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SORD 05-06

devil39

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CFL said:
Oh and nobody has yet to explain to me why this new change in policy which does greatly to neuter the effectivness of the Infantry.

Read my earlier posts on PYs etc.   There are only so many people allowed in the CF.   As we create new organizations the people have to come from somewhere.   We can survive with Mortars manned by Gunners and Engineer sections attached to Rifle Coys vice Pioneers.

As far as being "neutered" or left without support, see the link below.   Chapter 4, Annex A, Table 4A.1 Command Relationships.    It comes down to assigning and tasking of elements and comd relationships.

http://www.army.forces.gc.ca/ael/pubs/300-003/B-GL-300-003/FP-000/B-GL-300-003-FP-000.pdf


The infantry is not going to be sent out on the battlefield without appropriate support.   Talk to some people who were on recent operations wrt to Mor and Pnr support.  

Again this is not the ideal solution from the infantry point of view, however it will work.  

We must be diligent at the higher levels in the development of orbats for operations.   We must be diligent in our marry up drills and get to know our supporting arms comds (Arty, Engr, Armd), advisors and soldiers.   These are extremely professional people who will invariably go the extra distance to ensure the infantry are not left in the lurch.   Read the Comd relationship matrix and note that when they are cut to us, they are our asset, to do with as we see fit dependent on the limitations of the comd relationship.





 

devil39

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CFL said:
and your link doesn't appear to be working.

Change is necessary because the structure of the battlefield, technology available, doctrine, tactics, etc change.

Someone has to fly UAVs, whose orbat do they come out of?  

Someone has to manage, link, coordinate, and make sense of new situational awareness technology and command and control equipment and technology.   Whose orbat do they come out of?

Someone has to man the new CMTC organization.   Someone has to man the Area Training Centres, including the det in Shilo, which will mean 2PPCLI guys will not have to deploy as instructors to Wainwright as often.   The list can go on.


The link works for me.   It is Adobe Acrobat and takes a little bit of time to open up.

 

Scoobie Newbie

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Nothing you provided tells me why a change is necessary as none of the people gained or lost fill any of those rolls.   I'll try that link again.   I'm sure the instructors will appreciate not having to go to Wainwright but how does that factor into anything you have said.   Not being a smart ass, just trying to grasp what your telling me here.   The guys they pull out of TOW, Mortars and Pioneers will be absorbed into the Infantry companies but it will not make a significant difference.   The guys filling the roles in the Artillery will be moving from long guns to 81's so they won't be flying UAV's or making sense of new information.   The Anti Armor role will still be filled by our 031 for the time being and by the sounds of it will have to support the whole Army proper as no other TOW coy's are being raised in the other area's.   As for where do these people come from to fill these new technological roles.   Your guess is as good as mine but I doubt it will be from the CMBT arms.   More people is the answer (as we all know) not throwing out the baby with the bath water.   Why did the Infantry have these support elements in the past?   I realize we have to evolve and grow but this new way of thinking is not the answer unless we are only going to do domestic defense force or Bosnia/Cypress type of missions.   You seem knowledgeable but I think you optimism is misplaced.   An example of why we have redundant capabilities is as follows.   During an ex in Edmonton where we did FIBUA training through the barracks that were about to be torn down (forget the name).   The Engineer section attached to us died before they even got into the building.   This didn't stop our advance mind you because the individuals within the pioneer section picked up were they left off and carried through with the clearing of the building.   All the intentions of what your saying are great in the perfect world but the world and battlefield are far from it.
 

devil39

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CFL said:
Nothing you provided tells me why a change is necessary as none of the people gained or lost fill any of those rolls.   I'll try that link again.   I'm sure the instructors will appreciate not having to go to Wainwright but how does that factor into anything you have said.   Not being a smart ***, just trying to grasp what your telling me here.   The guys they pull out of TOW, Mortars and Pioneers will be absorbed into the Infantry companies but it will not make a significant difference.   The guys filling the roles in the Artillery will be moving from long guns to 81's so they won't be flying UAV's or making sense of new information.   The Anti Armor role will still be filled by our 031 for the time being and by the sounds of it will have to support the whole Army proper as no other TOW coy's are being raised in the other area's.   As for where do these people come from to fill these new technological roles.   Your guess is as good as mine but I doubt it will be from the CMBT arms.   More people is the answer (as we all know) not throwing out the baby with the bath water.   Why did the Infantry have these support elements in the past?   I realize we have to evolve and grow but this new way of thinking is not the answer unless we are only going to do domestic defense force or Bosnia/Cypress type of missions.   You seem knowledgeable but I think you optimism is misplaced.   An example of why we have redundant capabilities is as follows.   During an ex in Edmonton where we did FIBUA training through the barracks that were about to be torn down (forget the name).   The Engineer section attached to us died before they even got into the building.   This didn't stop our advance mind you because the individuals within the pioneer section picked up were they left off and carried through with the clearing of the building.   All the intentions of what your saying are great in the perfect world but the world and battlefield are far from it.

