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signed-off MGS SOR v5 - UNCLASSIFIED

You had better watch it Majoor, ND HQ just might go for the idea. Call it a DSF and replace all our tanks with it.

You know. Going to my MP's office is not such a bad idea. She is after all the Deputy PM and head of our new security ministry (whatever that is.). Ya, ya, thats the ticket.

 
Gobsmacked said:
Project File No 300000731-300

'MGS SOR (Mobile Gun System - Statement of Operational Requirements)' Highliights
[One of the few SOR to be written to Exactly fit a piece of equipment - and if thats not enough, due to well known problems - such as Autoloader, well lets reassess so that it still fits.]


4.1.3 Essential Criteria Achievable:  The stipulation of an essential criterion presumes that it is achievable at reasonable cost.  However, should any essential criterion subsequently be determined to be impractical for technical or budgetary reasons, that criterion will be reassessed. [/i]
[WTF??  ??? - I've never heard of this type of wishy-washy criteria before, ie. if it still don't work thats OK - we'll make it 'Non-Essential'.  For most any other material acquisition program out there - if it does not meet Essential criteria it is Not acceptable - I guess this Basic Tennant just does not apply to the MGS.  Basically, meaning that the MGS SOR is essentially Worthless as any part of it can be ignored/rewritten to ensure the MGS is acceptable.
Not a very stong assertion for a piece of equipment that is supposed to be the cornerstone of the DFS 'system of systems'.  ]

Any Opinions

I'm quite surprised that Mathew seems to have been the only one with Specific Comments on the above:

"P.S.  The part about essential requirements being deemed unessential if the vehicle can't qualify is truly frightening.  I cannot believe the NDHQ would allow such a thing.  To me that reeks of economic interests outweighing the safety of our men in uniform and that is truly unforgiveable."

[Guantlets Down]

The WishyWashy "Essential Criteria Achievable" Should be setting off RED ALARM bells in serving personnel, especially officers (who are supposed to abide by a certain Above Board CODE OF CONDUCT) and armour personnel (both serving and retired).
I've looked at many other SORs through ATI requests, and Not One has ever been this Accommodating that would allow failure of All Essential requirements and still allow Acceptance of a piece of $@#%.  :eek:

The fact that a Seriously Flawed SOR has actually been "Approved:
on 19/Jan/04 by:
Project Manager - LCol P. Ohrt;  Project Director - Maj J.A. Atkins;
on 29/01/04 by:
Head of Sponsoring Group & Chair, Senior Review Board - MGen JHPM Caron (CFs next CLS) ;
on 2/Feb/04 by:
DGSP Force Development Review - MGen DL Dempster;
and on 16/Apr/04 by:
Chair, Joint Capability Review Board (endorsed by JCRB 19/Jan/04) - LGen GEC Macdonald"
,
seemingly indicates an Astounding Lack of Ethics in the Officer Corps.  :-[
Truly, Not Worthy!

As noted in the 60th anniversary of 'The Royal Canadian Armoured Corps - an illustrated history',
the following are a few of the Important Values as espoused by LCol Worthy himself while commander of the Armoured Fighting Vehicle School at Camp Borden:
4 - When you comment on anything "I want your honest opinion, and not what you think I (or other Senior Officers/Politicians) would like to hear.  In other words, do not become a 'yes man' with me.
6 - The following are my pet aversions, which annoy me greatly: c) Stupidity; d) Officers who fail to look after their men; f) Deception.
"

In Peacetime, as opposed to Wartime, Officers who believe in the preceeding Values have a Moral Compunction to speak up and express their objections - especially when the future welfare of their men is involved.  Or has 'Leading by Example' fallen into some twisted abberation?

Officers should have a Moral/Ehtical Dutyl to speak out against a Fundamentally Flawed piece of equipment, Silence is a major symptom of Point 6-d).
Meanwhile, those who argue in favour of the Flawed MGS are symptomatic of Points 6-c) & 6-f).
Or have all the officers out there decided to become yes-men and roll-over and play dead?  ^-^
Or possibly looking forward to positions with GDLS-C ??  :-\

[Guantlets Up]
 
Like most of the recent purchases of equipment with the LSVW as the best example. Its ND HQ Brass rolling over to keep their political and future jobs (after the military) alive. It has very little to do with what is best for the service or for the job, but how much money can be saved and how many jobs are kept (made) at the GM plant. The GM military division is one of the strongest lobby's in Ottawa. Can you imagine the wails of anger if GM didn't land the contract, and we instead went for something more suitable?

Why else was the LSVW contract made? Jobs in Canada.

The Iltis. We could have purchased then directly from Germany at a fraction of the cost that we paid per unit for having them built by Bombardier.

