"O'Connor has $8B military 'wish list"

[Sheerin]

If memory serves most defence critics are assclowns... one just has to think back to O'Connor's comments when he held the post.

 

[paracowboy]

If memory serves most defense critics are assclowns... one just has to think back to O'Connor's comments when he held the post.

that is a fact.

 

[KevinB]

Now now name calling will not get you anywhere.

I view it less name calling and more of a statement of fact.

Believe me I dont like O'Connor - but the points being thrown against him are utter falacy.  You cannot throw the Lobbyist title at him in connection with the C17 - PERIOD.
He lobbied for AirBus -- so IF (like is insinuated by the Liberal Defence Critic) O'Connor is follwing his lobbyist roots intent -- then Airbus should have benifited.

As much as I think O'Connor is a fool -- I think he has integrity.

 

[Edward Campbell]

Below, reproduced under the Fair Dealings provisions of the Copyright Act, is an editorial from today’s National Post suggesting that the government of the day should allow the military to set procurement priorities.

I disagree.

It is the role of government – ministers and bureaucrats – to set the military’s course.  This includes deciding on priorities – especially priorities for major capital expenditures.  It is important to remember that strategy is the business of civilians – soldiers are rarely expert at it, being preoccupied with operational and tactical issues.  Strategy, at the national level, includes deciding that we will, or will not, have an independent global strategic reach  which implies that we will have strategic sea and air lift.

It is understandable that the defence staff, being preoccupied with current operational and tactical issue, have a short range shopping list.  We want – at least I think we should want – our political leaders and their bureaucratic advisors to have a long range view.  Now, perhaps Gen. Hillier is right – perhaps tactical transporters are the best course open; perhaps Minister O’Connor is wrong – perhaps the C-17 production line is not coming to an early end, perhaps we can still get them at current prices some five or ten years from now; I do not know who is right.  I do know that I accept that elected ministers have a duty and a right to make the final decision – having considered all the factors, including the military’s (current) operational interests.

Anyway, here is the Post’s view:

http://www.canada.com/nationalpost/news/editorialsletters/story.html?id=b4024764-e204-44ed-ae26-88f9256c958d

Let the military call the shots

National Post
Thursday, June 08, 2006

If Canadian Forces' commanders believe other aircraft would be a better fit for our overseas missions, then the Conservative cabinet should not plow ahead with the proposed purchase of four huge Boeing C-17 Globemaster cargo planes. We laud the government for moving swiftly to update our military's rusting equipment. When it comes to deciding what to buy, however, procurement decisions should be guided by the best judgment of our military.

But while the Cabinet would do well to heed the advice of the country's most senior generals and admirals, it should ignore the opposition Liberals' demand that buying a new airlift plane be delayed until pledges of hundreds of new Canadian jobs can be extracted from the winning manufacturer. It was just this kind of game-playing that plagued the Liberals' administration of our armed forces over the past decade. They saw the procurement process as first and foremost a way to score votes by propping up unprofitable manufacturers and service industries in ridings that might be persuaded to vote Liberal.

The ill-fated Iltis land patrol vehicle is a prime example. Never popular with troops and infamous for its lack of armour against land mines and bullets, the Liberals nonetheless chose the Iltis over other, more highly recommended alternatives because Volkswagen, which made the Jeep-like vehicle, would agree to have them built by Bombardier rather than in one of its own assembly plants.

Of course, this provision of the deal also almost tripled the Iltis's cost. But no mind: The Liberals bolstered their electoral hold on Montreal as a result. Never save a life when you can save a riding.

The same pattern was followed with the maintenance contract for our CF-18 fighters and our inability to choose a new main battle tank. Both were caused by political considerations. And of course, there are our decrepit Sea King helicopters, which would have long ago been replaced by superior maritime choppers had the Liberals not cancelled a contract for new ones, just because the deal was signed by the previous Conservative government of Brian Mulroney.

Multi-purpose sealift ships, troop transport helicopters, submarines, armoured personal carriers, supply trucks: the list of military contracts delayed or cancelled by the Liberals' insistence on working every purchase to their political advantage is long and shameful.