It isn't the individual soldier who is moved to the new position, only his authorized position.  

As an example an infantry battalion loses a certain number of positions, ie the Mor Platoon.   Those soldiers stay in the infantry in the same battalion, and normal attrition will bring the Bn down to its new (and smaller) size.   The battalion that was authorized 600 pers are now authorized 560 pers.   Those 40 positions (PYs or Person Years), not the people, are given to another organization allowing them to expand their organization.   As an end result the infantry becomes smaller, other organizations become bigger, the overall size of the CF remains the same.   The infantrymen who were in Mor Pl are now in other platoons in the battalion.

Arty gets double hatted with mortars as a secondary task.

Engineers get double hatted with Pnr type tasks as a secondary task.   Any task that would have had 1 section of Engrs and 1 section of Pnrs should now receive 2 sections of Engrs if the tactical estimate supports it.   This will happen, I have seen it in practice.  

Infantry bns were downsized and lost capabilities (Mor, Pnr, and now TOW), and these authorized positions went to creating CMTC, expanding ATCs, etc.   These capabilities (Mor, Pnr, and TOW) are still required and will be performed, however not with infantry troops, but rather with double hatted Arty and Engr troops.   This isn't a problem unless we decide to deploy a Division which is not an expected task.   If that was the case we would have time to reconstitute these orgs.
 

Scoobie Newbie

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You may have the time to reconsititure these organizations but you don't have time to make up the shortfalls created by cancelling the courses such as mortars and pioneers for the individual 031.  Here is a novel idea.  Keep the troops where they are and increase the allotement of numbers to these new postions which will be filled by new incoming people.  I am aware that there are retention and recruitment problems but decrease the size of the military isn't the answer.  We need to up the numbers back to 70,000 or so.
 

devil39

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CFL said:
P.S.   that link stilll hasn't opened after 20 mins.

Try going to

http://armyapp.dnd.ca/ael/main-acceuil.asp

followed by Publications, Command 300-003.

 

Infanteer

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If there are no jobs for the artillery and armored (there by giving them infantry assets to prove their existence), then they might as well combine the 4 cmbt arms into one force that eat, sleep and work together at the same base in the same barracks etc.   Abolish the differences and have one fighting force.   We all go on ex together, share the same messes and begin a new history.   No more colours, no more battle honors etc.   Stripping the Inf Bn's of there close support is no answer.

I personally like this suggestion.   I, along with others here, constantly trumpet the mantra of "soldier first" and "every soldier is a rifleman".   I detest regimental parochialism and how it inhibits the efficiency of our combat power and organization.

We have a Light Infantry battalion.   It requires A in Grunts, B in Gunners on the tubes, C in Assault Pioneers from the Sappers, and D in Jimmies, Medics and other support types.   Make them all organic to the unit as it requires and give them the same cap badge and colours.   Hell, call them the PPCLI if they want to.   Do the same for a mech regiment.   A in dismounts, B in crewmen, C in gunners, D in assault pioneers and E in support types.   Call it the Lord Strathcona's Horse (Royal Canadians) and every soldier within it a Strat.

If we had a tougher basic course like the RM Commando Course it wouldn't matter where they came from, because a common SOLDIER training would lend to universal respect.   I always figured the "Well, they didn't do the 10 week BIQ so they are not as good as us" attitude was simple tunnel vision.
 

Scoobie Newbie

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I'm not familiar enough with it but is the U.S. Marines model feasible?  I think if we went to one common unit though, a new one should be made so as not to have resentment towards an existing unit.  Ie. if we all became Patricia's then the RCR, R22nd etc would reaise a stink.  By forming a new unit or stand up a former unit ie. Blackwatch would do well to avoid this hostility.
 

