New roles for reserve recce? (an idea)

[dogger1936]

The issue, IMO, isn't re-roling Armd Recce.  The issue is that most folks don't have a clue what to do with a Recce Tp or Sqn, or what they are capable of doing. 

So, in all seriousness, to me the solution is one of education and knowledge.

So the question should be "how do we ensure the BG commander know how to employ his recce elements on the battlefield."

 

[dogger1936]

Here you witnessed first hand the lack of knowledge of what Recce does and some of the misuse and abuse that they face.  I guess this is why you have been formulating these questions and hopefully you are garnering useful info in the replies.

He also should look at how reg force recce was employed on tour....a recce squadron should not have it's own AO and be employed as a infantryish type group (i.e we need a company here...send recce sqn). Our tour recce...didnt do recce. And there was plenty of times we needed/could have used the element.

 

[George Wallace]

So the question should be "how do we ensure the BG commander know how to employ his recce elements on the battlefield."

Actually, this is not only a problem of how to employ recce elements, but all elements.  So many officers do not have the knowledge of what their supporting elements are capable of, and not capable of.  Those that do, do employ them to the best of their capabilities.  That includes Recce. 

Don't let bad experiences at lower levels cloud the picture.  That said, back in the days of the RV's, where numerous Bdes deployed and had head to head battles, and practiced Live Fire as Cbt Teams, these things were worked out and the various Arms and Branches showed their stuff and others became acquainted with what they did.  Even the small things as to Sgt Majors running Field Camps and Field Routine have been for the most part forgotten.  Money strapped as we are, the question of whether or not we can ever see major EXERCISEs like the RVs again, may be one to ask.

 

[Infanteer]

Actually, this is not only a problem of how to employ recce elements, but all elements.  So many officers do not have the knowledge of what their supporting elements are capable of, and not capable of.  Those that do, do employ them to the best of their capabilities.  That includes Recce. 

What are you basing this on?

 

[Webgear]

Actually, this is not only a problem of how to employ recce elements, but all elements.  So many officers do not have the knowledge of what their supporting elements are capable of, and not capable of.  Those that do, do employ them to the best of their capabilities.  That includes Recce. 

Don't let bad experiences at lower levels cloud the picture.  That said, back in the days of the RV's, where numerous Bdes deployed and had head to head battles, and practiced Live Fire as Cbt Teams, these things were worked out and the various Arms and Branches showed their stuff and others became acquainted with what they did.  Even the small things as to Sgt Majors running Field Camps and Field Routine have been for the most part forgotten.  Money strapped as we are, the question of whether or not we can ever see major EXERCISEs like the RVs again, may be one to ask.

I think George is correct in his statement, based off fours years at CMTC I have observed many situations were the supporting elements are not used to their full capabilities.

I would like to see exercises like RVs occur again however looks like we will stay to make do with  pre-deployment training exercises like Maple Guardian and Resolve to learn forgotten skills.

 

[ArmyRick]

A few interesting points here. It seems as our army transitions from Pre afghan (Cold war thinking only) to afghan (COIN) and then onto to post Afghan (Who knows? My guess is different flavours of COIN), we are in a conundrum.

Armoured Reserve Recce being re-tasked to infantry? Not sure thats the best idea. I can't say what, but that day may come where need these guys. To start with for dom ops, the G wagon is fine (Extremely low IED threat here in Canada). As far as FE, the reality is their will have to be some kind of work up trg. Even at that, look at 2002 3 VP BG TTPs and 2003 3RCR TTPs compared to the TTPs used by BG in the later years. The Taliban themselves I am sure adapted and changed to try and defeat us.

Infantry has an advantage. In our raw basic skills, we are a low budget and easy to train (troops + small arms + ranges or trg area + good plan = good trg). Vehicle skills (LAV, RG, TAPV, etc, etc) will also take time to work up.

I think we need to structure our reg and reserve for early entry forces and follow on sustainable/adaptable forces.

 

[dogger1936]

What are you basing this on?

I'd support Georges statement actually.

A few things come to mind one off the top of my head was watching a young infantry officer plan an attack on a mock up afgan village. He had plenty of thing avail to him for his attack and decided to park his zulu vehicles and tanks 2km outside the village...with the recce sqn Echo C/s's and tank sqn. Then proceed on foot to the obj.

