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Future Canadian Airborne Capability and Organisation! Or, is it Redundant? (a merged thread)

Elite units can have many roles - they don‘t have to be airborne any more than they need to be clearance divers. They do, however, need to be relevant. Otherwise, their only reason for existence is their own perpetuation.

If the strategic analysis leads to the conclusion that parachuting is a desirable skill but that unit-level AB ops are highly unlikely, then we should disband jump coys. If JTF2 requires AB skills, it can use para trg as part of the selection process. SAR can do the same. (Does the raise the question of whether we end up contracting out the Para Centre, though, doesn‘t it?)

Other discussions have indicated airmobile ops is likely to replace AB ops. This will cost more, not less, than AB ops -- probably safe to assume we won‘t be acquiring this capability in the short term, even if we really need it to maintain credible combat presence among our allies.

As suggested above, this could all be the result of political in-fighting within the military. We can‘t afford to let that happen - there is no point bickering over limited resources. We don‘t need another Vernon, e.g., leading us to an sharp end force that can‘t support itself, or any of the many possible outcomes that reflect personal fiefdoms over mission-oriented realities.

What we really need is a "big picture" analysis of what our military is expected to do, what roles are to be fulfilled, what skills are required, and what resources are necessary to make it happen. This has to be balanced against what funding the government is prepared to give. Take note of the recent (unscientific) Globe & Mail poll indicating only slightly more than 50% of Canadians think we should have an immediate increase in military spending. We can‘t expect more resources, and we know that we can no longer do more with less.

I‘m skeptical of such a White Paper level review ever happening under this govvernment.
 
This article is flawed right to the core. It is an undeniable truth that large numbers of troops with all manner of equipment (the Yanks man-jump the Stinger missile!!) and vehicles can he inserted far behind enemy lines with, to steal a line from A Bridge Too Far, "thunder-clap surprise." I feel compelled to remind any non-believers that the United Stated dropped a company sized fighting force in Afghanistan which not only successfuly completed a raid against an armed enemy but seized the airfield as well, allowing themselves to be airlifted out by three C-130‘s about one hour later. I‘m sick of Canada‘s "we can‘t do it" excuses. I hate to think the Americans are better but they sure showed the military community that mass para drops are still a great way into the bad guy‘s back yard.
 
A company-sized drop is not a mass para op. It is the kind of para op contemplated as still being likely.

The comment regarding the US drop in Afghanistan is incredibly ironic -- in stating that a sub-unit sized drop shows the world that mass para ops remain essential, you only emphasize how small our military is and how little we understand large-scale operations.

When we stopped studying Corps ‘86 on the basis that we were better off studying how to use what we had (rather than what we would hope for should we ever go to Europe en masse), we committed ourselves to studying tactics, not strategy.

Major decisions in large forces revolve around divisions - we can‘t put one together before a major op is concluded. Since we don‘t have a deployable division, we don‘t study how to use it. So be it - but let‘s not delude ourselves into thinking that we are preparing for mass ops of any kind.

Anything less than a drop of a complete division is not a mass para op. A brigade drop might be a large scale operation, but it hardly contemplates mass ops. Indeed, the heyday of para ops was in WWII, when everyone saw what a mass drop really was.

This distinction does not render our para training meaningless. Indeed, if we are consciously focusing on small-unit ops, one could say that all soldiers should do basic para, since it appears that small-unit ops is the future of AB tasks. Perhaps the real conclusion from the Council‘s report is that we are not consciously focusing on small-unit ops, since the recommendation re para forces seems based on a large force concept.

[Incidentally, this focus on smaller units also explains why we have no real understanding of logistics -- we don‘t have enough ground forces to create a serious logistical problem (consider the problems faced by the US in supplying food, fuel, ammo and repair parts in the Gulf War). If we did study larger ops, we would be trying to grow a larger tail, not a smaller one -- the logistics problems you experience on ex will only be magnified in the real world.]
 
