Plane crash near Resolute Bay kills 12 - Aug 20, 2011

[Good2Golf]

Flying Circus - 8 Air Communication and Control Squadron (8 ACCS)

If they were deployed, there would have likely been a lot more NAVAIDs than the ILS which is permanently located at YRB.

An ILS/LOC(BC), 2 x NDB, 1 x VOR, and the RNAV(GNSS) approaches...what more would civilian aviation require?


8 ACCS would be able to provide PAR/quad-radar services to military operators, but RAC 9.7.4. - Precision Radar Approaches, notes that use of Surveillance Radar-assisted approaches by Nav Can ATC units would only be provided in situations where a pilot has declared an emergency and specifically requested a radar-assisted approach.  Resolute Bay is an uncontrolled aerodrome and there are no air traffic controllers present to provide such services.  If 8 ACCS were present, it is doubtful that they would be allowed to provide civilian pilots untrained in the use of PAR approaches, especially when there are no less than five separate precision and non-precision approaches available to civilian pilots.


Regards
G2G

 

[R933ex]

Addition to this, in today's News North  2 more law suits have been launched against the AG and Nav Canada. The first one is on behalf of the pilots, the second on behalf of the family of the flight attendants.

 

[Occam]

If 8 ACCS were present, it is doubtful that they would be allowed to provide civilian pilots untrained in the use of PAR approaches, especially when there are no less than five separate precision and non-precision approaches available to civilian pilots.

It was PAR that I was wondering about, given the CFIT tack.  Thanks for the background info.

 

[dapaterson]

Just found that the TSB issued an Aviation Safety Advisory to 1 CAD related to this investigation nearly two years ago (Feb 2012).  As a non-pilot or ATC, I don't understand at least 90% of it.

http://www.bst-tsb.gc.ca/eng/enquetes-investigations/aviation/2011/A11H0002/a11h0002-d2-a1.asp


Two months later, the TSB issued Aviation Safety Information to Transport Canada, critiquing the Flight Data Recorder standards in place, and highlighting several cases of FDRs not properly recording incident data.

http://www.bst-tsb.gc.ca/eng/enquetes-investigations/aviation/2011/A11H0002/a11h0002-d2-l1.asp


News reports say that the TSB's final report will be out in early(ish) 2014.  Main TSB page for the investigation is at: http://www.bst-tsb.gc.ca/eng/enquetes-investigations/aviation/2011/A11H0002/a11h0002.asp

 

[SeaKingTacco]

Just found that the TSB issued an Aviation Safety Advisory to 1 CAD related to this investigation nearly two years ago (Feb 2012).  As a non-pilot or ATC, I don't understand at least 90% of it.

http://www.bst-tsb.gc.ca/eng/enquetes-investigations/aviation/2011/A11H0002/a11h0002-d2-a1.asp


Two months later, the TSB issued Aviation Safety Information to Transport Canada, critiquing the Flight Data Recorder standards in place, and highlighting several cases of FDRs not properly recording incident data.

http://www.bst-tsb.gc.ca/eng/enquetes-investigations/aviation/2011/A11H0002/a11h0002-d2-l1.asp


News reports say that the TSB's final report will be out in early(ish) 2014.  Main TSB page for the investigation is at: http://www.bst-tsb.gc.ca/eng/enquetes-investigations/aviation/2011/A11H0002/a11h0002.asp

The first link is, basically, the CF getting schooled by the TSB because we set up a certain type of temporary control zone that requires all instrument flight rules traffic to be kept separated either by procedural or active methods.  Whom ever from the CF who set up the control zone apparently ensured neither- although that had nothing to do with the First Air flight from flying itself into the ground.

Basically, the CF made an amateur error.

 

[YZT580]

Just found that the TSB issued an Aviation Safety Advisory to 1 CAD related to this investigation nearly two years ago (Feb 2012).  As a non-pilot or ATC, I don't understand at least 90% of it.

CF prepared all their plans and documentation to ensure that they were legal to provide services to all military flights using the aerodrome.  They neglected to plan for civilian flights.  That is what they are being chastised for. 

 

[Retired AF Guy]

The first link is, basically, the CF getting schooled by the TSB because we set up a certain type of temporary control zone that requires all instrument flight rules traffic to be kept separated either by procedural or active methods.  Whom ever from the CF who set up the control zone apparently ensured neither- although that had nothing to do with the First Air flight from flying itself into the ground.

Basically, the CF made an amateur error.

