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Iran Super Thread- Merged

SeaKingTacco said:
Chavez is an economic dolt.  What, exactly, does he figure is going to happen to his customers (and his cash flow) if oil goes to $200/barrel overnight?  And what is he going to do with his "worthless" US Dollars then?

He doesn't.  Figure, that is.
 
There's an intesting layout in the Globe on pg. A12

Graphics, pictures, words and everthing.

Sorry, I can't provide a link.

Describes the "death from above ", likely strategy
for how that nuclear hardware will disappear.
 
I caught that today, too. Very interesting.

Here's the article sans-pictures:

A plan to attack Iran swiftly and from above

http://www.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/story/RTGAM.20071122.wiran22/BNStory/International/

A bombing campaign has been in the works for months - a blistering air war that would last anywhere from one day to two weeks
PAUL KORING
From Thursday's Globe and Mail
November 22, 2007 at 5:11 AM EST


WASHINGTON — Massive, devastating air strikes, a full dose of "shock and awe" with hundreds of bunker-busting bombs slicing through concrete at more than a dozen nuclear sites across Iran is no longer just the idle musing of military planners and uber-hawks.

Although air strikes don't seem imminent as the U.S.-Iranian drama unfolds, planning for a bombing campaign and preparing for the geopolitical blowback has preoccupied military and political councils for months.

No one is predicting a full-blown ground war with Iran. The likeliest scenario, a blistering air war that could last as little as one night or as long as two weeks, would be designed to avoid the quagmire of invasion and regime change that now characterizes Iraq. But skepticism remains about whether any amount of bombing can substantially delay Iran's entry into the nuclear-weapons club.

Attacking Iran has gone far beyond the twilight musings of a lame-duck president. Almost all of those jockeying to succeed U.S. President George W. Bush are similarly bellicose. Both front-runners, Democrat Senator Hillary Clinton and Republican Rudy Giuliani, have said that Iran's ruling mullahs can't be allowed to go nuclear. "Iran would be very sure if I were president of the United States that I would not allow them to become nuclear," said Mr. Giuliani. Ms. Clinton is equally hard-line.

Nor does the threat come just from the United States. As hopes fade that sanctions and common sense might avert a military confrontation with Tehran - as they appear to have done with North Korea - other Western leaders are openly warning that bombing may be needed.

Unless Tehran scraps its clandestine and suspicious nuclear program and its quest for weapons-grade uranium (it already has the missiles capable of delivering an atomic warhead), the world will be "faced with an alternative that I call catastrophic: an Iranian bomb or the bombing of Iran," French President Nicolas Sarkozy has warned.

Bombing Iran would be relatively easy. Its antiquated air force and Russian air-defence missiles would be easy pickings for the U.S. warplanes.

But effectively destroying Iran's widely scattered and deeply buried nuclear facilities would be far harder, although achievable, according to air-power experts. But the fallout, especially the anger sown across much of the Muslim world by another U.S.-led attack in the Middle East, would be impossible to calculate.

Israel has twice launched pre-emptive air strikes ostensibly to cripple nuclear programs. In both instances, against Iraq in 1981 and Syria two months ago, the targeted regimes howled but did nothing.

The single-strike Israeli attacks would seem like pinpricks, compared with the rain of destruction U.S. warplanes would need to kneecap Iran's far larger nuclear network.

"American air strikes on Iran would vastly exceed the scope of the 1981 Israeli attack on the Osirak nuclear centre in Iraq, and would more resemble the opening days of the 2003 air campaign against Iraq," said John Pike, director at Globalsecurity.org, a leading defence and security group.

"Using the full force of operational B-2 stealth bombers, staging from Diego Garcia or flying direct from the United States," along with warplanes from land bases in the region and carriers at sea, at least two-dozen suspected nuclear sites would be targeted, he said.

Although U.S. ground forces are stretched thin with nearly 200,000 fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan, the firepower of the U.S. air force and the warplanes aboard aircraft carriers could easily overwhelm Iran's defences, leaving U.S. warplanes in complete command of the skies and free to pound targets at will.

With air bases close by in neighbouring Iraq and Afghanistan, including Kandahar, and naval-carrier battle groups in the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean, hundreds of U.S. warplanes serviced by scores of airborne refuellers could deliver a near constant hail of high explosives.