There is an urgent need to replace Canada's Hercules long-range aircraft. While they have been the noble workhorses of our forces for nearly five decades -- ferrying personnel, supplies and humanitarian aids to war zones, peacekeeping missions and natural disasters -- 19 of the 32 Hercules aircraft flown by the CF were purchased while Lester Pearson was still prime minister. Many are approaching 50,000 air hours, the point at which they must be retired.

Perhaps the Boeing C-17 Globemaster -- an enormous, jet-engined cargo plane capable of carrying four times what a single Hercules can transport, faster and farther -- is not the answer. Perhaps it is too much airplane for a smaller army such as ours. If that is the military consensus, then the Conservatives should heed the military professionals under them. At $2.5-billion for just four C-17 aircraft, it is too expensive a piece of hardware to be wrong about.

General Rick Hillier, Chief of the Defence Staff, is said to favour Hercules replacements that are smaller than the Boeing planes because more of them could be purchased and because smaller planes would be useful on more missions. That seems to us to be advice worth listening to. But when Liberal MP Ujjal Dosanjh starts blustering that the Conservatives are eager to buy American planes that would "deprive Canadian industry of $3-billion in economic benefits" just to win favour with the White House, well, that's just the Liberals making politics with military contracts again. When it comes to military procurement, listen to those in uniform, not those on the opposition benches.

© National Post 2006​

I do agree with the National Post when it says the government should ignore the clamouring of the opposition re: jobs, Jobs, JOBS.  Military procurement for job creation is a mug’s game: we should aim to get the most for the least cost which, more often than not, means buying off-shore.  Every penny spent on offsets (jobs for Canadians) is a total, complete waste – every single offset, without fail, costs us long suffering taxpayers at least 101% of its value.  Sometimes, but far, far less often than has been the case for the past 25 years, Canadian add-ons are useful – most often, however, they are vote buying boondoggles.  We need to get out of the offsets and Canadianization games – they are bad business.

 

[Kirkhill]

I do know that I accept that elected ministers have a duty and a right to make the final decision

Therein lies the rub Edward - people are not used to the notion of ANYBODY making ANY decisiions, much less standing in their place and accepting the consequences.

 

[-dikweed-]

I always thought going for the AirBus deal that would supply us with Refurbished C-130s until the A400M was available is the best way to go.  If world powers like France and Germany can make do without owning C-17s or Antonovs, why can't we?  I also know the gov't wants to stay away from Airbus for the time being due to the MND's past connections.  We should probably see how it flies first though lol. 

IMO, doesn't it seem odd that the CF will operate the most expensive lifter in the world while at the same time relying on allies for tactical chopper lift?

 

[vonGarvin]

If world powers like France and Germany can make do without owning C-17s or Antonovs, why can't we? 

"World power" France?  Germany?  Dude, it's been a while.  While you're at it, why not ask that if Haiti can survive without an effectively functioning sewer system, why can't we?
:

 

[-dikweed-]

"World power" France?  Germany?  Dude, it's been a while.  While you're at it, why not ask that if Haiti can survive without an effectively functioning sewer system, why can't we?
:

France and Germany have seats at the table while we, as a middle power, do not.  They are world powers with far, far more influence than what we can muster. 

I'll be happy to have C-17s, in fact  I'll cry with joy, I am just questioning the reasoning behind it.  We have far more pressing concerns than strategic airlift. 

 

[vonGarvin]

France and Germany have seats at the table while we, as a middle power, do not.  They are world powers with far, far more influence than what we can muster. 

I'll be happy to have C-17s, in fact  I'll cry with joy, I am just questioning the reasoning behind it.  We have far more pressing concerns than strategic airlift. 

Disagree whole heartedly.  We are destroying our tac lift just trying to keep our troops sustained.  We have great need for Strat lift (IMHO)

 

[FSTO]

France and Germany have seats at the table while we, as a middle power, do not.  They are world powers with far, far more influence than what we can muster. 

I'll be happy to have C-17s, in fact  I'll cry with joy, I am just questioning the reasoning behind it.  We have far more pressing concerns than strategic airlift. 