CF prepared all their plans and documentation to ensure that they were legal to provide services to all military flights using the aerodrome.  They neglected to plan for civilian flights.  That is what they are being chastised for. 

If I'm reading the first paragraph properly, what the TSB is saying that a second aircraft had also entered the control zone and the two aircraft had come to close together ( "loss of separation"); had not the First Air flight crashed, there was the possibility of an air-to-air collision. 

If anyone is interested, an explanation of a Class D control zone

 

[Good2Golf]

One thing I didn't see in this letter to 1 CAD was a reference to Nav Canada's original letter authorizing DND's set-up of the temporary Class D airspace at YRB.  There would surely have been a number of conditions that Nav Canada would have placed on DND, including, I would think, if the CZ was going to be provided to all users (civilian too, not just military), conditions for positive (radar, primary and/or secondary) and/or procedural IFR control in both instrument and visual meteorological conditions.

Interestingly, the letter does not state the degree of the "loss of separation" between First Air 6560 and the second aircraft, and thus leaves many wondering how truly dangerous the lack of separation was...or more correctly, 'would have been' had 6560 not flown into the ground. 

The entire set-up of the letter, particularly the 'background' first paragraph, seems to unnecessarily, and some might question inappropriately, tie the question of DND's provision of procedural/positive control within the Temp Class D control zone to the flight of FAB 6560 into the ground.

From some familiar with IFR flight into normally uncontrolled Class G airspace, it seems incongruous.  The question of why FAB 6560's crew apparently flew their 737 into the ground, on a track offset 1 mile east of RWY 35T's on-course is an entirely separate question.  Is this Nav Canada trying to deflect attention brought to them due to First Air's lawsuit, onto DND?

I mourn for the families of the 12 lost loved ones on flight 6560, but as an aviator, particularly one who has operated out of YRB in the past, and will do so in the future, I look forward to the results of the NTSB investigation, and what led to the crash.  I also look forward to greater clarity on how DND will be authorized by Nav Canada to operate control zones under the EATM program.


Regards
G2G 

 

[YZT580]

"IFR separation is normally provided by using radar information."  The quote is from the TC report.  Several problems with their outlook, the most important being that the basis for IFR separation is not radar but time and/or altitude.  In other words, procedural separation rules are the basis for all IFR separation procedures.  There are no details as to who handed off the a/c and who accepted it.  Did the NavCanada sector contact the radar site and initiate a hand-off or just dump the flight over?  If so, what was the basis for accepting the hand-off?  In addition, it is not up to NavCanada to authorize military anything but it is a function of Transport Canada and it is up to them to ensure that all the provisions for separation, communication and coordination are in place and that includes training up to and ensuring that non-radar procedures are available.  Without seeing  the transcripts, the loa between NavCanada and MOD, and finally the authorizing notam between TC, DOD, and NavCanada everything is pure speculation but I suspect that the powers that be are going to try and ensure that all of these details stay under the rug as much as possible.  Most of them have forgotten the applicable rules since they are not used very often.

 

[Zoomie]

  There are no details as to who handed off the a/c and who accepted it.  Did the NavCanada sector contact the radar site and initiate a hand-off or just dump the flight over?

There is no "hand-off" that far north.  Once you depart north of Yellowknife, you are essentially procedural all the way to destination.  You follow non-RADAR IFR procedures, conduct position reports and call before entering the airspace surrounding whichever airport you are flying into.

 

[Good2Golf]

YZT, good point about the authorization coming from TC, not NavCan.  Your and Zoomie's points about procedural IFR separation is what makes me wonder about NavCanada's admonishment of DND for not providing 'positive radar control' -- one would assume NavCanada was thinking of a capability based on both secondary and primary radar, but that is not any capability I have ever seen in Northern Domestic Airspace.

Regards
G2G

 

[SeaKingTacco]

G2G-

I didn't read the letter the same way as you.  I took TC as admonishing DND for not instituting proper Class D procedures- period.  Obviously, radar separation of IFR traffic is the gold standard, but as you well know, procedural separation works just fine. 

During Nav School, we visit a lot northern Manitoba and Ontario airfields that are a non radar environment.  It is no big deal- but only one IFR movement is allowed in the control zone at a time, period (yes, I know that you know this). It can lead to some long holds, however. I have waited for 40 mins to get into Red Lake, for example.

I suspect that the potential loss of separation that TC was hypothesizing about was that two IFR movements were going to enter the CZ at Res Bay at the same time with no radar- then the accident happened which was unrelated to this issue.  I am not aware of a method of doing that legally (there might be an ICP around who might know of a method- I don't).

