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Further delays in US F-35 testing schedule

"Our IOC will be at the end of 2018," says Air Vice Marshal Kym Osley, who represents the RAAF in the programme. "Approximately 18 months before this we anticipate the USAF IOC in 2016. End-2018 is the date we've always planned for [emphasis added]." The gap is required mainly due to testing and certification activities specific to Australia.

2018.......always planned..........??

Yeah right !!!!

Australia is expected to acquire the F-35A CTOL variant and achieve Initial Operating Capability in 2014

http://www.airforce.gov.au/aircraft/jsf.aspx
 
Pilot reviews seem quite positive . . . testing is proceeding and they  give very high praise for the avionics.


http://www.airforcetimes.com/news/2011/02/air-force-jsf-acing-tests-pilots-report-022611w/

 
As well, it just goes to show that military purchases made in the early 90's (re: Maritime Helicopter purchase) had issues with ballooning costs, so why should we not believe the same should happen with modern purchases such as the JSF?

 
Then there's the software, note the source:

Schwartz: Software may slow F-35 development
http://www.airforcetimes.com/news/2011/03/air-force-norman-schwartz-says-software-may-slow-f-35-development-030611w/

The painstaking effort to write the complex software for the F-35 may slow development of the fighter jet, the Air Force’s top uniformed officer said.

Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. Norton Schwartz said his service’s version of the tri-service stealth fighter is showing “good software stability,” but also that he was worried that the Joint Strike Fighter program might not be able to finish and test the software on time.

That might cause the software to become “the pacing item in terms of the development schedule,” Schwartz said last week at a conference hosted by Credit Suisse.

JSF program officials don’t dispute that, but say they have added extra time and more software engineers to stave off delays.

“The schedule and resourcing has been adjusted to address the risks that we saw associated with those next steps,” Maj. Gen. C.D. Moore, deputy JSF program manager, said at the same conference.

The F-35 program has been producing software at a world-class rate, but bringing the various bits of software together and integrating it with other onboard systems has historically been problematic, Moore said.

Along with software, Schwartz said, the plane’s production schedule and technical glitches with the helmet-mounted display were his top concerns about the F-35A.

He also said the fighter was structurally sound but has a few aerodynamic “hot spots.” The aircraft continues to perform well in flight tests, exceeding both its planned time aloft and test points.

“From a performance point of view the platform looks solid, but there a couple other aspects that are worrisome,” he said.

Schwartz also questioned whether Lockheed Martin would be able to deliver aircraft as scheduled [emphasis added].

“The more fundamental issue is the ability of the factory floor to produce machines on time and with minimum change work and so forth,” he said. “I’ve been disappointed in the fact that the schedule has continued to slip. We had a plan for nose-to-tail exchange between legacy aircraft and the F-35. That plan has been upset. … It’s a pain in the ass.”

He implored Lockheed Martin to “deliver what they promised.”

The JSF program office said that the program is keeping to its revised schedule...

Mark
Ottawa
 
Navy secretary hedging Marines bets for them?

US Marine Corps to become 2nd F-35C customer
http://www.flightglobal.com/blogs/the-dewline/2011/03/us-marine-corps-to-become-2nd.html

...the US Marine Corps, which previously seemed devoted solely to the short take-off and vertical landing (STOVL) F-35B variant, will soon buy some F-35C carrier varaints. Here's my transcript of the exchange yesterday between Sen Joe Lieberman, of Connecticut, and Secretary of the Navy Ray Mabus and commandant of the Marine Corps Gen James Amos.

    "Lieberman: I noted in the  statement you made in your prepared testimony that the F-35C of the Joint Strike Fighter will be procured for both the navy and the marine corps. I think it's been the general understanding that the Marine Corps would want to see produced and would procure a pure F-35B STOVL fleet variant of the F-35 and that in fact is the plan that is reflecte in the curret future years defense program. Did I read this correctly in your prepared statement and could you speak therefore to the future mix if that is the correct interpration of the F-35B and F-35C in the Marine Corps inventory?

