Mech infantry or all light infantry with some Armd APC units?

[Teflon]

Though not in the puzzle palace, what you propose makes too much sense.  Go back to growing dope, bubbles 

Bubbles doesn't grow dope, he looks after cats and fixes shopping carts, although he does often assist Ricky in his cultivation of his weed  ;D

Sorry about the hijack

 

[McG]

Nope, just the light companies of the three Third Battalions - and that is NOT going to work.

How long before the Army gives up on trying to keep these para companies?

 

[KevinB]

The reasoning behind the change was in fact due directly to OP's. It has been ascertained that light companies are less then useful in the environment were currently operating in for the next decade or so.

Whoever figured this out is an utter asshat
  The issue is NOT the Light Infantry but a Chain of Command that has not a CLUE on how to employ them (yes a stunning example would be the Brit incompetance in using the Para'sin Helmund)

This does not mean that Light Infantry is a skill set that is now dead in the CF as some people like to say simply that in our current organization and training scheme the Light Bn's are not finding a role. As it is C-Coy 3VP is the last light company on the TO&E for OP Archer (to my knowledge) In fact we on roto 2 LAVed our light coy from 2 VP ASAP when it was clear that the Gwagon was not a good idea and the Nyala was not a fighting vehicle.

2VP was NOT a Light Coy -- it was a NONLAV LAV Coy

With the 2 Mech and 1 light Coy concept your getting the best of both worlds in the perfect world. You get 2 companies that have sustained mobility and fire power and one compnay easily transportable. You also get depth in your infantry as everyone gets a taste of the others and the skills set mix and match. You also avoid what is happening right now with 3 VP C-Coy where they cannot even if asked to, LAV up the company. Now you're light Coy can LAV at any time and your 2 LAV Coy's can go light if and when needed.

All IMO of course.

Your missing the entire issue with LI - and Mech in that they fight and think differently -- meshing them into ONE unit will do no one any good -- in fact it will degrade both.
A LAV coy without LAV's in not a Light coy.
  The fact you cant understand that make it seem to me that its not worht explaining the rest to you.

 

[AIC_2K5]

Go back to growing dope, bubbles

Well geese HS I was just about to go get high! But there's a problem...Steve French pooped in the LAV...

The reasoning behind the change was in fact due directly to OP's. It has been ascertained that light companies are less then useful in the environment were currently operating in for the next decade or so. This does not mean that Light Infantry is a skill set that is now dead in the CF as some people like to say simply that in our current organization and training scheme the Light Bn's are not finding a role.

I don't know I disagree. Mechanized forces can do things that light forces cannot do and vice versa. In Baaz Tsuka, a Company Group was used in real mechanized warfare and that job probably couldn't have been conducted effectively by anything else. Likewise, mechanized forces cannot do alot of the light infantry stuff. Light forces conduct amphibious/airborne/airmobile ops and excel in urban ops. It would have been very difficult to patrol the Tora Bora mountain region with mechanized infantry platoons...

The way I see it we are in this situation by default, not by any light forces doctrine. That situation finds us with 6 mech inf battalions and 3 light inf battalions; all were meant to be mechanized, but lack of funding denied us of equipping a third of our mechanized force with IFVs. This may be a blessing in disguise...maybe we should invest more into our light fighters.

Most of the ops in Afghanistan aren't conducting real mechanized warfare. The LAVs are just performing battlefield taxi roles with a decent weapon for fire support. If we purchased more Nyalas with RWS, these could perform nearly identical function than was previously mentioned. Only diffrence is less hitting power and offroad ability. Could we not purchase these for the light inf battalions to address the shortfalls of light forces in this particular operation? Nyalas and LAVs seem to be doing fine conducting ops together...

Ever since the creation of militaries, armies have always - and will alway- use light forces. It's just a matter of how to effectively equip and employ them.

 

[TCBF]

"We don't need six light battalions."

- Probably don't need over 900 Logistic Captains either, but, there you go.

 

[MJP]

Most of the ops in Afghanistan aren't conducting real mechanized warfare. The LAVs are just performing battlefield taxi roles with a decent weapon for fire support.  If we purchased more Nyalas with RWS, these could perform nearly identical function than was previously mentioned. 

Dead wrong and wayyy out of your lane here dude.  LAVs are very much in intimate support of the troops on the ground doing much more than the battlefield taxi that you imply.  It isn't across the Fulda Gap mech warfare but mechanized warfighting it is.

