PSU WEAPON OF COICE (your input please)

[Ex-Dragoon]

is that with the butt completely collapsed .

All so some of the spaces on our current vessel are Less than one foot in width in these cases every inch counts. think about it MP,S  and some drivers, get them in the sand box so they can get in and out of their vehicles. I think even flight crews might get them , don't quote me on that one.

Unless you know for certain don't speculate.

Milnet.Ca Staff

 

[Nfld Sapper]

is that with the butt completely collapsed .

All so some of the spaces on our current vessel are Less than one foot in width in these cases every inch counts. think about it MP,S  and some drivers, get them in the sand box so they can get in and out of their vehicles. I think even flight crews might get them , don't quote me on that one.

FYI when refering to length of the rifle, I believe you generally will quote the length of the barrel and here are the fol lengths of barrels for the C7/C8 FOW.....

C7  20 in (508 mm)
C7A1  20 in (508 mm)
C7A2  20 in (508 mm)
C8 14.5 in (368 mm)
C8A1 14.5 in (368 mm)
C8A2 14.5 in (368 mm

EDITED TO ADD

For what its worth:

C7/C7-A1 Length: normal butt, 1.0 m
C8 Length: butt closed, 760mm, butt extended, 840mm

 

[chief_of_da_fence]

chief_of_da_fence,

We have a requirement here for posters that wish to engage in discussion. That is, to the best of their ability, to use the spell check, use proper grammar and to capitalize and punctuate, where necessary. It makes the post much easier to read and helps hold people's interest. Please endeavour to help us out in this regard, by reading, and correcting your replies prior to hitting 'Post'.

Thanks

Milnet.ca Staff

I choose to ignore your attempt to publicly humiliate me CARRY ON ! recceguy .

 

[Mike Bobbitt]

I choose to ignore your attempt to publicly humiliate me CARRY ON ! recceguy .

...and I choose to mute you until you can follow recceguy's  politely worded request. Carry on Chief.

 

[Nfld Sapper]

And the BOSS has spoken.......

 

[Ex-Dragoon]

Anyways....back on topic please.

Milnet.Ca Staff

 

[NavyShooter]

C7/C7-A1 Length: normal butt, 1.0 m
C8 Length: butt closed, 760mm, butt extended, 840mm

Further to the discussion:

MP-5 collapsible stock is 700mm extended, and 550mm collapsed.  (8.9" barrel)

The C-8 is not normally fired with the buttstock fully collapsed, something tells me that the fire will be....less effective...and poorly aimed.

Adding a 40mm GL underneath would completely defeat the attempt at making a handier weapon available...looking at the M-203, it's a 1.36 KG weight added on the front end.

I'll suggest though, that instead of worrying about the specifics of the individual weapons, we have a look back at the role for PSU right now.

In truth, it is to be a visible armed presence/deterrent. 

Having a standard weapon, that everyone is trained on means that all people can fill the duty with little additional training.

If there was a threat that necessitated the carriage of a different weapon system, then sure, train the people and go for it. 

In the meantime, the basic issue C-7 is good enough for a visible armed presence.  (IMO)

If I was sitting in a RHIB doing PSU, I would not feel overly encumbered by a rifle that's 16 cm longer than another. 

NS

 

[Ex-Dragoon]

Could be worse we could be issuing PSU FNC1s lol

 

[willellis]

Haha.. I would think that something along the lines of either a sig556 Classic config. or a H&K G36C. Both offer a folding stock so that CQ are not an issue, and are both in a barrel length that are between the C7 and C8. Best of both worlds.

 

[Ex-Dragoon]

Haha.. I would think that something along the lines of either a sig556 Classic config. or a H&K G36C. Both offer a folding stock so that CQ are not an issue, and are both in a barrel length that are between the C7 and C8. Best of both worlds.

Have you ever handled either weapon system beyond COD?

Which would also mean we would have to train people on a different weapon, techs to repair a different weapon, supply to order parts for a different weapon....see where I am going....:

 

[willellis]

Haha.  I do indeed, and no I have not. Just looking at the weapons out there, they seem like a decent choice. Good call tho.

