The Americanism of our Indiv Trg Methodology

[plattypuss]

Gents, I throw this one out for discussion as I have noticed a disturbing trend of our Army to look southward in the evolution of our individual trg.  Has anyone else noted this trend which I believe is generated only by the US involvement in Iraq and the continued lessons learned.  I will attempt to illustrate why I feel that we are going the "wrong way" if we continue to "Americanise" our individual trg.

Differences in Recruit - In the American Army it must be recognized that they recruit, and train those recruits on a Quantity vs Quality basis.  They need to push through as many people as they can in the shortest amount of time, as a result quality goes down.  This also affects the level of education of the basic recruit they get ie sometimes they have to teach the soldier how to shower (although we all know examples where this refresher is required for certain Cdn soldiers. In the Canadian Army we have the luxury of recruiting a higher educated soldier due to our smaller numbers etc.  The level of recruit that we train thus means that our individual trg will then naturally be better. We do not have to cover some of the basic, common-sense items like the Americans do. To illustrate this point was a recent call for rollover traing to be given to our drivers, just like the Americans now do. This very technical drill calls for the driver to place his hands on the wheel, yell rollover and brace for impact.  In addition the driver must then exit the vehicle once it has stopped rolling. Things that make you go Hmmm.

Time in Trg - As a result of the nature of the recruit, the individual trg times for a soldier varies distinctly between the US and Cdn armies.  The Cdn army spends a lot more time training its soldiers to a higher standard, once again due to the nature of our armies and the need for the US Army to fill huge numbers of vacancies.  An American Armour officer for example goes to the Fort Knox Armor Centre and spends about 5-6 months to become a Troop Leader.  In that time he completes a number of gauntlets in which he practices the art of field leadership. The problem with this system is that they are one week long and consist of a one week simulation gauntlet, a one week HUMVEE gauntlet and a one week confirmation gauntlet finally conducted on tanks.  The same tanks that they will soon lead in Iraq on operations.  The average Canadian officer spends about 3-4 months on the tank (or now the Coyote) before going to a Regiment.  If we were to look at the US NCO system we would see an even greater difference in trg which is further estranged by the rate at which US Snr NCOs rocket up the ranks. 

I will leave the issue for now and hopefully generate some discussion. The basic underlying moral is that we should be cautious of the lessons learned by the US and not willy nilly think that our individual trg has to be just like theirs.  Collective trg is a completely different ball of wax which is something that the US does a lot better then us  s
Am I the only one witnessing this?

 

[TCBF]

Though you are correct in that we should be carefull in adopting some cultural and socialization methods from other countries without changing them where needed first, your examples are flawed.

1.  The superiority of the Canadian Volunteer:  A Myth.

Having taught Recruits in Petawawa, Cornwallis and St. Jean, let me assure you that the basics of life have to be instilled in some recruits in every Army.  Further, do not confuse TIME in education with QUALITY of education.  In many aspects, Grade 12 Ontario 2005 is the Academic equivalent of Grade 10 Ontario 1970.

Some schools are capable of warehousing our youth and little else.  Basically, day-care for young offenders.

2.  Time in training.  Again, we compare apples and oranges.  The USA program entails a short, scientific up or out selection-through-training process which culls the herd and gives them a graduate who is then developed through the extensive field training of his unit.  Our units can no longer afford to field train as units, so we load our field training onto the courses, knowing full well that it may be the last time a officer actually will get to exercise a troop in the field, even after he gets to a regiment. 

They also give their recruits a good psych test, we consider that to be elitist.  Yet, not doing so cost us an Airborne Regiment.

3.  "Rocket up the ranks"  And why not, when your average US soldier packs in more operational and training field experience in five years than our Army now (not ten years ago, now) packs in in twenty.

Up or out works.  Soldiering is a young man's game, and applying civil service HR policies to the CF is destroying our Army.  Train them up, ship them out, get them shot at, bring'em back, select the ones you want to lead the next generation, release the rest into the ready reserve.  This gives you a young, experienced and energetic Army as well as a large pool of militarily experienced voters capable of influencing policy on a national scale.

And along the way, cull the herd.  Spend the money on the who can be most cost-effectively trained.  You cannot raise a modern professional fighting force by scraping the social and intellectual scum off the streets of the nation and sliding them into a uniform. 

The USA has an Army.  We are rapidly becoming the uniformed branch of the department of National Defence.

I eagerly await all comments, pro and con.

