Since merging the two posts would do no good, as the 4GW items would end up at the beginning of the thread due to the date they were posted, I'll just attach my thoughts here to re-establish the 4GW trend.
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Lately, I've been going through a series of articles that come from a certain school of thought which, as opposed to technical-based RMA's, sees paradigmatic shifts in the way we fight as based on ideas. It is a way of thinking that has deeply interested me in the last few months and challenged preconceptions I have held on many different aspects of our Army. These thinkers see the current war on extremist terrorism as representative of a "Fourth Generation" (4GW) of warfighting paradigms. Here are some of the articles I've went through that I'd recommend you take a look at; what is significant is that many are from the Marine Corps Gazette, indicating a vibrant culture of looking and thinking forward exists within the Corps:
The first article is significant in the fact that many of the events we see now were understood by those who viewed the "Fourth generation" of warfare to leave both the bounds of the state as target and the military as the main actor. The authors, William S. Lind, Colonel Keith Nightengale (USA), Captain John F. Schmitt (USMC), Colonel Joseph W. Sutton (USA), and Lieutenant Colonel Gary I. Wilson (USMCR), put forth the notion that "4GW" signalled a reversion to the fighting prevalent before the state monopolized it in the 18th century, namely factionalized conflict between competing groups of sub-state actors.
http://d-n-i.net/fcs/4th_gen_war_gazette.htm
The second article, by Marine Col Thomas Hammes, answered the question posed by the previous article in that "4GW" has already been defined throughout the insurgency conflicts during the Cold War. He believes that "4GW" forces, such as religious terrorists or ideological fundamentalists, seek victory over state actors through asymmetrical attacks on the culture and society of their opponents. For these forces, the center of gravity has shifted from purely military objectives.
http://d-n-i.net/fcs/hammes.htm
A third article which is a little more current to today's events, looks at the fighting in Afghanistan from a "4GW" perspective. The fighting of irregular, "Fourth Generation" Al Qaeda forces with conventional military troops offers us a real case study on the methods required and potential pitfalls of approaching this conflict in the manner we are. I know some of you have been actively involved in operations in Afghanistan (including Anaconda), so your input would be interesting.
http://d-n-i.net/fcs/wilson_wilcox_military_responses.htm
These are but three of a fascinating series of articles on this subject that have been collected here:
http://d-n-i.net/second_level/fourth_generation_warfare.htm
http://d-n-i.net/second_level/4gw_continued.htm
This is a site set up by followers of the late Col. John Boyd, USAF, who's ideas on how human interaction is involved with how we fight are still affecting thinking and doctrine of military forces to this day.
Anyways, one question to launch this thread that came to my mind as I was going through these articles was that if terrorism is a form of ""4GW", meaning that it is a form of armed conflict between societies, then perhaps the conventional idea of looking at terrorist acts in a legal framework as criminal acts is innappropriate for approaching our execution of the war.
If one is to apply a "4GW" framework to the war, then Osama bin Ladin is an enemy General, our economic and social infrastructure is a legitimate "4GW" target as it is our social center of gravity (hence 9/11), and hijackings and suicide bombings and media are new assymetrical weapons for attacking our society from inside. Although this may not make sense in a traditional military pattern of thought, human conflict does not fit nicely into structured and distinct forms (much to the chagrin of the Geneva conventions).
Viewing this conflict as a new paradigm in warfighting demands we alter our military structures in order to meet the demands placed on us by the operations of the enemy (as my sig line says). Perhaps certain areas of our forces need to be moved into a direction of "4GW-fighters", utilizing vastly different methods of fighting due to the fact that the new enemy does not possess a center-of-gravity that fits traditional military definitions. The formation of a new "4GW" force would most likely involve the intergration of other aspects of our society in order to attack the support of terrorist forces which may lie out of the conventional spectrum of armed conflict (ie: news media, religious propaganda, citizens within our own country).