Fighter-bombers and radar-jammers would spearhead any attack. B-2 bombers, each capable of delivering 20 four-tonne bunker-busting bombs, along with smaller stealth bombers and streams of F-18s from the carriers could maintain an open-ended bombing campaign.

"They could keep it up until the end of time, which might be hastened by the bombing," Mr. Pike said. "They could make the rubble jump; there's plenty of stuff to bomb," he added, a reference to the now famous line from former defence secretary Donald Rumsfeld that Afghanistan was a "target-poor" country.

Mr. Pike believes it could all be over in a single night. Others predict days, or even weeks, of sustained bombing.

Unidentified Pentagon planners have been cited talking of "1,500 aim points." What is clear is that a score or more known nuclear sites would be destroyed. Some, in remote deserts, would present little risk of "collateral damage," military jargon for unintended civilian causalities. Others, like laboratories at the University of Tehran, in the heart of a teeming capital city, would be hard to destroy without killing innocent Iranians.

What would likely unfold would be weeks of escalating tension, following a breakdown of diplomatic efforts.

The next crisis point may come later this month if the UN Security Council becomes deadlocked over further sanctions.

"China and Russia are more concerned about the prospect of the U.S. bombing Iran than of Iran getting a nuclear bomb," says Karim Sadjadpour, an Iran expert at the Council on Foreign Relations.

Tehran remains defiant. Our enemies "must know that Iran will not give the slightest concession ... to any power," Iran's fiery President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad said yesterday. For his part, Mr. Bush has pointedly refused to rule out resorting to war. Last month, another U.S. naval battle group - including the nuclear-powered aircraft carrier USS Harry S Truman with 100 warplanes on board and the Canadian frigate HMCS Charlottetown as one of its screen of smaller warships - left for the Persian Gulf. At least one, and often two, carrier battle groups are always in the region.

Whether even weeks of bombing would cripple Iran's nuclear program cannot be known. Mr. Pike believes it would set back, by a decade or more, the time Tehran needs to develop a nuclear warhead. But Iran's clandestine program - international inspectors were completely clueless as to the existence of several major sites until exiles ratted out the mullahs - may be so extensive that even the longest target list will miss some.

"It's not a question of whether we can do a strike or not and whether the strike could be effective," retired Marine general Anthony Zinni told Time magazine. "It certainly would be, to some degree. But are you prepared for all that follows?"

Attacked and humiliated, Iran might be tempted, as Mr. Ahmadinejad has suggested, to strike back, although Iran has limited military options.

At least some Sunni governments in the region, not least Saudi Arabia, would be secretly delighted to see the Shia mullahs in Tehran bloodied. But the grave risk of any military action spiralling into a regional war, especially if Mr. Ahmadinejad tried to make good on his threat to attack Israel, remains.

"Arab leaders would like to see Iran taken down a notch," said Steven Cook, an analyst specializing in the Arab world at the Council on Foreign Relations, "but their citizens will see this as what they perceive to be America's ongoing war on Islam."



Building tension

The confrontation with Iran over its nuclear program has been simmering for more than five years. These are some of the key flashpoints.

August, 2002: Iranian exiles say that Tehran has built a vast uranium enrichment plant at Natanz and a heavy water plant at Arak without informing the United Nations.

December, 2002: The existence of the sites is confirmed by satellite photographs shown on U.S. television. The United States accuses Tehran of "across-the-board pursuit of weapons of mass destruction." Iran agrees to inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency.

June, 2003: IAEA director Mohamed ElBaradei accuses Iran of not revealing the extent of its nuclear work and urges leaders to sign up for more intrusive inspections.

October, 2003: After meeting French, German and British foreign ministers, Tehran agrees to stop producing enriched uranium and formally decides to sign the Additional Protocol, a measure that extends the IAEA's ability to detect undeclared nuclear activities. No evidence is produced to confirm the end of enrichment.

November, 2003: Mr. ElBaradei says there is "no evidence" that Iran is pursuing nuclear weapons. The United States disagrees.