The 2REP showed what a small para drop could do in Kolwezi, 1978. They jumped and saved thousands of whites that were being slaughtered by the Katanga (?) rebels.
 
I see rceme‘s point about just what is a true mass drop. As you can see I‘m a product of the mid-late 1990‘s Canadian Forces.

I still consider 3 hercules flying abreast to be a mass drop. I do agree that the likelyhood of a true mass drop (10-20 000 troops) to be almost impossible. But company-sized drops are entirely realistic as long as they can either get out fast (like in my example) or have heavy follow-on forces relieve them. Plus, let us not forget, 2eme REP may have a storied history and get some fancy missions, but if Canada were to get a juicy mission we would excel at the task.
 
Weird,

A few guys in my unit were just offered a jump course...
Good article concerning the jump course and light infantry in general.

http://www.cbc.ca/news/viewpoint/correspondent_vernon/20020527.html
 
Interesting article. No disputing the comment that troops that train together under difficult circumstances will come together like no others. That doesn‘t mean those circumstances have to be under ‘chutes, though. Any tough training will do, and that training should be done at all units, not just para units.

Quite frankly, parachuting itself is not really that difficult. I‘ve done it, and landed safely all five times. We drop cargo, and it seems to find the ground. If we need to drop troops, they can be trained to hit their targets using steerable square ‘chutes as suggested. The difficult part is what you have to do once you are on the ground.

The technological hurdle is developing a highly steerable ‘chute which can handle the load of a fully-equipped infantryman, while providing the fast descent rate necessary for military ops. Ideally, it will be as small in area as current ‘chutes so as to remain relatively less visible.

Once again, I‘d note that the kind of ops mentioned in the article as the future of para seem to be smaller, not larger, teams. The other interesting point in the article is the argument that we need to maintain capabilities in a variety of ops - light, medium and heavy. Either that, or we had better get ready to saying "NO" when asked to support missions for which we are not equipped or trained.

Finally, for those who wonder about the credibility of journalists -- Mike Vernon, the article‘s author, is a former PPCLI officer and RMC grad (mid-80s) who came by his military interest the old-fashioned way -- he followed in his Dad‘s footsteps for a while.
 
All right !!! A mass drop does not necessarily mean thousands of troops are going at the same time in the same place. "Mass drop" is used when troops exit the aircraft from both side doors, putting a number of troops over a relatively small area. The largest drop I was involved in was 540 jumpers over the same Drop Zone in a few minutes and believe me, it WAS a mass drop!!! All WW2 drops went in over a number of DZ‘s, never was a Division dropped on a single DZ.
Now about the parachute, you cannot use a square for large drops (see mass drop above) because there is a great risk of entanglements in the first few seconds of flight with troops going in different directions. The next generation "mass drop" parachutes will enable the jumper to turn and choose the side on which he will land, but it will still follow wind drift to avoid collisions between jumpers.
Finally, journalists, no matter what their background, are in it for the scoop and to make money, no matter what!!! :cdn:
(read comment below, it is still relevant today)
 
Any group of soldiers who are told that what they are doing is extremely difficult, that they are the only ones who can do it, who are encouraged to think of themselves as an elite, who are led by similarly-minded NCOs and officers, and who are trained to fight, will fight. They don‘t have to be paratroopers. This doesn‘t take away from our jumpers. They get the kudos they deserve and have borne the brunt of a slagging they don‘t (i.e., Somalia fall-out).

The question that is raised by this discussion, as in many other discussions on this board, is one of priorities -- what does the government expect the military to do and what are they willing to accept as the costs (either in dollars or forgone capabilities). These things have to be decided at a high level, and I don‘t think this government is prepared to give the military the explicit direction necessary to allow real planning.
 
Well, I think Mr Montgomery had better knowledge and experience of the real thing than you or me to make this comment. Even though I respect your opinion, I think you are out of your field of expertise on this one... :cdn:
 
But would Monty be looking at paras for this quote if he were around today? It may be that it is a little dated. Perhaps he would be suggesting some other form of elite soldier.

