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I never realized that the Queen Elizabeth class CVFs were available for export sales?
http://news.ninemsn.com.au/article.aspx?id=697440
http://news.ninemsn.com.au/article.aspx?id=697440
report: Australia could be next regional power
- Thread starter CougarKing
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i have to admit i find this pretty amusing, last time i was speaking with some old buddies in the navy there they were having enough problems crewing 3
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With respect to the article:
A few points on the RAN issues raised in the article.
At present there are only 2 operating submarines. Simple there are no crews.
As of a news paper report, November 29, 2008, to quote, “The navy is at present experiencing a 36 per cent shortfall in submariners and a 13.3 per cent shortage in its trained workforce.”
Recruitment and retentions at present are big issues with the Navy and possibly with the other services.
In the November 29, 2008 news paper article makes the following comment:
“With three new air warfare destroyers and two amphibious helicopter carriers on order, Mr Fitzgibbon warns that there is little point in the navy acquiring new billion-dollar warships unless it has the crew to serve on them.”
The Rudd government ahs been very strong on the rhetoric of having a strong defense force, but much of this can be covered by simple statements of we will have to see what the ‘White Paper’ produces.
The news item presented is based on several select extracts from “Strategic Insight 45 - Strategic choices: Defending Australia in the 21st century”.
This as a PDF document can be found at http://www.aspi.org.au/
In this are 2 main articles outlines “probable options” within the White Paper, but the content of these 2 papers are not extracts nor based on the White Paper.
The first of these papers “Australia’s capacity for national defence to 2050”, by Mark Thomson deals with the economic issues of a defence force and its technological development and force size.
The second paper “Pay your money and take your pick—force structure
options and their costs”, by Andrew Davies puts forth several options based on what can or could be spent.
Unfortunately or fortunately depending on ones feelings I can see due to current world economic issues the chance that though the government will take the outcomes of the White Paper little will actually eventuate.
As a simple example the 100 F35 that are pushed as a minimum number could end up as at best 2 squadrons, or at worst 1 squadron.
At present there is a drain on skilled people due to the mining boom, well the mining is staring on its downward trend so this leakage may become minimised some what.
In some arms of the military there is a shortage of officers with in certain ranks, senior Capts and Maj from memory.
If Australia is to become a big player of lots money will have to be spent not just on equipment but on people.
Sorry tried to keep it short so I have left out lots..
A few points on the RAN issues raised in the article.
At present there are only 2 operating submarines. Simple there are no crews.
As of a news paper report, November 29, 2008, to quote, “The navy is at present experiencing a 36 per cent shortfall in submariners and a 13.3 per cent shortage in its trained workforce.”
Recruitment and retentions at present are big issues with the Navy and possibly with the other services.
In the November 29, 2008 news paper article makes the following comment:
“With three new air warfare destroyers and two amphibious helicopter carriers on order, Mr Fitzgibbon warns that there is little point in the navy acquiring new billion-dollar warships unless it has the crew to serve on them.”
The Rudd government ahs been very strong on the rhetoric of having a strong defense force, but much of this can be covered by simple statements of we will have to see what the ‘White Paper’ produces.
The news item presented is based on several select extracts from “Strategic Insight 45 - Strategic choices: Defending Australia in the 21st century”.
This as a PDF document can be found at http://www.aspi.org.au/
In this are 2 main articles outlines “probable options” within the White Paper, but the content of these 2 papers are not extracts nor based on the White Paper.
The first of these papers “Australia’s capacity for national defence to 2050”, by Mark Thomson deals with the economic issues of a defence force and its technological development and force size.
The second paper “Pay your money and take your pick—force structure
options and their costs”, by Andrew Davies puts forth several options based on what can or could be spent.
Unfortunately or fortunately depending on ones feelings I can see due to current world economic issues the chance that though the government will take the outcomes of the White Paper little will actually eventuate.
As a simple example the 100 F35 that are pushed as a minimum number could end up as at best 2 squadrons, or at worst 1 squadron.
At present there is a drain on skilled people due to the mining boom, well the mining is staring on its downward trend so this leakage may become minimised some what.
In some arms of the military there is a shortage of officers with in certain ranks, senior Capts and Maj from memory.