France has a seat, Germany doesn't (at the UN).

Neither France, nor Germany has the internal distance to warrant a C17. Canada does, and I am sure that once we get them we will wonder how we survived without them.

 

[Colin Parkinson]

My understanding that the delivery date for the C-17 is within 2 years, this means that the C-17 can take over the long haul routes and save the current C130’s for the short hauls. Perhaps have a cargo transfer point outside of Afghanistan, where the C-17’s can unload without threat of being rocketed or such into the more expendable C130’s. this means the C130’s are doing short hauls reducing flying hours and extending the fleet life until they are replaced and give time for proper contracting. 

 

[paracowboy]

Colin, I'm not sure you're correct here. (I'm well outside my lane and stand to be corrected by any of our resident fly-boys). But, it was explained to me that the majority of the stress an airframe receives happens on take-offs and landings, and that, therefore, the length of the actual flight is relatively immaterial.

 

[Good2Golf]

PC, that's exactly right.  That's what happened when we took a transoceanic airliner and used it as an AMU-hopping commuter...in the later years, Boeing's were busting landing gear components and fatiguing dynamic parts like crazy because of the unintended usage.

Currently, Herc DO fly mostly intra-theatre.  Polaris is primary strat lifter in to theatre.  Yes, there are some items that come in on more-or-less "direct" flights by 130 but that's the exception, and very rare one at that.

Colin, just wondering...what makes a C130 (and its crew) more "expendable" than a C17?

Cheers,
Duey

 

[Old Sweat]

PC,

If you need some company outside the lane, I think you are correct about the stresses of take offs and landings. However I believe the maintenance cycle is based on hours flown and thus the time spent in the air. Add: Duey has proven you correct, but I still think the maintenance issue is moot.

Back to the issue of strategic and tactical airlift, we are in a unique position in this country in that we are a very long way from most of our potential theatres of operations. Without the wherewithal to maintain large permanent bases or stockpiles of kit and supplies closer to the action, we have to use some means of strategic deployment. Whether that is leased or owned aircraft and/or shipping and in what proportion I will leave to those more qualified that I. The rider is that we also need tactical transport to get around in theatre.

The issue of helicopter lift which was mentioned a few posts back is an important side issue that is not germane to the discussion of fixed wing transport, in my opinion.

 

[Kirkhill]

Old Sweat, I'm not sure the differentiation between rotary and seized/fixed wing assets is that clear.  This letter from AUSA (Association of the United States Army) makes it clear that at least some folks see the aircraft for the Joint Cargo Aircraft programme, broadly similar to our Fixed Wing SAR programme, as replacements for some of the duties of the Chinook.  Because of a lack of short runway aircraft scarce Chinooks have been pressed into service doing tasks that the JCA could do if it was available.  The Chinook is needed for other taskings

May 16, 2006


On behalf of the more than 100,000 members of the Association of the United States Army (AUSA), I write to urge you to take whatever actions are required to restore funding for the Army’s portion of the Joint Cargo Aircraft (JCA) program.

There is a critical need within the Army to replace its organic fixed wing cargo aircraft now. This capability is essential to support the Army’s efforts in the Global War on Terrorism including efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq. JCA was also intended to support non-wartime missions for the Army and National Guard within the continental United States. Any further delay in the program will cause a significant increase in operations and maintenance costs of the CH-47 fleet which has been performing the missions intended for the JCA.
In order to more quickly and safely supply its soldiers on the battlefield as well as completed myriad other missions, our Army must have the capabilities provided by the JCA. Therefore, it is imperative that the Congress restore funding authorization for the JCA program, fully fund the Army’s portion of the JCA program and direct the Army to continue its acquisition process to procure an aircraft based on its original approved requirement, and future operations and maintenance budget constraints.

