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Infanteer said:I disagree with this assertion in US Doctrine. It stretches the meaning of the close/deep/rear framework, which was created for contiguous, linear operations (look at the Russian and U.S. theory behind it), almost to the point of uselessness. What does "organizational or temporal orientation" mean without relation to terrain and space?
I don't entirely disagree with you. In my mind as well the Bde is too involved in using it's available assets to deal with the situation in the close manoeuvre area to be able to take concrete action beyond that although they may well have gathered information with respect to the deep manoeuvre and deep fires areas and have concerns about them. Division and above is where there are resources available to plan and implement that fight.
I think these definitions from the recently published TRADOC Pam 525-3-1 "The US Army in Multi Domain Operations 2028" support your point.
Deep Fires Areas*
The areas beyond the feasible range of movement for conventional forces but where joint fires,
SOF, information, and virtual capabilities can be employed.
Deep Maneuver Area*
The area where maneuver forces can go (beyond the Close Area) but is so contested that
maneuver still requires significant allocation and convergence of multi-domain capabilities.
There's a bit of relativity here though. I think FM 3-96 isn't written just for high intensity conflict on the European battlefield but for a broad range of situations short of that where BCTs might be much more widely dispersed and without many of the typical div and above enablers save their own organic cannon battalion (The US command relationship incidentally would be - "organic" and the support relationship would be - "direct support" - see FM 3-09) and air.