If Australia is to become a big player of lots money will have to be spent not just on equipment but on people.
Sorry tried to keep it short so I have left out lots..
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tdr_aust said:
Thanks TDR for your insights.
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Now I may be wrong with some of my opinions, if so put it down to old age
(Bits in yellow come from the report)
In a bit more detail:
The following are the options presented in the paper “Pay your money and take your pick—force structure options and their costs” by Andrew Davies
Option one—‘stand easy’
This option is predicated on Australia taking the strategic decision that it doesn’t need to (or doesn’t want to) compete with the increasing economic and military strength of the Asia–Pacific region.
The main force structure changes, using the current ADF as a baseline, would be:
• cancelled acquisition of air warfare destroyers (frigate fleet remains as is)
• no acquisition of the JSF, and a tactical aircraft fleet of forty-eight Super Hornets (retaining the planned AEW&C and air-to-air refuellers). The ‘classic’ Hornets would be retired in 2015.
• four additional maritime patrol aircraft
• no submarine post-Collins
• additional sea-lift in the form of three catamarans
• an additional two C-17 airlifters and three additional medium-lift helicopters
• less hardening and networking of the Army, with an ultimate battalion structure of six light, one special forces (plus SAS) and one medium
Option two—the ‘focused’ force
This is the force structure proposed in an earlier ASPI publication.6 Strategically, it is predicated on the observation that Australia’s hitherto clear economic and technological advantage is being eroded and that the existing ‘balanced’ force structure, largely unchanged since the 1960s, is not optimized for such an environment.
In summary, the changes to the currently planned force structure would be:
• an additional six submarines (for twelve in total)
• (a) forty-eight additional F/A-18F Super Hornets, ordered for delivery in two tranches in 2012 and 2016 (but no JSF purchase in the near future) or
(b) the JSF purchase proceeds as planned
• a ‘two-tier’ Army, with additional special forces (one additional commando battalion for a total of two plus the SAS Regiment) and six light and one medium infantry battalions
• two additional air warfare destroyers, with an accompanying reduction in the frigate force from twelve to eight
• four additional maritime patrol aircraft.
The two-tier concept is based on the following approach assessment:
In the land domain, the traditional combined arms approach of infantry, armour and artillery is seen as less relevant for near-region stabilisation and assistance missions and as not the highest-value (or at least not necessary) contribution to coalition operations. The proposed land force involves a two-tier restructure of Army focused on developing more Special Forces for deployment to war zones in coalition activities and mobile light infantry units for regional stabilisation, humanitarian and peacekeeping missions.
Option three—Securing the waves
This is based on the Prime Minister own comments
‘If we are going to defend our sea-lines of communication to the rest of the world, we have got to make sure that we have got the naval capability to underpin that. And Australia therefore must have necessary maritime power in the future in order to give that effect’.
The posited force structure changes are:
• two additional air warfare destroyers
• five additional frigates
• one additional oiler and at-sea replenishment ship
• twelve additional ASW helicopters
• six extra maritime patrol aircraft
• six additional submarines.
This is a heavy maritime/ navy orientated approach. Fundamentally it leaves everything else as is.
Option four—Australia as a ‘muscular regional power’
The idea of Australia becoming a larger regional military power can be extended beyond the maritime domain. The rationale for such a force structure is essentially similar to that behind the ‘focused force’ option— the strategic and military relativities of the region are changing and the existing force will progressively carry less weight in the future. The difference is that the ‘focused’ option is predicated on Australia engaging a major Asian power only in coalition with the United States. In this model, Australia would be able to unilaterally engage such a power with a degree of confidence of prevailing (at least close to Australia), or at least being able to inflict enough damage to render belligerence against Australia unattractive.
On top of current plans, the ADF would get:
• twelve additional submarines, for eighteen in total
• 150 additional Joint Strike Fighters (250 total) with six each additional Wedgetail AEW&C and air-to-air refuelling aircraft
• two additional air warfare destroyers plus five additional frigates
• one additional oiler and at-sea replenishment ship
• twelve additional naval helicopters
• four additional P-8 maritime patrol aircraft
• three additional medium battalions for the Army
• three additional medium lift helicopters
• one additional LHD amphibious ship
• one Australian-owned ISR low-earth orbit satellite capability with 100 extra intelligence analysts.