Nyala is a crap vehicle for fighting....hard to dismount from, light weapons(relativly speaking in comparison to a tank/LAV).  Nyala shouldn't be used as and isn't an intimate support vehicle.  Great convoy vehicle especially in high IED areas but not a good battle field taxi at all.

 

[a_majoor]

An interesting note: I am associated with the RAF Regiment while in theater, and they do their patrols in Land Rovers (similar in appearence to the Landrover 110's used in the Gulf War in terms of kit). They find the vehicle is useful in getting places no one else can get to, and also the armoured Landrovers were simply too heavy to move along the trails they use (constantly getting bogged down).

They used to be a mech infantry unit, equipped with light tracked vehicles like the Scimitar and Stormer, and most of the RAF Regiment pers are of the opinion that these would have been ideal in the situation we are in today, having excellent cross country mobility and useful firepower. They are quite pragmatic about protection; Landrovers have none, and even the Scimitar and Stormer only provide protection against small arms and shell splinters; if the enemy want to get you with mines or IED's they will continue to build larger ones until they find the formula for success.

The point being there is no one formula for our success. The Canadians in theater are bulked up to fight set piece engagements against a dug in enemy (which happens) while the RAF Regiment are equipped to perform patrols to disrupt enemy activities in their AOR. If there was a need to assault dug in formations around here, obviously the Canadians would be put in their place. Even in places like Panjawaii or Helmand province, there is probably lots of scope for using light formations to shape the battlefield so the heavy forces can come in and swing the hammer. My own opinion is maybe we should be looking at something like Scimitar and Stormer class vehicles; they provide excellent mobility and firepower, and the battalions equipped in this fashion should be backed by a heavy battalion with vehicles designed for the assault.

 

[hat]

Infidel 6, I don't want to start a flame war but have a few points.

The Ops we are doing today favour mech infantry for a number of reasons (protection, firepower, sustainment etc..).  I firmly believe that light infantry has its place but the fact is we must man and equip to the task we have, with some prudent planning for other theatres/future conflict.  Were we engaged heavily in rugged terrain, perhaps increasing our strength in light infantry would be something under consideration right now.

Mindset is important.  However, I believe that it's more a function of command rather than whether a unit is light or mech.  There is no smoke and mirrors to learning a skill or method of delivery.  All infantry must have the mindset that they will get to the battle and destroy their enemy using whatever means of movement necessary.

A LAV Coy without LAVs is not a Light Coy - agreed.  However, a light infantry Coy without helicopters will have a great deal of difficulty getting around and sustaining itself in most theatres.  Hence, in Afghanistan, light forces from all nations spend most of their time riding around in vehicles.  If you had a choice between a LAV and Hummer (or LUVW) and knew that a LAV would go 90% of the places you were actually going to, which would you choose?

Bubbles, MJP,

I agree with MJP's comments.  RG-31 is not a fighting vehicle.

LAV may be restricted to the role of battlefield taxi.  However, it is certainly capable of being much more.

a_majoor,

Were you 34 Sqn?  If so, I spent a small amount of time patrolling in your AOR. 

During Roto 1 we operated in a very decentralized manner, trying to disrupt enemy throughout Kandahar and often Helmand province.  For the most part, we used the same vehicles that the forces in theatre have now. 

 

[HItorMiss]

Whoever figured this out is an utter asshat
  The issue is NOT the Light Infantry but a Chain of Command that has not a CLUE on how to employ them (yes a stunning example would be the Brit incompetance in using the Para'sin Helmund)
2VP was NOT a Light Coy -- it was a NONLAV LAV Coy

Call it what you will I6 but on the TO&E and as it was called by everyone on the Roto (including the Coy itself) It was our Light Company. Simply because they came from a mech Bn does not mean they did not spend a year training in Light Inf Tactics.

Your missing the entire issue with LI - and Mech in that they fight and think differently -- meshing them into ONE unit will do no one any good -- in fact it will degrade both.
A LAV coy without LAV's in not a Light coy.
  The fact you cant understand that make it seem to me that its not worht explaining the rest to you.

You'd be surpised what I could get, however since all my training has been Light and non LAV even though I have spent 7 years in a Mech Bn. Does not mean I do not know the difference in the thinking and the way they fight between Mech and Light. I was simply laying out how the new army thinks for those not in the know. I don't know if I agree or disagree. If it works or not has yet to be seen but I am willing to watch and shoot and not call this idea down just based on old ways of doing things.