    Mabus: Yes, sir. It has always been true that the F-35B was solely a Marine aircraft. It's also been true the C version the carrier version the naval version was going to have marines flying those as well. Today we have three marine squadrons aboard carriers. And we are currently undergoing a TacAir [tactical aircraft] integration look across the navy and Marine Corps to see what the proper mix is of C's for the navy and Marine Corps to make sure that we continue that integration and make sure marines continue to fly off carriers in strike fighters as well as in vertical takeoff and landing aircraft.

    Lieberman: General, can you give me your reaction to this? Is that mix at this point acceptable to the marine corps? Am I wrong that you had originally hoped for a pure STOVL variant fleet?

    Amos: Senator, you are correct that was the initial plan. Let me back up just a little bit. We've always been fans of TacAir integration. As the secretary said, we have had marine squadrons on the navy carriers -- on the Enterprise right now, we have Marine F/A-18s. We do that. We like that. It's good for both our services and the naval force. But when we set the requirement in for STOVL aircraft our hope was we would be able to some day fly some of those aircraft off CVN aircraft carriers. That's yet to be seen whether that would be possible. So in the meantime it would seem prudent that we sould buy some number of C variants even early on so we can begin to transition our force there. But it will be a proportional number to our overall buy of STOVL."

On the other hand:

Marine Corps F-35 Making ‘Significant Progress,’ Amos Says
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-03-08/marine-corps-f-35-jet-making-significant-progress-amos-says.html

The U.S. Marine Corps version of Lockheed Martin Corp. (LMT)’s F-35 fighter “has made significant progress” this year, including doubling in two months the number of successful vertical landings it made all last year, the service’s top officer said today.

The F-35B tests have included 22 vertical landings since January, compared with 11 in 2010, the Marine Corps commandant, General James Amos, told the Senate Armed Services Committee today in prepared testimony.

“I am confident that we will field this aircraft in accordance with responsible timelines,” Amos said. “This matter has my unwavering attention and I am personally overseeing this program.”

Defense Secretary Robert Gates in January decided to put the Marine Corps F-35, designed for short takeoffs and vertical landings, on a two-year “probation” to give Lockheed Martin more time to demonstrate the fighter’s reliability.

Navy Secretary Ray Mabus told the panel that the Marine Corps’ goal over the next two year is to demonstrate that the aircraft’s problems can be solved without exceeding weight and cost limits...

While the Israelis may also be bet-hedging:

In bid for air superiority, Israel may wait for better jets
Israel Air Force is due to receive F-35 stealth fighters from manufacturer Lockheed Martin beginning in late 2015.
http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/news/in-bid-for-air-superiority-israel-may-wait-for-better-jets-1.348009

Israel might accept deliveries of the new F-35 fighter jet later than planned to make sure the planes have the capabilities the air force requires.

The Israel Air Force is due to receive the planes from manufacturer Lockheed Martin beginning in late 2015. But the current development speed means that if Israel takes the planes on schedule, they will be from the first batch of production, lacking the advanced electronics, communications and radar functions that Israel demands.

Third-batch jets that feature these capabilities will not be delivered before late 2016. Teams from the IAF and the Defense Ministry have left for the United States in the past two weeks to take part in discussions between Lockheed Martin and the U.S. Air Force. The sides will plan production and the various delivery dates...

...the IAF also fears that even at the price of $100 million per unit [emphasis added], it may eventually end up with a jet lacking the advanced capabilities it needs. A meeting headed by the director-general of the Defense Ministry, Maj. Gen. Udi Shani, is scheduled to take place in two months to sum up the work of the teams that visited the United States and to decide whether the purchasing agreement of 25 jets already signed needs to be changed.

Lockheed Martin, for its part, wants to deliver the planes as soon as possible to boost its marketing efforts with an Israeli endorsement.

The Defense Ministry said yesterday that it had signed letter of agreement to receive stealth jets in late 2015. "We do no intend to comment on financially-motivated speculation," the ministry said in a statement...