Anyhow- interesting letter.

 

[YZT580]

Sorry Zoomie, wrong term.  There should have been an estimate passed from the last sector to YRB.  Upon receiving the estimate the approach controller would have issued any restrictions on the flight to ensure separation between the new inbound and FirstAir that is unless the a/c was flying IFR in uncontrolled airspace which would mean that he would have had to call for clearance to enter the airspace.  It is quite conceivable to have more than 1 a/c in the area at a time: that is why holding patterns were invented.  Unless the new inbound was cleared for an approach there should have been vertical separation with a EFC time at YRB issued to the new inbound that was above the missed approach altitude: even a EFC at YRB or clearance limit YRB with no delay expected would have been good enough.  If that was done then everything is kosher.  That is why I said that without the transcript it is impossible to judge at all. It almost sounds as if everyone involved in setting up the controlled airspace totally forgot about procedural control procedures and that is a big whoooops

 

[Good2Golf]

SKT, I tried getting a more recent copy of NAVCAN ATC MANOPs, but the best I could find was from the CZEG FIR site for NavCan references, which is a seven year-old version, and non current ( ATC MANOPS, ATCD 2006-3, 20-Jul-2006, PDF 5.5mb ).

I can't find anything that specifically restricts the number of aircraft in the zone on approach, so long as appropriate separation is maintained, be it procedural or positive (radar) control.  Both sections 560 (562 in particular for sequential approaches) and 532 (minima - separation) in Part 5 relate to radar controlled zones, and Part 4, section 470 related to procedural separation.  The required lateral and/or longitudinal separation during procedural control may result in de facto exclusion from the control zone, i.e. if MANOPS (particularly 532.1A) dictate a minimum separation of 5nm between IFR arrivals, that could, depending on where the first aircraft was in its approach, (commencing a procedure turn over the RU NDB, for example, to set up for the ILS RWY 35T) preclude the second aircraft from even being authorized to enter the Class D control zone (5nm in YRB, I believe).  This could then become an area for confusion in itself, as the second aircraft would technically be in Class G uncontrolled airspace if not in the Class D control zone...and would it then be subject to direction from the ATC unit?

As YZT580 notes, without knowing what constraints TC placed on DND for the operation of the temp Class D control zone, and without knowing any details of the second aircraft referred to in TC's letter and where it was, such that the TSB believed that the MATCU had not provided the required minimum separation, and even if civilian aircraft were subject to military control, it is extremely difficult to understand fully the alleged deficiencies in military air traffic control services at the time.  The letter referred to the Cdn Forces Supplement to the NavCan MANOPs, but then said that procedures were not in place to provide non-radar separation.  I am confused by this statement as the CFS and even the NavCan MANOPs itself contain the procedures necessary to maintain procedural (non-radar) separation.

It would certainly have helped the military to be provided more information on the issues noted by the TSB.  This would have allowed for DND to disseminate more specific information throughout the ATC and ICP networks to affected.  To my knowledge, such specifics have not been passed through the ICP network, for increased general awareness on the subject.  Perhaps such clarification will be provided prior to the next round of OP NANOOKs/NUNALIVUT.


Regards
G2G 

 

[SeaKingTacco]

G2G-

An excellent summary. 

The only fly in the ointment- would the IFR traffic in the Res Bay case not have been coming out of Class A, vice, G airspace, given that it was jet traffic?  Does that not change things?  (I don't have a 204 in front of me and cannot remember where Class A airspace starts  in Northern Domestic Airspace, vertically).

 

[Zoomie]

Thank you wiki for making my search easy:

"Class A airspace exists exclusively between FL180 and FL600. In the SDA, it begins at 18,000. However, in the NDA it does not. The NDA is divided into two Control Areas: the Arctic Control Area (ACA) and the Northern Control Area (NCA). In the NCA, Class A airspace extends upwards from FL230, and FL 270 (formerly 280) in the ACA"

Anyone know which altitude block those old-gen 73's work out of?

 

[Good2Golf]

Not necessarily, SKT. 

