RNZN Protector Project" Vessels

[Oldgateboatdriver]

I think we are all straying into a field of distinctions without differences and artificial use of vocabulary.

First of all I cannot see any difference between a "fighting" ship and a "combat" ship: There are no source I know of which currently distinguishes the two with a defined distinction.

And for the record, AOR's are neither: we in Canada tend to overuse them for tasks not directly related to their primary function as supply vessels (such as using them to house a combat mission staff), but many nations do not even bother to arm them with even self-defence weapons, and the British go even further: they are not warships but fleet auxiliaries  operated by the merchant seaman of the Royal Fleet Auxiliaries Service. 

Also, and sorry about this RC, but there is no reason whatsoever for an AOR to ever, ever, ever be in a position where it can be attacked by a Fast Attack Craft or hit a mine: These are littoral threats and an AOR is a deep ocean/away from theatre asset. There, they take the same chances as everybody else, including all the merchies we employ or protect there. For instance, during the Gulf War, all the support vessels were kept as far away from the gulf as possible consistent with the transit needs of the warships they served and were afforded protection by  a group of frigates and destroyers of the coalition and shore based aircrafts.

Now, depending on the circumstances, the AORs can be, or not, a High Value Asset. This term of art refers to any ship that happens to require increased protection under the circumstances of a mission: It can cover anything from an Aircraft Carrier (fully mil-spec, I presume) as well as a container ship delivering ammo to Europe (not mil-spec at all).

Speaking of mil-spec, we should remember that the British in the Falklands lost a fully mil-spec Type 21 Frigate to a single WWII 500 pounds bomb. Meanwhile, some supertankers (not mil-spec at all) have hit mines in the persian gulf and not even noticed until alongside and someone noticed the paint peeling of the hull. 

Acer Syrup is correct in my view: Its a matter of risk assessment and you can use the whole spectrum from fully mil-spec to fully civilian. This is exactly what led to the MCDV being civilian specs (like the British River class minesweepers that inspired them in fact). Their primary use (other than training), which was the justification for their original purpose was EDATS (extreme depth armed team sweep). This requirement existed because we were planning to acquire up to 8 nuclear submarines at the time. As everyone knows, these plans were abandoned after the Berlin Wall came down. However, those deep anti submarine mines posed little to no threat to the surface ships that were meant to sweep them.

By the way (and this may not belong here), I would not mind if new Canadian true AORs (built for no other purposes) were put in the hands of merchant seaman of the CFAV's and only embarked the military supply personnel required for the actual supply tasks. That could ease the manning problems of the fleet and I am sure that the supply techs and officers would not mind not having to perform to a "pusser" navy captain's standard.

 

[Ex-Dragoon]

I don't think you can really compare mil-spec early 1980s to mil-spec 2000+. Up until the Falklands War,it was ok to build warships made in part of aluminum. A 500 lbs bomb is going to make any frigate sized ship hurt if hit directly. Musing here though, I wonder if that same Type 21 frigate built to todays mil-spec and lessons learned from the Falklands War would have made out.

As for mine hits on supertankers come on. Those things are friggin massive!! I dare say it would take more then a single mine to sink a modern day supertanker....

I could be wrong but IIRC even during the Iran-Iraq War there were no merchant flagged vessels sunk, albeit I think it was over 600 damaged and around 500 sailors killed or injured, when both sides declared open season.

 

[Colin Parkinson]

Back in the 90's the sistership of the Exxon Valdez broke down off the west coast we were tasked to tow it till salvage ships arrived, even our 350' 1100 class icebreaker looked like a toy beside it. The amount of flex they are designed to have is also incrediable.

 

[RC]

I think we are all straying into a field of distinctions without differences and artificial use of vocabulary.

First of all I cannot see any difference between a "fighting" ship and a "combat" ship: There are no source I know of which currently distinguishes the two with a defined distinction.

And for the record, AOR's are neither: we in Canada tend to overuse them for tasks not directly related to their primary function as supply vessels (such as using them to house a combat mission staff), but many nations do not even bother to arm them with even self-defence weapons, and the British go even further: they are not warships but fleet auxiliaries  operated by the merchant seaman of the Royal Fleet Auxiliaries Service. 

Also, and sorry about this RC, but there is no reason whatsoever for an AOR to ever, ever, ever be in a position where it can be attacked by a Fast Attack Craft or hit a mine: These are littoral threats and an AOR is a deep ocean/away from theatre asset. There, they take the same chances as everybody else, including all the merchies we employ or protect there. For instance, during the Gulf War, all the support vessels were kept as far away from the gulf as possible consistent with the transit needs of the warships they served and were afforded protection by  a group of frigates and destroyers of the coalition and shore based aircrafts.