RCA

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1 RCHA supplied the mortar platoon in sp of 3 PPCLI on Op Apollo
 

Brad Sallows

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To reiterate what I have tried to stress before in this (ongoing) discussion: there are two situations which must be treated separately.

1) The Canadian Army deploying dribs and drabs of task-organized elements around the world today.

2) The Canadian Army mobilizing formations (say, a brigade or division or more) for a Really Big War tomorrow.

What follows is heavily condensed; misconceptions are my own.

When the idea was floated several years ago, it seemed clear that the movement of capabilities out of the infantry into other arms was a temporary measure that was dreamed up along with ATOF and other initiatives designed to maximize use of available resources.  (That idea may in some circles be evolving to more permanent status.  Change happens; machine gun platoons are no longer deemed necessary, for example.)  We didn't have enough line infantry and were not employing gunners and troopers as frequently as riflemen and sappers.  By calling on gunners and troopers to fill combat support roles we balance the personnel optempo load a little more evenly and by shuffling the former infantry combat support PYs we beef up the number of 031 positions which actually have a name beside the number on the printout.

The process for generating Roto 0 of OP SOMETHINGOROTHER is not simply to send an infantry battalion and see what happens.  An estimate is done which generates tasks.  Tasks suggest required forces, subject to restraints.  In situation (1) above, the only reason the CO will not have the assets is if the estimate determined they were unnecessary or could not be employed.  It will not matter if they were integral or had to be attached.  For example, if guidance for a UN operation states "no anti-armour, or you don't go", then it will not matter whether we have integral anti-armour or LdSH anti-armour.

But what happens in situation (2), you ask?  What happens when there is only a brigade anti-armour squadron and brigade close support regiment to be shared?  The short answer is: if we are going into a full-blown war and - my assumption - sparing almost no expense for manning and scales of issue, why would you assume we would not or could not revisit our doctrinal organization and re-introduce some of the things we took out?
 

Infanteer

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I'm seeing two different yet concurrent arguments in this discussion.

1)   Arguments surrounding the decision to remove the responsibility for mortars, pioneers, and anti-armour away from the Infantry and to the other combat arms.   This decision is related to operational tempo and manpower issues Mr Sallows and Devil seem to be focused on this.   I could care less who mans the systems, as long as they are competent.   Like I mentioned above, I think this is more important then guarding regimental or corps turf.

2)   An argument against removing organic support from the Infantry battalions up to the Brigade level.   This is CFL's concern and I am inclined to agree with him.   As much as all these neat ideas are formed around estimates, tasks, and forces, I would caution that our units must be in shape to deploy on combat operations.   With this in mind, I feel moving supporting elements up to Brigade is a step in the wrong direction as the last 200 years of warfare has shown that firpower has led to increased lethality and diffusion of modern units, requiring combined arms formations to be formed at the lowest level possible (I see the company/battalion as the ideal level today).   By basing our Infantry Battalions and Armoured Regiments strictly around their fighting sub-units (Rifle Company and Armoured Squadron) without their organic support, we seem to be moving to a more industrial form of organization that went the way of the dodo in WWII when unwieldly American Divisions with seperate arm sub-units had to be broken down into RCT's to match pace with the German Kampfgruppe.

Sorry if that seemed a bit academic, but I wanted to sift this thread into the two arguements I was reading into and give my take on both.
 

Scoobie Newbie

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The problem with reintroducing organizations that no longer exist IE Mortar pl is that it will take time to get new people up to speed with the equipment and the skills (time which we may not have) vs having an experienced platoon already established that can go at a moments notice and draw other qualified guys from the BN to make up any shortfalls.

By taking troops from cmbt support roles to shore up the rifle companies is a band aid solution at best (and the cheap band aids at that).  Pioneers had maybe 6 usable guys, TOW has maybe 12, same with Mortars.  (I speak for 2VP here).  However I went into cmbt support HQ as the OC's gunner and 2 guys from mortars came over to fill other roles in HQ.  Others went to sigs etc.  The rifle coy's got relatively few people.