In view of the economic times and vanishing surplus something between option 2 and option 3 may evolve.
Option 4 is possible where things should go but it always comes dowm to which service has the ear and the big $. This is also an option which is closer to pie in sky at present. (Wrong government, wrong timing, population not seeing the big need for a military, lots of reasons and hard to guess at).
I would also suspect there will be an emergence of a Three-tier Army, the first 2 tiers along that proposed and the third and poorer tier the reserve.
I would have strong doubts about maintaining basic light infantry as such. I in my limited view of things would prefer to see a better development of the motorised Infantry concept. This not necessary at the expense of the mech Infantry either.
I am also interested in what outcome will eventuate with the SP 155s, wheels or track? This is one of those long running issues since way back.
So to some extent the media report has just picked out the juicy bits to make it look good and excite the average reader/viewer.
(Bits in yellow come from the report)
In a bit more detail:
The following are the options presented in the paper “Pay your money and take your pick—force structure options and their costs” by Andrew Davies
Option one—‘stand easy’
This option is predicated on Australia taking the strategic decision that it doesn’t need to (or doesn’t want to) compete with the increasing economic and military strength of the Asia–Pacific region.
The main force structure changes, using the current ADF as a baseline, would be:
• cancelled acquisition of air warfare destroyers (frigate fleet remains as is)
• no acquisition of the JSF, and a tactical aircraft fleet of forty-eight Super Hornets (retaining the planned AEW&C and air-to-air refuellers). The ‘classic’ Hornets would be retired in 2015.
• four additional maritime patrol aircraft
• no submarine post-Collins
• additional sea-lift in the form of three catamarans
• an additional two C-17 airlifters and three additional medium-lift helicopters
• less hardening and networking of the Army, with an ultimate battalion structure of six light, one special forces (plus SAS) and one medium
Option two—the ‘focused’ force
This is the force structure proposed in an earlier ASPI publication.6 Strategically, it is predicated on the observation that Australia’s hitherto clear economic and technological advantage is being eroded and that the existing ‘balanced’ force structure, largely unchanged since the 1960s, is not optimized for such an environment.
In summary, the changes to the currently planned force structure would be:
• an additional six submarines (for twelve in total)
• (a) forty-eight additional F/A-18F Super Hornets, ordered for delivery in two tranches in 2012 and 2016 (but no JSF purchase in the near future) or
(b) the JSF purchase proceeds as planned
• a ‘two-tier’ Army, with additional special forces (one additional commando battalion for a total of two plus the SAS Regiment) and six light and one medium infantry battalions
• two additional air warfare destroyers, with an accompanying reduction in the frigate force from twelve to eight
• four additional maritime patrol aircraft.
The two-tier concept is based on the following approach assessment:
In the land domain, the traditional combined arms approach of infantry, armour and artillery is seen as less relevant for near-region stabilisation and assistance missions and as not the highest-value (or at least not necessary) contribution to coalition operations. The proposed land force involves a two-tier restructure of Army focused on developing more Special Forces for deployment to war zones in coalition activities and mobile light infantry units for regional stabilisation, humanitarian and peacekeeping missions.
Option three—Securing the waves
This is based on the Prime Minister own comments
‘If we are going to defend our sea-lines of communication to the rest of the world, we have got to make sure that we have got the naval capability to underpin that. And Australia therefore must have necessary maritime power in the future in order to give that effect’.
The posited force structure changes are:
• two additional air warfare destroyers
• five additional frigates
• one additional oiler and at-sea replenishment ship
• twelve additional ASW helicopters
• six extra maritime patrol aircraft
• six additional submarines.
This is a heavy maritime/ navy orientated approach. Fundamentally it leaves everything else as is.
Option four—Australia as a ‘muscular regional power’
The idea of Australia becoming a larger regional military power can be extended beyond the maritime domain. The rationale for such a force structure is essentially similar to that behind the ‘focused force’ option— the strategic and military relativities of the region are changing and the existing force will progressively carry less weight in the future. The difference is that the ‘focused’ option is predicated on Australia engaging a major Asian power only in coalition with the United States. In this model, Australia would be able to unilaterally engage such a power with a degree of confidence of prevailing (at least close to Australia), or at least being able to inflict enough damage to render belligerence against Australia unattractive.