As well, Col John Boyd asserted that war was fought in three fields; tactical (winning battles), operational (winning campaigns), and strategic (winning wars). As well, these three areas of conflict were fought on three levels; the physical level, the mental level, and the moral level. The goal is to ensure unity of effort so that your forces fight the enemy on the requisite level.
1) Failure to do so can result in a strategic defeat. One of the articles brings up the Tet Offensive as a brilliant example. Although the Vietnamese did even worse then they thought they would on the tactical level (only Hue held out for any significant amount of time) and on the operational level (The Vietcong was destroyed as a fighting force and the NVA units involved were shattered) they one a clear victory on the strategic level in that support for the war plummeted and Walter Cronkite said that the war was unwinnable.
How did they do this? The North Vietnamese were very astute in the levels of war. They clearly saw that the US strategy was to win the war on the physical level, using masses of technologically superior forces to fight an attrition battle with the Vietnamese Communists. Ho Chi Minh used this to his advantage by using the Tet Offensive to attack on the moral level; the used the Western media against the US. Images of an enemy that American Generals claimed to have on the verge of defeat launching vigorous counteroffensives throughout South Vietnam only fuelled the anti-war effort and led to Johnson withdrawing from the Presidential race and Nixon getting elected on the platform of "peace with honour".
Clearly then, military thinkers must begin to contemplate the levels of war when planning operations. Military planners should, as my sigline states, follow Scharnhorst's dictum and "endeavor to regulate one's dispositions according to the enemy's methods."
Point in case with the recent US action in Najaf against Muqtada al-Sadr. The Americans could easily have stormed the Imam Ali Mosque and cordoned off and "purged" much of Najaf, destroying al-Sadr's army and possibly killing Moqtada himself, but would this have been a unified victory? Sure, they would have experienced tactical victory (eliminating resistance in Najaf) and operational success (eliminating the threat al-Sadr posed to the US-backed government in Iraq) but I believe (and obviously, so did US planners to some level) that this would have resulted in strategic setback in that it would give the forces opposed to the US a unifying cause and further increased resistance against the US. A physical level victory in Najaf would have clearly become a moral failure for the Americans.
This leads to the next logical question, do any of you see the possibility for an counter-attack on the moral level against the Americans in Iraq, something akin to Tet which manages to throw American support at home so behind the antiwar effort (and perhaps leading to the failure of Bush to get reelected?!?) and leads to withdrawl? I think that the chances of this happening are more remote as Iraq is not a unified effort as was Vietnam, but the potential for a contingency such as this is there.
2) Obviously, pulling out of Najaf also led to strategic setbacks as anti-American support was bolstered when Goliath backed down. This sheds light on the fact that a military response on the physical level is completely inappropriate in some instances of 4GW. In many cases, the open presence of armed military forces acts against the efforts of a state on the moral level.
This leads to the discussion of 4GW Forces and changes we must make to them to give them the ability to fight on the moral level. In areas where the open presence of a military force is detrimental to the moral level of conflict, we must deploy a 4GW force, which is based off of our current SOC units (the US Special Forces fit the bill) that will leave a small footprint for opponents to exploit through non traditional means such as global media, anti-war efforts, etc, etc. Since these forces will be fighting on the moral level, they will require members not only to be proficient in tactics to win military battles, but other areas such as civil development, cultural development, and outright political maneuvering in order to collapse support for 4GW forces in the area.
Once again, the US SF seems to be a step towards this direction but obviously, further evolution to force structure and doctrine such that areas outside of the traditional military realm are required in order to attack opponents on a level outside of the purely military spectrum of objectives.
Any thoughts?
Infanteer
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Maybe there will be some new interest in the idea and its relation to this thread.
Im not even going to get involved in an argument with somebody who heard some "shop talk" and decided to run with it. We all feel things could be doing better- or may even be moving in the wrong direction- but put up some facts. I wont even get started on you regarding the "young offenders act"- since its called the "Youth Criminal Justice Act" now. SInce you cant even keep your limited facts straight. I wont even bother.