As I've said (and we all know this) we need more guys of good caliber to do the job longer then what is averaged now.  The roles that have been lost are still required IMO unlike machine gun platoon (although there is talk of adding more C6's to the rifle companies, and having a direct fire support element within CMBT SP).

This article will go round and round and I hope the troops IE. me aren't neglected if we ever go into it again hardcore.
 

Infanteer

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I don't need to tell everyone here again of how I am a big fan of the Marines (both British and American) and their mentality on what it means to be a Marine first, tradesmen second.   Sure there is infighting and pride among branches in the USMC; I've seen some of it first hand on other boards.   However, they all look to the Eagle, Globe, and Anchor as their true calling, putting that over crossed rifles or anything else.   I think this is central to the ability of institutions like this to instill the "warrior mindset" within all of its soldiers.   I think it would do wonders if the CF adopted the principle of "Soldier First, Tradesmen Second".   Everyone comes out of a challenging and demanding basic training course, akin to the RM Commando Course at Lympstone, that works everyone up to platoon live fire and instills into everybody an excellence within the field, which should be required of every soldier.   From there, the graduate goes onto a short trades indoc into the trade that he wishes to pursue (General Rifleman, Mech Dismount, Crewman, Mortarman, Assault Pioneer, etc).   I would like to see all soldiers to do a Basic Engagement in the one of the combat arms before moving onto a trade role required by his or her regiment; this would further reduce the gulf in skills (and reduce animosity) between frontline grunts and support guys.

Rather than have all mortars go to the Artillery Regiments for the sake of regimental "turf", have the Artillery Corps be responsible for all indirect fire trades (Mortarman, Mud Gunner, Bird Gunner, Rocket Artillery, etc.) and post their fully trained soldiers to regimental duties to any regiment that has a sub-unit that requires them; to a Light Infantry outfit (Mortars), a Mech unit (109), or Brigade Artillery (MLRS?).   They would all belong to whatever regiment they were posted to, wearing the cap badge and slip on.   They are a soldier in a fighting unit first, an artilleryman with the Artillery Corps second.   Do this to all the Arms.  

Ideally, I'd like to see four Combat Arms, each with a variety of sub specializations for Ranks within the branch;

Infantry, which will cover dismounted lightfighters in the light/airmobile/para roles.   Many of the small unit and unconventional warfare will come under this branch.   It is generally recognized that Canada's Light Infantry are among the world's best foot soldiers; we may as well make it doctrine.

Cavalry, an amalgamation of the Mechanized Infantry, Armoured, and Armoured Recce.   I think the German's had it right when the put the Grenadiers and the Panzers under one arm, directed by the "Inspector der Panzertruppe" Heinz Guderien. this branch is responsible for the shock (or what we have left of it in our Army) forces.   All doctrine related to mounted fighting will be under this arm.   Possibility of separating "Crewman" MOC from "Cavalry Dismount".   I've seen a proposal for having Officers trained in both mounted and dismounted roles, interesting concept.

Artillery, the traditional branch of Indirect Fire Support.   It would handle Mortars, Rockets, Field Artillery, Anti-Aircraft, and the emerging NLOS tech (UAV, etc).

Engineers, the branch of mobility and counter mobility.   Handles assault pioneers, construction, bridging, explosives, NBCW and all that other cool jazz that makes the engineers so sexy.

The supporting Branches (Aviation, Administration, Catering, Signals, etc) would all be similar, with trained members of the respective Corps or Branches being sent to fighting Regiments as needed, becoming members of these regiments.   The big thing here is that we are removing the association of a trade from the regimental system.   As I proposed before, I think it would be advantageous to move the regimental affiliation up to the Brigade level, with all soldiers within the Brigade, regardless of trade, being "Fusiliers" (or whatever) and part of that regimental family.  

Anyways, this might be a bit disjointed and confusing, but it has been something I've been playing around with in my head recently.   Maybe I'll write a White Paper.
 
Y

Yard Ape

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CFL said:
just so I'm on the same page here, does what your saying mean that if the RCR or R22nd need TOW, they will be Patricia's coming out of the LFWA woth there TUA's?
That is correct.   Alll the "benifits" of the super-bases will be gone in one nice swoop, becuase brigades will not be able to form at train complete battle groups at home.   2 and 5 brigade will be dependant on 1 brigade troops and assets to form a battle group.   We may start to see future battle groups that do not train as a single unit until after they are in theater.   Right now JSR sends soldiers on every single operation, but I don't necisarily belive we should think that successe is transferable to the Army.