Once Gen Milner (a seasoned officer and one I've always respected) got wind of his plan he quickly provided another plan to the young nodding infantry officer.

While walking in was simple to plan...it wasn't effective.

The attack suddenly had OP's watching for 24 hr's to est pattern of life and keep eyes on the obj. TCP's were established around the town to disrupt and suddenly the infantry had firepower covering their bums.

That's the knowledge of seasoned officers (like those of the days when we had things like RV's and CMTC's every fall and spring ex etc)who had a larger background knowledge of what each guy at the Orders group could bring to the plan.

Young officers haven't had the exposure of other elements as they use to. Luckily there are some good WO's and older captains out there who remember and pass this info down.

 

[PPCLI Guy]

The talk of "a war vs the war" is a red herring.  The Army has conducted a PRICIE + G analysis that is linked to the Canada First Defence Strategy, and determined what our Force Emplyment model is, which of course informs our Force Genration base.  In other words, short of a full mobilisation to counter an existential threat, we already know what our BGs and Bdes will look like in contact.  It is called Force 2013.  It is not a theoretical construct - it defines the way we will deploy, and hence fight.

So, again, there are no PRes Armoured Recce specific outputs in the current construct except individual augmentees.....

 

[brihard]

The Army has conducted a PRICIE + G analysis

Sorry- can you dumb that down for me please? Normally I've got good acronym-fu, but I'm failing on this one.

 

[PPCLI Guy]

Sorry- can you dumb that down for me please? Normally I've got good acronym-fu, but I'm failing on this one.

PRICIE is the acronym for Personnel, R&D/Ops Research, Infrastructure & Organization, Concepts, Doctrine & Collective Training, IT Infrastructure, Equipment, Supplies and Services.  The G is Governmenatal Direction.

 

[Webgear]

If I am not mistaken, it is a long process of determining the requirements of new personnel positions, equipment and such.

The process includes changes to UICs, position numbers, budgets/funding and such.

There is a long of paperwork and staff involvement.

I have avoided the process in my current position, however have heard the term quite a bit over the last few years.

PPLCI Guy will likely correct me.

 

[brihard]

PRICIE is the acronym for Personnel, R&D/Ops Research, Infrastructure & Organization, Concepts, Doctrine & Collective Training, IT Infrastructure, Equipment, Supplies and Services.  The G is Governmenatal Direction.

Ah, cheers. To my very amateur eyes it appears to be a complete needs estimate across the institutional board?

 

[dogger1936]

The talk of "a war vs the war" is a red herring.  The Army has conducted a PRICIE + G analysis that is linked to the Canada First Defence Strategy, and determined what our Force Emplyment model is, which of course informs our Force Genration base.  In other words, short of a full mobilisation to counter an existential threat, we already know what our BGs and Bdes will look like in contact.  It is called Force 2013.  It is not a theoretical construct - it defines the way we will deploy, and hence fight.

So, again, there are no PRes Armoured Recce specific outputs in the current construct except individual augmentees.....

So dumbing that down there is no requirement in the future layout of the forces under force 2013 aside from individual augmenters. So basically Res Armd recce is a augmentee battalion for the GD positions?

What is the 2013 plan for the future IRT the res armd recce units? Is 2013 nothing more than one of those "catch phrases" for posters or will we see unit's changing to meet the 2013 requirements?

 

[Sprinting Thistle]

Actually the G in PRICIE+G is for Generate. 

 

[PPCLI Guy]

Actually the G in PRICIE+G is for Generate.

Thanks - I was casting about a bit there...

 

[daftandbarmy]

Perhaps they should re-role to Artillery?  ;D

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[Eye In The Sky]

The talk of "a war vs the war" is a red herring.  The Army has conducted a PRICIE + G analysis that is linked to the Canada First Defence Strategy, and determined what our Force Emplyment model is, which of course informs our Force Genration base.  In other words, short of a full mobilisation to counter an existential threat, we already know what our BGs and Bdes will look like in contact.  It is called Force 2013.  It is not a theoretical construct - it defines the way we will deploy, and hence fight.

So, again, there are no PRes Armoured Recce specific outputs in the current construct except individual augmentees.....

Can you elaborate some on why there is no specific outputs?  What was lacking in the PRes Armd Recce 'toolbelt' to lead Snr Leadership to determine "we have no use for these guys as a Sqn or Tp"?

