Some questions on infantry tactics in Afghanistan

[HGCAP]

Hello Army.ca

This is my first time posting here.  I'm curious about a couple of minor things I've seen on video and thought this would be the right place to ask. 

First, how important is spacing between individuals within a squad on patrol when contact is expected?  I've heard 10m between men is a desirable distance to maintain but in most media I see squads significantly more bunched up than that.  20m for an entire squad seems to be more close to the norm.  Is this accurate or am I getting the wrong impression?  I guessed that maybe Taliban/AQ indirect support was virtually non-existent, perhaps, and that is why spacing hasn't been stressed as much.  Does spacing play a significant role versus small arms or mostly just indirect high explosives?

Secondly, it seems like engagements are taking place outside 200m most of the time.  Does the enemy in Afghanistan avoid closer range ambushes?  They don't seem to be very effective fighters because their chosen engagement ranges are outside the effective range of the AK47.  Is this for any specific reason I might be missing?

Thanks very much for any help.

 

[dangerboy]

Spacing is a very difficult thing to explain.  There is no "textbook" set distance for how far apart people have to be.  There are alot of different factors that come into play; the type of terrain is one, if you are in a bold open field then you would be more spread out than in you were in a thick wooden field. If it is day or night, during night people are closer you can see each other for command and control reasons.

For wither you space out for indirect or small arms you want to be spread out for both.  If you are bunched together a machine gun can hit multiple people with one burst of 20 rounds; and like you were thinking one mortar round can injure several people if they are close together.

I realize that this does not really answer your question, but hopefully it explains why it is hard to answer your question.

 

[Journeyman]

Just a couple of general comments:

Our platoons have sections, not squads.

Spacing is always important, since contact is always "expected" outside the wire.

It's human nature to bunch up more in complex terrain (eg - urban, orchards); it's discouraged, but often inevitable to some degree.

Engagement ranges very with terrain (and YouTube videos can be deceiving), but personally, I'd rather let our longer-range weapons sort out the TIC rather than be "sporting" and let the bad guys get within effective AK range.

Welcome to Army.ca;
enjoy the <search> function and feel free to add some detail to your profile.    :nod:

 

[HGCAP]

Wow, fast replies.  Thanks!

Another one on spacing - what would be considered the upper range of space between soldiers in a section?  (ty for that correction.)  Or to put it another way, what is the maximum desirable footprint for a section?

Engagement ranges very with terrain (and YouTube videos can be deceiving), but personally, I'd rather let our longer-range weapons sort out the TIC rather than be "sporting" and let the bad guys get within effective AK range.

Exactly   But since that is the case, why aren't the Taliban/AQ holding their fire until their enemy are closer? 

A new question:

What makes the enemy "come out to play"?  What stops them from just skulking in well hidden hole somewhere and letting the patrols go by, then coming out later?  Are they typically defending something they can't stand to lose when these firefights happen?  If so, what is it?

Thanks again.

 

[George Wallace]

Another one on spacing - what would be considered the upper range of space between soldiers in a section?  (ty for that correction.)  Or to put it another way, what is the maximum desirable footprint for a section?

This is determined by the type of patrol, the type and range of the weapons carried, visibility, etc.  There are guidelines for these, as has already been mentioned, which are also affected by factors like light and weather conditions, type of terrain, season, expected enemy contact, etc.

Exactly   But since that is the case, why aren't the Taliban/AQ holding their fire until their enemy are closer? 

A new question:

What makes the enemy "come out to play"?  What stops them from just skulking in well hidden hole somewhere and letting the patrols go by, then coming out later?  Are they typically defending something they can't stand to lose when these firefights happen?  If so, what is it?

If we knew this info the Taliban would all be dead or defeated and the war would be over.  What made the chicken cross the street?

 

[HGCAP]

Fair enough.  I've been reading through AAR's posted by boondocksaint back in 06.  He's describing Taliban opening up at 100-200m with RPK fire.  No casualties (reported anyhow) taken quite often, which amazes me.

I guess I'm mostly trying to figure out how it is that the Taliban seem to be losing firefights often even when they start with the initiative.  Also noticed a lot of semi fire rather than burst in the videos, that also surprised me.  I'm just an interested Canadian, I have no experience to lean on and have to get my impressions of what's happening from secondary sources.

 

[MikeL]

I guess I'm mostly trying to figure out how it is that the Taliban seem to be losing firefights often even when they start with the initiative.

We are better trained than Taliban.. theres more of us, and we have overwhelming firepower just to name a few.    Plus when a small group of Taliban open up with small arms and maybe an RPG against a column of LAVs yea.. the 25s will always win.  Or when Taliban try attacking a COP/Strong Point they can do some damage with RPGs but again we have overwhelming firepower.. an CAS usually shows up an takes them out. On my tour the US Army Kiowas really f*cked up the Taliban.

Also noticed a lot of semi fire rather than burst in the videos, that also surprised me. 