Parliamentary Budget Officer Kevin Page will release his F-35 report Thursday, March 10 at 1100:
http://www2.parl.gc.ca/Sites/PBO-DPB/index.aspx?Language=E

Mark
Ottawa
 
From Bob Cox of the Fort Worth Star-Telegram at his blog:

Canadian report says cost of F-35s far higher than advertised
http://blogs.star-telegram.com/sky_talk/2011/03/canadian-report-says-cost-of-f-35s-nearly-double-that-advertised.html

A new report out from the Canadian Parliament's budget office estimates that nation's cost of buying and operating 65 F-35 Joint Strike Fighters will be much greater - about $12 billion more -
http://www2.parl.gc.ca/Sites/PBO-DPB/documents/F-35_Cost_Estimate_EN.pdf
than the figures provided by the Conservative government.

The government's plans for buying the F-35, to be built in Fort Worth by Lockheed Martin, have come under considerable fire from the political opposition because there was no formal competition held. The Globe and Mail reports:
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/fighter-jet-price-tag-will-approach-30-billion-budget-watchdog-warns/article1936449/

The report by Parliamentary Budget Officer Kevin Page comes at a bad time for the Conservative government, which been dogged by controversy over the acquisition and faces a possible defeat in the weeks ahead.

The budget watchdog’s estimate represents the “total ownership cost” of the stealth jets over 30 years of service and is close to 70 per cent higher than the price tag disclosed by the Tories.

His report was independently peer-reviewed by non-partisan experts at the United States Congressional Budget Office, the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, and Queen’s University. Opposition Liberals, who’ve promised to cancel the F-35 contract if they win office, said Mr. Page’s report is proof the Tories have been hiding the program’s full costs of nearly $30-billion.

“This is an unconscionable amount, and the Harper Conservatives have again misled Canadians and Parliament,” Liberal defence critic Dominic LeBlanc said. “To put this in perspective, $30-billion is equivalent to $1,000 for every man, woman and child in Canada, and equals the entire federal government’s annual spending on health care.” Mr. Page’s report is an effort to get at the full price tag for the 65 F-35 Lightning fighter jets the Conservatives have agreed to purchase from Lockheed Martin. The budget watchdog is also warning there is a “risk that costs may increase” further.


The government has said the per-unit price of each plane is about $70 million to $75-million, while other estimates have pegged them at $91-million each. Government figure sput the total cost of ownership at $17.6-billion.

Mr. Page’s report estimates the jets will cost nearly $149-million each but over their lifetime will run about $450-million per plane in support and maintenance.

- Bob Cox
rcox@star-telegram.com

Mark
Ottawa
 
PBO uses a 30 year timeline with 2 Life Extensions at 10 and 20 years.  DND only used 20 years.

Presumably if they extend the life of the F35 for 100 years it will cost 100 bazillion gigabucks......
 
So there are delays.  Critics also hounded the M1 Abrams, the M2/M3 Bradley and the AH-64 Apache as overpriced disasters, but they've ruled the roost for the last generation.
 
Kirkhill said:
PBO uses a 30 year timeline with 2 Life Extensions at 10 and 20 years.  DND only used 20 years.

Presumably if they extend the life of the F35 for 100 years it will cost 100 bazillion gigabucks......

LOL...man, I like that comment.... ;D

At least you didn't go on to say that our CF-18's never dropped any air to ground ordnance during their operational life like a certain host of a certain political show did tonight...good grief.
 
Kirkhill said:
PBO uses a 30 year timeline with 2 Life Extensions at 10 and 20 years.  DND only used 20 years.

Presumably if they extend the life of the F35 for 100 years it will cost 100 bazillion gigabucks......
It is pretty thin report actually, very little meat,

Take out $4-5 billion for those two upgrades and the take 2/3 of the $24 B remaining to make the 20-30 year differential go away and you have a PBO estimate of about $16 Billion.

