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Reservists in AFG

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A bit more old grist for the latest re-grinding:
http://forums.army.ca/forums/threads/19482.0.html
http://forums.army.ca/forums/threads/17136.0.html
http://forums.army.ca/forums/threads/16197.0.html

Back to your regularly scheduled forum discussion...
 
Eye In The Sky said:
The first question that comes to my mind, and the one that IMO would be the show-stopper is that infers that certain units would disband and rebadge as Unit A.  Is that what you have in mind?

In the UK TA they've created a City of London Regiment, with multiple cap-badges, and it seems to work out all right.  No reason to lose those parts of the unit identity - and perhaps even include a position or three as "Regimental Capt", "Regimental WO", and "Regimetnal Clerk" - giving the unit an extra Capt, WO and Cpl to sustain the history, and provide extra depth on the bench.

Lots of ways to be creative and make things better - if we don't get worked up and are able to work together.

And as for the River Regiments;  Why not take five and make two?  Pay admin can be doen centrally - faxes, scanned documents by email or other methods.

The problem is numbers:  Try to take a pool of 75 trained soldiers (about what you've got in the Brocks) and, every three years, produce one LCOl and one CWO.  Do you get the depth of experience you want?  Do you get the quality you want - or do you get the Last Man Standing?  (Not always - let me hasten to add - but it is a perpetual problem).

Yes, there will be some duplication across different locations.  But if somehow the Engineers are bright enough to have a single LCol command two sqns, one in Calgary and another in Edmonton, can't we find an infantryman (or two) just as capable?
 
Old Sweat said:
Let me stick my oar in here. Since the Brockville Rifles is being discussed, let's review its geographical position. Sorry if this is pedantic, but you should get my drift. Brockville lies on the St Lawrence about an hour's drive east of Kingston and about the same west of Cornwall and south of Ottawa. All four centres are home to one or more reserve units. Let's deal with the three in the Seaway Valley, the SD&G Higglanders in Cornwall, the Brockville Rifles in Brockville and the PWOR in Kingston. (In the last, there is another reserve unit, the H&PE Regt, another hour's drive to the west in Belleville.) So let's address these four units covering a few hundred kilometres of Highway 401.

Could we achieve major personnel savings by having one battalion headquarters and four sub-units stretching along the southern border of Eastern Ontario? (I know the Hasty Ps have a company in Pterborough, so maybe it becomes five.) First - what about personnel administration? I submit that each will have to maintain an orderly room and an adjutant et al by any other names to service their personnel. The same with a QM and a recruiting cell and a tasking cell and a . . . Oh, and did I mention somebody to sort out the pay issues? Maybe in these cases where the geographical spread is fairly large, the savings are only in the nature of a few relatively senior positions, along with perhaps the honouraries. Is it worth the hassle? We are not talking about, say the Minto Armoury in Winnipeg, with two infantry regiments under the same roof. To my tiny mind, we will end up with five 'separate' units, one commanded by a LCol and the others by (bolshie-minded) majors, each self-administering, but suddenly with three angry senates and honouraries all pulling all the political strings they can reach.

Will someone please explain the errors in my thinking to me? Please use real life examples in similar geographical and demographic situations.

OS,

I think you focused in on the real issue.

1.  Logically, that would make the most sense financially and from a "army thinking" mind.

2.  Policitically is where this would brew up, and likely has, in the past.  There was talk about making my old PRes unt (PEIR, the only Army unit in PEI at the time) D Sqn of the 8 CH, HQs in Moncton.  Logically it made sense as we were, by numbers, a Sqn commanded by a LCol.  However, you can bet that had that of happened, you would have seen a very small number of the Officers and mbrs of the WOs and Sgts mess and the senior members of the Jnr Ranks mess on parade at the rebadging.  The loss of 'unit identity', the loss of the Guidon, the Regimental cap badge, etc would have had many members simply turn in their kit.  I suspect that this would be a likely effect across the PRes were units disbanded and people being told to change units.
 
dapaterson said:
In the UK TA they've created a City of London Regiment, with multiple cap-badges, and it seems to work out all right.  No reason to lose those parts of the unit identity - and perhaps even include a position or three as "Regimental Capt", "Regimental WO", and "Regimetnal Clerk" - giving the unit an extra Capt, WO and Cpl to sustain the history, and provide extra depth on the bench.

Lots of ways to be creative and make things better - if we don't get worked up and are able to work together.

Now that I can see working. 
 
ltimately, we need to find ways to present options that are palateable and explain what they mean and what they will involve - try some "key leader engagements" to ensure openness.  Coming down from on high, becasue somone in a cubicle in Ottawa has decided upon the perfect solution (uncontaminated by the real world) wouldn't work.


And, to bring it back on topic, the goal is to improve the ability of units to force generate for missions at home or abroad.  Reduce the pressure to find the next CO/RSM, and let people get experience.