February, 2004: An IAEA report says Iran experimented with polonium-210, which can be used to trigger the chain reaction in a nuclear bomb. Iran did not explain the experiments. Iran again agrees to suspend enrichment, but again does not do so.

March, 2004: Iran is urged to reveal its entire nuclear program to the IAEA by June 1, 2004.

September, 2004: The IAEA orders Iran to stop preparations for large-scale uranium enrichment. U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell labels Iran a growing danger and calls for the UN Security Council to impose sanctions.

August, 2005: Hard-liner Mahmoud Ahmadinejad is installed as Iranian President as Tehran pledges an "irreversible" resumption of enrichment.

Jan. 10, 2006: Iran removes UN seals at the Natanz enrichment plant and resumes nuclear fuel research.

February, 2006: The IAEA votes to report Iran to the UN Security Council. Iran ends snap UN nuclear inspections the next day.

July 31, 2006: The UN Security Council demands that Iran suspend its nuclear activities by Aug. 31.

Aug. 31, 2006: The UN Security Council deadline for Iran to halt its work on nuclear fuel passes. IAEA says Tehran has failed to suspend the program.

Dec. 23, 2006: The 15-member UN Security Council unanimously adopts a binding resolution that imposes some sanctions and calls on Iran to suspend its uranium-enrichment activities and to comply with its IAEA obligations.

March 24, 2007: The Security Council unanimously approves a resolution broadening UN sanctions against Iran for its continuing failure to halt uranium enrichment. Iranian officials call the new measures "unnecessary and unjustified."

April 10, 2007: Iran's Minister of Foreign Affairs says Iran will not accept any suspension of its uranium-enrichment activities and urges world powers to accept the "new reality" of the Islamic republic's nuclear program.

May 23, 2007: The IAEA says in a new report, issued to coincide with the expiration of a Security Council deadline for Tehran, that Iran continues to defy UN Security Council demands to halt uranium enrichment and has expanded such work. The report adds that the UN nuclear agency's ability to monitor nuclear activities in Iran has declined due to lack of access to sites.

Oct. 24, 2007: The United States imposes new sanctions on Iran and accuses the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps of spreading weapons of mass destruction.

Sources: BBC, Reuters, Financial Times, Radio Free Europe



Target: Iran

Despite continuing wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the United States has ample air and naval power to strike Iran. In addition to nuclear installations, other likely targets include ballistic missile sites, Revolutionary Guard bases, and naval assets.



Syria: Earlier this year, Israel bombed a site in Syria's Deir ez-Zor region that it suspected was part of a nascent nuclear program.

Osirak: Israel in 1981 had its aircraft bomb Iraq's nuclear reactor before it became operational.

Natanz: Believed to be Iran's primary uranium-enrichment site and a key target of any attack.



B1: A supersonic, intercontinental bomber, capable of penetrating deep into defended airspace and dropping more than 50-tonnes of conventional bombs on a single mission.

B2: America's biggest stealthy long-range bomber, capable of flying half-way around the globe to deliver up to 23 tonnes of bombs on multiple targets.

F-117: The original stealth fighter, almost invisible on radar, was used to drop the first bombs in both Iraq invasions.

F-18: Carrier-borne fighter-bomber capable of many roles from air combat to bombing missions.

EGBU-28: The newest of the U.S. "bunker busters," it uses a GPS guidance system and can penetrate six metres of concrete to deliver four tonnes of high explosives.

SOURCES: FEDERATION OF AMERICAN SCIENTISTS, GLOBAL SECURITY.ORG, ASSOCIATED PRESS
 
Is there a sense of "The Great ZOT" in the air? 

Apologies to Johnny Hart and BC.
 