Like I said I will watch and shoot.

 

[Journeyman]

Infidel 6, I don't want to start a flame war but have a few points.

The Ops we are doing today favour mech infantry....

I believe the light vs mech issue here is beyond the level of this thread (how to organize our Inf Bns).*

To correct what you are saying though ('cause I'm OK with flame wars  ), the Ops, as our leadership has chosen to conduct them ...require LAVs, Leo2, etc.

To defeat the bad guys' immediate objective (make the cost is too high in casualties so that the Western nations will withdraw), we have opted for an increasing emphasis on force protection (Iltis -> Nyala ->LAV/Leopard....Leopard 2s !) which will make the mission an easier sell in Ottawa.

Personal experience and reading, however, do not provide many examples of successful counterinsurgencies which relied significantly on armour and superior firepower over engaging the population more effectively. COIN, militarily, is a light infantry game....and Canada is opting out of the Light business.

COIN is also a long-term proposition, and the government (and perhaps some military leadership) has an event horizon limited to the next election and/or two rotos, max.

Within the context of our current ops and current leadership's vision of those ops, arguing about whether the third battalions should be light, or even whether one company in nine could maintain a parachute capability, is rearranging deck chairs.

----------------------------
* That being said, Light and Mech are different. Combining them in one battalion only bastardizes both - - kind of a typical Canadian solution.  :

 

[Kirkhill]

It still seems to come down to this:  Policing or Warfighting.

We are stuck in seeing the enforcement of the government's will in terms of those two options. A nice clean dichotomy between the (essentially) unarmed policeman operating in a permissive environment of willing subjects and going out and slaughtering all available targets in a free-fire zone.

Unfortunately, as we are all aware operating environments come in a wider array of options than those two solutions provide for.

We suffer from being a little bit too British (Policing vs Army) and a little bit too American (Army = Warfighting).

The French have, as in so many other fields, moved the other direction.  They try and parse the spectrum of conflict into a number of tailor made bureaucracies.

1. They have the local Police to deal with traffic violations.
2. They have a separate organization for dealing with unarmed mobs - CRN or CRS or some such
3. They have the Gendarmerie for dealing with armed insurgents domestically
4. They have the Army for defending La Patrie and her borders
5. They have the Foreign Legion (largely foreign mercenaries - sorry for the perceived slur guys) that they can use to prosecute the nation's interests at limited domestic political cost.


The Brits covered this spectrum with the local Constabulary to deal with levels 1 and 2.
The Army covered levels 2-5.
They did this by maintaining an Infantry heavy army where the Cavalry switched roles between Patrolling and Shock Tactics.  Even the artillery could be "dragooned" into use as armed policemen to bolster the imperial constabulary. The Army has been able to fight wars, successfully - if usually after a setback or two in the opening rounds - but it has conducted operations for centuries primarily as a Gendarmerie, both domestically and imperially, that also fights wars.

The Americans, as stated before, have a distaste for maintaining and operating that type of force.  They are predisposed against the maintenance of a Standing Army to coerce populations into following the will of the government.  Therefore, for them, an Army is all about rapidly destroying those nasty coercive Standing Armies and freeing up the population to be what they naturally want to be - Americans.    Shock follows the realization that when they wake up an Arab at 3 O'Clock in the morning he isn't speaking with a Bronx accent - their working assumption (as many American friends have told me about my Scots-Canadian accent).

This peacemaking business demands a longterm security force.  It can be an Army task, or a Police task (we created the NWM Rifles/Police to fulfill the role - patrolling in pairs but also equipped with 9 pounder cannons and gatling guns), or it can be a separate Bureaucracy like the Gendarmerie, the Carabinieri or the Dutch Marechausse or the Spanish Guardia Civil.  The Gendarmerie still conducts operations against insurgents in Corsica and Pays Basque.  The Carabinieri is busy in Sardinia, Sicily and the Naples area.  The Guardia Civil has to deal with ETA and with the Catalonians.

These are on going operations where Soldier/Policemen are regularly engaged by their own citizens (reluctant) with rifles and bombs.  They have been at it, in most cases, since 1814.  Their governments have been at it with various forces for a lot longer than that.

