Is there a case for a new Garrison Artillery?

[Gunner98]

Kirkhill your rationale may be fine, but your history is a little inaccurate.  Fort Henry's second construction and large fortification was completed in 1837.  It was abandoned by the British in 1870 and only occupied by Canadians until 1891.  It fell into disrepair until 1936 and was opened as a museum in 1938.

Fort Henry's other purpose was to guard the Royal Naval Dockyards at the current site of RMC.

The Halifax Citadel is run/owned by Parks Canada and has been a historic site since 1951.  At its peak, the gunners were responsible for more than 2700 guns within the city's defence complex, a tall order, for the number of artillerymen in Halifax rarely exceeded 350.  To help make up the shortage of trained gunners, Artillery NCOs spent much of their time instructing infantry and militia in the art of artillery drill.

The major role for the Citadel after 1900 was to provide barrack accommodations and act as a command centre for other harbour defences. In 1939, the Citadel was used as a temporary barracks for troops going overseas.

So perhaps La Citadelle is the best/only example that meets your criteria for longevity.

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

I'm seeing two issues here.  The first is what is the optimum resource to employ in "forts."  The other is whether we should have forts at all.

On the first issue, I do not see employing LAVs or Leopards as part of a FOB/patrol base/platoon house defence plan as a waste of resources.  A platoon will usually have the task of securing that FOB, and as such their LAVs will already by available.  A FOB in a high-threat area can be augmented by tanks to give it further protection, but those tanks and LAVs can still go forth with minimum notice.  In addition, they may be able to support operations from the FOB itself.  I don't see the need to add a whole new family of equipment with the associated personnel and training bill.  The Afghans themselves have their SPG-9s and light artillery among other systems.  The SPG-9 is a nice little gun as long as you stay out of the backblast...

On the question of having forts at all, I see advantages and disadvantages.  On the plus side they establish a presnce in an area around which you aim to coalesce security and local support (the inkspot stragegy).  They can become supply nodes and allow you to move some CSS elements forward to support operations.  Hopefully, they can allow you to have a place to rest troops in a bit more comfort and security than out in the field.  On the down side, they tie you troops to the ground.  I recognize that the garrison artillery you are proposing is meant to ease this burden, but it does not solve the issue that it still ties personnel and equipment to the ground.  They can also be templated by the enemy and can then become rocket/mortar targets.  Their supply lines can also become vulnerabilities for the enemy to target. 

I would rather be out in the Mongol horde than be the castellan, but I recognize the need for some castles.  Modern forces operating in the field need support from someone somewhere.  I would err on the side of keeping the maximum number of troops mobile, but I recognize that you do need some "forts" out there. 

Cheers,

R5/2B

 

[Kirkhill]

Gunner98,  thanks for the corrections on my history.  However I am glad you can see the rationale.  On the other hand though, unless I am mistaken, Halifax, the Citadel and Fort Henry are still in the crown's possession. 

Red Five, I would never suggest replacing the beat cop and the mongol hordes with a castle. I see the need for all of the above, especially until the society settles down a bit.  Then you can have guided tours of the ramparts.  Even the QRH's boss in Iraq, travelling as light as he did, bemoaned that he still needed an operating base.  In his case that base was not local (because his local base was being regularly stonked) but miles away at the end of an airlift and helicopter lift.

I can't help but wonder about the effect on the population if they have smiling, lightly armed local cops in armoured vehicles backed by the permanent mass of a fortress that dominates their view but doesn't interfere with their lives - however there is that ongoing threat of involvement by the mongol hordes, who they regularly meet as they patrol the dominated ground.  That threat could extend to emplaced artillery, guns or howitzers, or conceivably it could include Vertically Launched GMRLS missiles and Netfires.  Together they would give all-weather fire support similar to Fixed Wing Air Support in a 40 to 70 km radius of the fort.  That would mean that the forts would not have to be in every village and would not be a daily reminder.

The longer that the stick is available and is not used, or is only used with care, the more comfortable the locals will become with presence of the stick and the person wielding the stick.

 

[a_majoor]

See, we always end up talking about the same things  ;D: http://forums.army.ca/forums/threads/23394/post-256627.html#msg256627

 

[Kirkhill]

See, we always end up talking about the same things  ;D: http://forums.army.ca/forums/threads/23394/post-256627.html#msg256627

Ouch.  Wash, rinse and repeat, repeat, repeat......  :-[ ;D

Does this mean that things are simpler than we make out?  We keep covering the same ground with the same limited array of solutions.  The ones that were available to Sun-Tzu and Pilezer and Menes and whoever taught them.  ???  Technology wouldn't seem to count for much then would it?  Lack of technology can cause you to lose or help you win but it can't cause you to win.

Secure patrol bases, command of choke points, dominance of the ground, good civil relations, aggressive action against disruptive elements - basic principles that are independent of technology.  Technology changes time and space and manpower but does it change operations?  (Do I feel a thread split coming on?) 