Now, depending on the circumstances, the AORs can be, or not, a High Value Asset. This term of art refers to any ship that happens to require increased protection under the circumstances of a mission: It can cover anything from an Aircraft Carrier (fully mil-spec, I presume) as well as a container ship delivering ammo to Europe (not mil-spec at all).

Speaking of mil-spec, we should remember that the British in the Falklands lost a fully mil-spec Type 21 Frigate to a single WWII 500 pounds bomb. Meanwhile, some supertankers (not mil-spec at all) have hit mines in the persian gulf and not even noticed until alongside and someone noticed the paint peeling of the hull. 

Acer Syrup is correct in my view: Its a matter of risk assessment and you can use the whole spectrum from fully mil-spec to fully civilian. This is exactly what led to the MCDV being civilian specs (like the British River class minesweepers that inspired them in fact). Their primary use (other than training), which was the justification for their original purpose was EDATS (extreme depth armed team sweep). This requirement existed because we were planning to acquire up to 8 nuclear submarines at the time. As everyone knows, these plans were abandoned after the Berlin Wall came down. However, those deep anti submarine mines posed little to no threat to the surface ships that were meant to sweep them.

By the way (and this may not belong here), I would not mind if new Canadian true AORs (built for no other purposes) were put in the hands of merchant seaman of the CFAV's and only embarked the military supply personnel required for the actual supply tasks. That could ease the manning problems of the fleet and I am sure that the supply techs and officers would not mind not having to perform to a "pusser" navy captain's standard.

No problem at all.  I'm a Nav Arch with 90% civilian experience, so you could drive an AOR through the hole in my  knowledge regarding military operations and tactics.  A large part of the reason I read this forum is to learn, so I'm quite happy to be educated.  My understanding for the AOR's is that they would be sent to combat zones (thus they are combattants) but obviously are not armed to attack (thus are not fighting ships).  I picked up the terms from naval officers, so I figured they would have some understood definition.

My feeling is that if the AORs need to be protected by a group of frigates, destroyers, and aircraft, it's because you expect them to get shot at.  And if you expect them to get shot at, then you'd better factor that into your risk assessment during design. 

Also, my understanding of High Value Asset corresponds more to the asset than the mission.  A high value asset is one that the crew will fight to save until they just can't fight anymore (and thus they should have the resources to do so) rather than an asset that will be abandoned at the first real hint of danger to the crew (as you would see on a commercial ship).  I would expect a naval AOR/JSS to lie much closer to the former than the latter.

 

[RC]

Sorry to double post, but I also wanted to add that I've heard High Value Asset used in reference to Naval vessels in the very literal sense that it was expensive to build and if it gets sunk in a battle, you probably aren't going to get another one.

This is somewhat of a philosophical musing, but I think that a Navy needs to build these types of assets (ie. complex, robust, mil-spec) during peace times because if we do go to war at some point, all they are going to get is whatever can be pumped out quick, dirty, and cheap.  So it is best to build the solid, tough ships that will form the backbone of your combat force when you have the opportunity.

 

[CougarKing]

An update: a problem has emerged with HMNZS Canterbury's 2 landing craft/LCMs.

link to article on NZ's Stuff news website

The multi-role HMNZS Canterbury's two landing craft are be replaced due to design flaws.
The problems are the latest to affect the fleet of seven ships bought by the Government for $500 million. The Australian-based builders BAE Systems have agreed to an $85 million payout.
The navy today confirmed some of that money would go towards designing and building two new landing craft medium (LCMs) to replace the vessels which came with Canterbury when she was commissioned in Melbourne in June, 2007.
Other cash would be used fixing weight issues on the two new 85 metre offshore patrol vessels, HMNZS Otago and HMNZS Wellington.
The deputy chief of navy, Commodore Bruce Pepperell, told NZPA design deficiencies in Canterbury's landing craft had caused problems with the bow ramp doors which were prone to cracking.
They were also problems loading cargo into the landing craft from the stern door of Canterbury at sea, and stability issues.
The craft were still being used, but with "very severe limitations".

(...)
 

 

[CougarKing]

A related update:

Defense News link

New RNZN Ship Arrives; U.S. Policy Stirs Debate
By NICK LEE-FRAMPTON
Published: 13 Apr 2010 12:10 

WELLINGTON - On the same day that New Zealand welcomed a new Offshore Patrol Vessel, a former prime minister said he thinks it's time to allow non-nuclear U.S. ships to return to the country's ports.
HMNZS Otago, the sixth of seven ships ordered for the Royal New Zealand Navy (RNZN) under the 500 million New Zealand dollar ($357 million) Project Protector, arrived in Auckland from Melbourne, Australia, on April 9 with Defence Minister Wayne Mapp aboard.

