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signed-off MGS SOR v5 - UNCLASSIFIED

Gobsmacked

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Project File No 300000731-300

'MGS SOR (Mobile Gun System - Statement of Operational Requirements)' Highliights
[One of the few SOR to be written to Exactly fit a piece of equipment - and if thats not enough, due to well known problems - such as Autoloader, well lets reassess so that it still fits.]

The retirement of the Leopard fleet and its associated mobility enabling system [mine ploughs/rollers, AEV, ALVB] will present the LAV based force, including the MGS, with a significant challenge in ensuring mobility in the battlespace.  :fifty:

4.1.2 Levels of Requirement:
Essential - An essential requirement is a criterion that must be met if a contender system is to be considered for selection.  Performance thus designated is deemed to be so important that even if a contender system meets all other essential criteria and all desirable criteria, the system will be rejected.
Desirable - Desirable criteria are used to promote more sensitive evaluations of contending items that meet all essential requirements.
4.1.3 Essential Criteria Achievable:  The stipulation of an essential criterion presumes that it is achievable at reasonable cost.  However, should any essential criterion subsequently be determined to be impractical for technical or budgetary reasons, that criterion will be reassessed.

[WTF??  ??? - I've never heard of this type of wishy-washy criteria before, ie. if it still don't work thats OK - we'll make it 'Non-Essential'.  For most any other material acquisition program out there - if it does not meet Essential criteria it is Not acceptable - I guess this Basic Tennant just does not apply to the MGS.
Not a very stong assertion for a piece of equipment that is supposed to be the cornerstone of the DFS 'system of systems'.  ]
These essential criteria will, however, remain as deficiencies and will be considered for vehicle improvements throughout the vehicle's life span.

Essential
Weapon system of the MGS: Be capable of perforating the frontal turret armour of a T-72M tank at 2000m.
Main armament operational ammunition:  AT - APFSDS-T M-428, DM63C and C76 rounds.
The autoloader must: Permit storage of - An APFSDS-T round.

[This seemingly directly contradicts an 8 May 2003 'BRIEFING NOTE FOR ADM(Mat) - MGS' stating "The main gun, a stabilized 105mm with autoloader, will defeat hardened bunkers and armoured vehicles up to T-62 Tank [level II armoured threat]".
In 2003, LCol Luc Petit A/DLR confirmed, that "Doctrine and tactics of the US Interim Force clearly specify that the MGS is not an anti-tank platform but rather an Infantry support vehicle [it will not carry APFSDS ammunition]."
Col Petit also received information in June 2003 that specifically noted that, as to the "MGS - this system is not designed as a medium tank or a tank replacement vehicle.  It will be unable to shoot from the move and it's primary role will be direct support of the Infantry [bunker busting, etc]."

As per Oct 2003 report 'Stryker Brigades Versus the Reality of War':
"Serious problems with the MGS Autoloader.  The sensors in the MGS autoloader may not be able to recognize certain types of ammunition with brass casings (such as existing CF warshot).  The MGS . . . autoloader cannot identify types with accuracy.  Brass cased rounds are just not detected.  No protective separation from ammunition storage.  This is a core survivability issue."
On 9 December 2004 the 'Army Times' admitted that "Stryker program officials are hoping that redesigning the sophisticated loader on the MGS will prevent the jamming problems that last year caused the vehicle to fail reliability tests".

Numerous serving/retired Canadian armour personnel note the Leopard I with its 105mm L7A1 could NOT defeat a T72M (~90cm RHA) frontally at 2,000m, unless, of course, "stockpiled M900 DU ammo" (per Oct 02 CLS 'Info Brief') is used.  "The DM63C (Canadian designation C127) APFSDS [47cm RHA penetration at 2km] is most likely the best non-DU standard 105mm NATO projectile available, and that is the round we bought [c2000], but, whether it is fired from the MGS or the Leo I, it will NOT penetrate the turret front of the T-72M at 2,000 meters."  Even the latest 105mm M1060A3 APFSDS-T round, using technology derived from the 120mm DM53 round only has a penetration path of 50cm RHA at 2,000m.  :fifty:
Meanwhile, CF policy (per CF Director Medical Policy) does not sanction retention of DU munitions in the CF inventory.
M-428 APFSDS round? What is that??]