Tom

 

[Bruce Monkhouse]

MODERATOR NOTE: this topic sounds like it could produce good discussion or a ton of "us vs. them" flaming,...please lets keep it to good discussion.
Thanks,Bruce

 

[54/102 CEF]

An excellent start!

I would call it Uniformed Branch of PWGSC.

How the mighty have fallen and you know what, this is a true Reg/Res Joint experience.

A quote from Winston Churchill to be sent to all your MPs

The Army is not like a limited liability company, to be reconstructed, remodelled, liquidated and refloated from week to week as the money market fluctuates. It is not an inanimate thing, like a house, to be pulled down or enlarged or structurally altered at the caprice of the tenant or owner; it is a living thing. If it is bullied, it sulks; if it is unhappy it pines; if it is harried it gets feverish; if it is sufficiently disturbed, it will wither and dwindle and almost die; and when it comes to this last serious condition, it is only revived by lots of time and lots of money.

Quoted in - http://www.quadrant.org.au/php/archive_details_list.php?article_id=673

 

[48Highlander]

I gotta agree with TCBF there.  I mean, talking about quantity vs quality....we've been downgrading the quality of recruit training for many years now in order to get more troops in.  And we're even failing at that.  Our problem isn't that we're becoming "americanized", it's that we're heading the opposite way.  Check out the thread about recruiting methods for one example of the problem.  The American military along with most other militaries that recruit, pushes the message that their training is difficult, macho, unique, challanging;  that only the exceptional need apply.  We push the message that we're more friendly to women and minorities, and try to hide our guns as much as possible.  There's a problem with the military mindset these days, sure, but it's nothing to do with the Americans.  Wether we like it or not, we're being turned into the peacekeeper brigades that everyone thinks we are.

 

[MdB]

Up or out works.   Soldiering is a young man's game, and applying civil service HR policies to the CF is destroying our Army.   Train them up, ship them out, get them shot at, bring'em back, select the ones you want to lead the next generation, release the rest into the ready reserve.   This gives you a young, experienced and energetic Army as well as a large pool of militarily experienced voters capable of influencing policy on a national scale.

I'm for that too. But, I wonder how good or bad our training system is designed. If the washout rate of Officer Training Phase IV (Infantry) is about 70%, I ask it very candidly, how could it not be up or out training at that point? Should it have done before phase 4 and have a much lower washout rate while Phase IV training? Is Phase 3-4 any good or rightly designed? What about US Officer training and how similar/different is it?

 

[TCBF]

Some of our wash-out rate is poor recruiting, but I believe a lot of the injuries could be prevented by lengthening the training and providing a more gradual slope of physical expectations.   Most of our losses in Cornwallis and St. Jean were due to injuries that could have been prevented had the courses been longer with increased opportunities to harden the recruits.

As well, more time would allow the instructors a chance to fairly assess the long term viability of our recruits, both Officer and Other Ranks.

But, that reform would be useless unless combined with an expedited release mechanism, rather than the present one which forces injured recruits to wait for two years to finalize their release.

We need a fast-in, fast-out system.   Flaws and all, or our mobilization theory goes right out the window.

Tom

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

Plattypuss,

Good post, although I think that we could adopt some US Army (and USMC) practices.  I did notice some differences between Canadian and US Army Indiv Trg while attending training at Ft Knox in 1998.  Your observations of the officer level training was certainly correct then (and could be now).  The Basic Course in 1998 (a rough equivalent of Ph III and IV) had a very high success rate compared to our Ph III and IV.  They had a success rate of 97%, while we had a rate that varied between 40% and 60%.  I was also struck by the lack of hard assessment in the field for command positions.  I explained to my Advanced Course classmates how ours worked and they were suitably impressed.  

A visit to a tank battalion a year later demonstrated to me that a newly graduated 2Lt in the US Army has very little credibility at his unit.  I'm not saying that a Canadian 2Lt gets a free ride up here but at least they shown their potential and ability in a rigorous setting at the school.  My impression was that many US 2Lts get "summed up" early on.  The end result is the same when you get to Capt, but the Canadian army does its major cull at the school.  One thing I really liked about their Captain's course was that what was taught was what the US Army would actually do (very low notionality factor).

I was impressed by the recruit training that the US Army gave its soldiers.  They take one long course instead of a bunch of shorter ones at different training centres.  I liked how their Armor Branch "owned" the recruits from when they start to where a uniform until they are sent to a battalion.  Their recruit training is very strict (to me as a somewhat distant observer).  I wouldn't say that it is better or worse than ours.  Both systems turn out good soldiers.

