Saving Money in the PRes (From: The Defence Budget)

[George Wallace]

No, because here's the thing:  you are a moderator. Regardless of whatever your signature says, as a moderator you should be fostering forums that encourage people to debate. You are doing the opposite, you are seemingly on a mission to chase away anyone new.

Ah!  I see.  As a moderator, I am not entitled to an opinion, especially if I think I am commenting on less than knowledgeable musings of a poster.  OK. 

Think maybe for a second that someone else might have a different experience that you never did, and then listen to what they say. In my trade we call that turning on your squelch. Otherwise you're just making white noise.

I might retort with a "Carrier.  No Modulation" to your bizarre concepts of what you conceive to be problems covering all of the Reserves.  Perhaps your experience has been of a minute part of the Reserves in a poorly administered and lead unit.  Whatever your experience, it still seems to be lacking in knowledge of the much larger picture. 

And this is not from a moderator, but from a site member who has as much right to comment as you do.

 

[PuckChaser]

Would love to see much more grander explanations and specifics on organizations, training (individual and collective) and career prgression for your future concepts of the P Res. Not just abstract ideas. Please, please, do list your mil experience so we know if we should take you seriously or not.

I seem to remember their being a completed profile before, but it was completely wiped immediately prior to these shenanigans....

 

[RADOPSIGOPACCISOP]

Ah!  I see.  As a moderator, I am not entitled to an opinion, especially if I think I am commenting on less than knowledgeable musings of a poster.  OK. 

I might retort with a "Carrier.  No Modulation" to your bizarre concepts of what you conceive to be problems covering all of the Reserves.  Perhaps your experience has been of a minute part of the Reserves in a poorly administered and lead unit.  Whatever your experience, it still seems to be lacking in knowledge of the much larger picture. 

And this is not from a moderator, but from a site member who has as much right to comment as you do.

My perspective comes from many years working with the reserves. I know some people take personal offence with my critique of the reserves, however it's not so much a critique of the rank and file soldier there (who do the best with the system the sign up into) it's more to argue that the reserve is not the same as the regular force, and we should not pretend it is by organizing it the same way. Reserve regts are never full regt size, most I've seen barely parade a full coy. The Sqns I seen parades a Tp at best, a oversized Sect at worst. However the HQ structure for a higher level formation was there. I've been on exercises where there were nearly equal numbers of SNCOs and officers as there were JNMs.

My arguments above I stand by. It needs to be determined what the purpose of the reserve truly is, and reorganize against that goal. If it is to provide for against domestic ops then maybe revisiting the DRC model, or DART model would be more appropriate. If the goal is to augment the Reg Force then I would argue that we need to make both the reserve and reg force work closer together. Right now they seem to be in parallel but seperate organizations. When I was in the reserves the opportunity to work alongside regular force counterparts were limited. if you want someone to augment then they need greater exposure to how the regular force operates. Maybe reorganize for instance, reserve sqns as a troop within a reg force Sqn. Have them work side by side.

 

[PuckChaser]

Maybe reorganize for instance, reserve sqns as a troop within a reg force Sqn. Have them work side by side.

There is one unit in the CF doing that, and its an absolute failure IMO.

 

[Fishbone Jones]

There is one unit in the CF doing that, and its an absolute failure IMO.

The opposite was also tried with the 10\90's.

Another dismal failure.

 

[kratz]

Again,
Your posts are referring to the PRes in it's entirety (all elements, broad brush)
through your narrow personal experience.

ARAF Sqns work closely with current and retired RegF members.
NR formation/divisions have key positions held by RegF positions.

You are arguing the RegF is better, yet the above PRes elements already
have a working model that meets the CAF's mission and goals.

If you are unsatisfied with Comms Sqns, or milita units,
please state as much when making your points.

As I've mentioned above, some PRes elements are already working well
alongside the RegF on a regular basis.
No pun intended.

 

[MilEME09]

it was a lot of bumps and a pissing contest at first but my unit and the former ASU have merged together well, to the point we are working on the floor along side them. To add to the earlier comments from my previous post on the dom ops focus. Wpns tech and Vehicle tech trades for the reserves are focused on that task now. Vtechs train on generators and heaters on DP1, wpns techs deal with the kitchen trailer, stove, lantern etc.. after the first mod of DP2 (recovery, and small ares for vtech and wpns tech respectively) the tech is considered dom ops qualified, can take PLQ for career advancement, and be a MCpl. Taking mods 2 and 3 are needed to go over seas and to get on a 6A's course.


On cost saving maybe we need to make infrastructure investments in the short term for long term savings. Take a driver wheeled for example, you need to do off road and black out drive, do we really need to travel to wainwright from calgary to do that? perhaps use another departments land closer to home? or invest and fence off some land closer to home to limit fuel costs.