Essential that the MGS at 38,000 lbs be capable of being transported by the CC-130 for a distance of 1,000 nautical miles [1,852km].
[Presentation to JCRB:
"It has been clear to all involved with the project, including the former Minister's staff, that movement by C-130 is not the normal mode of transport and would only be done in an emergency with limitations.
The vehicle can be prepared for a transport weight of 38,000 pounds.  The limitations will probably include a reduced ammo load and removal of the 14.5mm heavy machine gun armour."

Curious that this is an Essential requirement (although as per 4.1.3 that doesn't mean much) as its well known that the 1,000nm range via C-130 is unachievable.  :fifty:

Per GAO report 04-925:
"Weight Presents Significant Challenges for C-130 Transport of Stryker Vehicles, Making Requirements and Expectations Difficult to Meet
With most Stryker vehicles weighing close to 38,000 pounds on board, the distance - or range - that a C-130 aircraft could fly is significantly reduced when taking-off in high air temperatures or from airfields located in higher elevations.  In standard, or nearly ideal, flight conditions - such as day-time, low head-wind, moderate air temperature, and low elevation - an armoured C-130H with a cargo payload of 38,000 pounds can generally expect to fly 860 miles from takeoff to landing.  Furthermore, . . . a C-130's range is significantly reduced with only minimal additional weight, and ideal conditions rarely exist in combat scenarios.  The C-130 aircraft's range may be further reduced if operational conditions such as high-speed takeoffs and threat-based route deviations exist because more fuel would be consumed under these conditions.  The more than 41,000-pound weight of the MGS (41,300 lbs Combat Weight per GDLS-C - and thats before any add-on armour to defeat RPGs) would limit the C-130 aircraft's range to a maximum distance of less than 500 miles.  Furthermore, according to the Army Test and Evaluation Command's Stryker System Evaluation, in less than favourable flight conditions, the Air Force considers routine transport of the 38,000-pound cargo weight of a Styker vehicle on C-130 aircraft risky, and such flight may not be permitted under the Air Force's flight operations risk management requirements if other transport means are available.  In two theatres where U.S. forces are currently operating - the Middle East and Afghanistan, high temperatures and elevation can reduce C-130 aircraft range if carrying a 38,000-pound Stryker vehicle.  Furthermore, a C-130 with a 38,000-pound Stryker vehicle on board would not be able to take off at all from locations in higher elevations, such as Afghanistan, during daytime in the summer.

Based on Air Force restrictions "Three Hercules flights are required to transport two LAV-III vehicles", a minimum of 6x CC-130Hs (out of 11 total) would be required for basic intra-theatre movement of 4x  18,734kg (41,300 lbs) MGS, "the usual unit of employment is at least four, at the minimum three", less-than 250 mi - in nearly ideal flight conditions, based on GAO analysis.  Plus, at 48% availability - requiring two Hercs assigned to ensure completion of one mission, this doubles the requirement to 12x CC-130H to airlift 4x MGS.  (Not accounting for those in normal 3rd line maintenance/upgrades - ie. likely maximum 9 of 11 CC-130Hs available at any given moment.)  Keep in mind CC-130s are further restricted as prior DAR 2  had noted: "Typical Maximum Payloads [MPL] for an eastern crossing to Europe are 28,000 lbs for an E-model and H30, and 30,000 lbs MPL for a regular H.  Western crossing are limited to 25,000 lbs MPL for an E or H30 and 27,000 lbs MPL for a regular H."
This compares very unfavourably with just 2x BC-17Xs needed to move 6x LAV-III-type vehicles over 3,000 nm.  You can't count the 2x CC-130H-30s - weight reduced by some 5,000 lbs - the approx added weight of the 15' stretch mods w\o any additional fuel capacity, therefore not capable of LAV-III transport, but possibly older LAVs.]