The 279-foot, 1,900-metric-ton Offshore Patrol Vessel, armed with a 25mm Bushmaster cannon, was ordered in 2004 and launched in November 2006. It was originally scheduled for delivery in 2007 but was only formally handed over to the RNZN in February.

Mapp said the Otago was value for money "even though maritime terrorism is not currently a problem for New Zealand. We haven't had those things in our area as yet, but the whole point of a defense force is to be prepared for contingencies that might happen. When you've got unstable states, you've certainly got the prospect of transnational crime, drug running, piracy and things of that nature," he said.

Otago's sister ship, Wellington, is expected to arrive by June.

Also on April 9, Sir Geoffrey Palmer, a former prime minister and an architect of New Zealand's nuclear-free laws, told the DominionPost newspaper here that it is time U.S. ships were allowed to return to New Zealand.

Under the New Zealand Nuclear Free Zone, Disarmament and Arms Control Act 1987, nuclear-powered or armed ships have been barred from local waters.
Palmer is not advocating a change to the legislation but said he sees no reason to stop U.S. Coast Guard ships - or any other non-nuclear American vessel - from entering New Zealand ports.

U.S. ship visits are "desirable" if they conform with New Zealand law, he told the NZPA news agency. "I'm just suggesting that ship visits could occur from almost any other nation that has a navy under New Zealand law, and there does seem to have been a change in American attitudes to the subject, and therefore the time may be propitious for this."

However, Foreign Affairs Minister Murray McCully said Washington takes the view that it will not send ships to New Zealand while the legislation is in place, and the Wellington government, he says, has no intention of changing that.

"We were elected on that policy, have adopted that policy and accept that there are some consequences that flow from that," he said April 10.

The debate over nuclear warships has "bordered on hysterical" for years, Associate Defence Minister Heather Roy said in a statement April 10. "Confusion has been encouraged by many groups around nuclear weapons, nuclear propulsion and nuclear power, and this has been counter-productive to our relationship with the U.S. Repeal of the legislation that prevents nuclear propelled ships into our waters is long overdue."

Two RNZN ships, the Anzac-class frigate Te Kaha and fleet tanker Endeavour, left this week for the first RNZN visit to U.S. ports in 25 years.

The two ships will exercise in the South China Sea with the Singaporean, Malaysian and Australian forces. The RNZN vessels will then split up - Te Kaha sailing to support the New Zealand exhibition at the Shanghai Expo, and Endeavour visiting South Korea - before reuniting to attend the Canadian Navy centenary celebrations. The ships will then sail down the west coast of the United States, stopping at the civilian ports of Seattle, San Francisco, San Diego, and stopping in Hawaii at Honolulu.

 

[CougarKing]

Defense-Studies Blogspot link

Cracks in the Navy's four new inshore patrol vessels are not serious and just part of the "bedding-in" process, Defence Minister Wayne Mapp says.

The 55m-long ships, which were delivered in 2009, have undergone repairs and strengthening to the front of the superstructure where it meets the deck.

Dr Mapp said the acute angle had created pressure that caused the cracking, and it needed to be strengthened.

The damage is not considered to be serious or threatening to the integrity of the ships, he said.

Repairs took place under warranty, meaning it did not cost the Government anything.

"Those cracks were relatively small and able to be easily repaired, and repaired under warranty. I don't know [how much the repairs were], and neither do I need to know," Dr Mapp said.

"These are the sorts of things that occur in the bedding-in period. And they're back in service.

"I'm assuming that all the little things that need to be fixed up under warranty will be fixed up under warranty. And there's been a few little things like fans being too loud, stuff like that."


The four vessels - Taupo, Rotoiti, Hawea and Pukaki - were part of the Navy's $500 million Project Protector in 2004, which delivered seven new ships to the Navy.

Taupo also had repairs done under warranty to its main engines and generators. During maintenance in Auckland, its fuel system was stripped and cleaned out after contamination.

The four vessels are used for maritime surveillance and to support other agencies such as Customs and Fisheries.

They have a range of 3000 nautical miles and patrol up to 200 nautical miles off the coast.

Dr Mapp said "they're out and about on the New Zealand coast, and that has been noticed".

The Navy has also had repairs done under warranty on its two 85m-long patrol vessels, HMNZS Otago and HMNZS Wellington, which were delivered earlier this year.

After the Wellington left the shipbuilder's yard in Melbourne, a water seal leaked in its port engine and its starboard engine control system developed a fault. The ship was diverted to Sydney.

Meanwhile, Dr Mapp said the $234 million contract to upgrade the military's five Hercules aircraft is close to a solution.

Safe Air, which was subcontracted to do some of the work, had pulled out.
"We've almost resolved that issue," he said, "but we're not quite ready to make a formal announcement."