My main point is that we shouldn‘t be hung up on para solely because of tradition, esprit de corps, etc. -- if the skill is still needed, we should train for it; if not, we shouldn‘t waste time or money on it. Same goes for whether we should or should not have para units.

It is worthwhile asking whether there are better ways of doing things rather than simply continuing to do them the same way we always have. Leadership involves knowing when to stop following.
 
Ladies and Gentlemen,

I believe this newspaper article deserves wider circulation. Being someone who spent seven of the formative years of his life in the (and out) of the three regular bns of The parachute Regiment, which shaped me and made me the human being I am, I must say that I am bias. However, even though having finally left the system after a lifetime, I am still firmly conviced that there remains a need for airborne units, with operations of company-battalion group size a distinct possibility.

I am not over impressed with the references to Saving Pte Ryanor Band of Brothers.
Yours,
Jock in Sydney.

Parachute troops produce top soldiers

Dave Brown
The Ottawa Citizen
Saturday, June 01, 2002

The possibility of declaring parachute troops obsolete has caused upset among the few former jumpers I know. They say parachuting isn‘t the issue, and the decision to remove it should not be made by people who never did it.

It‘s a confusing issue, they say. It‘s something one has to live through to understand.

Searching for an explanation, I put the question to Brig.-Gen. (retired) Ian Douglas, a 36-year veteran of the military who was Commander of Canada‘s élite Canadian Airborne Regiment from 1982 to 1985.

He, too, seemed to struggle, trying to find common ground with a person who has no military experience. We found a starting point when he asked if I had seen Steven Spielberg‘s epic war movie Saving Private Ryan, and the made-for-television series Band of Brothers, made by Mr. Spielberg in partnership with Tom Hanks.

"Something those films show well is what is required of troops in combat; the amazing things we expect young men to do under terrible circumstances. The sacrifices they become willing to make.

"I think what most people don‘t realize is that they don‘t do those things for a country or a flag or an ideal. They certainly aren‘t interested in politics. They do what they have to do for each other. For the small unit. In combat, the small unit, the infantry section, becomes something stronger than family."

Is it the terror of combat that creates those bonds?

"I‘ve never been in combat," said Brig.-Gen. Douglas. "But I‘ve known terror.

"The most terrifying moment of my life was standing for the first time in a mock tower as a young officer knowing I was going to have to jump (10 metres). You jump in pairs and there was a young private with me waiting for me to do it, then he would have to follow.

"I could see he was as scared as I was. But we did it, and at that moment there was a bond formed between us neither would ever forget. We had both conquered a great personal fear."

The training of parachute troops, it seems, is a way of substituting actual combat with something almost as tough and terrifying.

Those who experience it become set apart from the rest of us, and in the mutual overcoming of fear and great discomfort find a new respect for each other.

That isn‘t the right word, but there doesn‘t seem to be one.

I‘ve travelled to many military ceremonies in many countries and have seen the paratroop phenomenon. They seek each other out and even former enemies have that special bond.

As a man who spent much of his military career preparing young men to perform under terrible circumstances, Brig- Gen. Douglas shows open fear at the possibility of losing the parachute as a training tool.

"We expect so much from these kids. We have to give them every bit of help we can."

He sees the parachute not as a device to slow a falling body, but as a psychological training tool.

In 1982, the general recalled, he took part in the Maroon Beret course at Petawawa. He was a colonel at the time, but all rank was removed and everybody on the course was a paratrooper, including the regimental sergeant major. Nobody got preferential treatment.

They spent their days and nights together sharing rough duty in the field. They picked the same bugs out of the same field rations. They went on runs at five in the morning. And they jumped together.

As one of two men responsible for jumping with a medium machine-gun, Brig.-Gen. Douglas recalls that particular horror.

"You are so loaded with equipment that the jump masters have to stand you up, help you to the door, and hold you in place until the green light comes on. Then you jump, or perhaps fall out of the airplane would better describe it."

He recalls his "airborne buddy" from that course was a young trooper from 1er Commando Aéroporté, the Airborne‘s francophone unit.