Heavy forces are necessary for conducting security operations - but only when a target has been identified that is suitable to their employment.  If you have a target-rich environment like parts of Iraq and Afghanistan right now, then they are going to be in high demand.  However Heavy forces cannot be maintained indefinitely.  They are too costly, no matter how rich the treasury.  Like the plant of the engineers, they need to be conserved for critical taskings.

As well, it doesn't tell the locals that it is safe to come out and send the kids to school, buy groceries and go to work, if the only way that the government feels safe is driving around in great, armoured bomb-magnets.

The government of Afghanistan needs that Imperial Constabulary/Gendarmerie/Carabinieri/NWMR force to control its people and its terrain.  To establish presence, to gain intelligence and above all to give the sense of security that the locals crave.  In that environment having Big Brother constantly watching you, with guns pointed outwards towards the unknown, is not a bad thing.  Security cameras, machine gun posts and armed policemen are all part of that security net.  This is the traditional role, in British parlance of the infantry and light cavalry.  (Light infantry is WAS (Edited to enhance chances at a free beermug) something else again - more akin to the infantry recce platoon)

Dealing with armed, organised insurgents in large numbers, retaking occupied villages, relieving besieged villages, these operations require a heavily armed assault forces to intervene.  Now whether those forces are deployed in LAVs, M113s, Marders, Helicopters or Boats they are all ultimately Assault forces.  They are a Heavy Cavalry/Artillery force.  Even troops deployed from helicopters without armoured vehicles (the American definition of a Light Force) are ultimately there to deliver a shock action for a limited duration to a specific target taking the heaviest equipment that time, terrain and transport will permit.

Afghanistan also needs that type of force and you guys are providing that capability.  And maybe Canada should restrict itself to supplying that type of force and call it good. 

However most governments seem more comfortable offering that type of force to assist a friend.  Its tasks are limited and its utility is time limited - essentially once the environment is no longer target-rich then the "service" can be withdrawn in good conscience - or reallocated to another theatre that is rich in targets.  That ultimately leaves Canada armed with a rapier that can only be applied offensively to eliminate threats.

The question is who supplies the Gendarmerie/Constabulary/Security force until the locals have their own version stood up and who trains the locals if the trainers don't have experience in those types of operations?  Who supplies the shield to be applied defensively to protect communities?

A further question?  Which is most likely to be useful in a Canadian domestic environment in the future?  A heavily armed assault force? Or a sustained security force?  And who will supply the latter?

 

[Journeyman]

(Light infantry is something else again - more akin to the infantry recce platoon)

Ohhhhh, sorry - - and you were doing so well.......next contestant please 

 

[Kirkhill]

Dammit - and I so wanted that free beer mug ;D

Can I get a do-over and stipulate that I was talking historically? 

That Light Infantry, and the Rifles, were raised for wartime taskings to skirmish in front of the main body, gathering intelligence and applying accurate fire against high value, point targets, usually of the C&C type, while screening the main force as it manoeuvred into position to supply shock action through the application of fire and steel.

Interestingly the American Rangers, who see themselves as a warfighting Light Force capable of delivering a short sharp punch, draw their ethos from the Pre-Colonial Rangers - who were actually raised by the Colonies as  standing militias to enforce the governments will against armed colonists as well as dissenting natives.  The Rangers were actually raised as a Gendarmerie.

So much for terminology - a name means whatever you want it to mean  - and whatever you can get people to accept it as today.  Today's Socialists are conservative, while today's Liberals are socialist and today's Conservatives are liberals (if you revert to 19th century standards).

 

[Journeyman]

Forgiven 

 

[Kirkhill]

Here's the founding orders for Butler's Rangers - raised as a Special Service Force to work with the locals - The Indians - kind of a Green Beret type role - but this was the Hide-bound, unimaginative British doing it. ;D

"Quebec
15 September 1777
GUY CARLETON, Knight of the Bath, Captain General and Governor in Chief of the Province of Quebec and Territories depending thereon, &c, &c, &c, General and Commander in Chief of His Majesty's Forces in said Province and the Frontiers thereof, &c, &c, &c
To JOHN BUTLER, Esqr, appointed Major Commandant of a Corps of Rangers to serve with the Indians.
By Virtue of the power and authority in me vested by the King, I do hereby authorize and empower you, or such officers as you shall direct, by Beat of Drum or otherwise, forthwith to raise on the frontiers of the Province, so many able bodied men of His Majesty's loyal subjects as will form one company of Rangers, to serve with the Indians as occasion shall require.

