Future of ATHENA: Manning issues & LAV III upgrades
- Thread starter The Bread Guy
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There is another point here, I think.
The R(C)ASC was instituted to serve the needs of armies of millions in an era when small engines could only carry small loads, there wasn't a highly developed civil transport system that can "Fedex" a package anywhere in the world in 2 days and where very few people new how to drive and maintain vehicles.
Prior to the rise of the internal combustion engine it was common for armies to rely on civilian transport to move themselves around the country-side. The debate then, as now, centered not on skills but on willingness to serve close to the firing line.
We can find lots of civilians willing to act in the supply chain as long as they don't need to hear the "crack-thump". We can even find some that are willing to operate in that environment as well.
I think a similar argument could be made for depot level maintenance.
The government only allows for a small number of people to be put into uniform. It seems reasonable that those uniforms should be reserved for those people willing to put themselves at risk.
And by putting themselves at risk I mean deploying to "forward" locales such as KAF as a maintainer or driver or service on board a vessel, which is always "forward".
The R(C)ASC was instituted to serve the needs of armies of millions in an era when small engines could only carry small loads, there wasn't a highly developed civil transport system that can "Fedex" a package anywhere in the world in 2 days and where very few people new how to drive and maintain vehicles.
Prior to the rise of the internal combustion engine it was common for armies to rely on civilian transport to move themselves around the country-side. The debate then, as now, centered not on skills but on willingness to serve close to the firing line.
We can find lots of civilians willing to act in the supply chain as long as they don't need to hear the "crack-thump". We can even find some that are willing to operate in that environment as well.
I think a similar argument could be made for depot level maintenance.
The government only allows for a small number of people to be put into uniform. It seems reasonable that those uniforms should be reserved for those people willing to put themselves at risk.
And by putting themselves at risk I mean deploying to "forward" locales such as KAF as a maintainer or driver or service on board a vessel, which is always "forward".
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An updated version of Blanchfield's hatchet job:
http://www.canada.com/ottawacitizen/news/story.html?id=a6f8ebef-9418-40a8-9094-389593b19083
Fair dealings, blah, blah, blah...
I am getting increasingly concerned at the "spin" being put on this in the media and the abjectly pathetic lack of knowledge and research that goes into reporting on Afghanistan.
Let's start with this. The CDS is merely addressing a long-held concern that the burden for deploying some support trades has not been shared equitably throughout the three services. This is not new and has been a complaint by the Army for many years. Most air force and navy installations have personnel in "purple" trades (indeed many wear army uniform) who have been "untouchable" for deployments because they don't belong to the army.
For example, and this is a real one, a Leopard mechanic might be posted to, say, CFB Comox in Base Maintenance. The army can't get at him for tasking because he belongs to the air force. That entire base maintenance organization has, until now, avoided being tasked en masse for deployments. Where has anyone suggested that these people will be forced to remuster to infantry to "fight in the trenches"?
Moreover, when has anyone suggested that "raw recruits" be used as infantry? For the love of God, the media needs to get a grip. What has been suggested - in the past - was that some trades (armour and artillery were mentioned) might be asked to volunteer to remuster to infantry.
I meant to address Blanchfield's use of inflamatory language ("raw recruits"? "trenches of Afghanistan"? "cadets in training"?) but am too annoyed with the crux of the story.
Finally - Ruxpin to Dosanjh: You have no - zero - idea of what you're talking about with references to pay and how the increases work. STFU.
http://www.canada.com/ottawacitizen/news/story.html?id=a6f8ebef-9418-40a8-9094-389593b19083
Fair dealings, blah, blah, blah...
I am getting increasingly concerned at the "spin" being put on this in the media and the abjectly pathetic lack of knowledge and research that goes into reporting on Afghanistan.
Let's start with this. The CDS is merely addressing a long-held concern that the burden for deploying some support trades has not been shared equitably throughout the three services. This is not new and has been a complaint by the Army for many years. Most air force and navy installations have personnel in "purple" trades (indeed many wear army uniform) who have been "untouchable" for deployments because they don't belong to the army.
For example, and this is a real one, a Leopard mechanic might be posted to, say, CFB Comox in Base Maintenance. The army can't get at him for tasking because he belongs to the air force. That entire base maintenance organization has, until now, avoided being tasked en masse for deployments. Where has anyone suggested that these people will be forced to remuster to infantry to "fight in the trenches"?