Essential that the MGS have a wall-to-wall turning circle no greater than 16 meters in diameter.
[Not very practical for Urban/City ops, unless there is a convenient park or sports field nearby for turnaround.]

Run Flat - It is essential that the MGS be capable of running flat for 40km at 50 km/h [convoy speed] on a hard surface with all the tires on one side of the vehicle deflated for any reason . . . and at a speed of 10 km/h with all tires deflated.
[SBVRW - "Wheel design grossly inadequate for 2 axle operation considering only 2 axles equipped with run-flat inner cores.  The reality is that the weight on 4 axles then gets transferred to only 2 - and neither the wheel design nor the axle is up to it because the MGS is grossly overweight.
Note: To save weight, the Army reduced the number of heavy run-flat wheels by half - and deleted the winch on the MGS."
  MGS overweight also pertains to the following.]
It is essential that the MGS:  Be capable of towing a combat-loaded MGS . . . for 5km cross-country, and for 25kms at 30 km/h on a dirt road;

Working Area/Seating - Essential that the MGS incorporate the following:
Individual Space - The MGS must provide for effective operation by at least 95% of the environmentally clothed Canadian military population;
Operational Effectiveness of Crew - The MGS must permit operational effectiveness while moving at 50 km/h . . . by at least 95% . . . military population;

[SBVRW - "Multiple space problems - too many ergonomic issues to list.  The ergonomics - human factors - in the Stryker MGS have proved to be appalling.  You cannot see what you need to see - and there is no space for 95% of the population;"
Matt noted they have supposedly addressed some of these problems - but for a cramped vehicle, with back cut-down from LAV-III, can now fit what 25% of armour crews?  ::)]

Desirable
The weapon system should be capable of:  Perforating the frontal turret armour of the T-80U tank at 2000m;
 
[See above re: T-72M - Just not gonna happen.]  ::)
Destroying or neutralizing the following targets up to 8000m using CE rounds employing semi-indirect fire techniques - APCs including the BMP-3 and BTR-80.
The maximum ranges for the in service Canadian APFSDS [C76] and HESH ammunitions are 6000m and 8000m respectively.

[MGS capable of IF - I thought only Leo IC2 had this capability?]
It is desirable that the MGS be fitted with a self-recovery winch.  [See Note: above]

The MGS should have: An onboard, near silent auxiliary power unit, using the same fuel as the vehicle engine . . . to run essential silent watch systems.
[Per January 2004 'MGS Statement of Operational Requirement Presentation to JCRB' by Maj JA Atkins MGS Project Director, and former M-113LE PD.
"Silent Watch [without the engine on] - 4 hrs [not part of current MGS capability];"]
:salute:

:cdn:
Any Opinions
 
Opinions?

Thats easy.

As a famous Scotsman once said...            ..."Its a piece of crap".

At least for what they are wanting it to do.

Infantry support against bunkers and other positions, great. But losing our mobile anti-tank and shock ability. No.

Thanks
 
CFL said:
Where did yo get this info from?

Ummmm...mmmm - let me think real hard???  ???
Could it possibly be the recently UNCLASSIFIED  MGS SOR?  Yup, thats it. ;D
As I always say, you'd be amazed at what is available via the ATI request route.  :salute:

(CFL, one of those brainfart days eh?  :D    Seems we all get those sooner or later.)

:cdn:
 
I do....

1)   Instead of buying MGS, buy more LAV-III's with the 25mm cannon and TOW ensuring maintenance, support and parts commonality.   (I'd also like a real tank, but I think that's likely beating a dead horse)
2)   Then as a soft-skinned vehicle, stop pretending it's a tank and from a doctrine standpoint design tactics around the fact it's a well-armed battle taxi.
3)   Eliminate the C-130 as a benchmark as they've outlived their ability to transport relevant vehicles and commit to the C-17/IL-76 (Canadianized) now.