AUSA stands ready to assist in this worthy effort.

http://www.ausa.org/webpub/DeptGovAffairs.nsf/byid/JSUR-6PUQJY?OpenDocument&Print=1

The problem with all of these competitions is that the aircraft don't nicely fall into direct competition categories.  As I have said before elsewhere the various aircraft stand as discrete points on a spectrum: C17; A400M; C130J-30; C130J; C27J; C295M; CN235 and (just for good measure) DHC-5.  C17, A400M and C130J-30 competed for the Strategic lift dollars.  The A400M, C130J-30 and the C130J competed for the Medium/Large Tactical dollars.  The C130J, C27J, C295M and the CN235 are competing for the small Tactical dollars in the role that the DHC-5 was designed for. 

In the US rotary wing CH47s are doing jobs that the small Tacs could do, that the Army wants done, but the Air Force seems to have a problem with.  My guess is that the Army wants something like the old DHC-5 and in its absence will accept something up to the C27J.  The US Air Force would probably be happier if the dollars were supplied to it to buy more C130J-30s or Js but would find the C27J acceptable as long as they got to keep the jobs.  The Army meanwhile doesn't seem to need the jobs, it would probably be happy if somebody would just do the job they need doing.

OT:  I have been fascinated by the notion, alluded to in a number of Rand studies, that the Air Force could only ever guarantee the Army use of 25% of the C17 fleet, even for a 1 week surge to deploy a Stryker Brigade.  The rest of the aircraft are apparently tied up on Air Force support duties.  Jointness down south still seems to have a ways to go.

 

[Old Sweat]

Kirkhill,

Thank you for that. From a Canadian perspective, we are unlikely to be able to field a fleet that complex. As for the dedication of flying hours to army support, I vaguely remember seeing a breakdown of the C130 hours that were actually devoted to support of the army many, many years ago and suggest that the 25% figure is not too far out of line.

Perhaps Duey or one of the other aviators could comment on the percentage of the rotary wing hours that are available to flying missions in direct support of the army. Training, maintenance of proficiency, ferry flights and VIP lift eat up a lot of the available hours, if I recall correctly, again from many years ago. I remember discussing this with both the 10 TAG staff and the pilots from 427 Squadron who used to frequent the 2 RCHA mess.

 

[Cdn Blackshirt]

Duey,

Would not the addition of even (1) C-17 due to its range and lifting capacity not replace the equivalent of (3) or (4) C-130's (which you could then either completely take out of service if totally unairworthy or if determined worthwhile perhaps refurbish)?

Specifically, as an example could you walk a civvie through the comparables of airlifting whatever the maximum number of pallets you can jam in a C-17 from Trenton to Kabul as carried by the (1) C-17 and the required number of C-130's?

How many Herc's to lift the same load?

How many refueling stops for each aircraft type would be normal (I'm just thinking about the airframe stresses previously mentioned at take-off and landing)?

And anything else I've overlooked?

Many thanks in advance....


Matthew. 

 

[George Wallace]

Would not the addition of even (1) C-17 due to its range and lifting capacity not replace the equivalent of (3) or (4) C-130's (which you could then either completely take out of service if totally unairworthy or if determined worthwhile perhaps refurbish)?

One would do as you suggest, but would not be practical.  You would need approx. four as proposed.  If you didn't have a small fleet, you would have to schedule all your Deployments and 'Emergencies' around the Maintenance Schedule for the aircraft.  With a small fleet you should always have one or more aircraft in service, while others were down for maintenance.

 

[Cdn Blackshirt]

One would do as you suggest, but would not be practical.  You would need approx. four as proposed.  If you didn't have a small fleet, you would have to schedule all your Deployments and 'Emergencies' around the Maintenance Schedule for the aircraft.  With a small fleet you should always have one or more aircraft in service, while others were down for maintenance.

I may be a civvie, but I didn't just fall off the turnip truck....  ;D

I was just thinking in terms of a replacement ratio and how bringing in (4) new C-17's could lighten the burden on the current C-130 fleet, and more to the point if we looked at the Trenton-Kabul airlift requirement how many flight hours/take-offs/landings in C-130's could be eliminated with the additional of those (4) C-17's, and as such how many C-130's "could" be taken off the flight line either permanently or for refurbishment if the airframes were worth the effort.


Matthew. 