Politicians will always buy votes if they can.
 
Alarm bells?

:eek:

You have confirmed what we've been saying for the past 2 years.  ;)

Just good to see it in writing. As for the tank demise....

During a brief a few weeks ago a Marine from the States had come in to address a few points on the "3 block war" concept....

His final remarks were: "Do whatever you can to save the tanks.....in Iraq we couldn't have done the job without them"

We'll soon see...methinks it's a done deal and the politicians don't give a damn until the body bags come home.

Regards
 
He gave a presentation in Petawawa.  Try this link:

http://army.ca/forums/threads/25726.0.html

Gw
 
Franko said:
We'll soon see...methinks it's a done deal and the politicians don't give a darn until the body bags come home.
Regards

You know...    ...thats a good point.

I may need to start a separate thread for this, but it is perfect timing.

I find it alarming at just how little, either the news agencies get a hold of, or are told explicitly not to report on, news of Canadian wounded, deaths, and awards of bravery that happen. Its like everything that happens on a mission that is either good or bad never gets reported on unless some other country reports it. Its all classified as soon as it happens and not even those involved are allowed to speak of it for a certain number of years.

Its no wonder the Public is so ignorant of everything. We should let them know if someone is killed so that we can properly honour them (although not necessarily memorialize), and we should defiantly shout from the mountain tops when someone is awarded for bravery (or even mentioned in dispatches), as they have done an extraordinary thing that can only attract praise for the CAF.

I don't think I have ever heard of one person who has received an award of bravery within at least 5 years of them doing so.

Should I start a new thread on this rant?

Thanks
 
Medac was to much of what a military actually does, kill people.  Can't have that.
 
Franko said:
Alarm bells?
:eek:
You have confirmed what we've been saying for the past 2 years.  ;)
Just good to see it in writing.

We'll soon see...methinks it's a done deal and the politicians don't give a darn until the body bags come home.
Regards

Franko,

I think you have missed the point of my 'downing of the Guantlets' entirely.
I too agree, ever since the MGS idea for the CF idea was first broached in public, that the MGS is a BAD Idea for the CF.
While 'informed banter' is good, I would hope that the drivel that passes for a SOR for the MGS would generate more actual discussion about 'factual' requirements.
Especially the fact that section "4.1.3 Essential Criteria Achievable:"  means that the MGS SOR is essentially Worthless as any part of it can be ignored/rewritten.

As for the politicians, couldn't agree more - but see my revised comments regarding officers above.

CFL/Zipper,

I agree fully MGS = the 'New' LSVW.
As per SCIP - "Light Vehicle Wheeled project proposes to provide the Army with light, highly mobile vehicles to support field units" within 6-10 years, Cdn$150,000K within Subsequent years ("2008-2013").  A MERE 17 YEARS SERVICE.
The current Light Support Vehicle Wheeled (LSVW) fleet of 2,800 LSVW - procured from 1992-96 for Cdn$278M under politically driven circumstances, ignored DND safety concerns after failing acceptance trials with over 200 major deficiencies, with numerous examples permanently parked outside army bases due to inherant reliability problems (as confirmed by Edmonton Garrison & LFWA unnamed officer sources), and somewhat useless for overseas missions due to shortsighted fuel type requirements.
 
So then...      ...as per the reason you started this thread...


Should we then look at the possable reason why the government continues to make up these lengthy requirement sheets with alot of confusing language, and then either completely ignore the requirements? Or in this case, actually write in to them the fact that they would ignore them?

WHY!! Oh GOD! WHY!?

The frustration level is just off the charts.
 
I wonder why they listed "essential" criteria that is so clearly out of scope?  For example, the CC-130 criteria.  This sounds more like a criteria for the CC-130 than for the Stryker.

And the Armour stopped using indirect fire techniques years ago.  To save ammunition.  Who's going to teach it now, especially to hit itty-bitty vehicles at 8 KM?  Does anyone there have any clue just how hard it is to hit a four by two meter target at 8,000 Meters with CE ammunition? 

Also, the true definition of "Essential Criteria" is given by the PWGSC.  And there are no caveats to that definition.  To add caveats, obviously negates the "essential" part from the "criteria" part.

What a bunch of clueless, no-brained characters we have running around the hollowed halls of NDHQ, running projects...
 
Lance Wiebe said:
And the Armour stopped using indirect fire techniques years ago.  To save ammunition.  Who's going to teach it now, especially to hit itty-bitty vehicles at 8 KM?  Does anyone there have any clue just how hard it is to hit a four by two meter target at 8,000 Meters with CE ammunition? 

