I'll echo Tango2Bravo. Erosion of some skills as a low-level policing operation has different demands than a high-level combat operation. In Afghanistan, our emphasis shifted to meet these demands.
However, I feel we have to be very careful about saying there has been any sort of decline on "warfighting skills". Our sub-unit war fighting skills are probably better than ever - every Afghan tour saw platoon/troop and company/squadron/battery commanders doing their thing. A combat team attack against a trench or an insurgent in a grape hut demands the same sort of tactical acumen. Where we've suffered is at the higher level, mostly at the formation level. Senior leaders went from manoeuvring sub-units/units to managing their AO, which only makes sense. However, it means we forget things that are associated with manoeuvring large units (and supporting this manoeuvre) in the face of a enemy with real combat power.
The erosion of these skills probably wasn't as pronounced in Canada, as we've been a Battle Group army with a keen focus on the combat team for over a generation now. I could see the problem being much more pronounced in the US Army which was really organized in most respects around the Division.
However, I also think that Ricks was trying to play a little "Gotcha" journalism with a document that represents a process that he doesn't really understand.
As for "atrophy", lets just look at the 13 issues cited, and see how we stack up (from my point of view, in italics, anyways). They are interesting as they are at the Regimental level, which coresponds to our Brigade level - a specific area that Army has focused on revitalizing over the last couple of years (as posts above indicate):
[list type=decimal]
[*]Field Craft - Junior soldiers and leaders are not trained in basic field craft skills: Some field craft has eroded, mostly with regards to camoflauge and to a lesser extent defensive routine, but this is a function of leadership, not type of conflict; good units in Afghanistan did range cards, walked their defensive positions (most often TI), set up ablution/piss-s**t points, etc.
[*]Roles and Responsibilities - Officers and NCOs are not familiar with the doctrinal roles and responsibilities of their MTOE positions: Might be a problem specific to the personalities in that unit - Canadian G4s know they are responsible for CSS, etc, etc
[*]Command Posts - Unit Lack Training on Rapidly Displacing Command Posts: This is definitely a problem we had due to the coziness of KAF and Ma'sum Ghar, but we've been good in addressing it. 1 CMBG's Main CP could move in under five hours during Ex WARRIOR RAM
[*]MDMP - Staff Officer and NCOs had difficulty with MDMP in DATE, which varies significantly from MDMP in COIN or Stability Operations: This is, in my opinion, a problem specific to the US Army which loves big process and big, staff driven planning regardless of the type of conflict. We've picked up some bad habits from them in Afghanistan which we'll hopefully drop.
[*]Mission Command, Commander's Intent - Many Commanders are not comfortable in allowing subordinate and supporting commanders to operate broadly under their intent and broad mission orders: This is a problem in Canada too, but is not related to COIN or conventional warfighting, but rather personality; some leaders are not comfortable in letting go while others are. Also, we don't teach Commander's Intent and how to write that important paragraph very well in the Canadian Army
[*]Common Operating Picture, Seeing Yourself - The Regiment and supporting Squadrons did not maintain a current COP: As far as I know, we don't have this problem - I've seen bird tables used quite well in our HQs
[*]"Fighter Management" - The Regiment did not have systems in place to manage its fighters during the extended period of this exercise: This may represent a challenge from Afghanistan where we conducted "24 hour ops" at a very low pace vs conducting conventional operations at a high pace. I think we need to be careful about the idea of conducting operations 24/7 in a conventional environment as it is not generally sustainable. That being said, during peak activity, people get exhausted as the push is made over a couple days - this is nothing new
[*]Communications - Hilly terrain, inclement weather, geographic dispersion, and lack of training in moving and displacing command posts resulted in significant communication problems: Find me a conflict where stuff like this hasn't wrecked havoc on comms. It's called friction
[*]Synchronization - Regimental and squadron staffs did not effectively synchronize the operations and effects of all subordinate and supporting assets and enablers: This is probably a personality issue specific to this unit; procedures exist to deal with these problems and I've seen them executed well in Canadian BGs and CMBGs over the last few years
[*]Medical Evacuation - The Regiment did not effectively execute ground medical evacuation of wounded soldiers: This is definitely an Afghanism and one we've latched onto; we need to accept that in the face of a more capable enemy and higher friendly casualties that the "Golden Hour" kind of fades, triage takes over and ground evacuation through properly established evac chain needs to be done
[*]Sustainment Planning - Sustainment planning was ineffective throughout the Regiment:This goes back to point 9 and to point 12 below. But I will caveat it with the issue that we have seen erosion in the ability to sustain large scale operations - Artillery dumping, MSR management, and putting realistic logistics problems within our training are areas for improvement
[*]Sustainment Operations at Company Level - Company XOs and First Sergeants do not understand their roles in sustainment operations at the company level: Not a problem in our Army, IMO. Company 2ICs are senior Captains and Company CQs are senior WOs. The Americans, as far as I know, do not do this the same way (ie, 1st Lieutenants are Coy XOs - we confine them to Platoon Command)
[*]Structure of Regimental Support Squadron - The Regimental Support Squadron is not structured to support sustained combat operations: This is a problem unique to the Americans as well - the RSS concept is different than our echeloned system of lines of support. We moved away from our traditional model in Kabul and it bit us in the a** in Kandahar, so we wisely went back to things like A echelons, Admin Coys and FSGs.
[/list]
So, of the 13 points from the ARR, in my opinion:
2, 4, 6, 9, 12 and 13 are likely problems with specific personalities within the assessed unit or are structural problems unique to the American Army that we don't really have.
1, 5, 8 and 11 are general problems of friction and warfare that always pop up, regardless of the type of operation - we're bound to see them in Canada all the time.
3, 7 and 10 and parts of number 1 really are as a result of the nature of operations in Afghanistan, but that we are making a conscious effort in Canada to readjust to (while remembering why we didn't need to do them in Afghanistan).
My 2 cents.