To get things back on topic a bit...               
            China no doubt has very significant energy interests in Iran, this is common knowledge.  It is also true that China now holds more international 'weight' than it has in the past couple hundered years, also common knowledge.  It is important, however, to note the precarious nature of the Chinese political system, it's environment and it's economic system. It is a colossus with it's feet in cement blocks.  There is a very good reason that the CCP does not have an 'expansionistic' policy, (save for Taiwan which is a special case), and that is because it is difficult, in the extreme, to govern as it stands now.  Any problem multiplied by 1.3 billion is a very difficult one indeed to solve. China is also tied much more closely with the U.S. than Iran, they desire improved standing internationally and are better at negotiating than many give them credit for.
            IMHO, China's role in the near to mid-term would be more of a 'positive' peace broker (in that they may put some back room pressure on Iran) role rather than an agitator.  China needs oil for stability and would likely wish to avoid any further conflict in the region if it can be helped.  That said, either way they are in no position to intervene directly in any meaningful stragtegic manner on Iran's behalf in the near to mid term even if they wanted.  Long term, who knows what would happen.  So I must agree with CDN Aviator, China in Iran's corner is not going to happen.  China is a very delicate crossroads in its development and is practically chocking on its own success; a major external conflict is not what they want or need. Again, my money is on them 'expressing concern' to both the U.S. and Iran and using back-channels to massage the situation to avoid conflict.
          As to Russia, I have not studied modern Russia so I can't comment with much authority, but off hand it again seems unlikely for direct strategic support.  I wouldn't be surprised if the Russians were more concerned about a nuclear Iran than the U.S. A nuclear Iran would provide an impetus for many other nations to 'go nuclear' too, right in their backyard (Turkey then Greece, Egypt, - those from Janice Stein)  In anycase, it seems Iran is several years, at the earliest, from a viable homemade nuclear weapon, so there's lots of time to debate.
 
Bane said:
 There is a very good reason that the CCP does not have an 'expansionistic' policy, (save for Taiwan which is a special case), and that is because it is difficult, in the extreme, to govern as it stands now.

Bane,

Speaking of "expansionism" under the aegis/aim of Chinese nationalism, you probably forgot to mention Hong Kong, Macau, Xinjiang and Tibet, though the PRC has direct control of the latter two though the first two are more like Special Administrative Regions (SARs). The PRC might also want to influence Singapore as well because of the large ethnic Han Chinese living there, but who speak the Fukien/Hokien and Cantonese dialects like many members of the Chinese diaspora/Hua Qiao community scattered all over the world.

Of course they will have an interest in Iranian oil, since their growing population and economy will have an energy demand that is directly proportional to both of these two characteristics of this nation. America/the West's fear of a nuclear-armed Iran and their seeking to disarm Iran would be interpreted by the PRC govt. as "meddling" in the domestic affairs of another nation, and would argue against such action against Iran in the UN partially because the PRC also doesn't want other nations to meddle in the Taiwan issue, which they see as "domestic" issue even if Taiwan/the ROC is a de-facto independent country.







 
    Hong Kong and Macau aren't like SAR's, they are SAR's.  And the PRC does have direct control over them, but they are permited to maintain their current system for 50 years post assimilation under the 'one country two system's ' addition to the 1982 constitution ( made BTW with an aim to coax Taiwan a little closer). The top leader in HK is effectively picked by Beijing.  Also, trying to 'influence' is not a militarily expansionistic posture I don't think.  You are absolutely right that they have a huge stake in Iranian oil, I said that. That's why they don't want a conflict of any sort. How are you supposed to buy oil from a country that's just been pounded to dust?  And of course the Chinese would be upset if the U.S./West sought to disarm Iran ( a great euphamism for pound to dust). And yes they would likely protest to high hell at the U.N. But I was trying to pick some meat from the ugly bone that Braveheart threw out, . direct military support by the Chinese on behalf of Iran in the near to mid term is unlikely.


edited for spelling, and to remove the underlining from the entire post  :-[
 
Bane said:
    Hong Kong and Macau aren't like SAR's, they are SAR's.  And the PRC does have direct control over them, but they are permited to maintain their current system for 50 years post assimilation under the 'one country two system's ' addition to the 1982 constitution ( made BTW with an aim to coax Taiwan a little closer). The top leader in HK is effectively picked by Beijing.  Also, trying to 'influence' is not a militarily expansionistic posture I don't think.  You are absolutely right that they have a huge stake in Iranian oil, I said that. That's why they don't want a conflict of any sort. How are you supposed to buy oil from a country that's just been pounded to dust?  And of course the Chinese would be upset if the U.S./West sought to disarm Iran ( a great euphamism for pound to dust). And yes they would likely protest to high hell at the U.N. But I was trying to pick some meat from the ugly bone that Braveheart threw out, . direct military support by the Chinese on behalf of Iran in the near to mid term is unlikely.