 

[RADOPSIGOPACCISOP]

Again,
Your posts are referring to the PRes in it's entirety (all elements, broad brush)
through your narrow personal experience.

ARAF Sqns work closely with current and retired RegF members.
NR formation/divisions have key positions held by RegF positions.

You are arguing the RegF is better, yet the above PRes elements already
have a working model that meets the CAF's mission and goals.

If you are unsatisfied with Comms Sqns, or milita units,
please state as much when making your points.

As I've mentioned above, some PRes elements are already working well
alongside the RegF on a regular basis.
No pun intended.

Point taken, Reserve RCAF do work much more closely with their counterparts and I'd argue they are more interchangeable because of that. On the flip side the AF Reserve personnel I knew normally worked much more, often it was 6 month contracts followed by 6 months of working 10 - 14 days a month. Some a little more or less.

It would be difficult to replicate this in an army reserve unit as the army normally relies more on collective training (levels 2-5 IBTS) than the air force. Not to mention the cost of reserve pay would have to increase, or the numbers of reservists would have to come down drastically.

 

[pbi]

This argument never ends.

I had it with my buddies in the Mess as a young Sgt in the Militia in the late 1970's, and since then I've heard it in every imaginable version, in every imaginable place, almost always based on a narrow-minded focus that would saddle us with an Army Reserve that was pleasing itself (maybe...) but really nobody else. We are too small an Army to afford the luxury of specialization.

The Army Reserve has a purpose, and a very important and useful one, which has been clearly stated and put into effect for decades: act as reserve for the Regular Army, either individually or in whatever size elements we can manage.

Domestic operations are an occasional task, not a purpose for a military unit's existence. If you want to train for disasters, join the Red Cross or your local fire service. What makes the military useful in DomOps is exactly what makes the USARNG useful for DomOps, or any military force for that matter: the residual effects of training for war.

 

[RADOPSIGOPACCISOP]

This argument never ends.

I had it with my buddies in the Mess as a young Sgt in the Militia in the late 1970's, and since then I've heard it in every imaginable version, in every imaginable place, almost always based on a narrow-minded focus that would saddle us with an Army Reserve that was pleasing itself (maybe...) but really nobody else. We are too small an Army to afford the luxury of specialization.

The Army Reserve has a purpose, and a very important and useful one, which has been clearly stated and put into effect for decades: act as reserve for the Regular Army, either individually or in whatever size elements we can manage.

Domestic operations are an occasional task, not a purpose for a military unit's existence. If you want to train for disasters, join the Red Cross or your local fire service. What makes the military useful in DomOps is exactly what makes the USARNG useful for DomOps, or any military force for that matter: the residual effects of training for war.

Is that to say there is no better way to organize, train or employ the reserve? "Worked in the past" only makes sense if the organization's environment never changes, which the military's does constantly.

 

[pbi]

Is that to say there is no better way to organize, train or employ the reserve? "Worked in the past" only makes sense if the organization's environment never changes, which the military's does constantly.

But, better for what? And why? And under what conditions?

Defining what the Canadian Army is supposed to be for, or what threat it's supposed to be able to counter, or how big it should be, or how it's supposed to be equipped, have consumed the total production of many paper mills and breweries.

If we ever learn one thing from history, it's that we have no real idea what's coming next, or when, or where, all high-priced military punditry and pontification aside. Because we are so small,  but historically so likely to be employed almost anywhere to do almost anything and often with little warning, what matters IMHO  is that we preserve a general purpose capability, some basic military virtues, and a good backbone of trained leaders.

None of this has anything to do with not being capable of fighting under modern combat conditions, or mindlessly doing what we've always done. It's about an honest  appraisal of how big and how capable we are really ever likely to be in "peace time", to be able to do the things we are likely (or "least unlikely...) to be called on to do. Failure to accept the grim limitations that this appraisal presents is to fool ourselves.

You claim that the Reserve needs to change, based on your perspective. I joined the Militia in 1974, served in it until 1982,  had close contact with it on several occasions over my Regular Army career, then went back to being a Res for my last two years in uniform. In my perspective, in those 30 plus years, lots of things did change about the Reserve. In some ways it's utterly unrecognizable from the drunken, largely amateurish and heavily "social" rabble I first joined, when the idea of a Militia soldier going into combat, short of WWIII, was considered laughable.

But, as long as it remains a part-time, volunteer organization faced with limited time and resources, some things about the Army Reserve will never change nor could they be expected to. Trying to produce highly skilled "niche"specialists is, to me, not only an unattainable goal but a very undesirable one that will limit the utility of the Reserve in its primary role.

 

[RADOPSIGOPACCISOP]

But, better for what? And why? And under what conditions?

