, given the decrepit status of our fleet.  For APOLLO, we used US airlift almost entirely, with all that means.  For instance, the USAF uses a different manifesting system that threw everything for a loop at the last minute and we lost control over the flow into theatre.

Finally, we're a smaller Army now.  Unfortunately, even keeping one of our battalions out of the normal tasking loop (bearing in mind that of the nine, we typically have one out the door, one just back and one preparing to go, writing off three right away - not counting IRU tasks), gives a very heavy hit to Schools, etc..  Build in leave, etc., and we run out of troops pretty quick.  You can't backfill with Reservists, as the NTM is too high.

Some good points, though - we need to sort this out and I'm cautiously hopeful the CDS' plan will do that.
 
TR,

Thanks for the constructive reply. The army was not all that larger, with ten infantry battalions and the airborne regiment, especially as two of the battalions were in Europe. We were not really out of the tasking loop, and at that stage, the supplies were not pre-positioned.

For whatever it is worth, the Canadian battalion group was destined to be part of the CAST or Canadian Air-Sea Transportable brigade, known lovingly by the troops as Hong Kong Mark II. (CAST was one of these things Canada hauled out of the air to attempt to make up for slashing our commitment to the Central Front in Europe, and was, in my opinion, a bit of a joke as no one really sat down and decided what we were supposed to do, and how we would do it.)
 
Inflation and 'Rust Out' has taken out the ability of the existing Military Budget to finance any of the operations the CF could accomplish 15 or 20 years ago. It is not just a matter of less troops.
 
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