 

[Good2Golf]

Kirkhill,

Thank you for that. From a Canadian perspective, we are unlikely to be able to field a fleet that complex. As for the dedication of flying hours to army support, I vaguely remember seeing a breakdown of the C130 hours that were actually devoted to support of the army many, many years ago and suggest that the 25% figure is not too far out of line.

Perhaps Duey or one of the other aviators could comment on the percentage of the rotary wing hours that are available to flying missions in direct support of the army. Training, maintenance of proficiency, ferry flights and VIP lift eat up a lot of the available hours, if I recall correctly, again from many years ago. I remember discussing this with both the 10 TAG staff and the pilots from 427 Squadron who used to frequent the 2 RCHA mess.

Old Sweat, no, your memory has not failed you in the least!  Direct support from the Air Force to the Army was a small portion, 10%-25% for aviation as it varied throughout the last decade and a half (the start of the "lean years", early-90's)  Tac Aviation was highest followed by TAL.  Rarely would the Army ever see CAS in Canada during training.  Now that's not to say we weren't able to realize some collateral training, but much support was to other stuff...admin, VIP, etc...  It also depended on the type of aircraft within aviation as well.  When I was flying Chinooks, I would guess that less than 10% of flying, closer to 5%, was in direct support of the Army...most to the SSF (para & boatwork) and a bit to 5e Bde.
Far more was to national "rotary Herc"-like support taskings, replacing HDACS batteries from Eureka to Alert, etc...  I can only recall doing one airmobile in support of a non-para/non-light infantry unit with the 147.  My time on the Twin Huey was a bit of an anomaly since I flew for the prime user >90%.

Duey,

Would not the addition of even (1) C-17 due to its range and lifting capacity not replace the equivalent of (3) or (4) C-130's (which you could then either completely take out of service if totally unairworthy or if determined worthwhile perhaps refurbish)?

Specifically, as an example could you walk a civvie through the comparables of airlifting whatever the maximum number of pallets you can jam in a C-17 from Trenton to Kabul as carried by the (1) C-17 and the required number of C-130's?

How many Herc's to lift the same load?

How many refueling stops for each aircraft type would be normal (I'm just thinking about the airframe stresses previously mentioned at take-off and landing)?

And anything else I've overlooked?

Many thanks in advance....

Matthew. 

Matthew, in terms of bulk, a C-17 will take a total of 18 x 463L pallets (the flat 88"x108" aluminum "plates" you see cargo loaded on..pretty much a NATO standard for air-lift palletization).  The C-17 is wide enough to take two full rows, seven in each row on the floor (14) and two per row on the ramp (4), thus totalling the 18 pallets.  The C-130 takes 5 x 463L pallets on the floor (IIRC, a C130J-30 'stretch' will take a 6th pallet on the floor) and a partially-loaded pallet on the ramp.  So, bulk-wise a C-17 carries about 3 1/2 times the bulk load that a Herc can.

Now weight...compared to a C-17, the Herc's issue is weight, not bulk...meaning you can get the pallets in, but the weight eats almost directly against the usable fuel load, thus greatly reducing range when you're loaded to max normal weight (about 36-37k lbs for the E or H models, max-max is 42,000-ish).  "Empty" (of cargo), a Herc can fly about 5,000 miles, do about 2,500 with half max cargo (~20,000 lbs) and if carrying around 35,000 lbs, an E or H-model will fly about 1400-1500 miles.  Since our Es or Hs are not themselves refuellable, they would have to hop with a max load.  The C-17 of course can gas in-flight, probably needing about 2 or 3 refuels to lift its max 170,000lb payload into theatre (Kabul) (about 12,500 miles from Trenton to Kabul as the crow flies).  A Herc would need 9-10 hops from airport to airport carrying a "de-turreted" LAV to get into theatre...

In the end, there really is no comparison in the long-range lifting between the two aircraft.  The C-17 was designed to lift lots of cargo long distances, in-flight refuelling was an added bonus to fly anywhere in the world.  Herc's really can't compare.  We in Canada just happened to use the Hercs over much longer distance than Lockheed originally intended the Herc to go, since some stuff doesn't fit into an LD3 pallet like the Boeing took, or Polaris takes today.

Cheers,
Duey