Defining what the Canadian Army is supposed to be for, or what threat it's supposed to be able to counter, or how big it should be, or how it's supposed to be equipped, have consumed the total production of many paper mills and breweries.

If we ever learn one thing from history, it's that we have no real idea what's coming next, or when, or where, all high-priced military punditry and pontification aside. Because we are so small,  but historically so likely to be employed almost anywhere to do almost anything and often with little warning, what matters IMHO  is that we preserve a general purpose capability, some basic military virtues, and a good backbone of trained leaders.

None of this has anything to do with not being capable of fighting under modern combat conditions, or mindlessly doing what we've always done. It's about an honest  appraisal of how big and how capable we are really ever likely to be in "peace time", to be able to do the things we are likely (or "least unlikely...) to be called on to do. Failure to accept the grim limitations that this appraisal presents is to fool ourselves.

You claim that the Reserve needs to change, based on your perspective. I joined the Militia in 1974, served in it until 1982,  had close contact with it on several occasions over my Regular Army career, then went back to being a Res for my last two years in uniform. In my perspective, in those 30 plus years, lots of things did change about the Reserve. In some ways it's utterly unrecognizable from the drunken, largely amateurish and heavily "social" rabble I first joined, when the idea of a Militia soldier going into combat, short of WWIII, was considered laughable.

But, as long as it remains a part-time, volunteer organization faced with limited time and resources, some things about the Army Reserve will never change nor could they be expected to. Trying to produce highly skilled "niche"specialists is, to me, not only an unattainable goal but a very undesirable one that will limit the utility of the Reserve in its primary role.

I'd argue that we have no choice. When I first joined using crystal controlled radios, the job was fairly simply. It was hard, we perfected our craft, but it wasn't difficult to comprehend. Now when I look at the same trade (post 2 trade renames) the same expectations for new soldiers coming in are much more mind boggling. While it might not have been that difficult to teach soldiers to use radios and teach some antenna theory, teaching soldiers the fundamentals of TCP/IP and switching and routing, server administration, electrical theory and add field craft on top of that, it all takes much longer. I'd extrapolate that to other trades, and I would bet they have gotten similarly complex.

From what I've seen all trades are getting much more technical, the expected knowledge of a trade qualified Pte or Cpl has shot up. Luckily it has seemed so far to go hand in hand with a higher quality of recruit (smarter, more  professional, more motivated).

I don't think this will sustain it though, eventually the minimum knowledge and expertise demanded of a qualified soldier will be more than what can be crammed in what little training time there is available to reserve recruits. While they are every bit as smart as their counterparts, they simply don't have the time to become proficient in increasingly complex trades.

So yes, I think the standards will have to diverge. I think we'd be fooling ourselves if we think we are going to have the time to fully qualify reserve soldiers up to their reg force standards. So maybe we need to look at why we want the reserves, prioritize what their aims are, and start focusing our time on that instead of trying to make them something they are not going to be.

This is why splitting the expeditionary trades and soldiering training off from the standard DP system into it's own supplement might be a first step. Reorganizing the structure of the reserve Bde might be a next good step, and refocusing the dollars from the far too numerous CWOs, LCols, Capts and WOs and back to more training for the MCpls, Cpls and Ptes that are the most important ranks to have.

 

[Jarnhamar]

[quote author=RADOPSIGOPACISSOP]and refocusing the dollars from the far too numerous CWOs, LCols, Capts and WOs and back to more training for the MCpls, Cpls and Ptes that are the most important ranks to have.
[/quote]

Or maybe not authorizing the former (CWOs, Cols, Capts) to attend  ex's if there is no job/requirement for them.

 

[RADOPSIGOPACCISOP]

Or maybe not authorizing the former (CWOs, Cols, Capts) to attend  ex's if there is no job/requirement for them.

Or restructuring so you don't need so many. If you only parade 80 people you don't need a regimental structure.

 

[Haggis]

Or maybe not authorizing the former (CWOs, Cols, Capts) to attend  ex's if there is no job/requirement for them.

Most major exercises now are staffed/filled through CFTPO.  If there's no brique position for said CWO, Col, Capt etc. they should not be there.

 

[Haggis]

I don't know about you, but I grew up in a small town that way nowhere near any reservist unit. Everyone's opinion of the military was exceptionally high, higher than in any town like London Ontario, or Saint John NB. I don't see that being worth the money spent.

This reply has irked me for a few days now.

Your example is but one of thousands of small towns.  What of the others?

With the Regular Force garrisoned in a small number of "super bases" across Canada, and the reduced attaction activities of CFRG, the only CAF member the majority of non-urban /rural Canadians will likely see is a Reservist (including CIC/COATS).  Many small communities rely on the Reserve Force to provide that link between them and the greater CAF for emergencies, ceremonies and to maintain their proud historical roots (think War of 1812).