On top of current plans, the ADF would get:
• twelve additional submarines, for eighteen in total
• 150 additional Joint Strike Fighters (250 total) with six each additional Wedgetail AEW&C and air-to-air refuelling aircraft
• two additional air warfare destroyers plus five additional frigates
• one additional oiler and at-sea replenishment ship
• twelve additional naval helicopters
• four additional P-8 maritime patrol aircraft
• three additional medium battalions for the Army
• three additional medium lift helicopters
• one additional LHD amphibious ship
• one Australian-owned ISR low-earth orbit satellite capability with 100 extra intelligence analysts.
In view of the economic times and vanishing surplus something between option 2 and option 3 may evolve.
Option 4 is possible where things should go but it always comes dowm to which service has the ear and the big $. This is also an option which is closer to pie in sky at present. (Wrong government, wrong timing, population not seeing the big need for a military, lots of reasons and hard to guess at).
I would also suspect there will be an emergence of a Three-tier Army, the first 2 tiers along that proposed and the third and poorer tier the reserve.
I would have strong doubts about maintaining basic light infantry as such. I in my limited view of things would prefer to see a better development of the motorised Infantry concept. This not necessary at the expense of the mech Infantry either.
I am also interested in what outcome will eventuate with the SP 155s, wheels or track? This is one of those long running issues since way back.
So to some extent the media report has just picked out the juicy bits to make it look good and excite the average reader/viewer.
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On top of the Infantry battalions, the Cavalry will need to change too. We can assume that there'll be no change to 1st Armoured Regiment seeing as they've got their "retro" M1A1's.
For a start, for the RAAC to stay a power we'll need to finally acquire enough ASLAV's for the two Regiments and the School of Armour, rather then rotating our car's between the three and replenish our war stocks. Also, the contribution that 3/4 Cav will play in the Corp, whether it'll stay with bushmasters or be given the surplus M113 AS4's so as to continue to be the Lift capability for 3 Brigade, whether they'll be re-roled to ASLAV or, together with a new ASLAV purchase and the raising of more INF battalions, expanded themselves beyond the current APC Squadron.
In a perfect world, we'd have equipped 3/4cav with LAV3's and given the Bushmasters purely to the grunts, instead of having an armoured taxi service in a vehicle with nothing more then a MAG58.
Alternatively, we could raise another couple of Inf battalions, expand SF, buy new planes, ignore Cav and create a situation where the only way the infantry will go into battle will be in Bushmaster and their boots with nothing more then half a regiment of tanks and one and a bit of ASLAV's to support them. And with no armoured vehicle able to lift grunts AND be used in an Armoured role.
For a start, for the RAAC to stay a power we'll need to finally acquire enough ASLAV's for the two Regiments and the School of Armour, rather then rotating our car's between the three and replenish our war stocks. Also, the contribution that 3/4 Cav will play in the Corp, whether it'll stay with bushmasters or be given the surplus M113 AS4's so as to continue to be the Lift capability for 3 Brigade, whether they'll be re-roled to ASLAV or, together with a new ASLAV purchase and the raising of more INF battalions, expanded themselves beyond the current APC Squadron.
In a perfect world, we'd have equipped 3/4cav with LAV3's and given the Bushmasters purely to the grunts, instead of having an armoured taxi service in a vehicle with nothing more then a MAG58.
Alternatively, we could raise another couple of Inf battalions, expand SF, buy new planes, ignore Cav and create a situation where the only way the infantry will go into battle will be in Bushmaster and their boots with nothing more then half a regiment of tanks and one and a bit of ASLAV's to support them. And with no armoured vehicle able to lift grunts AND be used in an Armoured role.
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I would agree with you in the 3/4 Cav should be LAVs. It was something I could not quite understand moving them to Bushmasters and basically becoming a taxi service.
I thought that making 6 RAR as Motor and then 3/4 Cav as LAVs was looking like some form of real logic. Should also include the fact 3/4 Cav could be brought up to real strength.