Matthew.    :salute:

P.S.   The part about essential requirements being deemed unessential if the vehicle can't qualify is truly frightening.  I cannot believe the NDHQ would allow such a thing.  To me that reeks of economic interests outweighing the safety of our men in uniform and that is truly unforgiveable.
 
Yet another related interesting tidbit.
(Its from the InsideDefense website - pay per article - so only excerpt attached.)

January 24, 2005

'DOT&E REPORTS SAFETY, RELIABILITY CONCERNS WITH TWO (should be Four) STRYKER VARIANTS'
[DOT&E annual report released to Congress just after Jan 12 Army celebration of receipt of 1,000th Stryker]

"Variants of the Army's Stryker family of vehicles were 'not operationally suitable' in tests conducted during fiscal year 2004 (Oct 03 thru Sept 04), according to the Pentagon's testing director (Thomas P. Christie).

The annual DOT&E [director of operational test and evaluation] report says testers found safety and reliability issues with two Stryker variants, which will require additional work and monitoring during 2005.
The Engineering Squad Vehicle
(#1 - ESV) and the Mortar Carrier-B (#2 - MC-B w\ turntable-mounted 120mm) are chief examples, according to the report.

The ESV could not keep pace with other Strykers when equipped with its mine plow or mine roller, the report states.  In addition, both the mine plow and mine roller performed poorly, and the ESV system is 'prone to failures', according to the report.  DOT&E will assess follow-on testing for the ESV.

In September 2004, DOT&E published a classified report on the MC-B variant, the annual report said.  Although the vehicle was considered to be effective and survivable enough for use in small-scale contingencies, it was Not 'operationally suitable' because of safety and reliability issues.  The Army has proposed fixes to the vehicle and is expected to demonstrate the improvements during this fiscal year, the report said.

The remaining two variants -- the Mobile Gun System
(#3 - MGS) and the Nuclear Biological Chemical Reconnaissance Vehicle (#4 - NBCRV) -- were approved for Limited low-rate initial production (late last year).
In an October 2004 acquisition decision memorandum, Michael Wynne, the DoD acting acquisition chief, approved the initial production of Only 14  MGS vehicles, citing dissatisfaction with the ammunition handling system's 'reliability'.  He also expressed concern about a chemical agent detector aboard the NBCRV.

The DOT&E report elaborates on the problems with the MGS.  The system demonstrated 'excessive weapon system dead-space and other issues associated with gun sights, main gun fire control and soldier-machine interface', Christie's report says.  DOT&E has identified survivability concerns, including ballistic protection and the system's mission equipment package, that must be addressed, according to the annual report.  :fifty:
The NBCRV did not escape criticism either.

Both of the two variants that remain in development
(MGS & NBCRV, are in developmental programs that) are 'extremely aggressive', because the Army's plans call for component-level and system-level tests to run concurrently (instead of sequentially), the report states.  The program took on additional risk because it lacked a detailed system design, schedule and resource information, the report adds.

As of early January, nine Strykers were either destroyed or rendered 'non-missiion capable' after hits from rocket-propelled grenades, bombs and small-arms fire.  Two were incapable of executing missions after rolling into a canal, and five were damaged in enemy attacks, according to a former service official."

:salute:

Meanwhile, the Pentagon has eliminated the C-130 as a MGS/Stryker/FCS benchmark as their 23 Dec 2004 PBD No 753 (prebudget decision) cancelled further USAF acquisition of the CC-130J (other than those 'traditionally' added in by a 'pork-barreling' Congressional Defence Committee).
 
Links to your "Annual Technical Inspection" info would better qualify your statements. 