CFL said:
You may have the time to reconsititure these organizations but you don't have time to make up the shortfalls created by cancelling the courses such as mortars and pioneers for the individual 031.
You will not have to re-train the infantry in those skills.   When the time comes to reconstitute mortar or Pioneer platoons, these platoons will be manned by gunners & sappers (not infantry).

CFL said:
Nothing you provided tells me why a change is necessary as none of the people gained or lost fill any of those rolls.  
We have long accepted an Army that had great individual training but a shoddy collective training system.   The CMTC (Canadian Manouvre Training Centre) is supposed to fix that.   However, to make CMTC possible we have to do a lot of stupid things like reduce the saiz of our field force (PYs taken from the Infantry are not going to the Cbt Arms that take over lost rolls) and Whole Fleet Managment (a brigade will only have vehicles for one battle group to train at a time and CMTC will have vehciles for a brigade and an enmy force to take to the field).

Brad Sallows said:
Taking the resources out of the battalions is its own issue, but you're selling short the flexibility of artillery if you think all the guns in a brigade would be on the move at the same time, incapable of delivering timely fire, or incapable of reaching everywhere they need to in a brigade's AOR.
But I think it is fair to say that the guns will not be able to man all the howitzers and mortars at the same quantitiy as when the indirect roll was shared with infantry.   A single deployed battle group will probably never notice the effects.   This could be disasterous if we deploy larger than battle group level.

Brad Sallows said:
If we lose the "plug-n-play" concept, fail to conduct all-arms training events at least at the battle group level, or the capabilities quietly disappear after being shuffled to other arms due to parochialism or budget shaving, then it is indeed a poor shell game.  
Not having all the assets available to all brigades (LdSH Direct fire support Bn) will prohibit all-arms training more than once every 3 years (in WATC when ATOF says it is time).

Brad Sallows said:
There are two concerns to address:

1) We set out to deploy a brigade group.   (How likely is that?)We will no longer be able to deploy a brigade.   I think it is foolish to kill that ability.   I've never needed fire insurance and my house is not likely to burn, so should I do away with it?   How many people thought WW II was likely, or Korea, or the first Gulf War?

2) We set out to deploy a battle group.   Does it matter if the battle group has an integral mortar platoon, or a battery of mortars/guns courtesy of the artillery branch (or a field engineer troop vice pioneer platoon, etc)?This will become all we can do in the future.   Not only that, but we will not be able to sustain more than one battle group operation at a time.   That means one UNPROFOR BG, one PALLADIUM BG, one APOLLO BG, or one ATHENA BG.    . . . and you forgot:

3) We deploy brigade units, partial brigades, or multiple battle groups.   ATOF gives us a three yrea cycle with 12 battle groups in waiting.   However, with the exception of battalion/regimental HQs and rifle companies, we do not have enough of anything to beploy all 12 battle groups in a 3 year cycle (and if we want to send battle groups with a full compliment of rifle companies, we do not even have enough infantry.  

Our history should not allow us to come to the conclusion that this is okay.   As part of UNPROFOR the Canadian commitment was two battle groups and a combat engineer regiment.   The first two rotations of ATHENA called for a full up brigade headquarters and a battle group (during this time we also had the PALLADIUM batttle group in Bosnia, a rifle coy in the Persian gulf, and we deployed the NEO company).   During the life time of Bosnia, we have had other concurrent battle group deployments in Eritria, APOLLO, and (I tink it was BG) East Timor.  

Recent force restructureing and Whole fleet managment are essential for Canada to establish the collective training system it wants.   However, will reaching this goal forever leave our regular army impotent above the "one battle group at a time" level?   I think yes (if Whole Fleet Managment does not do worse).

The elimination of the assault troops in the three Regular Force armoured regiments.
Here is the same as Mortar, TOW, & Pioneer being stripped from the Infantry.   Like the other assets, this loss will not be replaced by an extra section in every Infantry battalion Recce Pl nor with an extra field troop in every CER.

 

Scoobie Newbie

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I think we as a fighting force or going to be going through some serious blood letting, good or bad.  All these jobs and idea's and no troopies to run them. 


Do you think there will be a permanent enemy force like in California?
 
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