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paracowboy – thanks for the heads up. Here's my spin:
This article appears to be a compilation of everything somewhat controversial that was mentioned in a lengthy interview I did focused on 39 CBG soldiers joining C Coy and the training we were conducting. The context of this interview is reflected in the author’s main piece found here:
http://www.canada.com/vancouversun/news/story.html?id=bf158b3e-6a01-4596-9e85-d3aca784e110
Several complicated issues were discussed, then edited and re-edited down to, in my opinion, over-simplistic descriptions and in one case, wrong intent. Firstly and most importantly is criticism of government decisions. One can be unhappy with the immediate results of a decision (especially if one understands the rationale) without being critical of it. I explained the rationale for the cancellation of TF 2-07 in detail: the shortfall of enablers such as line of communications troops, intelligence, and medical personnel; and the requirement to have somebody train recruit influx with force expansion. Civil control of the military is a hallmark of democracy – we do what we’re told. We don’t criticize government decisions.
We discussed in detail the conundrum (I used that term) that we face with force expansion versus retention. We understandably need to grow, yet at the same time provide the challenge that young soldiers join for. It’s hard to train others and deploy yourself at the same time. This will be one of the biggest challenges we as an Army will face over the next decade. The solution begins now with ‘growing’ as many quality NCOs as we can.
The ‘MBA’ issue arose out of his question regarding why we have to supply a rifle coy to 2 RCR, since they should have three of their own rifle coys. We discussed the shrinking of infantry bns over the past decade or so. The 90s were hard on us, and I don’t believe the introduction of business practices (and language) helped in this case. The ‘elimination of redundancies’ hit the infantry battalions hard in the search to reduce or re-apportion PYs – pioneer and mortar pls are an example. As a result, with depth / redundancy non-existent, infantry bns are hard-pressed to generate three fully manned, deployable rifle coys. This adoption of business models in the 1990s was matched by MBAs becoming fashionable. The hard historical lessons through which our structures evolved took a back seat to efficiency. I have previously called this the ‘triumph of the MBAs over the military historians’ or of ‘efficiency over effectiveness’. Some in the US have called out against this as well (see The Danger of Generals as CEOs: War-Mart, http://www.tnr.com/doc.mhtml?i=20060403&s=risen040306). Many who were confronted with these decisions will understandably disagree with me, but regardless, in the end, our bns lost strength – a loss we’re really feeling now. Finally, I’m far from anti-academic and this observation is not directed to individuals who have or are pursuing MBAs (no offence Gunner and 'surprise'). Gunner is right when he says MBAs can offer different approaches to problems - we just have to ensure they are in balance and that we retain a military, not a business culture.
Understandably, I’ve already been called to task on the article. Soldier on.
This article appears to be a compilation of everything somewhat controversial that was mentioned in a lengthy interview I did focused on 39 CBG soldiers joining C Coy and the training we were conducting. The context of this interview is reflected in the author’s main piece found here:
http://www.canada.com/vancouversun/news/story.html?id=bf158b3e-6a01-4596-9e85-d3aca784e110
Several complicated issues were discussed, then edited and re-edited down to, in my opinion, over-simplistic descriptions and in one case, wrong intent. Firstly and most importantly is criticism of government decisions. One can be unhappy with the immediate results of a decision (especially if one understands the rationale) without being critical of it. I explained the rationale for the cancellation of TF 2-07 in detail: the shortfall of enablers such as line of communications troops, intelligence, and medical personnel; and the requirement to have somebody train recruit influx with force expansion. Civil control of the military is a hallmark of democracy – we do what we’re told. We don’t criticize government decisions.
We discussed in detail the conundrum (I used that term) that we face with force expansion versus retention. We understandably need to grow, yet at the same time provide the challenge that young soldiers join for. It’s hard to train others and deploy yourself at the same time. This will be one of the biggest challenges we as an Army will face over the next decade. The solution begins now with ‘growing’ as many quality NCOs as we can.
The ‘MBA’ issue arose out of his question regarding why we have to supply a rifle coy to 2 RCR, since they should have three of their own rifle coys. We discussed the shrinking of infantry bns over the past decade or so. The 90s were hard on us, and I don’t believe the introduction of business practices (and language) helped in this case. The ‘elimination of redundancies’ hit the infantry battalions hard in the search to reduce or re-apportion PYs – pioneer and mortar pls are an example. As a result, with depth / redundancy non-existent, infantry bns are hard-pressed to generate three fully manned, deployable rifle coys. This adoption of business models in the 1990s was matched by MBAs becoming fashionable. The hard historical lessons through which our structures evolved took a back seat to efficiency. I have previously called this the ‘triumph of the MBAs over the military historians’ or of ‘efficiency over effectiveness’. Some in the US have called out against this as well (see The Danger of Generals as CEOs: War-Mart, http://www.tnr.com/doc.mhtml?i=20060403&s=risen040306). Many who were confronted with these decisions will understandably disagree with me, but regardless, in the end, our bns lost strength – a loss we’re really feeling now. Finally, I’m far from anti-academic and this observation is not directed to individuals who have or are pursuing MBAs (no offence Gunner and 'surprise'). Gunner is right when he says MBAs can offer different approaches to problems - we just have to ensure they are in balance and that we retain a military, not a business culture.
Understandably, I’ve already been called to task on the article. Soldier on.
)