 

[Ex-SHAD]

Port Security in the context of the Naval Reserves has always been a confused issue, and suffers heavily from high turnover rates, and what seems to be a lack of vision beyond defending naval assets within the context of Halifax or Esquimalt. In my own opinion, I believe that to change Port Security we must refine or change the following elements (My PSS theory is based on serving with POESB-PSS Esquimalt, and limited engagements with PSU-Halifax).
1) Port Security Section, Port Security Unit and Formation Guard Force must establish a common operations doctrine. An effective and coherent Port Security policy is a must in an era where we face threats from both home and abroad. A solid and well executed/funded Port Security strategy is the only way to guarantee the safety of our naval assets and insure that Canada can continue to effectively wage a global war against terrorism.

2) To elevate the status of Naval Reserve based Port Security, one of the first and most important steps is for access control/security patrols to be handed over to Port Security personnel. The continued usage of unarmed civil security guards (the Corps of Commissionaires) is an outdated practice which no longer fits with the current world situation. In my own personal experience, I found the Commissionaires to be less that suited to the job of access control, and often times making mistakes which could in theory cost of lives of countless Canadian Servicemen.  With that being said, in consultation with the Naval Provost Marshal’s (of their respective regions), Port Security Personnel should take over all security functions aboard both CFB Esquimalt & CFB Halifax.

3) Port Security as a whole must transition from an any trade required function, to an actual rating with established doctrine, and leadership. Now obviously some may complain that the Navy’s primary function is not combat related and that would therefore be stepping on the toes of Army, but in a historical context many services across the world(especially in the context of the world’s Air Force’s have had to create force protection units to defend air assets, a good example being the Royal Australian Air Force Airfield Defense Guards, who were created out of necessity during Vietnam when it became impossible for the United States Air Force Security Police(now USAF Security Forces) to provide coherent and effective protection to both USAF and RAAF assets). Now with respect to a Port Security Rating, it would not have to be a direct entry and instead could operate as a re-muster rating which would then bring a wealth of experience from across the NAVRES community to the rating. The other option, would be a direct entry rating, in which personnel from the time they have completed BMQ will become adept in the all the functions and duties required of a PS Sentry/Boats Crew. Now obviously, the other question remains as to whether the rating would have its own officers, or if instead officers would be seconded to the rating to simply fulfill a logistical/leadership function. The other option, would be the creation of an PS Classification for Officers, with a focus on tactics and doctrine.


4) Now obviously in the modern CF the idea of a “fighting sailor” is considered something of a relic from the days of Nelson and the RCN, but in actuality pre-unification at least among certain elements of the RCN/RCN(R) & RCNR there seemed to be some impetus on teaching naval landing training (references to this can be found in articles in the Crowsnest Magazine). For the modern Port Security Sailor, the concept of naval landing training should be revised, since after all a well rounded fighting sailor, should be able to defend his fleet along with being able to engage the enemy without having to rely on the army, or wait for the air force to bomb the aggressor force out of existence. After all, if Port Security personnel were able to receive offensive training, as well as defensive training they could realistically be employed in combat zones (as it has sometimes been stated in the past, that the future of NAVRES PSS lies in external operations).

5) Finally, there must be a change in the security posture of NAVRES Port Security in general. Rather than simply acting as a visual deterrent/tripwire, PSU (and its sister units) should instead adopt a more aggressive policy. After all, when dealing with any aggressor it is better to be ready to fire and be on the offensive, then to stand fast and potentially loose servicemen because of vaguely instituted policies. After all, force protection should not be viewed through a litigious lens of whether or not we are justified to use force, but instead should be based around, are our sailors ready to kill a potential aggressor, and protect his fellow shipmates from harm. Now this may seem like a rather harsh view on both policy and procedure, but if we are to look at the situation in a fair and balanced manner, how many times have we seen our US Allies loose personnel in overseas operations due to rules of engagement/policies which were either too strict, or far too vague. Simply put, a sailor must be able to make a snap decision on every call, and he must feel competent to be able to back that call, if he is made to account for his actions, in front of a jury of his peers.