GW
 
George Wallace said:
Links to your "Annual Technical Inspection" info would better qualify your statements. 
GW

My apologies, sure wouldn't want to 'pull this outta my thumb'.  ::)

http://defense.iwpnewsstand.com/cs_newsletters.asp?NLN=ARMY&ACTION=RECENT

Headlines from Inside the Army
January 24, 2005 - Vol. 17, No. 3

DOT&E REPORTS SAFETY, RELIABILITY CONCERNS WITH TWO STRYKER VARIANTS
Variants of the Army's Stryker family of vehicles were â Å“not operationally suitableâ ? in tests conducted during fiscal year 2004, according to the Pentagon's testing director.
Story length: 1,131 words.
 
The basic problems can only be solved by creating a vehicle "from the ground up", rather than stick a turret on an existing platform and calingl it "MGS."

Some very heavy duty cutting and welding of the existing LAV chassis above the chines would be needed if the project was absoulutly driven by logistics considerations. By the time you created a new upper hull, moved the engine and transmission, relocated the turret, added a new ammo stowage system and autoloader....I suppose you could do it, but would it be worthwhile?

CASR had posted a vision of an alternative MGS idea based on cast off 155 cannon barrels and a totally new hull design (it is wheeled, but differentially steered like a tracked vehicle, see picture), which represents one extreme, but I'm sure we could come up with any number of off the shelf designs and various mods.

My big concern is why this process is still going on? MGS is a non contender on the battlefield, and I suspect it will be the mother of all hanger queens in garrison as well. If they want, I will build a prototype in my garage, if that is what it takes, but we need to raise this issue and push it as hard as we can through the chain of command.

 
Ok perhaps a more articulate question is where can I find a source for the info you provide so I can send it to a key Senator with some further discussion of my own.  Also this info should be sent out to guys like Peter Worthington so he can get it into the public forum.
 
Gobsmacked

Thanks for the link.  Looks like an informative site worth bookmarking.

GW
 
I completely agree with CFL. You have to get this kind of info off to the right places. Although if they don't already have it, they're not doing their jobs. Is Canadian Military Magazine still around? Esprit de Corp?

It seems to me that most of our equipment purchases are for financial reasons. Hell look at the LLVW, the iltis, the entire AVGP fleet, and the returreted C2 (hell, the latest combats). If they were actually thinking about the troops, do you think they would make these decisions. All these things were doomed even further after they shut down our testing branch.
 
There are a lot of links right here in Army.ca under Armour, Combat Arms, Equipment, The Canadian Army...just give your contacts the http://army.ca address, and they will discover all kinds of things.....
 
I find that a more direct approach best.  By that I mean giving them all the hard work done here by other members into 1 instructional essay.  I think that if we save them the work they may be more partial to reading it.
 
Sounds like someone just volunteered?

Heh

And to think the promo to Cpl hasn't taught you not to do that!. Ha!
 
I've emailed the MOD so I've go no problem with the task.  The biggest job will be compling the information to send.
 
Perhaps a tad mean spirited, but here is an idea for a quick and easy MGS, which will have all the virtues(?) of the version we are slated to get, yet is far less expensive, and may even be more effective: (substitute a Bison for the illustrated vehicle and you have the idea)

http://janes.mil.ca/data/yb/jaa/jaa2003/images/p0103425.jpg

Al-Faris AF-40-8-2 armoured car and AF-40-8-1 armoured personnel carrier

 
Where would you suggest we dig up all the 106 RR?  Or....would you up-gun to 120 mm?

GW
 
We still keep the 106 RR in war stocks (some were pulled out to trial the CLASS computerised sight unit a few years ago), and there are stocks all over the world we could buy and send to Demico for refurbishing. The British might have 120mm MOBATs still in war stores if we want to go for a bigger bang...

This would be airportable in a Herc, maybe the Americans will go for it as well!  ;)
 
Best of luck to you CFL.  I've also thought about discussing this issue with my local MP (Winnipeg Center) as well, though as a concerned civilian.
 
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