edited for spelling, and to remove the underlining from the entire post  :-[

Yes I am quite well aware that both HK and Macau are SARs- I used to live in HK for 3 years myself as an expatriate when I was younger.  The "One Country Two systems" in place in both territories can be seen as a motivation for the Taiwanese to possibly consider reunification with the mainland- with implications for the future of the Waishengren (who have strong roots in the mainland) and the Benshengren of Taiwan(local Taiwanese whose roots in Taiwan go back beyond the 50-year Japanese occupation of Formosa) as well as the Aboriginal Minority population of the island.

Sorry for straying off topic, folks.
 
        What do you do you think CougarDaddy? As you say there may be some latent 'expansionistic' tendencies within CCP leadeship, there is certainly mistrust of the U.S. inside the PLA and the Military Commision .  As I noted, I'm not convinced that there is any potential for serious, direct, military support for Iran in the near future. You think perhaps it is not so certain?
        Part of the reason I'm so sceptical of the strenght of CCP rule and desire to engage in that type of military venture, ability to do so aside, is that I've been writing a research paper on the environment generally; and specifically on water pollution and access in the Huai River basin and in the Beijing-Tianjin region.  It seems that the internal problems in China are so numerous and serious that significant and direct support for Iran just wouldn't fly.  Though one could make an argument that conflict would galvanize the populace, I just don't see that as happening.  I must admit I've spent the past few months looking at internal problems and that my perspective may have become biased. Still, I think that there are serious internal weaknesses within China, and I don't think a war would help any of them. I would also have to guess that CCP leadership would come to the same conclusion, prefering to use it's very substantial financial stake in Iranian oil to try to cool their heels a bit.  Can't buy oil from burning rigs. Thoughts?



My apologies also, I didn't mean to drag the thread down too far down the China road, but it was brought up in a series of posts that have, by the mercy of the maker, dissappeared. At any rate, it is a worthy topic to explore vis-a-vis Iran.
 
Bane,

What I know of Chinese politics is already somewhat dated since I've last been to China, though I still pay close attention to current events revolving around China. The Politburo Standing Committee (PBSC) led by Pres. Hu Jintao is certainly different from the one led by Jiang Zhemin with other members of his "Shanghai clique". This clique included members such as former Premier Zhu Rhongji whom he brought to Zhongnanhai (the Chinese "White House") in Beijing in the time Jiang gained favor from Deng Xiaoping and eventually ascended to the presidency.

Beijing and Tianjin are two seperate municipalities that have equal status to every one of China's 30 or so larger provinces. However,  a former, though recent, PBSC member that has one of the largest power bases in that area is possibly Li Ruihuan, a supposed "liberal rival" to Jiang Zhemin before both ascended to the PBSC. I'm not sure about his positions on the environment, but he has been known to be a "pragmatic leader". It can be inferred he can be more of a reformist within the CCP instead of a party conservative because of he had emphasized the right for people to criticize the govt. once in a while without fear of retaliation, though ironically, he was put in charge of the govt.'s propaganda dept. for a time. He is a former carpenter and long-time party cadre, but I think it's a place for you to start if you want to find out issues that affect the Beijing-Tianjin area directly.

BTW, it's the Central* Military Commission (CMC), not just Military Commission and last I checked Hu Jintao was still the chair especially after Jiang gave up its chairmanship. Note that there is BOTH a State CMC and a party CMC and there have been times within party history when the members of both did NOT coincide.

English language sources you could use which I'm sure will help you when it comes to the environment there and other internal problems of China include:

Nathan, Andrew and Gilley, Bruce China's New Rulers
New York: New York Review books, 2002 (.)

  "China beware", The Economist
   Oct.13-19 issue, Volume 385, Number 8550, p. 15, 27-28, 43 (.)

  http://www.chinavitae.com/biography/Li_Ruihuan/bio -some basic info about Li Ruihuan to get you started

  The article "China: Dysfunctional Nation" which I posted a link to in the China megathread.