"We did everything together; checked each other before jumps, literally lived and breathed with each other for 10 days, 24 hours a day.

"Every time we met after that, even if I was inspecting the troops, we had a little look for each other. Not quite a wink. He was my airborne buddy."

In a letter to the editor in this newspaper last Saturday, similar sentiments were expressed by Col. (Retired) R.L. Cowling of London, Ont.

"(Paratroopers) have the ‘can-do‘ temperament, and the willingness to accept hardship and danger that is the mark of the professional soldier world-wide."

Canada‘s military leaders have promised a decision in the fall about whether to retire the parachute. The military isn‘t a democracy so there won‘t be a vote. One thing is clear. Those who have experienced parachute training think dropping it would be an awful mistake.

Dave Brown is the Citizen‘s senior editor. Send e-mail to dbrown@thecitizen.southam.ca Read previous columns at www.ottawacitizen.com

© Copyright 2002 The Ottawa Citizen
NOTE
In regard to Spielberg. During the making of Pte Ryan the extras that played the American/German soldiers (apart from the initial scenes of the invasion when the Irish Army provided the big blob of people) in the vast majority of the scenes, were a group of 18 either serving regular members (or who had just been discharged) of the Para Regt and Royal Marines who were on leave, most being Cpls or Sgts (British equivalent not CFs), and either Jocks or Londoners.

Spielberg was fascinated by them, because when they did a scene - it was done to perfection, no retakes like they do with Hollywood extras/stunt men, these blokes were professionals. They would contribute their own thoughts to the proceedings, which enhanced the dramatic appeal of many of the scenes.

So Spielberg was absolutely and totally impressed, although his minders were quite upset with the behaviour, believing the chaps should kowtow to the great man.

He would talk to them during breaks being fascinated by stories of the Falklands, Northern Ireland, para/commando training, in short everything to do with them. But, what really amazed him was their sense of humour, and the constant rapatee between them.

In our regimental association we have a chap who is ex Para Regt, and who got the job as an extra on the day he completed his 22 years and was waiting to migrate to Australia (since then three of the other extras have arrived in Sydney as migrants). He telling the story, since confirmed by the others of Spielberg asking the lads if any of them were Jewish, of which three of them where (lot of Jewish lads have joined the Para Regt over the years).

He then asking if anyone had had family who had died during the war, another of the lads - a true cockney, born in the Tower Hamlets, piped up and said "yes, I had a uncle". Spielberg saying he was sorry, and what camp did he die in. So and so said the cockney, "terrible, that was a death camp" from Spielberg. "How did he die", "o‘h he fell out of a guard tower"!

18 Tom‘s roaring with laughter, some 10 or 11 of Speilbergs minders, saying disgusting, terriblce, how racist et ect et ect. Spielberg, standing there like a stunned mullet, then finally disintergrating in hysterical laughter.

For the rest of the production, he was constantly saying ‘he fell out of a guard tower‘. When the final scenes requiring the lads was shot. He took all 18 and their wives/lovers/girlfriends out for dinner (no minders present), presenting each with a silver pint tankard with the traditional glass bottom with a gold guinea inside, each engraved for the bloke‘s, and the movie details. A number subsequently took part in the filming of Band of Brothers.
 
thanks Jock for a great article...
Of course the non-believers will think: "here we go again..." but guess what...
I have never heard of a Mechanized Infantry Brotherhood, or a Tank Loader Brotherhood... but the International Brotherhood of Paratroopers, even though not an official organization, really exists. There really is a bond between Paratroopers that goes beyond nationality, religion, color, language etc... :cdn:
 
There is also the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers. And the Teamsters. Let‘s not get hung up on a word.

If the time has come for para to be replaced by airmobile or some other concept, so be it. If the time is to change the focus of the use of para, that‘s fine too. And if the current use of para should remain, then let it continue. But the decision has to be based on strategic assessment, not on sentiment or regiment.