I had one briefing on NCO courses.  It struck me that our CLC (whatever it called each month) and 6A are somewhat more formalized and field oriented but I had no first hand experience.

Bearing in mind that I am often accused of being too "pro US", I do think, however, that we can learn some things from the US Army.  They do tend to break things down into details and assume nothing.  They have also been in and out of combat since the Korean War and their leaders have seen what happens when assumptions are made.  Again, I'm not saying that they are superior.  We shouldn't just copy them but I wouldn't be afraid of studying their methods and lessons and applying them up here after some analysis and comparison (along with other armies).

Cheers,

Iain

 

[aesop081]

I agree with alot of what TCBF had to say.  But based on my experiences as an instructor at the US army engineer school, i cannot help but say that the american system has not survived the test of war.  In the last 2 platoons that graduated in my time in Fort leonard wood, almost all the sudents were deployed to Iraq the following week.. In itself not an issue if it wasnt for the american training philosophy.  Soldiers are trained in the US with the premiss that their AIT ( same as our QL3) is only a rudimentary introduction to the skills they must have for their respective MOS ( i was teaching 12B Combat engineer and 12C bridge crewmember) and that they will receive the better part of their training once they have arrived at the unit.  The problem is that when the unit is deployed on a high-intesity operation such as OIF, there is little, if any, to train these soldiers to do what they are expected to as new privates. We had long discussions about this with the senior staff at USAES and they recognized that there was some serious deficiencies in the training pipeline when face with a high operational tempo that did not support the current training philosophy.

 

[Matt_Fisher]

I definitely don't want to start some pointless "We're better than you" flame war, however I do feel qualified to contribute since I've been through both the CF and USMC training systems.

In some ways that the US military's training system is akin to the 'fast food' approach to military training.

Unfortunately, this is true to a degree with the USMC.  Large class sizes and a check in the box mindset are present in certain areas of recruit and initial trades training, more so for combat arms than it is so for the aviation fields.  In the aviation and more technical, the $s at stake with the equipment that the Marines will be supporting/maintaining ensure a high level of proficiency.

There are areas that are definitely taught to a higher standard than anything I experienced in the CFs, such as rifle marksmanship, martial arts/unarmed combatives, physical fitness, etc. 
If the minimum standards are not met, the training for that individual is remediated until they attain the acceptable standard.

What is mostly lacking is individual instruction at the School of Infantry level, particularly within the Marine Combat Training Course.

Now with the deficiencies that are present, the US military is still capable of fielding a force that is capable of winning battles.

While individual instruction standards, method of instruction, etc. may be higher in the CFs, the system itself is broken, in that the recruiting system cannot process recruits in a timely manner, there aren't enough instructors/courses to get the untrained soldiers qualified, etc.

Perhaps rather than looking at how the system's standards have supposedly been "Americanified", attention should be given to creating a more streamlined recruiting and training system.

 

[aesop081]

Perhaps rather than looking at how the system's standards have supposedly been "Americanified", attention should be given to creating a more streamlined recruiting and training system.

I totaly agree with your statement there.  Since you have been a memeber of both armed forces, i bow to your experience.  I certainly did not mean to suggest the the US training sytem is not capable of producing a victorious fighting force.  I was simply commenting on my observations and the discussions that prevailed during my time teaching US soldiers.

 

[enfield]

Further, do not confuse TIME in education with QUALITY of education.   In many aspects, Grade 12 Ontario 2005 is the Academic equivalent of Grade 10 Ontario 1970.

Some schools are capable of warehousing our youth and little else.   Basically, day-care for young offenders.

I think this is overly pessimistic. With the increased demands of society and the work force, education has to have gotten better. Unless you can produce statistics, its heresay whether or not high schools are producing better or worse people. Now, how many of the smart high school graduates choose to join the army may have changed since 1970, but I'm not sure about that either.  
But I heartly agree with the rest of your points, especially regarding 'up or out' and the fact time in training does not equal quality, and is not necessarily comparable.

In defence of Canada...
Don't overestimate the quality of the material the US gets, and what it does with them. A large percentage join for the education and monetary benefits: very un-military, mercenary and self-interested motivations. The US also has a 'short-service' culture, which I think results in less return for training dollar over the long run, and a lower quality of soldier, at least initially.