Internal problems you'd especially like to focus that affect the environment include the increasing numbers of rural migrants to the cities, who come to China's burgeoning new urban areas only to find menial jobs as the only ones they can take because they lack the education for better ones. This floating population of migrants has had their access to local social services such as education for their children restricted partially because they do not possess a resident ID card of the place they migrated to; it is very had to get one and they usually only possess such resident IDs from their home provinces only. Thus, this growing number of floating poor in China's cities will become a bigger problem, while the tycoons such as those in Shanghai and Guangzhou prosper.

You must have heard of the "Three Gorges Dam" project, though it's in another province; how the Chinese govt. handled the situation with respect to resettling the residents of the areas flooded for the dam's resevoir- reportedly in many cases with little compensation- should also be studied, aside from the environmental hazards created by the dam's construction and the dam itself.

As for anything on the Chinese military/the PLA, there are many books in English by Sinologists such as David Shambaugh which I'm sure will give you a better insight.

I hope this helps. Sorry for straying off topic folks; mods, please do not repost to the China megathread.










 

 
Thanks for the info. Did you have any further thoughts related to Iran?
 
Not much at this time. I'm not familiar with the extent of the relationship between the PLA and the Iranian military. Anyone, please correct me if I'm wrong, but didn't Iran purchase some missile-armed patrol boats from China? The Hou Dong class patrol boats similar to those Russian Osa class vessels? I'm not sure if they purchased anything else.

 
I think we should understand that China is pursuing its own self-interests. Amongst them are:

1. Acquiring secure, long term energy supplies, which requires good relations with oil producers in the Middle East, Africa and Russia. If good relations are difficult then pressure may/can be applied, very selectively;

2. Somewhat contradictorily, suppressing Muslim (mostly Uighur) separatists in Western China - separatists supported by the people who supply China with oil; and

3. Doing whatever it can to discomfit the USA, especially in the energy producing regions.

China matters in West Asia, the Middle East and Africa and failing to consider how China works and what it sees as its own interests in very, very shortsighted.
 
E.R. Campbell said:
2. Somewhat contradictorily, suppressing Muslim (mostly Uighur) separatists in Western China - separatists supported by the people who supply China with oil; and

This may be a very important point that many of you have missed or overlooked, and may in fact be a very decisive factor in how their relationships in the Region develop. 
 
Well the Uighurs are just one of the Islamic ethnic groups within China and they are mainly concentrated in China's Xinjiang Province. They are mainly composed of Turkmen, Tajik, Kazakh and other Central Asian ethnic groups who are just a minority in Western China.

George,

You must be aware that the Uighurs are not the only Islamic group in China though. There is this group called the Hui Ren who are ethnically Han Chinese, but who practice Islam. They are scattered all over China, though their population density obviously gets larger as you travel further West. Their mosques look more like Taoist/Buddhist temples though those buildings are bound to have both writing in Arabic and Mandarin characters and you can even find Hui Ren mosques are far east as Beijing and Xian. They practice certain Muslim traditions such as not eating pork, etc. and their men and women wear head dress similar to Uighurs and other Central Asian Muslim groups. However, it is expected that those who live in the larger cities are increasingly living a secular lifestyle and are sometimes indistinguishable from the mainstream Han Chinese society.

Hui Ren means "returning person", which can be inferred to mean that these were just Han Chinese who converted to Islam, but still chose to live among non-Muslim Han Chinese. I assume they are Sunni Muslim just like most Central Asian groups. Still, it is possible that their loyalty to the State/CCP may also be questionable, especially if the govt. clamps down more on their fellow Sunnis- the Uighurs- in the West, even if the Hui Ren are ethnically Chinese.

As for the Uighurs, there has been nothing recently in the news about Uighur seperatists lately; please correct me if I'm wrong. Still, China's involvement in the Shanghai Cooperative Organization or the Shanghai Six alliance with Russia and all these other former Soviet satellites in Central Asia was probably partially done to act as a deterrent against both these seperatists or any radical Islamic threat that might rise in the region, such as in a scenario where a fundamentalist govt. may overthrow one of the more moderate govts. in those Central Asian republics. The huge joint military exercises the SCO has held recently could possibly signal that this alliance is indeed a solid, active one.