Moreover, when has anyone suggested that "raw recruits" be used as infantry? For the love of God, the media needs to get a grip. What has been suggested - in the past - was that some trades (armour and artillery were mentioned) might be asked to volunteer to remuster to infantry.
I meant to address Blanchfield's use of inflamatory language ("raw recruits"? "trenches of Afghanistan"? "cadets in training"?) but am too annoyed with the crux of the story.
Finally - Ruxpin to Dosanjh: You have no - zero - idea of what you're talking about with references to pay and how the increases work. STFU.
My first post here, been CBT Arms for 11 years, PPCLI guy has it right, you joined the Army/CF. This does not qualify you to a desk job/ spec pay for passing Basic"Training" Spending 2 years in LPC's should start to weed out the wannabe's from the pers who are commited. All that I have to say.
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Twice this month, I agree with Teddy 
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Is the CDS not saying exactly what some of us *ahem* have been saying here? See my previous post... Why all the media spin? Oh yeah :
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Signallers is the only thing I am thinking about. A Naval Communicator pretty much does the same job, U know there will be some comms at work freaking out over this.
I read that as Signallers posted to places like Comox/Greenwood or other non Army field units. We have seen several SIGOP's from ESQ already make the trip over, some have completed 2 tours.
But I agree guys working in Purple trades shouldn't be surprised if they end up going over.
I read that as Signallers posted to places like Comox/Greenwood or other non Army field units. We have seen several SIGOP's from ESQ already make the trip over, some have completed 2 tours.
But I agree guys working in Purple trades shouldn't be surprised if they end up going over.
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From what I have seen there are always ten times more volunteers than positions. This is amongst 226 and 227 techs(since we are talking purple trades). The last tour that we were offered was Kabul, they turned down 12 people to submit one name...and he was told he wasn't needed.
If there is a personnel crunch in the Army they sure arent looking very hard for replacements. ???
If there is a personnel crunch in the Army they sure arent looking very hard for replacements. ???
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Misconceptions and misreporting (hopefully) dealt with, all in one column - I've highlighted some points that'll appeal to the "more teeth, less tail" caucus of Army.ca enthusiasts. As usual, shared in accordance with the "fair dealing" provisions, Section 29, of the Copyright Act - http://www.cb-cda.gc.ca/info/act-e.html#rid-33409
Forces deployment: for the record
CDS Gen Hillier, Halifax Chronicle-Herald, 2 Nov 06
HCH link - Permalink, if HCH link expires
Much has been said in recent days on how the Canadian Forces (CF) intends to meet its commitments in Afghanistan utilizing the maximum number of men and women in uniform to therefore minimize the number of times a soldier will have to deploy to that country. While this debate has gone on, there has been much speculation as to our intentions, the breadth and depth of any actions we might be contemplating, and often criticism of the effects that may result. Given the variety of opinions expressed, and the obviously keen interest, I thought it would be useful to put on record a bit of context in the aim of better informing the debate.
While we are looking at various options to achieve the goal – balancing the demand and thus minimizing the number of an individual’s combat deployments – our guiding principle remains that military missions are Canadian Forces missions and will involve all parts of the Canadian Forces. We have extremely competent men and women throughout our organisation and we want to make sure they are all given an opportunity to contribute, without asking any single one to carry an inordinate share.
To put the right person with the right training in the right position is a complex task – but, more important, a necessary one. Our intention is to make the smartest and the most sustainable use of our resources.
Our mission in Afghanistan differs from others in the past, in that the structure required to support the troops involved in active operations is much larger. That support structure, however, does not need to be entirely operated by army personnel, and that, in past operations, has been the default setting. We already have personnel from the navy and the air force in some of these support positions and, as you know, reservists, who are also an important part of this mission, both in combat and support roles.
Part of the solution to ensure we meet our commitments will simply be to do what we are already doing, this time on a larger scale, both in terms of numbers and in terms of where we look for these people, utilizing people from every part of the Canadian Forces in their primary role – logistics, military police, signallers and medics spring to mind – even though they are not in operational units. Thus, we are willing to shrink headquarters, task every wing, station, base and unit to ensure specialists are available, trained and deployable to do the job.
Second, making available combat arms soldiers from traditional static jobs, to ensure our units are filled, will occur. We’ll live with smaller headquarters to do this.
Third, recruiting and the efficient training of those combat arms soldiers already in the pipeline will ease the individual burden, as will the opportunity for former Canadian Forces members in our Supplementary Reserve to re-enrol under flexible terms for service in Canada or overseas.