Go figure, Kevin Page and the PBO agree with the government estimates.

So much for Iggy creating an election issue . . he just gave ammunition to the CPC to support the purchase.

And who knew you could forecast future aircraft costs by weighing them.  Them kids in the PBO sure are smart. 
 
At least you didn't go on to say that our CF-18's never dropped any air to ground ordnance during their operational life like a certain host of a certain political show did tonight...good grief.

Well, one never thought Mr Martin had more cattle than hattitude.

Mark
Ottawa
 
I have to say that estimating aircraft production costs by the kilogram o' plane is a new one on me, so that makes me scratch my head a bit - happy to hear from those with more experience on such studies than I on this one.

That said, to play the devil's advocate:  is the 30 year timeline unreasonable? 

In this specific example, yes, comparing apples to the CF's 20-year-oranges.

However, given the actual service life of some Canadian airframes (like this or this), would it make more sense for the CF to look at a longer timeframe (as routine, not just in this case)?
 
milnews.ca said:
That said, to play the devil's advocate:  is the 30 year timeline unreasonable? 

I don't think a 30 year timeline, in and of itself, is unreasonable.  MY problem is comparison of variable timelines by accumulating costs.  Longer timelines will always mean higher costs.  You might as well say that operating a hospital will cost you trillions of dollars because once erected they tend to stand for centuries.

The only fair method of evaluating these types of "services" is to annualize the costs, which is to say you take your timeline, whatever it is, and whatever platform, add up the costs and then divide them by the number of years to get the annual cost of providing the service.

Strangely enough that corresponds to the manner in which parliament finds and grants funding.
 
milnews.ca said:
.... That said, to play the devil's advocate:  is the 30 year timeline unreasonable? 

In this specific example, yes, comparing apples to the CF's 20-year-oranges.
I stand corrected - I just spotted this footnote (page 10 in exec summ) that (sorta kinda) suggests that's the figures MAY be more comparable....
DND Additional Costs include costs for project management, infrastructure, weapons, and a contingency.  The PBO has not included these costs in its estimate. In addition, while the PBO operating and support cost is based on a 30-year program life, DND's operating and support cost is based on a 20-year program life. For purposes of comparability, PBO has increased the DND's forecast operating and support cost on a pro-rata basis to reflect a 30-year program life.

With that, my question for those with bigger money forecasting brains is now "how useful are 20-year figures stretched on paper to cover 30 years?"
 
The 30 year timeframe is a lot more realistic than the gov't's 20 year one.  The key figure to me is the PBO's $148.5 million initial acquisition cost per aircraft vs. the gov't's mid $70 million (see pp. 10, 28).  The latter is simply unbelievable and the gov't is unwilling or unable to provide any evidence to back up its figure--rather telling to me. 

This from the report (p. 41) is very interesting: 

The new aircraft was to reflect key lessons derived from the 1991 Gulf War. Stealth was seen as immensely valuable in the first day of the war; however, after the first day’s operations, the Iraqi integrated air defense system never recovered, and Pentagon planners believed that stealth would be less vital as any campaign continued. In addition, operations revealed the high value of precision guided munitions. The Joint Direct Attack Munition80 program, the first full-production GPS guided bomb, was well under way by 1995. This meant that a combat aircraft could be lethal even with a relatively small weapon load. All this led to a ‘day-one stealth’ concept, where the aircraft would carry a restricted internal load at the start of the campaign but then switch to non-stealthy operations with a larger load of external weapons afterward in order to deal with bigger target sets [emphasis added]. This transformation in approach called for a versatile design.

Does the Canadian Air Force need that initial strike stealth?  If we on the other hand take part thereafter stealth is not critical--and is not demanded even of the F-35 with weapons on the wings degrading stealth severely. 