In my view, a key part of the US indiv training system has been the move to push the better people up and out of the basic, general units and into 'elite' formations, right from the beginning. There is a huge hierarchy, from National Guard to Mech to Light Inf to Airborne to Ranger to SF to whatever to whatever, and this pushes quality soldiers up but retains the slower ones at the bottom, to the detriment of lower level - but just as essential - formations. I think one of the reasons the Cdn Army is so strong is because we do not have Direct-Entry specialist/elite units, and our quality soldiers have few other options beyond the battalions - there's no 'brain drain' to higher units. Now of course this has all sorts of other negative implications, but from a trg perspective, it gives us higher quality personnel at the basic level.

From our perspective up here we have 'grass is greener across the 49th' view. I've seen plenty of US recruiting ads that were just as bad as the Canadian ones, with the same obvious political agendas and that emphasize all the things we often critique the CF recruiting for. I think we should also be careful about using a few chosen units - Marines, Airborne, etc - as examples of the US military as a whole. We definitely need to strive for a USMC-like recruiting system, but while we look at that, don't forget the garbage material that the US Navy, Air Force, Army and National Guard is turning out.

We keep looking at the best of the US, and find ourselves wanting, but against the US military as a whole, and especially equivalent units, I think we hold our own very well in indiv training.

None of this was to bash the US. I fully agree that there is a huge amount we can and should be learning from them, and I certainly want the CF to use the USMC as a model for, well, just about everything.
I think an interesting point to look at would be how much money is invested in each recruit, or soldier over a set amount of time, in training by each country.

Cheers,
Enfield

 

[TCBF]

"they will receive the better part of their training once they have arrived at the unit.  The problem is that when the unit is deployed on a high-intesity operation such as OIF, there is little, if any, to train these soldiers to do what they are expected to as new privates."

You have raised a good point that I should have mentioned.  Whatever system you use must be capable of taking a graduate from "trades training"/TQ3/whatever, and inserting him as a replacement into a unit on operations.  He must be ready.  Given our history of providing our units in action with insufficient and poorly trained replacements, I would think that we should lengthen training in such a case, not shorten it.

I do recall details on the US Armoured Crewman course as it was explained to me ten or so years ago by an SFC from Ft Knox.  They trained their soldiers to function in any crew position other than TC.  They picked up the detail we include on our PCFs (or did) later.  Were their gunners, loaders, and drivers as good as ours?  Maybe not initially, but you never ran out of gunners or drivers.

Train to need is killing us.  We are cost accounting ourselves out of the Army business.  A unit should not pay for every tank and every person in that tank in the field.  It should pay for every day that tank is NOT in the field, and pay more for every EMPTY crew hole in that tank every day it is in the field, otherwise, you are just training air.

Tom

 

[Infanteer]

I generally disagree with the "Up-or-Out" system; most of what I've read seems to point out that it drives careerism and is a huge kicker on morale for Officers in the US Army.

As for:

Perhaps rather than looking at how the system's standards have supposedly been "Americanified", attention should be given to creating a more streamlined recruiting and training system.

Very good point Matt.  I recently read somewhere that, in light of recruiting problems following Vietnam, the Commandant of the USMC took recruiting and made it the responsibility of the Basic Training Depots.  The Commanders of Parris Island and San Diego were responsible for the entire transformation process, from interested civilian to hardened recruit to Marine.  I proposed this earlier for the CF as an idea to look at, but I was surprised to see that this was an approach that was actually adopted by the Marines.

Since our biggest asset is the quality of our soldiers, recruiting and basic indoctrination and training (this is the heart of the basic training process) should be a "main effort" of our military - an ERE for Officers and NCO's to a unified Recruiting and Basic Training Command should be reserved for the best leaders and they should (ideally) do a stint at both during their ERE to get the experience.

I dislike the "Lowest Common Denominator" approach to building a member of the CF that our military takes.  This is an unfortunate side affect of Unification that I think is unnecessary - the cultures and operational environments of the three Services are distinct and unique enough that separate basic training in warranted.  Currently, we lower training in phases; BMQ is lowered for all service members, SQ is lowered to be applicable for all members in the Land environment, while real combat training is reserved for the final tier when it is applicable to the trade.  As well,  Currently, we take Officer's at 3 periods a year, 1 for college students in the summer and 2 for DEO's in the fall and winter - this leaves big gaps with guys sitting around and waiting for the next course.  How come we can't just load them with recruits on BMQ courses in St Jean and just give them extra coursework.  They have real leadership challenges by leading the recruits.  The Royal Marines do this, and they seem to do alright (see below).