Temporarily employing uniformed personnel in other than their primary role, re-roling them, will also be an option and is not something new to the military when it comes to adapting to changing situations. Our military personnel are extremely capable, and their training allows them to perform duties effectively that extend beyond their primary roles. This happens daily not only in operations, but also in non-operational functions in headquarters and support areas.
It is clear that re-roling must be done smartly to be effective. Infantry personnel employed in non-combat roles in Canada can be made available for deployment by replacing them in their current positions by navy, air force, reserve and civilian personnel. We are looking at all options that will allow us to augment the infantry’s ranks with minimum impact on other services and on our serving members’ career progression. In fact, the operational experience will have a significant positive impact.
Our fine members wearing the uniform do so proudly and with the understanding that they are part of one big team. Most of them have already been employed in the past in other than their primary roles and they know this is part of our business. We are not looking at taking trained sailors and air force personnel and making soldiers out of them. We will find the right spot for each member. If it makes sense to train temporarily as infantry for some people who have not yet begun trades training, we will consider it. But once again, this will be done only after careful consideration of effects, and only if taking such action would provide an effective and more timely result than those actions that we already employ.
The length of deployment is also something we are looking at. Troops participating in active or combat operations in Afghanistan will continue to deploy for approximately six months. Troops involved in other functions may see the length of their tour being extended for a total of nine months or longer. This, as well, is not something new. We already have some members in Afghanistan serving one-year tours. Brigadier-General David Fraser, the Task Force Afghanistan Commander is one of them. As Commander Multi-National Division (South West) in Bosnia, I served there for 12 months. The relationship building at these levels of command takes time, so in order to get the positive effect we seek, longer command tours are necessary.
Some changes will occur sooner than others, but we don’t expect they will affect the current rotation in Afghanistan. We will make the logical and sensible choices to ensure we fulfil our commitment, take care of our troops and continue to assist the Afghan people on their way to a better life, free of oppression and violence. Canadians can be assured that the troops we send to Afghanistan will continue to be trained to the highest standard and ready for the challenges ahead.
- edit: fixed spelling in subject line -
Forces deployment: for the record
CDS Gen Hillier, Halifax Chronicle-Herald, 2 Nov 06
HCH link - Permalink, if HCH link expires
Much has been said in recent days on how the Canadian Forces (CF) intends to meet its commitments in Afghanistan utilizing the maximum number of men and women in uniform to therefore minimize the number of times a soldier will have to deploy to that country. While this debate has gone on, there has been much speculation as to our intentions, the breadth and depth of any actions we might be contemplating, and often criticism of the effects that may result. Given the variety of opinions expressed, and the obviously keen interest, I thought it would be useful to put on record a bit of context in the aim of better informing the debate.
While we are looking at various options to achieve the goal – balancing the demand and thus minimizing the number of an individual’s combat deployments – our guiding principle remains that military missions are Canadian Forces missions and will involve all parts of the Canadian Forces. We have extremely competent men and women throughout our organisation and we want to make sure they are all given an opportunity to contribute, without asking any single one to carry an inordinate share.
To put the right person with the right training in the right position is a complex task – but, more important, a necessary one. Our intention is to make the smartest and the most sustainable use of our resources.
Our mission in Afghanistan differs from others in the past, in that the structure required to support the troops involved in active operations is much larger. That support structure, however, does not need to be entirely operated by army personnel, and that, in past operations, has been the default setting. We already have personnel from the navy and the air force in some of these support positions and, as you know, reservists, who are also an important part of this mission, both in combat and support roles.
Part of the solution to ensure we meet our commitments will simply be to do what we are already doing, this time on a larger scale, both in terms of numbers and in terms of where we look for these people, utilizing people from every part of the Canadian Forces in their primary role – logistics, military police, signallers and medics spring to mind – even though they are not in operational units. Thus, we are willing to shrink headquarters, task every wing, station, base and unit to ensure specialists are available, trained and deployable to do the job.
Second, making available combat arms soldiers from traditional static jobs, to ensure our units are filled, will occur. We’ll live with smaller headquarters to do this.
Third, recruiting and the efficient training of those combat arms soldiers already in the pipeline will ease the individual burden, as will the opportunity for former Canadian Forces members in our Supplementary Reserve to re-enrol under flexible terms for service in Canada or overseas.
Temporarily employing uniformed personnel in other than their primary role, re-roling them, will also be an option and is not something new to the military when it comes to adapting to changing situations. Our military personnel are extremely capable, and their training allows them to perform duties effectively that extend beyond their primary roles. This happens daily not only in operations, but also in non-operational functions in headquarters and support areas.