 

[Ex-SHAD]

Though this article relates to ground defense and how it should be implemented in the context of the Canadian Air Force, it’s worth the read for those who are interested in Force Protection as it relates to the CF.

http://wps.cfc.forces.gc.ca/papers/c...obocarlsen.doc.

 

[George Wallace]

You really don't have to SPAM the site with this link.........which I can not get to work anyway.

If I catch you posting it one more time, you may find your way onto the WARNING SYSTEM (READ up on it).

 

[Lex Parsimoniae]

the Navy’s primary function is not combat related

???

 

[Cronicbny]

1) Port Security Section, Port Security Unit and Formation Guard Force must establish a common operations doctrine. An effective and coherent Port Security policy is a must in an era where we face threats from both home and abroad. A solid and well executed/funded Port Security strategy is the only way to guarantee the safety of our naval assets and insure that Canada can continue to effectively wage a global war against terrorism.

2) To elevate the status of Naval Reserve based Port Security, one of the first and most important steps is for access control/security patrols to be handed over to Port Security personnel. The continued usage of unarmed civil security guards (the Corps of Commissionaires) is an outdated practice which no longer fits with the current world situation. In my own personal experience, I found the Commissionaires to be less that suited to the job of access control, and often times making mistakes which could in theory cost of lives of countless Canadian Servicemen.  With that being said, in consultation with the Naval Provost Marshal’s (of their respective regions), Port Security Personnel should take over all security functions aboard both CFB Esquimalt & CFB Halifax.

though somewhat off topic from the "Weapon of Choice theme" it would seem the Brass disagree with your vision - not only is PSS (Esquimalt) losing all of its funding, but NADEN is, in fact, reducing to the "open base" concept effective 1 Apr. I'm not saying I agree with the plan for PSS and the "open base" policy, but I would venture to say the PSS goose is cooked...

As for PSU, we shall see what the post PODIUM lessons learned bring forth. More importantly, we will see how this summer shapes up vis a vis NAVRES staffing KIN Class billets and billets in the Training Establishments - if we can't muster the personnel to complete those two (very important) Force Generation tasks then I think PSU might find its goose in the oven with the knob set to 450...

Enough with the Geese I suppose...

 

[chief_of_da_fence]

I think PSU might find its goose in the oven with the knob set to 450
[/quote]

I don't know if anything is cooked .They are now qualifying Reserve QL1  boatswains on the 24 ft RHIB, I can assume this is to bolster the amount of coxns  to be used in a PSU environment. I am sure there are other reasons .

BOAT COXN MOD 4A RIB 02-JUN-2010 TO 09-JUN-2010 is completely loaded with AB's

 

[Retired AF Guy]

You really don't have to SPAM the site with this link.........which I can not get to work anyway.

If I catch you posting it one more time, you may find your way onto the WARNING SYSTEM (READ up on it).

Besides not working, it locked up my computer, crashed my browser, forcing me to do a hard re-boot. Thanks!  :threat:

 

[Cronicbny]

I don't know if anything is cooked .They are now qualifying Reserve QL1  boatswains on the 24 ft RHIB, I can assume this is to bolster the amount of coxns  to be used in a PSU environment. I am sure there are other reasons .

BOAT COXN MOD 4A RIB 02-JUN-2010 TO 09-JUN-2010 is completely loaded with AB's

Given the new CMS Readiness direction and the upcoming Strategic Review of the Reserves this fall I think we're cooking above 450.

I can't see CMS justifying continued funding of PSU given the fleet reductions we have just taken.

That being said, it's a NAVRES decision as to where they will put the money - but recent 67% cuts to NROTS makes me think PSU will find itself somewhere between funding Central region meet and greets and the Training officer billet...

*IF* funding for PSU (outside of OPERATIONS - read: IFR) continues at its previous pace while we write off half of our fleet Force Generation capability I will most humbly eat my chapeau. I whole heartedly agree that we still need to FG boat coxn's for the RHIBs though... that is a core capability we need and until DMTE relegates us to the old school "War Augmentation" Formation status of the "dark days" then it will, I suspect, remain on the Res 00105 QL1

my two cents...