I was under the impression the upgraded M113 AS4s were going to 5 & 7 RAR as they were to stay Mech.
Some how I was running under some silly notion we were starting to look at a Mech brigade, a Motor brigade and one light brigade.
Besides that the “White Paper” will tell all, what you will get and not necessary what you need.
I thought that making 6 RAR as Motor and then 3/4 Cav as LAVs was looking like some form of real logic. Should also include the fact 3/4 Cav could be brought up to real strength.
I was under the impression the upgraded M113 AS4s were going to 5 & 7 RAR as they were to stay Mech.
Some how I was running under some silly notion we were starting to look at a Mech brigade, a Motor brigade and one light brigade.
Besides that the “White Paper” will tell all, what you will get and not necessary what you need.
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Your absolutely right about what you get and what you need. I think everyone here knows about it!
The AS4's are to be heading to 5 & 7 RAR, 1st Armoured and, as i understand it, CSR in Darwin because, as you say, Darwin is a mechanised brigade.
However, the army have just ordered another 80 and the rumours are flying about what'll happen with them. B 3/4 are one place people are saying they could be heading too but it doesnt seem that likely to me, though it would make a hell of a lot of sense, what with an Armoured unit needing an Armoured Vehicle.
Right now, the infantry are being swamped, especially due to the Gap yearer's and the economic downturn and this has also meant that in Cav we've had a big influx, to the extent that, for the first time in a very long time, people are being turned away from Armoured corp. Unfortunately though, all the new blokes dont bring an ASLAV with them, especially PC's, and we're still short of cars.
The Army have been very, very lucky over the last few years with funding and budget, but we can always use more and we will always complain about what we'll get. I'm sure if we'd got Leopard II's we'd still complain about them, maybe the big difference there though would be that we'd still be able to drive them! ;D
Hopefully the money can continue flowing in, the trips can keep coming and we'll continue to grow.
The AS4's are to be heading to 5 & 7 RAR, 1st Armoured and, as i understand it, CSR in Darwin because, as you say, Darwin is a mechanised brigade.
However, the army have just ordered another 80 and the rumours are flying about what'll happen with them. B 3/4 are one place people are saying they could be heading too but it doesnt seem that likely to me, though it would make a hell of a lot of sense, what with an Armoured unit needing an Armoured Vehicle.
Right now, the infantry are being swamped, especially due to the Gap yearer's and the economic downturn and this has also meant that in Cav we've had a big influx, to the extent that, for the first time in a very long time, people are being turned away from Armoured corp. Unfortunately though, all the new blokes dont bring an ASLAV with them, especially PC's, and we're still short of cars.
The Army have been very, very lucky over the last few years with funding and budget, but we can always use more and we will always complain about what we'll get. I'm sure if we'd got Leopard II's we'd still complain about them, maybe the big difference there though would be that we'd still be able to drive them! ;D
Hopefully the money can continue flowing in, the trips can keep coming and we'll continue to grow.
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Well I did have something hanging about where some of the AS4s were going but it has vanished into the MBs of documents on my HD. Though I thought some were going to 1 CER. I would have to cross check that bit of rumour mill anyway.
Well to be honest I personally feel we may have been better off with Leo IIs but I thought there was some background reason for not getting them. Again old memory hits in.
As you said at least they could be driven. I will not push the issue re AVLB and a few of the other toys for the M1s.
My only problem with embedding a brigade with heavy armour is that in most cases that armour will not get deployed. This in essence fragments a Brigade in its normal total training process. Ok oldness crawls back in. At one point units such as 1st Armoured were non brigade and came direct under Div commd. In light of current ops I wonder if this is not a more appropriate concept. Ok it has flaws as an idea.
You don’t needs actual vehicles play Steel Beats all day. Besides it will keep the Simulation people occupied and provide a need for their existence.
If you can answer this funny:
Some time ago a piece of paper turned up with some invisible vehicles. Back in 2007 when I checked they were still very invisible.
Have these Bushmaster variants, IMMV and the IMDFW decided to become visible yet?
They are supposed to be part of 3/4 Cav.