History teaches us lessons, but we musn‘t forget that it must be viewed in today‘s context if it is to be of any value. Any unit can be made into an elite, no holds barred, fight to the finish unit if you are permitted to have high standards, intense training, and solid leadership.
 
Great Post.
As one of the "Last of the First" ( Served with the 8CH/RCD jump troop 83-93. I know the feelings of we don‘t need it.
We were always enemy force, it was great. The LEG Sqns never had a chance. We made the last operational jump Oct 31, 93. With a total of 26 Drops and 5 LAPES, our Lynxs were well worn. To all of the Airborne Brothers. Airborne /Bold and Swift
 
Rat, these things you‘re talking about are official organizations... but I guess you don‘t care !! I recognize the lawyer in you, and the frustrated Ringknocker who was probably told he would never make General, and the cherryjumper who never made it in the Regiment... you see, there was only one MAINT O in the Regt, and it was never you !!!
It seems you have a solution to all the problems in the system, yet you are looking at it from the outside... have you thought about coming back and changing all those things ??? I am still in, and will be for some time. I work hard to make things better in my organization, and motivating young people to stay in the system is very difficult. I know by experience that an Airborne unit is great motivation for troops who aspire to more than debussing from a veh, and it helps keep good soldiers in the system. So can we afford to lose good soldiers because there is no challenge for them ? Does debussing from a veh or helo give the feeling that you have conquered fear ? A former boss of mine told me one day: "Choose your battles"... well, a lot of people, including myself, think this one is worth fighting for !!! :cdn:
 
To address Jungle‘s points for those who may not have read as many of my posts as he:

A. Regarding the basis for my point-of-view:

I never had to worry about being a General and certainly never had to be told that in the first place. There are only one or two EME generals at any one time, and it would have been incredibly unrealistic to expect it to happen, particularly given my inability to master French beyond the functional level. If I had not left, I‘m confident my career would be progressing as well as I could have hoped for.

I never had any interest in joining the CAR, nor in doing the jump course. After 4 or 5 (sport) jumps, I realized jumping per se wasn‘t my thing - while jumping itself is fun, there is nothing driving me to do it again and again (and note that there is no attempt here to equate sport jumping with military jumping, since they are clearly different). Motorcycling, hang-gliding and climbing are a little more fun for me and have an allure which maintains my interest more than jumping ever could.

Maint O? No, not of the CAR (and used herein, its successors). But of a differnt combat arm unit - yes, I did that tour. I‘ve co-ordinated the efforts of multiple multinational Maint Os as well.

Do I agree that there should be elite units, or at least advanced quals that require soldiers to push themselves, for the purposes you mention? Yes, there should be something to aspire to, particularly for soldiers who easily conquer most other challenges. Para might still be one of those quals, if it is truly relevant to future ops. But if it doesn‘t have any other value, is it the best challenge to offer, or is it just an officially-recognized form of adventure training?

As far as "having solutions", I don‘t claim any infallible insight. Far from it, since I recognize a lot of my experience involved making mistakes large and small. I do have opinions regarding solutions, or approaches to determining solutions. They are based on my education (engineering at RMC, and business and law at civilian universities), - my military experience (line and staff EME positions across Canada and with the UN), and my civilian work, as a lawyer. They are also based on a continued interest in and discussion of military affairs.

Is that interest from the outside? Yes. Be thankful that some of us on the outside have military experience and continue to care about what is happening. In the end, the major decisions will be made by people on the outside, and a lot of them have no military experience. Maybe they will be inclined to listen to other people on the outisde if not to soldiers who are sometimes thought to have a vested interest.

Should I come back? A continual personal debate. The areas of practice offered in JAG are not my most favoured and the pay is about half of the best positions on Bay Street. Frankly, I‘d be better paid if I came back as an EME officer (than as a JAG officer), but I think the years I spent at law school and in practice could be put to better use.