 

[a_majoor]

I'm pretty sure Odysseus would not be too surprised if he were to have a tour of the modern battlefield. Even the motivations of the ACM (greed, plunder, dominance) would be pretty transparent to the crafty King of Ithaca, and after he worked out the general effects of the weapons Pallas Athena had granted us, he would probably be coming up with solutions we would recognize, even if we were not bloody minded enough to implement them.

Military science (time, space, terrain, effects) is fairly consistent over the millennia, winners are masters of military art (putting the "science" into action).

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

I think that any soldier from before 1900 (perhaps the US Civil War veterans less so) would be very suprised to tour a modern battlefield, and I don't think that the adjustment would be very easy.  WWI, with its dress rehearsal at Port Arthur, showed what happens when a real revolution in military affairs occurs.  Alexander would have done well at Waterloo once he had had a quick primer.  The strategy and tactics would have been quite familiar to him.  In 1916, the very things that had stood him and his army so well would have been turned against him and I wager he would have gone down in slaughter like the rest.  The "empty battlefield" stumped pretty much everybody for quite some time.

Going back to today, I think that winning an insurgency is much more than military tactics and military strategy.  The overall strategy and solution must be political in nature or you are stuck with "no win//no lose."  This goes beyond the question of forts and mobile columns.

Cheers

 

[Kirkhill]

I think that any soldier from before 1900 (perhaps the US Civil War veterans less so) would be very suprised to tour a modern battlefield, and I don't think that the adjustment would be very easy.  WWI, with its dress rehearsal at Port Arthur, showed what happens when a real revolution in military affairs occurs.  Alexander would have done well at Waterloo once he had had a quick primer.  The strategy and tactics would have been quite familiar to him.  In 1916, the very things that had stood him and his army so well would have been turned against him and I wager he would have gone down in slaughter like the rest.  The "empty battlefield" stumped pretty much everybody for quite some time.

Perhaps that "empty battlefield" was as much a result of weapons being able to apply effects farther than the field commanders could see with their own eyeballs.  They were still restricted to what they could see and what was reported by someone else (using their eyeballs and brains) at the speed of the fastest horse.

Maybe all that is happening now is putting the "field" commanders back in the loop on the "global battlefield".  That seems to be the effect of long range, real time surveillance and instantaneous global communications - an effect often called micro-management.  That effect too was known in historical battles as Field Marshals and Generals got involved in Captains' fights.

  Going back to today, I think that winning an insurgency is much more than military tactics and military strategy.  The overall strategy and solution must be political in nature or you are stuck with "no win//no lose."   This goes beyond the question of forts and mobile columns.

Cheers

Agreed entirely....Insurgency is all about governance.  To beat the insurgency then you have to get people to trust the government. 

By the way, in Southern Afghanistan are we talking about defeating an Insurgency,  a rising of the population against their recognized government,  or are we talking about establishing dominion, or empire, by Kabul over people that have never recognized even a local empire much less a distant empire?

I am not against empires or dominions so I don't consider Kabul's efforts in that field to be a problem.  It just seems that a campaign of empire building would supply different opportunities and problems to a counter-insurgency campaign.

Now significantly off the topic of the role of a Garrison Artillery in the defense of fixed bases......regardless of size and purpose.  No matter how we slice the campaign, any campaign, there will always be bases to be defended, ranging from section and platoon sized "police stations" that are effectively permanent in nature to Brigade Maintenance Areas that may be in place for a temporary period of months or decades to lagers and FOBs.

My point in all of this originally was that there are places that demand long term covering of arcs.  That can be done as effectively, if not more effectively, by emplaced artillery (defined as any projectile launching system from rifle calibre machine guns to ICBMs) than by tying up scarce manoeuvre forces.

 

[a_majoor]

You want to project power from afar?

Hypersonic Cruise Missile: America's New Global Strike Weapon: ttp://www.popularmechanics.com/technology/military_law/4203874.html,

Marines in Spaaaaaace!: http://www.defensetech.org/archives/001815.html
Low-cost access to orbit: space Marines to the rescue: http://www.thespacereview.com/article/530/1

Have light Infantry patroling the AOR and the ability to bring on robotic firepower at a moments notice and the Marines a short while later will certainly change the way business is conducted.

 

[Kirkhill]

All good stuff Arthur - but where do the patrolling light infantry sleep and get to listen to their I-Pods and send their e-mails?  Living in sleeping bags must get old, even for Canadian infanteers.

As to the other stuff - There is always this:

http://forums.army.ca/forums/threads/54658/post-496663.html#msg496663

Combine the best aspects of Parachuting and Glider Troops - stealthy approach, reduced scatter and reduced training requirements.  Pegasus Bridge with the Ox and Bucks in Gliders was one of the most successful Airborne missions of WW2.

Stand By to Drop!