I would check my normal source but he has been posted PNG for a 2 year visit.
Well to be honest I personally feel we may have been better off with Leo IIs but I thought there was some background reason for not getting them. Again old memory hits in.
As you said at least they could be driven. I will not push the issue re AVLB and a few of the other toys for the M1s.
My only problem with embedding a brigade with heavy armour is that in most cases that armour will not get deployed. This in essence fragments a Brigade in its normal total training process. Ok oldness crawls back in. At one point units such as 1st Armoured were non brigade and came direct under Div commd. In light of current ops I wonder if this is not a more appropriate concept. Ok it has flaws as an idea.
You don’t needs actual vehicles play Steel Beats all day. Besides it will keep the Simulation people occupied and provide a need for their existence.
If you can answer this funny:
Some time ago a piece of paper turned up with some invisible vehicles. Back in 2007 when I checked they were still very invisible.
Have these Bushmaster variants, IMMV and the IMDFW decided to become visible yet?
They are supposed to be part of 3/4 Cav.
I would check my normal source but he has been posted PNG for a 2 year visit.
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It is probably small things like this that may influence the way the White Paper will run.
(Though the add for the Find your Russian Beauty Today looks more interesting)
Link http://www.india-defence.com/reports-4110
(Though the add for the Find your Russian Beauty Today looks more interesting)
Link http://www.india-defence.com/reports-4100
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To the very best of my understanding, a bushmaster is a bushmaster is a bushmaster. I dont know of any variants of them and while looking through B 3/4's compound a month ago i saw no trace. They must still be invisible. Like I always say, the T50 turret was always supposed to be an interim turret and look how long we kept it. The Army (Every army), as you know, uses plenty of "Interim" bits of kit while we wait for the special, fancy, gucci, you-beaut gear to rock up. And i reckon a lot of the time that "Interim" kit isnt too bad (6x6 IIMV Land Rover excepted).
I've never even heard of a variant Bushmaster but i'm sure someone has drawn a picture of it somewhere and been paid $14million...
Reference the Engineer's at 1CER, it's my understanding they use all the normal M113 variant and they work fine. Fitter's, ARVL and APC.
And what you say about 1st Armd is very true. I know for a fact that tankies have always found it very hard to sit by and watch the rest of 1 Brigade get sent overseas over and over again while they do endless bush ex's.
My take on us not getting Leo II's was so we had a vehicle that was interchangeable with our American friends and that our Abram's would never go overseas, we'd crew US M1A2's where ever we were needed. If that's true it'll definitely restrict us to fighting only US sponsored war's. But perhaps thats not such a bad thing either.
I've never even heard of a variant Bushmaster but i'm sure someone has drawn a picture of it somewhere and been paid $14million...
Reference the Engineer's at 1CER, it's my understanding they use all the normal M113 variant and they work fine. Fitter's, ARVL and APC.
And what you say about 1st Armd is very true. I know for a fact that tankies have always found it very hard to sit by and watch the rest of 1 Brigade get sent overseas over and over again while they do endless bush ex's.
My take on us not getting Leo II's was so we had a vehicle that was interchangeable with our American friends and that our Abram's would never go overseas, we'd crew US M1A2's where ever we were needed. If that's true it'll definitely restrict us to fighting only US sponsored war's. But perhaps thats not such a bad thing either.
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Interim equipment I can deal with, it exists.
I only asked about the invisible vehicles as they were in listed on that piece of paper for B 3/4 Cav, 6 Tp.
Ah, but like many things that piece of paper may have been invisible as well. Never trust the system. (Sorry I think I have been around to system too long and it has made me a little bit cynical.)
Also of interested Thales Australia had the following listed on their web site at least till 1/22/2008:
Variants of the Bushmaster include:
* Troop transporter (standard variant)
* Command and control
* Ambulance
* Direct fire support weapon
* Combat engineer
* Mortar.
Seems to be a lot of invisibility here! Pity some of this might have proved interesting equipment.
Actually I don’t think there are any pictures of these. Someone missed out on the big money here.