Again this goes to our training.. we take aimed shots  emptying a mag on auto won't do you any good.

 

[HGCAP]

Are the Taliban emptying mags on full auto?  I'm really curious about how they fight. 

Even with all the training and firepower, superior numbers etc... I'm not sure how our guys manage not to take a few casualties in the initial ambush.  Another question comes to mind - are the Taliban anywhere near running out of ammunition?  Are they being supplied?

 

[Franko]

My question for you, before there is anymore disclosure of information (me being a vet of that shyte hole and having buddies ont eh ground right now) is why do you want to know all this information?

The Army.ca Staff

 

[GAP]

You Know what....this is an open forum and most of these questions are strictly newby stuff that the person will have answers to in the first few minutes of a TIC...he can wait...

 

[HGCAP]

The short answer is that I feel a strong desire to understand and know what goes on in combat, particularly at the small unit level, but because of real life obligations (caring for a family member with a long-term illness) I'm not able to go and find out on the ground.  So I do a lot of research at the University of Toronto and on the web and try to keep up to speed on it all as much as I can from here. 

The longer answer delves into psychology, as in "Why do you have the desire to know?"... and I'm not sure you're asking for that.  Both my grandparents served in the British forces in WW2 and I got lots of stories from them as a child.  As I grew up I felt like it was important to know these things.  I feel like I'm irresponsible if I don't.  It's strange, and I know most people don't have that feeling and are happy to ignore what goes on.  It's almost like keeping fit.  Some people just have this desire to reach as far as they can in their circumstances. 

More specifically to my question, I read Infantry Attacks back many years ago when I first started university.  Rommel wrote (paraphrasing here) something like "Whoever fires first tends to win".  In Afghanistan that doesn't seem to be the case. 

Generally, I don't understand what's going on, so I thought the best people to ask about this stuff were the vets. 

I'm in the whitby area if any of you want to meet for a coffee at tim's or something and check me out

 

[Franko]

More specifically to my question, I read Infantry Attacks back many years ago when I first started university.  Rommel wrote (paraphrasing here) something like "Whoever fires first tends to win".  In Afghanistan that doesn't seem to be the case. 

It just lets us know EXACTLY where the bad guys are....so we can hammer them.


:tank2:

I'm in the whitby area if any of you want to meet for a coffee at tim's or something and check me out

Not necessary, but thanks for the invite.   

Regards

 

[HGCAP]

Any time  

 

[HGCAP]

How about this one... what size are Taliban patrols typically?  Do they operate in teams over mutually supporting distances or tend to travel all together in a single unit?  I realize there are no hard and fast answers, I'm looking for ballpark/rough info. 

 

[George Wallace]

How about this one... what size are Taliban patrols typically?  Do they operate in teams over mutually supporting distances or tend to travel all together in a single unit?  I realize there are no hard and fast answers, I'm looking for ballpark/rough info.

I know you are curious, but this is army.ca; perhaps you should try http://www.taliban.af/   

 

[HGCAP]

Sorry, I'll just go back to ignoring what's going on like everyone else.  Cheers.

 

[George Wallace]

You are looking for specific answers for which there are none.

 

[TCBF]

Sorry, I'll just go back to ignoring what's going on like everyone else.  Cheers.

- I understand your frustration, but any detailed information given here would be viewable by all, and people who know the details are generally cautious about giving out information which, when coupled with other open source information, could provide aid or comfort to the enemy.

- If you read "Koran, Kalashnikov and Laptop" by Antonio Giustozzi, you will find that there is a very wide range of motivation and training among the Taliban, partly because of who, where and why they join, and partly because of the harsh realities of life as an insurgent.

 

[40below]

Sorry, I'll just go back to ignoring what's going on like everyone else.  Cheers.

The Taliban are not commission-holding graduates of any accredited military college and they don't have a 'doctrine' the way you are phrasing your questions. You only have to look at how their tactics have changed in even the past year based on what the blue side is doing. Part of it is that insurgency tends to be fluid, particularly when one set of tactics is getting their a$$ kicked, part of it has to do with availability of different arms, number and experience of fighters, time of year, terrain – Afgh is not a uniform rock-strewn desert – and about 100 other factors, including the fact that without air or armour, they are always going to be opportunistic fighters.

There are several excellent treatises on the Taliban, including several that go into detail on how they have fought over the years going all the way back to the 1970s when today's Taliban leaders were the mujhadeen. You're be better off reading those books, or books on insurgency and COIN in general, and understanding the larger picture than demanding answers about a doctrine that does not exist.

Cheers.

 

[Old Sweat]

I have not been in theatre but I am a student of military history. One general account of fighting in what was the North-West Frontier of then British India in the period between the two world wars made the point that the tribesmen were adaptive and skillful. That is, they observed their opponents carefully and were quick to pick up patterns of behavior. They then would adapt their tactics to exploit their enemy's perceived soft spots. I have been told by some who have fought in Afghanistan that the Taliban do the same sort of thing today.