It is clear that re-roling must be done smartly to be effective. Infantry personnel employed in non-combat roles in Canada can be made available for deployment by replacing them in their current positions by navy, air force, reserve and civilian personnel. We are looking at all options that will allow us to augment the infantry’s ranks with minimum impact on other services and on our serving members’ career progression. In fact, the operational experience will have a significant positive impact.
Our fine members wearing the uniform do so proudly and with the understanding that they are part of one big team. Most of them have already been employed in the past in other than their primary roles and they know this is part of our business. We are not looking at taking trained sailors and air force personnel and making soldiers out of them. We will find the right spot for each member. If it makes sense to train temporarily as infantry for some people who have not yet begun trades training, we will consider it. But once again, this will be done only after careful consideration of effects, and only if taking such action would provide an effective and more timely result than those actions that we already employ.
The length of deployment is also something we are looking at. Troops participating in active or combat operations in Afghanistan will continue to deploy for approximately six months. Troops involved in other functions may see the length of their tour being extended for a total of nine months or longer. This, as well, is not something new. We already have some members in Afghanistan serving one-year tours. Brigadier-General David Fraser, the Task Force Afghanistan Commander is one of them. As Commander Multi-National Division (South West) in Bosnia, I served there for 12 months. The relationship building at these levels of command takes time, so in order to get the positive effect we seek, longer command tours are necessary.
Some changes will occur sooner than others, but we don’t expect they will affect the current rotation in Afghanistan. We will make the logical and sensible choices to ensure we fulfil our commitment, take care of our troops and continue to assist the Afghan people on their way to a better life, free of oppression and violence. Canadians can be assured that the troops we send to Afghanistan will continue to be trained to the highest standard and ready for the challenges ahead.
- edit: fixed spelling in subject line -
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Interesting article sounds like he has some good solutions.
I would suggest two points he missed that may help.
One - Go beyond sup reserve and invite back the wounded and injured soldiers who have been released that could work in the training system. I for one was released medically while sitting in a training position which I could do with my med issues just could not run around like a 19 year old anymore.
Two - Change the the deployment cycle to meet the enemy at its weakest. That would mean going back to the spring fall deployments not the summer winter changes that appear to serve no strategic aim other than the system was geared for that since IFOR deployment Jan 05.
I would suggest two points he missed that may help.
One - Go beyond sup reserve and invite back the wounded and injured soldiers who have been released that could work in the training system. I for one was released medically while sitting in a training position which I could do with my med issues just could not run around like a 19 year old anymore.
Two - Change the the deployment cycle to meet the enemy at its weakest. That would mean going back to the spring fall deployments not the summer winter changes that appear to serve no strategic aim other than the system was geared for that since IFOR deployment Jan 05.
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being done already.3rd Horseman said:
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Para,
Thats good news, I have not heard of the program, do you have any info on that program? I know guys are still being released out of key training places and some converstations have occured at the local base to bring back some key SME people for training but due med cats they were told they could not. Also how would they bring them back? Those that are beyond Sup Res are not med cat to even be in the Cadets let alone Sup Res.
Thats good news, I have not heard of the program, do you have any info on that program? I know guys are still being released out of key training places and some converstations have occured at the local base to bring back some key SME people for training but due med cats they were told they could not. Also how would they bring them back? Those that are beyond Sup Res are not med cat to even be in the Cadets let alone Sup Res.
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all above my pay grade. I don't have hard facts, and can only supply RUMINT, and considering it affects people's lives, I don't think it right to do so. (As I'm in the beginning stages of the process, I'll keep the boards info'd as applicable.)3rd Horseman said:
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It's called contracting out - hiring pers outside the miltiary to provide training for the military. Trg billets are partially intended to provide relief for field force soldiers - giving them a break from deployments. Filling HQs and trg positions with medically unfit pers just increases the burden on everyone else.
That being said, DND is noptoriously bad at doing such things. See, for example, the CITT ruling at http://www.citt-tcce.gc.ca/procure/determin/pr2g008_e.asp, where one bidder successfully complained that serving members working inthe shop that was contracting out skewed the playing field.
That being said, DND is noptoriously bad at doing such things. See, for example, the CITT ruling at http://www.citt-tcce.gc.ca/procure/determin/pr2g008_e.asp, where one bidder successfully complained that serving members working inthe shop that was contracting out skewed the playing field.
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