The following is a briefing note that was distributed by the RCAS to all unit commanding officers.
BRIEFING NOTE FOR COMMANDING OFFICERS ON TARGET ACQUISITION ARTILLERY
1. Target Acquisition (TA) is the latest buzzword sounding around the Royal Regiment of Canadian Artillery. It is an exciting, â Å“new to usâ ? area where the chances for development, for both the Reserve and Regular Forces, is huge. During the Second World War there were whole Regiments dedicated to classic TA. In the post war years the need to maintain such large TA units was not apparent and much of the capability was reduced to nil strength. The traditional capabilities for TA have been Artillery Intelligence, Survey, Ballistic Meteorology, Acoustic Weapon Locating, Counterfire Radar and Aerial Observation.
2. The years leading to the end of the Cold War saw little technological advancement in the areas of TA. The sound ranging was still using the same principles from WWI, the radar from the early 60s, and survey exactly the same from WWII. The biggest technological leap was the conversion from Air OPs with Artillery Pilot Observers to the use of the CL-89 drone. The Artillery started working with Canadair in 1963 to develop this capability.
3. During those same years the level of TA capability was further reduced by â Å“downsizingâ ? and removing capability. The entire CF was reducing and the â Å“bullets on the groundâ ? attitude of the past saw that TA was reduced to the point where in 2002 the entire CF's TA capability rested with one troop consisting of one officer, one warrant officer and seven soldiers. Likewise, one specialty, ballistic meteorology, was reallocated to the purview of the airforce, due to their specialty for other meteorological systems.
4. During the post Cold War years technology exploded. Advancements have been extremely beneficial for TA:
a. Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) have become longer range and endurance with greater accuracy to provide better surveillance;
b. radars process data faster and more accurately;
c. sound ranging principles more adaptive, faster deploying and more accurate;
d. survey more accurate and less prone to error due to better instrumentation; and
e. Artillery Intelligence (Arty Int) digitised and readily part of the Brigade HQ of the 21st century.
5. The deployment of guns, radars and UAVs to Afghanistan saw a rapid re-emergence of TA capability within the CF, Army and Artillery. The next step is to anticipate the needs of the future.
Aim
6. The aim of this BN is to highlight some of the future possibilities with Surveillance and Target Acquisition (STA) Artillery and the Reserve potential to support them.
Discussion
Tactical UAV (TUAV)
7. The SPERWER TUAV was purchased on an accelerated procurement cycle to meet the requirements of the CF's commitment to Afghanistan. Despite some problems initially with the system, and the media's reporting of these problems, it is an excellent system that will serve the Army and Artillery well for many years to come.
8. A TUAV is specifically designed to offer a Divisional or Brigade Commander another sensor to help his/her staff develop the Common Operating Picture (COP). This will aid in ensuring adequate coverage of the battlespace. It has several advantages. The SPERWER:
a. is flexible in deployment and employment;
b. gives over the horizon visibility;
c. is capable of long range operation;
d. can fly day or night;
e. has a lengthy loiter time over a target area;
f. difficult to engage with many current air defence systems; and
g. does not risk a human pilot to observe a target area.
9. The SPERWER is also a highly technical system that currently requires three months of intensive training before an operator is â Å“technicallyâ ? capable of flying. Tactical and operational training must come at another time.
10. At present the Army only has one SPERWER system. There are plans to procure more in the future. However, the timelines are unclear and the number of systems not yet announced.
Counter Battery Radars (CBR)
11. The CF leased four Artillery Hunting Radar (ARTHUR) systems from Ericsson Microwave Systems in Sweden for the deployment to Kabul. Unfortunately, the lease is not a purchase and the regular procurement cycles will still be followed for the purchase of the CBR. One of the benefits of having deployed with the system is that the Statement of Requirements written up for CBR has been refined to meet more operational needs.
12. While the ARTHUR and Raytheon's AN-TPQ-36 FIREFINDER are capable of operations in Kabul and Bosnia, the procurement cycle will take some time. Another CBR is being reviewed by the Army for limited deployment. It is known as the Lightweight Counter Mortar Radar (LCMR). It is a man-portable CBR that has a detection range of 10 kms and is deployed by four soldiers. A troop would consist of about 26 soldiers and six vehicles.
13. Despite the fact that the LCMR is limited in range, its staff, planning, recce and control is virtually identical to the manner in which ARTHUR or FIREFINDER would be employed.
Sound Ranging (SRg)
14. The only SRg system that the Army has at the moment is the SATech Sound Ranging System 6 (SORAS 6). This is an old, fragile system held at the RCAS. The company that produced it does not support the product any more, thus leaving us with no spares if the system breaks.
15. Another SRg system that has gained visibility lately is the Hostile Artillery Locator II (HALO II) from BAE in the UK. This is a true 21st Century system. There is no official procurement program established for this, but it was identified in Kabul that this is a capability that for force protection would be necessary for future operations.
16. HALO II is easily deployed and operated. Unlike in days past, it can be operational within hours, rather than days. Two soldiers can set up one microphone station in fifteen minutes. The basic troop consists of at least sixteen soldiers and five vehicles.
Artillery Intelligence
17. The Arty Int Cell for ISAF was formed out of the small troop in the RCAS. With the advent of STA there will need to be Arty Int staffs at each of the Regular Force Regiments and the Reserve Regiments designated with a STA capability.
18. Unlike perceptions that are prevalent throughout the Royal Regiment, the Arty Int staff is not only looking for â Å“intelligenceâ ?. The staff is also responsible for the counter battery battle, including planning for CBR, UAV and SRg, giving orders for CBR emissions and deployments, SRg deployment, and UAV flight, airspace coordination, clearance of launch and recovery positions, task management and mission profiles.
19. The Arty Int staff is known by the term Brigade Artillery Intelligence Officer (BAIO) and formed the Target Acquisition Coordination Centre (TACC) in Kabul. It would typically be formed with one Officer, one Warrant Officer, one Sergeant and five Gunners to Master Bombardiers. They work beside the Fire and Effects Synchronisation Centre (FESC formerly FSCC) and Airspace Coordination Centre (ASCC) at Brigade HQ. This is currently becoming a training focus at the RCAS.
Survey
20. Technology has advanced the ability to provide highly accurate survey to the user almost autonomously. The introduction of the Gun Laying and Positioning System (GLPS) spelled the end of the Regimental Survey Sections. There must still remain a capability in the Royal Regiment to provide manual survey. Currently, that requirement is undefined in manpower and training necessary.
Reserve Support
21. The slate is relatively clear for reserve support to STA. The principle ideas focus themselves on individual augmentation for CBR, TUAV, Arty Int and SRg deployments overseas. This is not the limit. There can be Arty Int troops formed, LCMR troops, SRg troops or Survey troops. TUAV troops will be problematical with the reserve, but there is still scope for it.
Formation of Regular Force Unit
22. The SPERWER is redeploying to Canada in August and will be housed temporarily in a cadre in Valcartier. The future of the SPERWER and the cadre are being planned as we speak. Future STA unit(s) will be defined when equipment procurement occurs and PYs allocated. Until then, there will be much debate.
Conclusion
23. The re-establishment of STA within the Royal Regiment will necessarily be a major issue affecting all units. By providing recommendations to the RCAS about how reserve support to STA can be furnished, and understanding the limitations of systems and employment, the Royal Regiment will be able to focus on ensuring that STA becomes highly effective within the shortest time possible.