B. As for the topic at hand:

‘Official organizations‘ are not sancrosanct -- whether they should remain or not is a fair topic of discussion, particularly given the current reality. At present funding levels, and with no real improvement in sight, something will have to give soon. Don‘t be surprised if units disappear or their roles change. If the army continues to fight internally over establishments, it is likely that it won‘t be the navy or air force that suffers.

We must continually evaluate our strategic and tactical plans and, if the analysis points to disbanding units or even eliminating certain skills, then we should do so. If the sole raison d‘etre for the CAR is as a training ground, then it seems a luxury we can no longer afford.

If it is better to maintain the CAR as an element of a diverse force, rather than disbanding it to provide for a deeper, but more concentrated, force, then it should be kept. But it shouldn‘t be kept just because there are a bunch of jumpers who can‘t envision change.

Should you fight this fight? By all means. By putting forth the best arguments in favour of keeping the CAR, or even in just maintaining para skills, it will provide the best possible means of evaluating the value of doing so (flexibility of response, special teams, maintenance of unique skills that are not easily replaced, etc.) compared to the potential value of changing tactics, of consolidating equipment types, of ensuring we have similarly trained soldiers throughout the forces, etc.

At the same time, jumpers should not be afraid (perhaps hesitant or resistant would be better words) to conclude that their role is passe if that is where the analysis leads them, since they are usually among the best troops and they will easily adapt to whatever new, probably elite, role is assigned to them. Just don‘t situate your estimate.

Frankly, I don‘t see the army giving up the airborne skills quite yet, particularly for small team operations (say, company level or smaller). I do see the outside possibility that they will become more of an advanced qual. Personally, I do think it would be nice if the tower (at least) was part of basic for everyone. No reason it shouldn‘t be, just as rappelling was.

Finally, and perhaps as an aside, consider that if someone doesn‘t occassionally ask the hard questions, the answers may be forgotten when you really need them. This is a good time to remind ourselves (and others) of what we want our military to do for use as a nation, how they must do that, and what support they require.
 
rcemerat: I‘m confused.....did you actually earn your wings at the CABC/CPC or did you ‘jump‘ as a civy? Any fat chump can go jump out of a cessna in a pink powerranger outfit and say he‘s airborne. Jumping from the mock tower and the helicopter or plane tests someone more than rapelling/fastroping/obstacle crse does. I‘ve never seen anyone refuse to rapell off a tower or rock face. For the experience and challenge it provides to motivated troops and for the small amount of money (was it $100mil?) it costs it is a great investment.
 
I thought I was quite specific in that I had not done Basic Para and that I do see the value of the course, and in particular the tower, as a confidence builder.

As far as what stops people in their tracks, I have seen people refuse to jump from a Cessna, others who have frozen at the top of the cliff when on belay, others who couldn‘t breathe with scuba gear, etc. In almost all of these cases, it is simply a matter of learning to trust yourself, your peers, and your gear.

As far as cost goes, I think the real cost is not the obvious training cost - it is the loss of depth in similarly equipped and trained troops (for rotos, etc.), the additional support costs, etc. These may be perfectly acceptable in light of what para-equipped troops can accomplish. But it appears that it is time for a serious discussion of the pros and cons of having para. One of these discussions should centre on jump coys vs. CAR -- which makes more sense in light of our approach to ops in the future?
 
A paratroop can always participate in an airmobile operation. The reverse is not true of conventional light infantry participating in an airborne Op. With paratroops you get two capabilities in a ground force for the price of one.

It is also intresting to note that the scale of parachute operations has shrunk to a size ideally suited to Canada. The prevailing wisdom is that parachute operations will be conducted at the Bn and Coy levels.

With that in mind, we should be looking at how we can get the most out of parachute units. Do we want a standing Airborne Battle Group (like CAR) or do we want Airborne Companies within Airmobile Battalions?

The characteristics of an Airmobile force include its reach (which is far deeper that of conventional ground forces) and its speed of deployment. Both the reach and speed of an Airborn force exceed the reach and speed of an airmobile force.

There is not question about it, parachuting is a necessary skill for the Army and it will remain a neccessary skill into the forseable future.
 
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