I still see the Royal Marines approach as ideal - perhaps not in depth, duration, and intensity as they are basically building a Tier III SOC unit (we wouldn't have an Army if we did it this way) - but still following the principle that the end product of a single course is a Marine who is prepared to fight as a rifleman.  As well, Officer candidates take the same course - they are expected to perform in leadership roles, do extra work required for the commission, and to generally meet higher standards then the recruits as they are Leaders and must lead by example.

In the CF context, the Recruit or the Officer Cadet is shipped to the Army Basic Course.  Instruction is broken into 4 phases:
1. Foundations (the basics of soldiering - Drill, Dress and Deportment)
2. Individual Skills (living in the field environment, weapons handling and marksmanship)
3. Unit Skills (Section and Platoon level skills - fire and movement, patrols, etc, etc)
4. Warfighting (Putting all the three modules together in tough training - livefire, urban environments, 3-Block War, etc, etc).

High standards of Drill, Dress and Deportment are maintained throughout, as is Physical Training.  When the recruit passes out of the Army Basic Course, he proceeds to either his Regimental School or (for the smaller and more specialized trades) a Joint, national School for trades training.  Infantry, being the "complex terrain" fighters, will do Basic Mountain Ops, rappelling, indepth MOUT training, (ideally, Air Assault and Basic Para), etc, etc.  Cavalry types get regimental indoc in both crewman and dismounted roles.  Officers go on to the advanced training in their specific branch at Gagetown, which only need to deliver the detailed stuff as the basics of combat leadership and leading by example have been covered.

Well, just a few thoughts on recruiting and training.  I really think it should be seamless and efficient.  As well, it is not necessary to send guys all over the place for different aspects of training.  Except for MOC specific stuff, most training can be taught at one depot that trains recruits with the mentality of "Soldier First".

Infanteer

 

[TCBF]

Infanteer, and others, good points.

  My "Up or Out" tag is probably an over-generalization.  What I should have said (but that would have slowed me down), was that if a person was not employable, then they have to be replaced by someone who was.  If an Acting Blank File Third Class cannot do the job in the field, and there is insufficient numbers of his rank/trade to put him in another job and give another ABF3 his field job, then the CF should say, "Sorry mate, exigencies of the service.." release him, and promote an ABF4 into his hole.

At some point, the taxpayers - meaning the Army - has to come first.

Tom

 

[ArmyRick]

I agree alot with Tom. I don't think our training approach is any kind of holy grail, rather I do not like it at all. I am a part of the training system (I  have been teaching Reg F SQs for eight months now).
I think we do not focus on the most important things such as marksmanship, fitness and individual aggression.
On the SQ we do one day on SATS and one day on the range. I would much rather give up a week in the field and spend that week on the range, really learning to shoot (like we did when I was on my QL3 Infantry in the PPCLI). That would get the basis of the marksmanship handled and it would be up to units to do a annual week-two week shooting refresher. Instead we are dollar driven and only worry if someone can pass the PWT3. 

Physical fitness and aggression can be done in creative ways. Rucksack marches (anything less than two hours is a waste IMO), 45 minute runs, short hard and mean 20 minute runs, circuit training, confidence courses done in combats only, log PT and much more unarmed combat (for all combat arms)..

The RSM here at M-ford, has been preaching the Canadian Army ethoes here alot (Duty, Honour, Integrity and Discipline) and I agree with those ethoes. We teach and preach them for a reason. However they should be emphasized much more on BMQ in St Jean or Esquimalt (thats another topic, they way Esquimalt handles recruit training  :rage:
Ironing your under wear into 6 x 6 squares is what training value ?

I think we lost some of the good when we got rid of the old army way of doing business. Whats wrong with extra PT here and there to instill a little motivation?

I think an up or out/sideways is a suitable idea for the Canadian army.

Have everyone and I mean everyone in the land forces join the combat arms (infantry, artillery, armour or sappers) and have them serve. After 3-6 years they either complete PLQ or remuster to another trade such as FCS Tech, MP, clerk, Veh tech, etc, etc.

Also I think the CF members (due to the nature of our service) should have a program that makes it easier or gives us an advatage to get other fed govt jobs (pending qualifications). Alot of people are in the CF strictly for the money to support their families and I beleive people like that would fit the bill perfectly.