The only people left that really understand how hard it is to hit targets indirectly are the few remaining armoured gunners, and of course the artillery. Having fired the Cougar AVGP until it's retirement last year, I can tell you that even at 4km you're lucky if you're getting a round in the ballpark, let alone actually hitting anything. I do understand that with new advances in equipment, it does become easier. I've used the Leopard firing system and even with the upgraded sights and weaponry, the round to round variations on indirect ammunition just don't allow for hitting vehicles at 8km. If you're firing wire-guided or fire and forget weaponry, the accuracy is better, but it still comes down to a person's ability to actually see the target.
 
Maclimius

Just to clarify your last sentence:  It still comes down to a person's ability to actually see the target, but not necessarily the Gunner.  It could be someone in an OP with a Laser Designator who will have to "paint" the target.

GW
 
Very true, and much like artillery you would have someone calling in corrections. I had unintentionally implied that it was just the gunner that needed to see the target, but it is very true that most of the time, the gunner doesn't even need to see it at alll. Although, it does tend to help. Thank you for correcting me GW.
 
I find it a real mistake to be retiring the M 109s.  With the new munitions being produced for the 155s we could have troops out front with Laser Designators calling in FMs and achieving single round kills.  That would cut down on the number of FOOs required to support many missions.  Don't ever get the idea though that it would ever get rid of the FOO or FAC, as Laser Designators would involve a totally different implementation on the battlefield and totally different types of FM.

Something for the future.

GW
 
I was reading the canadian MGS website and it said this...

A Stryker MGS* for the CF
On 29 Oct. 2003, approval of â Å“the acquisition of a mobile gun systemâ ? for the CF was announced. John McCallum, Minister of National Defence had already alluded to MGS in a speech delivered late in Feb. 2003. The Stryker MGS has generated considerable debate and reaction. John McCallum referred to the MGS as a â Å“direct-fire supportâ ? vehicle ** (ie: 'big-gun' counterparts to the Coyote DFSV), while critics have derided these 8-wheeled LAV III-derivatives as inadequate replacements for CF Leopard C2 main battle tanks.


Big Shot MGS and the ERP, â Å“a mighty maze! But not without a plan.â ?
But, the MGS is not a tank â “ 'self-propelled gun' would better describe the vehicle. And, rather belatedly, DND refined its concept for direct fire support  â “  now saying that this role will require three separate LAV III- based vehicle types â “ MGS, wheeled TUA (TOW-Under-Armour â “ left),  and a future Multi-Mission Effects Vehicle (the MMEV is expected to enter CF service sometime around 2010). MGS reflects DND's current concept of an all-wheeled Medium Weight Force. The US Army's Stryker Brigade concept (which spawned MGS) is precisely the sort of communications-rich niche force that the CF's Army of Tomorrow and ISTAR project aimed for.
 
â Å“... The next,  like fire he meets the foe,  And strikes him dead for thine and thee ...â ?
DND will buy 66 MGS at just under $600M. So what exactly is the Mobile Gun System? The hull is that of the LAV III modified to mount a General Dynamics low-profile turret. The main armament is a stabilized 105mm cannon***  for use against opposing armour and other hard targets. Like most new systems, MGS has experienced teething troubles â “ mostly related to the recoil of its main gun and to excessive weight. Weight-gain is the problem of most interest to DND. The US Army insisted that the MGS be tailored to the Hercules tactical transport (a good thing since CF strategic airlifters are no longer in the cards).  With its top-heavy 105mm gun and light armour, MGS will continue to present both technical and tactical challenges.  The tankers will bemoan the loss of their mounts.  But, what is really being shed is a traditional, unilateral war-fighting capability. Army strategy assumes that future operations will be multilateral â “ coalitions made up of niche forces.

I found that most interesting. They are basically saying precisely what we have been arguing about here. We're a niche force and that is that...

Although I never knew that we ever had a unilateral war fighting capability? Even in WWII we did not...          ...interesting on the spin eh?


 
Hello again.

After reading the Armour Bulletin and the article updating the MGS...

http://www.army.forces.gc.ca/Armour_school/bulletin/index_e.asp

http://www.army.forces.gc.ca/Armour_school/Documents/Bulletin/sept_04/MGSUpd_e.doc

...I find it interesting that the MGS has not even passed US testing yet. In fact, it would be interesting to see if the US cancels its orders for reasons of non-capability, would Canada follow suit?

I also found it interesting that we are only buying 66, of which the initial 16 are simply US versions for us to test out our systems compatibility. What if our ammo doesn't work with it?

I think I am going to withhold any firm ideas on it, until it gets closer to even being accepted by the US.

 
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