One aspect of the removal of the 81 mm mortar from the Infantry was the effect this had on the Reserves. The following is a short piece I penned after seeing the Army instruction on standing down the mortar platoons (it's been updated to a current point of view). At the time I was the Adjutant for the Princess Louise Fusiliers, which had long maintained a successful mortar program. I started with the PLF as a mortarman, and went on to command 2 RCR Mortar Platoon and to sever at the Infantry School as the Subject Matter Expert Mortars. I agree with Mortar Guy, the mortars had a lighter-weight command and control system that gave a greater responsiveness to the battalion while the Artillery indirect fore control system is a little more ponderous in application at that level. Not wrong, just different
EULOGY FOR A MILITIA SUCCESS STORY
Recent developments in force structure for the Infantry have seen the demise of the medium (81 mm) mortar as an Infantry weapon system. This decision had not, however, been predicated by a tactical analysis which determined that the 81 mm mortar had outlived its usefulness, but had been brought to fruition by infantry manning shortfalls and the interim solution of Artillery crewed mortar platoons on operational deployments. With the additional perceived advantage that this also leveled the pers tempo between these corps, the notion that mortars could disappear from the infantry was thus born.
Mortars, long the poor cousin of the battalion support weapons' platoons, lacking Recce's snake-eating aura, TOW's high-tech systems and reach-out-and-touch-someone approach, and the Pioneers' esprit for construction and high-explosive destruction, have seldom been appreciated for the unique integral capability they provide to the battalion.. (It should also be mentioned that those bearded souls are now also a historical footnote.) The medium mortar has supported our infantry organizations since the First World War and evolved into integral battalion elements after the Second. They have long been the sole dedicated indirect fire support resource under the Commanding Officer and gave him the capability to reach over the next hill wherever a requirement for fire could be observed, or predicted.
The training of mortar detachment members has always been a relatively easy task. Training time for the basic weapon course is much less than for the other support platoon specialties, in some cases half or less. Training the Advanced Mortarman is a somewhat different problem, and many who have completed, or attempted, the Advanced Mortar Course will readily proclaim it was one of the more difficult courses in the Infantry's inventory. Yet, it has never been a limitation in training and maintaining the requisite NCOs and officers to staff our mortar platoons, when those platoons were granted any level of manning priority to begin with.
Significantly, the infantry mortar platoon also represented the sole long-standing success story for support weapon platoons in Reserve infantry units. The Militia has not had an Anti-Armour Platoon since the retirement of the 106 mm Recoilless Rifle. TOW weapon systems being too expensive and too few for a Reserve allocation. Various attempts to create Reserve Recce or Pioneer platoons have foundered on the shoals of too-limited Class â Å“Aâ ? training time to maintain skills and the cost and limited availability of requisite equipment and Regular Force expertise in support.
The Reserves maintained the 81 mm mortar for decades. In Land Force Atlantic Area these have been held and manned by the Princess Louise Fusiliers (PLF) with an annual live fire capability for over 25 years without additional funding. Throughout this period, the unit has also had Reserve Advanced Mortarmen trained on the Regular Force Courses at CTC, always having at least one, and up to five PLF-badged advanced mortarmen in the unit. The training of basic mortarmen was successfully conducted throughout this period both on the Armoury floor within Class â Å“Aâ ? timeframes as well as at the various iterations of the Area Training Centre.
The training requirements and technology to maintain a mortar program are well within the fiscal and training capabilities of a Reserve unit. With the application of some degree of priority to supporting the mortar platoon and the dedication of funding Advanced Course training for an officer or NCO every 2-3 years to maintain unit staff, success is very achievable without detracting from other unit roles and tasks.
But Army planners ignored this Reserve capability, and, notably, the success of the Princess Louise Fusiliers with mortars. Yet, each operational rotation still draws augmentation from the Reserves to support the deployed task forces. In a similar vein, Reserve infantry mortar detachments, or ideally, groups, could have been provided to a Regular Force battalion and its FSCC.
Instead, Infantry mortars will fade quietly in the night as soldiers move to fill rifle company shortfalls and the Artillery fill the operational requirements for mortar platoons. When the dust has settled and the Canadian Army revisits its battalion organizations in Canada, few will notice that the Battalions now have no integral indirect fire support. One of the inevitable fallouts of this decision will be the loss of support to infantry mortar programs and any justification to create or maintain 81 mm mortars in Reserve Infantry units.
There may be good reasons at this time to shift manning priorities in the Regular Force battalions. A formal and open doctrinal analysis may even raise cause to examine the current capability of the 81 mm mortar systems. But there is little evidence at this time that they have achieved obsolescence and their loss from the infantry may be a difficult gap to fill in a few years if we find ourselves in error. Even if the Regular Force battalions stand down their mortar platoon in the near term, is there a good argument for completely divesting the Infantry Corps of this capability when it is transferable to and maintainable by the Reserves.
The mortars of the Princess Louise Fusiliers were proof that Reserve mortar programs, alone among the Infantry support weapons systems, can be a long-term success. Correct me if I am wrong, but I thought that reinforcement of success was a credible tactical principle.