Few comments, please keep in mind I've been away from Armd Recce for while.

- Although there seems to be a lack of knowledge on "what to do with D Sqn", is this true for both the Res and Reg Force Bdes?  I know it exists in the PRes world, folks just don't get the exposure they do in the Reg Force.  Just a fact of life.  I'd guess its not quite the same in the Reg Force world.

- I was at a CBG HQ 02-06, and the way Armd Recce was used seemed to improve 500% from when I was with D Sqn in terms of 'what' they did on Bde Exs, as an example.  I think, from watching at the HQ lvl, this change for the better was because the G3 was an Armd Officer who had D Sqn time.  Having sat in Bde Comd and COS O Gps around the time of Op Splinter and fwd, the G3 was able to impress upon the Bde CofC that they had a recce element that had abilities that were not being exploited properly.  IIIRC, the Tp that was tasked to Op Splinter (Hurricance Juan, Sept '03) did Area Recces, as an example.  Damage assessments, stuff like that.  Because it was something that they HAD trained for/done before, doing it in a DomOp scenario was for the most part, a no-brainer.  I was one of 3 blackhats at the HQ then, and was asked how quickly I thought the Tp would be able to ramp-up for 'recce tasks'.  Knowing the Tp Ldr and A c/s personally, my reply was 'as soon as they can get their orders issued".

- Following Juan, there were several exercises I know of that D Sqn was used extensively in ways I'd never experienced when I was still in the Troops.  Bde ex's, Southbound Trooper, etc, where the recce sqn was used in a variety of mtd & dismtd tasks.  Recce/secure beachhead for the Inf Coy, lead them into their position, while maintaining contact with the En Force, flank surviellance.  LZ recce/security.  Route Recce.  The Bde execised in 3 different locations, each a Inf Coy group, with 1 Tp attached.  Speaking to both the guys I knew in D Sqn and the Inf Coys, all had good things to say and people were shown just what "they guys who drive around in jeeps" could do if tasked.  The light bulb had seemingly been switched on.  I recall talking to one of the Coy Signallers after a SBT, and he said the folks at the Coy lvl were extremely impressed with what the jeep-dudes were capable of in the dismtd role.  They were on the Obj 24 hrs to H-Hour, feeding SITREPS back, lead the Coy into their positions, all that good stuff.    For a few years, it seemed they had a job and a role within the Bde and morale was high.

I can't talk about PRICIE-G and things like that, or what happened in the sandbox.  I can say that I believe there is a role for Armd reservists.  Maybe the Reserve D Sqn are victim of nay-saying in The Corps itself, because of the huge delta in trg and equip.  If The Corps is saying " we can't really use these folks for anything other than individual agumentation", well thats too bad.  A Tp is where young Tpr's and jnr Officers learn their craft.  It has to come from somewhere.

Mud Recce skills are, IMO, a part of the toolkit that shouldn't go away.  Unfortunately, it doesn't seem that folks can see that PRes Armd Recce can still train for mud recce, and do a not bad job at it (given the limitations of todays training budget amounts).  I started off when the PRes trained 2 nights/2 weekends a month, and saw the skill-fade that happened as trg days were sliced and diced.

On Bde/combined ex's, I'd say the best way for D Sqn to be used effectively is to put a good, experienced Capt as the LO and let him sell the Sqn at the HQ CP.  Thats where I'd start. 

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

My last read of Force 2013 showed two expeditionary outputs for the Armoured Reserve units: a Convoy Escort Troop and a Persistent Surveillance Troop. In addition, there is always the possibility of topping up Reg F Recce Sqns if we get into back to back rotations in the Afghan style.

 

[Colin Parkinson]

This goes for all reserve units, not just armour. If you want to attract and retain talent and people, you better have a clear role for them or at least 2 clear roles. They will want and need a level of equipment that will allow them to function and feel useful to the scheme of things. While it's unlikely a Reserve unit will be deployed enmasse, the unit and it's history adds a intangible element that helps retains people. Reserve armour, artillery and engineers need weapons and equipment that reflects their tasks, without it we are wasting their time. The key is finding a level of equipment issue that allows them to do their job and train to it, while not dragging them down with maintenance issues and not breaking the piggy bank.

 

[Tank Troll]

From D Armour the Pres role in future ops will be convoy escort in TAPVs to inclued being dismounts in the back.