Which company shall consist of a Captain, a First Lieutenant, a Second Lieutenant, three Sergeants, three Corporals and fifty Private Men; and when you shall have completed one company as aforesaid, you are further empowered to raise and form another, in like manner and of like numbers as the first and so on, until you shall have competed a number of companies of Rangers not exceeding in the whole eight companies; observing that the first be completed, armed and fit for service and have passed muster before such person as shall be appointed for that purpose by some one of the Commanding Officers of His Majesty's Troops nearest to where the said companies so raised shall be at the time, before another is begun to be raised.

You and the officers so raised to be paid as is customary to other officers of the like rank in His Majesty's service, and you are carefully to obey and follow such orders and directions as you shall receive from me or the Commander in Chief for the time being or any other, your superior officer, according to the rules and discipline of War, in pursuance of the trust hereby reposed in you.
Given under my hand and Seal at Arms at Quebec, this fifteenth day of September, one thousand seven hundred and seventy seven and in the seventeenth year of the reign of our Sovereign Lord, GEORGE the THIRD, by the Grace of God of Great Britain, France and Ireland, KING, Defender of the Faith."

http://www.iaw.on.ca/~awoolley/brang/brbeat.html

This is a link to Roger's Rangers rules, raised in 1757 as a scouting force for the British in the French and Indian Wars

http://www.military-info.com/freebies/roger.htm

And here's a blurb on the Georgia Rangers of the 1740s and 1750s. -  A constabulary

"General James Oglethorpe, Georgia's founder, held colonial provincial rangers in high regard. Such mounted troops could patrol vast frontier areas, wherever and in whatever numbers they were needed. Unlike the citizen militia, the rangers were a permanent professional military force. They did not require mustering or operate under special legal restrictions. Oglethorpe's troop numbered as many as fifteen officers and 122 enlisted men; and they were with him at his great victory at Bloody Marsh in 1742.1 With the end of his war with Spain and the removal of the British regulars in 1749, the rangers were disbanded. Georgia's defenses against the neighboring French and Spanish provinces consisted of only the poorly equipped, indifferently trained militia. Until long after the American Revolution, most of the province's boundaries adjoined the Cherokee and Creek lands. War parties could potentially reach anywhere within the colony in a day, even to the capital at Savannah.

Many Georgians called for the return of rangers. Reverend Thomas Bosomworth, Indian trader and husband of Oglethorpe's famous Creek operative Mary Musgrove, argued that economically depressed Georgians really wanted a government payroll. He claimed they were even trying to provoke an incident with the Indians to make the colony's military situation seem desperate.2
In light of Bosomworth's accusations, the incident that brought back the Georgia rangers seems highly suspicious. On September 10, 1756, James Lambert reported that four Indians attacked the settlement where he and Andrew Clement lived, near present-day Louisville. However, when the smoke cleared, three of the Indians were dead and the fourth, wounded, had fled into the swamps. The frontiersmen only suffered only one casualty, one wounded horse. Georgians petitioned Governor John Reynolds to raise troops. The colonial commons house of assembly urged him to raise a troop of rangers to consist of six officers and seventy enlisted men. By December, Reynolds enlisted a troop of forty men under Captain John Barnard, Oglethorpe's former ranger commander. The next month, the House requested that the governor bring the unit up to full strength and to raise two additional troops of seventy men each. Reynolds appointed the officers but, without the means to pay for the men he already had, he could not add more soldiers.3..."

http://www.hsgng.org/pages/gacolonialrangers.htm

 

[McG]

Most of the ops in Afghanistan aren't conducting real mechanized warfare. The LAVs are just performing battlefield taxi roles with a decent weapon for fire support. If we purchased more Nyalas with RWS, these could perform nearly identical function than was previously mentioned. Only diffrence is less hitting power and offroad ability. Could we not purchase these for the light inf battalions to address the shortfalls of light forces in this particular operation? Nyalas and LAVs seem to be doing fine conducting ops together...

As has been noted, we are conducting a mechanized fight.  The LAV is fighting with the soldiers that it carriers.  There have even been times where the LAV alone fought and won.  I recall one incident in which a patrol identified a much larger enemy force.  The LAVs destroyed the enemy at a range where they could not touch our guys.  Had we not had the LAV, the FOB likely would have been in trouble that night.