From the same page: 

As the largest customer, the USAF had a strong influence on the basic operational requirement, which was expressed early on as ‘70 per cent strike and 30 per cent fighter’ [emphasis added]. In USAF service, the F-15 and, later, the F-22 are the primary air combat fighters, with F-16s in a fighter-bomber role. The strike mission emphasized ground targets, called for the ability to carry bombs (bulkier and heavier than air-to-air missiles), and required a built-in infrared/laser targeting system. Fighter missions stressed speed and acceleration, radar size and power, and agility.

Are those our requirements in a fighter?  Esp. since its main use in practice is Canadian airspace patrol and protection, a role for which stealth is not needed. 

Mark 
Ottawa
 
The issue is that the PBO report is being used to compare prices between its conclusion and the government's number.

The headlines make it easy for a casual reader to conclude the government has low balled their number, has mislead Canadians, when in fact the two estimates  - when you turn PBO apples into government oranges, are essentially identical.

Maybe the PBO should produce a report that tells Canadians the 30 year cost of all Government Departments and Operations, such as the CBC - I'd guess that would about $50 Billion ++, Agricultural subsidies to dairy farmers, subsidies for the aerospace industry,  transfers from Have to Have Not Provinces . . . it would a very interesting list with some huge numbers.

Why we only do this for selected military purposes is an interesting area for speculation.  It distorts the public debate to use it selectively.






 
MarkOttawa said:
Navy secretary hedging Marines bets for them?
For the benefit of conspiracy-seekers and followers of dubious/selective titles...

....the US Marines are a subordinate Department of the US Navy -- it's the Secretary of the Navy's job to support the Marines.
 
Mark,

Interesting points of view, but it does raise some points for discussion.

1.  The cost of the A-variant, according to a recent report by Aviation Week dd Feb. 14/2011 is only $110 million per - not the near $150 million being cited in the report.  That $40 million per airframe difference adds $2.6 billion to the cost of the purchase. 

2.  Only 2.5% of the American aircraft in Iraq (original Gulf War) were F-117s, yet they struck more than 40% of the strategic targets.  If anything that should show you that the a/c was used well beyond the first day of the war simply because there are ALWAYS mobile ground targets to be engaged.  As the F-22 is the only platform capable of performing the role of the F-117, and they are no longer being produced, it is important to have a fleet of a/c that can perform in that role.  The F-35 is the only option available to do that.

3.  You ask if Canada needs that "initial strike stealth" capability.  I ask you this - who says stealth is for "initial strike" capability only?  After all, our CF-18's didn't start dropping bombs in the Gulf until near the end of the campaign, and I'm 100% certain that they would have appreciated having some type of stealth capability while engaging ground targets in Kuwait. 

4.  To add to #3, Canadian pilots in Yugoslavia flew 678 combat sorties: 120 defensive counter-air escorts for Allied strike packages and 558 bombing strikes during 2,577 combat flying hours. CF-18s dropped a total of 397 PGMs and 171 free-fall iron bombs on a wide variety of targets including surface-to-air missile sites, airfields, bridges and fuel storage areas.  Once again, I’m certain that a stealth enabled platform would have given pilots a greater peace of mind while flying those hostile skies.

5.  You go on to ask if “those are the requirements in a fighter.”  The fact of the matter is, since the mid 70’s, no aircraft has been designed as a “fighter” – they ALL have multirole capabilities.  Even the Raptor and the Eagle, both designed to conquer the air superiority realm, come with ground attack capabilities.  It ensures that, and yes the pun is meant, that we get more bang for our buck as it enables our fleet of a/c can perform in ALL the roles that NATO and the UN ask of us.  That is why the part that you failed to bold, “This transformation in approach called for a versatile design,” is perhaps the most important part of the entire paragraph.

6.  Frankly, you’re missing the larger picture about the a/c which this plane is designed to replace.  The F-16, A-10, F/A-18, and AV-8B Harrier – all of which have been used to strike ground targets more often than perform in the air superiority theatre.  I would argue that the only planes out of that entire group who used their “fighter” capability to the max would be our CF-18’s, but to state that was its “main use in practice” as Canada only needs a “fighter” would be grossly inaccurate.
 
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