 
The role of the militia for the last century and a bit has been force generation, not as the first line of defence. This dates back to the Boer War where the militia provided individuals to 2 RCR and parts of sub-sub-units for the second contingent, through the national efforts of the First and Second Wars and during the NATO build-up of the early fifties. The only regression into a traditional model (with a non-traditional role) was the national survival experiment of the late-fifties and early-sixties. In recent years the militia has moved away from the total force and 10/90 experiments to the provision of very high quality individuals. The force structure, however, has remained firmly wed to the nineteenth century model that responded to the Fenian Raids of 1866 and 1870 and the Northwest Rebellion of 1885.

As Dave so wisely noted, it will take careful management of the file so that the reserves can rightly come up with a solution. I certainly would not care to poke that sleeping bear.
 
It seems to me that a lot of the discussion surrounding the reserves focuses on achieving efficiency.  I'm not sure that's really what we need in a Reserve Force.  U.S. Army Colonel H.R. McMaster isn't addressing that issue specifically, but this passage from his latest paper seems applicable to the discussion going on here:

Moreover, efficiency in war means barely winning, and in war, barely winning is an ugly proposition. In war one seeks to overwhelm the enemy such that he is unable to take effective action; the business principle of maximum payoff for minimum investment does not apply. The complexity and uncertainty of war require decentralization and a certain degree of redundancy, concepts that cut against business’s emphasis on control and efficiency.

In other words, cutting out the fat is all fine and good until you hit lean times and the fat is what keeps you from starving.  Shutting down or consolidating units have knock-on effects that may well fall into the category of unintended consequences.
 
dapaterson said:
In the UK TA they've created a City of London Regiment, with multiple cap-badges, and it seems to work out all right.  No reason to lose those parts of the unit identity - and perhaps even include a position or three as "Regimental Capt", "Regimental WO", and "Regimetnal Clerk" - giving the unit an extra Capt, WO and Cpl to sustain the history, and provide extra depth on the bench.

Outside observer, so take your own value from the following

The use of secondary titles seems to not last.
A Canadian example is the 4th Battalion of The Royal Canadian Regiment which was formerly the 4th Battalion, The Royal Canadian Regiment (London and Oxford Fusiliers) only from 1958 to 1989 (1958 - 1970 as 3rd Battalion, the Royal Canadian Regiment (London and Oxford Fusiliers)). There a lot more British Examples of this, unfortunately the best online resource, regiments.org has vanished from the Internet.
 
Colin P said:
I recall a move to make Reservists purely Civil defense personal, also remember become Op tasked and then had that taken away. The fact that reservists contiuned to serve in the 70,80 & 90's despite being the plaything and punching bag of NDHQ and the DND. Anyone who didn't go through that period will not understand how hard it was to maintain morale in a constantly shifting world lacking direction and purpose.

Well said! I remember going out on Exercises with no blanks for the FNC1 and having to yell "bang!" or "bullets!" instead. It was, at first, kind of humiliating. But the first person who yelled "cutbacks!" instead won not only our respect, but our howls of laughter too.
It's nice to see things changing for the better.
 
Blacksmith said:
I remember going out on Exercises with no blanks for the FNC1 and having to yell "bang!" or "bullets!" instead.

The Regular Force did that in the 70's and 80's as well.  Another thing both components had in common (but probably failed to realize it).
 
Blacksmith said:
Well said! I remember going out on Exercises with no blanks for the FNC1 and having to yell "bang!" or "bullets!" instead. It was, at first, kind of humiliating. But the first person who yelled "cutbacks!" instead won not only our respect, but our howls of laughter too.
It's nice to see things changing for the better.


Aha,

I remember carrying the FNC2, and having the privelage of being issued very specdial blanks in the Militia (As we called it back then);

"BUDGETCUT....BUDGETCUT...BUDGETCUT!"

And we carried an Onion tied to our belt, becasue that was the style in those days....

dileas

tess
 
Another great article by Ms. Blatchford.

I've been on courses with two of the guys in the article, and currently work with a third. Funny to see such familiar names and faces in the national press.



It's a small army. I know someone will get the reference:
chewbacca.lg.jpg
 
My apoligies Brihard.,....should have looked at the beginning of this thread....doooohhhhh :clown:
 
This article describes a great success story, namely, the reserves are doing a great job at force generation for Afghanistan and are sharing the load equally with their regular force counterparts. Despite the challenges of the past morale is good, quality is good and improving, and I'm betting you'd be hard pressed to pick out the reservists from any one of the rifle companies in action right now. Hell, we've even got a reservist who has won the MMV in battle recently (Capt Rob Peel).

Why change anything?
 
OldSolduer said:
Did anyone read the comments after Ms. B's article?
Interesting.

yup nice to see you and another old army.ca alumni on there trying to set the masses straight.

By the way Tess it was "budget cuuut' you had to drag out the last syllable to get that full 2-3 round burst. 8)
 
OldSolduer said:
Did anyone read the comments after Ms. B's article?
Interesting.

I read some of them, but then my computer crashed (right off my desk....after my fist hit the monitor).
 
Haggis I really did LOL after that one!! How's the new computer!!
Haggis said:
I read some of them, but then my computer crashed (right off my desk....after my fist hit the monitor).
 
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