If you release right now, there is limted options to help you out getting along on civie street (read we have deadweight because they have no place else to go).

 

[tomahawk6]

The US Army has to train 80,000 new recruits every year. We do this pretty much the same way that we did since WW2. Recruits are trained at Basic Combat Training Centers/AIT then sent to a unit as an individual replacement. This system has worked for us. Is it perfect ? No. Does it turn out MOS qualified soldiers ? Yes. It is up to the unit the new soldier joins to learn his role within the team. In time the soldier learn's more about his MOS. There is a written MOS test taken annually. Units are given annual readiness tests that evaluates each level - squad, platoon, company and battalion. This is make or break time for the unit leaders.

The Army periodically tries to tweak the system. In the 80's we tried COHORT where soldiers would train together from basic thru AIT and then the new company would join a battalion. The system was discontinued. Once again we are trying this with at the brigade level. Brigades will be in 3 year cycles. They will be built, trained and deploy- then broken up with soldiers moving on to new assignments or schools. Then the cycle begins again. I have my doubts but we shall see how it works.

The officer education system is also being tweaked. In the past maybe 50% of Major's got to attend the Command and General Staff College. Now starting this year 100% of Major's will attend. Previously attendance at C&GSC determined if a Major
got to be a LTC and no one got a battalion command without C&GSC. They still wont. We only select around 60% of Major's to LTC [this varies by year] so C&GSC was a good way to make the cut. Those that didnt make it were at the 11-12 year point in their career and could move into civilian life without too much difficulty. Now we are going to keep Major's on the hook until 15-17 year points and after they have been passed over 3 times they are out - without 20 years of service without a pension. I think this is unfair. But we shall see how it works in practice. The new LTC board that will convene will select Major's in the primary zone with dates of rank 1 july 99 - 1 june 00. The above the zone will be 1 july 99 and earlier. Below the zone will be
june 00 to june 01.

There has been some criticism of our NCO promotion system. Like your system it is based on vacancies we just have alot more NCO slots to fill. During wartime promotions always speed up. We are expanding the number of brigades from 33 to 43 this creates more openings. We are in the process of promoting 20,000 E-4's to SGT. For a career map for the Infantry for soldiers here is a link  https://www.hrc.army.mil/site/active/epinf/11b_team.htm. Scroll down.

Like it or not the combat experience that the US has obtained is being studied by other militaries. We learned alot from the Israelis in MOUT operations which was applied to Iraq. Modern combat is information intensive. The more real time information about the battlefield you obtain the more of an advantage you will have. This is seen from the UAV down to the platoon leaders PDA. We are driving this technology down to the company level. A US rifle company will be able to have a much clearer
view of the battlefield than an allied rifle company. In addition the US rifle company can share its information with other units that are tied into the brigade net. If other countries want to be able to operate with US forces they will need to spend money on this type of technology.

But back to training issues. The CF recruiting process is inefficient and costly. Because you actually have a smaller training base you cannot enjoy the economy of scale. US BCT includes both active and reserve/NG soldiers. Does the Land Forces train its regulars/reserve recruits at one center ? If they did so training might be more effective. How can the US give a medical/written test and give a job offer to an applicant in one day ? Why does it take the CF +6 months to do the same ? If CDS could improve this one aspect of the CF he could have a huge impact on both recruiting but recruit training as well. There is no doubt that Canadian soldiers are very well trained - in spite of the system. How much better could it be if the system was reformed ? Train regular/reserve recruits at the same time at one training center. US reservists do BCT one summer and the following summer they attend AIT. The CF could do the same. The key is to put more men into the training system which is efficient and less costly than the current system.

 

[plattypuss]

I've just now had the chance to review the various responses and am surprised at the excellent points brought up.

For 2B, I graduated with the ACCC 2004 class and from the sounds of it little has changed with respect to US Armour officer trg then and now.  Although I was impressed as they did have a Convoy Escort stand which incorporated irregulars and civilian negotiations techniques which we did not have at the Armour Sch at the time.  The only problem with this trg for the young Armour officers was that they received little if any formal trg on negotiation etc prior to the event. 
Today at the School we have started transitioning to placing more emphasis on the Contemporay Operating Environment, placing "influence" tasks within a trace which introduces things like civilian mobs, ambushes etc to better prepare a graduate for operations.  This trg should then be re-enforced during collective trg prior to a tour. These influence tasks are used for both NCO and Officer trg and I think produce a more capable and better prepared leader.
I was surprised with the US system for trg Armour officers that they do not actually have an officer assess them as a Troop leader but have a Snr NCO instructor monitor their performance.  The only officer mentorship that was provided was an ACCC student who was not evaluating him or their course officer who even in the final days of the course treated them like basic recruits.