As it is I have been use to military invisibility. Way back in the late 70’s early 80’s there was a set of unit orgs that covers funnies like SP Arty. What is even funnier, we are still trying to make a decision on this little issue of SP Arty some 28 years later, possibly some of the longest running invisibles yet. Back then it was an SP 105mm, (ABBOT) and an SP 155mm, (M109 A2).
As for 1CER, yes it is the standard M113’s just with a dozer blade attached. Sorry I did not make myself clear enough on that one. It was/is not a special variant.
As for 1st Armd I was under some mild impression that they were also rotating to get some experience but not with tanks.
Your understanding on the Abrams may be close to the facts but I see this strategically as having political as well as military flaws. This at present still introduces some invisible M1 based vehicles as well. But there is always Steel Beats to fill in the missing ‘links’.
As for the Abrams not going overseas, I will just refer to the fact that some numnut somewhere said tanks would be no good in Vietnam so they were not part of the initial deployment. (Ok put in simple terms, but that sums up the overall logic).
From Thales’s web site http://www.thalesgroup.com/australia
These sounds interesting:
1. “integration of ISTAR on Bushmaster vehicle”.
2. “Bushmaster Copperhead” -4-wheel drive cab chassis protected logistic vehicle that can carry a 4,000 kg load on its 9.4m2 tray.
I only asked about the invisible vehicles as they were in listed on that piece of paper for B 3/4 Cav, 6 Tp.
Ah, but like many things that piece of paper may have been invisible as well. Never trust the system. (Sorry I think I have been around to system too long and it has made me a little bit cynical.)
Also of interested Thales Australia had the following listed on their web site at least till 1/22/2008:
Variants of the Bushmaster include:
* Troop transporter (standard variant)
* Command and control
* Ambulance
* Direct fire support weapon
* Combat engineer
* Mortar.
Seems to be a lot of invisibility here! Pity some of this might have proved interesting equipment.
Actually I don’t think there are any pictures of these. Someone missed out on the big money here.
As it is I have been use to military invisibility. Way back in the late 70’s early 80’s there was a set of unit orgs that covers funnies like SP Arty. What is even funnier, we are still trying to make a decision on this little issue of SP Arty some 28 years later, possibly some of the longest running invisibles yet. Back then it was an SP 105mm, (ABBOT) and an SP 155mm, (M109 A2).
As for 1CER, yes it is the standard M113’s just with a dozer blade attached. Sorry I did not make myself clear enough on that one. It was/is not a special variant.
As for 1st Armd I was under some mild impression that they were also rotating to get some experience but not with tanks.
Your understanding on the Abrams may be close to the facts but I see this strategically as having political as well as military flaws. This at present still introduces some invisible M1 based vehicles as well. But there is always Steel Beats to fill in the missing ‘links’.
As for the Abrams not going overseas, I will just refer to the fact that some numnut somewhere said tanks would be no good in Vietnam so they were not part of the initial deployment. (Ok put in simple terms, but that sums up the overall logic).
From Thales’s web site http://www.thalesgroup.com/australia
These sounds interesting:
1. “integration of ISTAR on Bushmaster vehicle”.
2. “Bushmaster Copperhead” -4-wheel drive cab chassis protected logistic vehicle that can carry a 4,000 kg load on its 9.4m2 tray.
All the different variants of the Bushmaster exist, its just that they are not very different from the troop carrying version. They are all indistinguishable from the outside (besides an extra antennae or two), and simply have different internal fitouts, not unlike how an ASLAV-PC can turn into an -C or -Amb simply by installing an MRIK. For instance, the DFSW version simply has less seats and more stowage for weapons. The mortar version is the same, less seats but lots of stowage for ammo. The combat engineer version simply carries a lot of engineering stores inside. The intial production of the Bushmaster concentrated only on the troop carrying version as that was needed urgently for ops. It is only recently that the other variants have begun to reach units.
The reason the Abrams was chosen over the Leopard II was simply that the package evalutated for the Abrams was much cheaper than the package evaluated for the Leopard II (which was actually the Swedish Strv 122 version). Nothing magic there.
The reason the Abrams was chosen over the Leopard II was simply that the package evalutated for the Abrams was much cheaper than the package evaluated for the Leopard II (which was actually the Swedish Strv 122 version). Nothing magic there.