Since CYRB is in the Arctic Control Area of Northern Domestic Airspace, there is a 9,000' 'sandwich' of Class G uncontrolled high level between FL180 and FL270.  Class A airspace only starts at FL270 and goes higher in the ACA, so in lieu of any temporary control zone or terminal control area being established at CYRB, all flights below FL270 will necessarily be uncontrolled.  Given that most operators would conduct some type of profile descent (last time I did a 'gut-wrenching' HI TACAN approach dropping essentially out of high level airspace within the control zone was about 24 years ago), I can't see an airliner (or any airplane, for that matter) staying above FL270 until within 25 nm of an airport (the MF radius at CYRB is 25nm).  There would definitely be a clear period of travel in "fully uncontrolled" airspace until the aircraft was about to enter the MF Zone and then, while still uncontrolled, the pilot would then be required to make several communications, at least: (ref: CAP charts for CYRB)

a) on 126.7, 15 min back from landing;

b) on 126.7, commencing the descent...not sure how an extended profile descent would affect this call, conceivably a profile descent could start notably longer than 15 minutes prior to the ETA); and

c) on the MF of 122.1 when 5 mins from commencing the approach (which for the ILS or LOC(BC) I would take to be 5 min back from planned intercept of the PT fix outbound. 

The CYRB 25NM MSA is 2200' ASL, so that leaves about 24,800' of altitude between being in controlled airspace and being down at the MSA, from where you could then drop down another 400' to the PT altitude of 1,800' once you passed the RU beacon outbound on your track of 167T.


While not controlled by them myself at the time, I have been in the area when 8 ACCS  is providing radar services, both PAR and an equivalent to what we would call combined primary/secondary radars.  The other operators conducted both PARs and radar area let-downs (basically a vectored circling approach, negating the need for a procedure turn to navigate to the FAF) and in both cases, the control provided by 8 ACCS controllers was of excellent standard.  I have to ask myself whether the issues that surrounded Resolute Bay back in 2012 were centred more on mutual miscommunication, than they were on a flagrant disregard for airspace control and airmanship, as the TSB letter would appear to impugn.

I can't ever see a civilian operator being allowed by TC to conduct a precision radar approach except in an emergency situation, so the only function I could see provided by any ATC unit, military or civilian, in CYRB would be flow control and management of the control zone/terminal control area such that civilian operators would be able to expeditiously conduct one of the approved, published approaches.


Regards
G2G

 

[Good2Golf]

Looks like Zoomie scooped me while I was writing my response.  :nod:

Zoomie, I can't recall a specific block, but last time I was in YFB chatting with the Canadian North guys who had flown us up on a -200 combo, they mentioned they would run mid-FL2##'s.  That was YFB, which is, due to a little cutout of the SCA and NCA, part of the SCA, so HLA still starts at FL180 and flying in the 200's would still have been fully controlled HLA.


Regards
G2G

 

[YZT580]

There are no specific qualification requirements for civilian flights for a PAR.  In fact, through the mid70s YYZ used PAR for runway 32 (now 33R) as the only other approach available was a BC with no glide path.  So qualification for PAR is not a factor.  Now who gave the second flight clearance to enter controlled airspace?  The standard NavCanada clearance pre- military ops would have issued a clearance to leave controlled airspace via descent and to report leaving controlled airspace so unless there was something on the sector ops letters to coordinate something different that is what the second aircraft would have received.  I don't know what altitude the Class D airspace commenced but there is still a transition area from HL controlled to the control zone through which the aircraft was uncontrolled.  My guess, and it is strictly a guess, is that there was no provision made to coordinate inbound flights given that NavCanada responsibiliities ended at FL180 and the class D started at what? 5000 so NavCAnada did nothing since they didn't have to.  That would appear to be a loss of separation just looking for a place to happen and folks need to take a real good look at the transition.

 

[Zoomie]

  Given that most operators would conduct some type of profile descent, I can't see an airliner (or any airplane, for that matter) staying above FL270 until within 25 nm of an airport (the MF radius at CYRB is 25nm). 

Apparently the older Gen 737 handles very similar to the B707 - if that is so, it's a slick jet and a handful to slow/descend.  That being said, we routinely use a x3/x4 distance to go//altitude to lose multiplier.  So these guys would have been descending well out to 100nm back.

My arctic IFR flying has always been in lower airspace.  Even coming out of Thule to Alert, we had to transit relatively high for the Buff - until basically no-one wanted to talk to us.  At which point we made the broadcasts on 126.7 and conducted our own RADAR let-down over Hans Island area.  We proceeded on an IFR flight plan up to Alert, canceled IFR with the radio and proceeded to land WFI.  This type of flying is very much prevalent throughout the north - if an operator missed the NOTAM, he could very well stumble into the temporary airspace surround YRB.