I am not sure how Iran views the SCO- whether as a threat or as a possible alliance that Iran itself might join in the future as protection against the United States and its allies.




 
CougarDaddy said:
I am not sure how Iran views the SCO- whether as a threat or as a possible alliance that Iran itself might join in the future as protection against the United States and its allies.

That's a very interesting point.

I must ask some Chinese acquaintances what they think about Iran in or versus SCO.
 
Re: the Uighurs - I think the Chinese remain quite "tolerant" of minorities who are 'well integrated' onto the mainstream.

While I noticed a lot of Muslims in, for example, Shaanxi Province they were, except for some religious practices and a very few 'dress code' issues, indistinguishable from most other Chinese. That's different in the Xinjian AR. There, I believe, a lot of Chinese men in offices in Beijing believe there is a real separatist threat. And that's not something the Chinese centre will accept.

We may find Uighur separatism pretty tame when compared to the FLQ circa 1970, but it's still a real problem for official China.
 
E.R. Campbell said:
I think we should understand that China is pursuing its own self-interests. Amongst them are:
1. Acquiring secure, long term energy supplies, which requires good relations with oil producers in the Middle East, Africa and Russia. If good relations are difficult then pressure may/can be applied, very selectively;
2. Somewhat contradictorily, suppressing Muslim (mostly Uighur) separatists in Western China - separatists supported by the people who supply China with oil; and
3. Doing whatever it can to discomfit the USA, especially in the energy producing regions.
China matters in West Asia, the Middle East and Africa and failing to consider how China works and what it sees as its own interests in very, very shortsighted.

Edward,
      I agree that they will attempt to pursue national interests, but the process by which those are choosen is not always very straight forward, you allude to this tension in your first and second points.  Regarding the third point, can you flesh that out a bit. I don't see destabalizing the U.S. as an obivious foreign policy goal, or in the national interest.  Indeed turmoil in the U.S. markets has already caused the largest financial default in history with the drop in the USD. Does it follow that the Chinese would, indirectly, want to 'discomfort' a currency of which they hold a substantial stake in?  If you are looking at it in zero sum terms, sure the U.S. and China are  rivals, but both would be vastly better served through co-operation.  Recall several decades ago Japans booming economy was the growing asian threat, but today it is an important U.S. ally. Thoughts on this?

David


edited for spelling
 
Bane said:
Edward,
      I agree that they will attempt to pursue national interests, but the process by which those are choosen is not always very straight forward, you allude to this tension in your first and second points.  Regarding the third point, can you flesh that out a bit. I don't see destabalizing the U.S. as an obivious foreign policy goal, or in the national interest.  Indeed turmoil in the U.S. markets has already caused the largest financial default in history with the drop in the USD. Does it follow that the Chinese would, indirectly, want to 'discomfort' a currency of which they hold a substantial stake in?  If you are looking at it in zero sum terms, sure the U.S. and China are  rivals, but both would be vastly better served through co-operation.  Recall several decades ago Japans booming economy was the growing asian threat, but today it is an important U.S. ally. Thoughts on this?

David


edited for spelling

I didn't say "destabilize" - that's a few long steps beyond "discomfit".

While, in medieval English, discomfit meant to defeat in battle, now it means to disconcert and that is almost exactly what I think the Chinese want to do and are doing.

China has no interest in making enemies, but it has little use for friends, either. It wants reliable and respectful trading partners and, maybe, some compliant clients.

China is America's most important creditor - not a situation in which the Chinese find overwhelming comfort; they want, have traditionally craved, stability, internally and externally. I see nothing in the 21st century to challenge twenty other centuries of tradition.
 
How well does China learn from its own history?

The concern over the USD reflects the trade imbalance as China exports goods in return for money.  The last time that that happened, IIRC, Hong Kong was the result.

The Chinese were trading goods for Sterling Silver, depleting European and British silver reserves. They wouldn't accept European goods for their goods and drugs (tea is addictive) trade had to be in cash.  The Brits consequently created their own supply of tea in India and found something that the Chinese WOULD buy: opium.  Hence the "pirates' lair" at Hong Kong, the opium wars and the 99 year lease.  At least that is the way that I remember being taught the story.
 
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