Would the Regular Force be willing to send contingents to small towns across Canada for Remembrance Day, Canada Day etc.? Would the Regular Force be able to quickly provide emergency support and manpower in small town Canada if their "super base" is hundreds of kilometers away (i.e. The 1998 Ice Storm)?

Laastly, remember that Reserve unit budgets get spent in Reserve unit communities.  Pull a half million to a million Reserve Force dollars in wages, O&M and contracts out of a small Canadian city  (i.e. Brockville, ON or Truro, NS) and see the impact.

Reserve units can do so, have done so in the past and will continue to do so in the future.  Can you quantify the impact on the CAF's visibility, reputation and relevance in small town Canada if this were to cease?

Didn't think so.

 

[Fishbone Jones]

This reply has irked me for a few days now.

Your example is but one of thousands of small towns.  What of the others?

With the Regular Force garrisoned in a small number of "super bases" across Canada, and the reduced attaction activities of CFRG, the only CAF member the majority of non-urban /rural Canadians will likely see is a Reservist (including CIC/COATS).  Many small communities rely on the Reserve Force to provide that link between them and the greater CAF for emergencies, ceremonies and to maintain their proud historical roots (think War of 1812).

Would the Regular Force be willing to send contingents to small towns across Canada for Remembrance Day, Canada Day etc.? Would the Regular Force be able to quickly provide emergency support and manpower in small town Canada if their "super base" is hundreds of kilometers away (i.e. The 1998 Ice Storm)?

Laastly, remember that Reserve unit budgets get spent in Reserve unit communities.  Pull a half million to a million Reserve Force dollars in wages, O&M and contracts out of a small Canadian city  (i.e. Brockville, ON or Truro, NS) and see the impact.

Reserve units can do so, have done so in the past and will continue to do so in the future.  Can you quantify the impact on the CAF's visibility, reputation and relevance in small town Canada if this were to cease?

Didn't think so.

RM,

You know from past experience here, that when someone has a hard on for the Reserves, there is no logical argument or point that will sway their bias.

That's why most have given up on this thread.

Or are using the "Ignore" function.

:dunno:

 

[Haggis]

RM,

You know from past experience here, that when someone has a hard on for the Reserves, there is no logical argument or point that will sway their bias.

That's why most have given up on this thread.

Or are using the "Ignore" function.

:dunno:

Yeah...... I know.  :brickwall:  But at least I got that off my chest. 

 

[RADOPSIGOPACCISOP]

This reply has irked me for a few days now.

Your example is but one of thousands of small towns.  What of the others?

With the Regular Force garrisoned in a small number of "super bases" across Canada, and the reduced attaction activities of CFRG, the only CAF member the majority of non-urban /rural Canadians will likely see is a Reservist (including CIC/COATS).  Many small communities rely on the Reserve Force to provide that link between them and the greater CAF for emergencies, ceremonies and to maintain their proud historical roots (think War of 1812).

Would the Regular Force be willing to send contingents to small towns across Canada for Remembrance Day, Canada Day etc.? Would the Regular Force be able to quickly provide emergency support and manpower in small town Canada if their "super base" is hundreds of kilometers away (i.e. The 1998 Ice Storm)?

Laastly, remember that Reserve unit budgets get spent in Reserve unit communities.  Pull a half million to a million Reserve Force dollars in wages, O&M and contracts out of a small Canadian city  (i.e. Brockville, ON or Truro, NS) and see the impact.

Reserve units can do so, have done so in the past and will continue to do so in the future.  Can you quantify the impact on the CAF's visibility, reputation and relevance in small town Canada if this were to cease?

Didn't think so.

It was quoted by someone before that reserve pay is approximately $1.3B. That's a lot of money to pay for staffing parades and raising DND profile.

A big problem with the reserve is the lack of concentration. Say what you want about having the reserves scattered around, but I'm in no delusion that if a major disaster hit Saint John or St. John's that it would be the local reserve Regts that are going to handle it, rather than 4 ESR and 2 RCR.

Wasn't it a while back they sent 4 ESR to Newfoundland after a hurricane? This was Newfoundland too, perhaps the furthest point from a superbase, and still it went to a Gagetown unit to take the lead.

That's why I don't think the reserves are delivering on value for money. Could they be better organized and led? Absolutely, in my experience there were a lot of good soldiers and some good leadership but were held back by and organization that made no sense.

 

[kratz]

Radop+13

Here is where your suggestions are a failure.

During Y2K planning, reserve members, their civilian job expectations and
their families were considered as part of the planning process.

While the exercise did not pan out as anticipated, it did demonstate the varied
mix that makes an effective volunteer reserve force.