The Nyala is inadequate.  It is not a fighting vehicle & it does not fit a section.  It is a well protected car to move a few people between two protected locations.  The Nyala has also shown itself to be well suited to engineer recce of mine & IED threats (even the US has it for this).

Light forces conduct amphibious… ops 

Seems to me that the USMC has a significant mechanized element.  I would not paint it as something exclusive of mechanized forces.

Ever since the creation of militaries, armies have always - and will alway- use light forces. It's just a matter of how to effectively equip and employ them.

True, and “light” has always been relative to the infantry of the time.

2VP was NOT a Light Coy -- it was a NONLAV LAV Coy

Call it what you will I6 but on the TO&E and as it was called by everyone on the Roto (including the Coy itself) It was our Light Company.

It was called light on the R01 TO&E as well.  While it never met the CF definition of “light” (it was tied to its vehicles: GWagon & Nyala), it was lighter than the LAV Coys.  (It was certainly not a LAV Coy as its organization was different).  Call it “light mech” or “motorised” if it helps get past this word-smith argument.

Personal experience and reading, however, do not provide many examples of successful counterinsurgencies which relied significantly on armour and superior firepower over engaging the population more effectively.

Well, engaging the population certainly seemed to be the approach that we were taking while I was over there.  I’d be surprised it that has changed as the importance was understood at all levels (even the CDS took part in a village leader engagement).

COIN, militarily, is a light infantry game....

This is pure wrong.  If you put a ture light battalion in an area almost the size of NB and give that battalion a COIN & reconstruction mission, that battalion will fail.  Soldiers without vehicles lack the mobility required to exert a presence over the area required.

I suspect you would have us believe that mechanized infantry cannot engage a local population.  That is simply untrue.  They dismount, and from there they can do all the engaging that the light forces would do.

COIN is also a long-term proposition, and the government (and perhaps some military leadership) has an event horizon limited to the next election and/or two rotos, max.

How did you come to this conclusion?

in Afghanistan, light forces from all nations spend most of their time riding around in vehicles. 

I’d even go so far as to say that they spend most of their time tied to vehicles.  They operate as mech/motor forces.

 

[Journeyman]

MCG, friendly PM inbound 

 

[McG]

MCG, friendly PM inbound  

Sarcastic retort launched.  ;D

 

[Journeyman]

Quote from: Journeyman on Today at 13:56:24
COIN is also a long-term proposition, and the government (and perhaps some military leadership) has an event horizon limited to the next election and/or two rotos, max.

How did you come to this conclusion?

I gather you're OK with the premise that COIN is long-term, so I'll comment on the leadership, starting with the government.

Based on the way the government (ruling and opposition) flip-flops based on opinion polls and editorials, (NDP against Afghan, then based on editorials, "oh no, we support the TROOPS, just not the military"; Dion saying he's going to scuttle the mission at first opportunity, then saying he's supporting it until 2009) - - I don't know how anyone can believe the government is looking beyond the next election. It's even more painful than normal because of the minority government.

As for the military leadership's event horizon.....we've been cobbling battle groups together every six-months, grabbing Companies from different Battalions or even Regiments for a few years now, and it's forecast to remain the same until at least 2009. Sorry, but that doesn't strike me as evidence of any sort of comprehensive vision.

While that is oversimplified, and I acknowledge that there are significant factors at play, the CF is obligated to plan counter-insurgency - - a long-term, multi-agency, comprehensive proposition - - in six-month scrambles... one or two rotos at a time.

And within that strategic environment, (in order to keep this posting within the thread's title), that's why I also said

Within the context of our current ops and current leadership's vision of those ops, arguing about whether the third battalions should be light, or even whether one company in nine could maintain a parachute capability, is rearranging deck chairs.

 

[hat]

Journeyman,

I believe it is more than just the ops as our leaders choose to execute them.  I never said the ops require LAV Leopard 2 etc...  I still would say that they favour Mech forces.  Force protection is important.  As you yourself alluded to, our centre of gravity is back here in Canada.  While we may wish that not to be true, it is.  At a lower level, having the tools to do the job as safely as possible is a good thing.  It really hurts to loose a soldier, especially if it could have been prevented by better equipment. 

I believe that the change in force composition for the infantry battalions is more than just rearranging deck chairs since it is part of the army's vision for correcting the problems such as plug and play rotos.