My underlying premise for starting the thread was to point out that there are a numbers of countries who have contributed to Iraq but we seem to be getting information on US lessons learned.  Whether this is by design or not I am not sure and we should be thankful that the US has been very open to sharing these lessons learned.

I am still very confident that our trg system is very good despite recent changes to the BMQ and the possible dropping of the SQ.  With the dropping of SQ, more and more emphasis will have to be placed on DP1 trg at the various Corps schools. This may or may not be a good thing depending on whether they expand the amount of time allocated for DP 1 trg.  We are already expecting that the general fitness level and military competency will be a lot lower then what we are receiving now.

I agree with most peoples opinion that we need a pseudo-Marine corps philosophy to trg in that everyone learns to be a soldier first and from my experience with marine Corps officers on my course in Fort Knox, they tend to be on a different and higher level then the average US officer.  I don't know if we will see a change in the formative level of trg for US Armour officers where they will get culled at the early level of trg (I might add that the Brits also have an extremely high level of passing in their Officer corps) but the culling of the herd prior to deployment is not necessarily a good thing.  I think that this is becoming more and more recognized and how the US Army will adopt I am not sure but I think we have gone down the right path in our trg philosophy.

I am curious to see the trend towards civilianation of trg and know the US army uses it for some of the technical aspects of trg but I am not sure of its use or success in other armies.

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

Plattypus,

When I was there in 1998 the Basic Course was organized into Small Groups along the same lines as the Advanced Course.  Each Small Group had a Capt as its "DS."  The hands-on technical training (gunnery etc) was performed by NCOs as was the field portion.  I'm assuming that things have changed somewhat (due, perhaps, to a higher Op Tempo).

What struck me down south was that US Army training emphasized how to be an Officer, while our officer training emphasized the tactical aspects of field command part at the junior level.  The differences were subtle and perhaps were only my perception.  Both are important, and an optimum system would impart both on the new officer.

As for lessons learned, I think that we focus on the US Army (and USMC) for two main reasons.  The first is that they have been in action(not that others haven't) and the second is that they have an excellent "Lessons Learned" system process that collects, analyses and disseminates lessons from the field.  I read two excellent reports in May 03 and many more since then (including one UK report).

All,

I think that the key attribute of the Army's Indiv Training is our NCO instructors.  They are more important than course design, resource allocations and the details of PO/EOs.  One thing that struck me in Meaford when I was the Trg O was the amount of instructors we need to do our basic level training.  Things may have changed, but our instructor/student ratio was usually somewhere between 1:4 and 1:6 for Reg F courses and 1:6 for the Res courses.  This was before counting the Crse O, Crse WO and Swing NCO.  This gives an excellent level of instruction but it comes at a cost (less throughput, more tasks for units etc).  There are many things that are needed for a course but instructors are the vital ground.

While we never altered the ratio for Reg F QL3s, we did go "outside the lane" for ARC in at least one summer.  The benefit was that the reserves got more soldiers but the price was paid by the instructors (more students/work) and perhaps by the soldiers (less instructors to train them).  I'm not sure if getting the additional students at the price of a higher ratio was worth it, but perhaps it was our only way to meet the aim.

My question for all is whether or not we have the right ratio/balance.  Do we need Sect 2I/Cs or would one Swing NCO per Pl be sufficient?  As we try to train 5,000 new soldiers in addition to our normal throughput this basic question will probably be considered.  It having a huge PAT platoon or tasking most of the NCOs in the Bns/Regts an acceptable price if we do not alter the ratio? 

Cheers,

Iain

 

[aesop081]

It is my beleif that if we are to suceed in training 5000 new soldiers, we need to invest BIG in the training system.  We need to take the collective hit and send more NCO to  the training establishments.  I always felt that there needs to be more instrutors around new soldiers when on BMQ.  These instructors should also be from varried backgrounds.  New recruits need to be exposed to alot of the different perspectives and have staff available to mentor them and show them " the way" as it were.  If we are not willing to invest what it takes, we will crank out a substandard product ( as alot of people feel we already do) and solve absolutely nothing.

end rant