Field Marshall Eric Von Manstein

[54/102 CEF]

Read "Lost Victories" by Feldmarschall Eric von Manstein. If you read nothing else he comes across as a German Eisenhower, firm but fair.

Then "Manstein: A Portrait" by Marcel Stein - in this book we see him as a German Eisenhower until they implement the Commisar Order. The Commissar Order aimed to kill off all Communist Party cadres with the Soviet Army in the field or wherever they were found by the German Army. It lasted about a year until it was abandoned as it ratcheted up resistance to the Germans exponentially. We also see the unwritten rules of cooperation to liquidate Jews and "undesirables" essentially anyone targeted by the Nazi ideology. There are repeated quotes of undesirables = Communists = Jews.

The trouble with all this is it was fiction. The Jews were at the bottom of Soviet society vs. the top. You could say the German attack had fallen on "air" to paraphrase Basil Liddell Hart.

Until the front hardened after the fall of Stalingrad in 1942 it was the fashion to see the end of the Russian Empire as just a matter of time and this is reflected in numerous orders of the day where by we see endless repetitions of any threat to Rear Area Security is best met by liquidating the Jews. It is shown that this engendered very close coordination by all units of the Wehrmacht with the SS who ran the liquidation squads.

From the clearing of the Crimea to the push into Stalingrad and down to Rostov on the approaches to the Caucuses one man has his finger on the Army Group South orders and that is Von Manstein.

This all comes out in his trial where they find the most complete records of his 11th Army which cleared the Crimea.

Manstein was sent up the river but only served 4 years. He was treated this way the author suggests because he had been captured by the British who, after the Allies fell out with the Russians - had to be seen as cleaning house in their side of Germany, but their hands weren't so clean in particular the French who had sent thousands of French Jews east to their fate in the Concentration Camps.

Throughout the 60s and early 70s Manstein was regularly brought up on charges as new evidence came to light but he could not be prosecuted twice. So he walked and ended his days as a Grand Old Man of what could have been.
Both books are well worth reading and highlight the infighting of the 2 main HQs of the Germany Army, the OKH and the OKW. OKH was the Berlin based politicised Army HQ - OKW being the senior HQ of the fighting Armies. The Armies might recommend but the Army HQ held sway as the voice on the Corporal.

The question is constantly brought up - why didn't they revolt? Political corruption and co-option is the answer. In general the view seems to have been, for at least the first 29 months of the war that "we can handle the Russians." By the summer of 1943 that had all turned around, the Germans had lost North Africa and they were about to start losing Italy. The one man band in Berlin couldn't focus on two fronts and so the East became a long retreat. By the time the realisation set in that there was no way out - the exit door had slammed shut.
Despite this the Wehrmacht, in a conventional battle executed a withdrawal that saw incredible casualties on their side but far worse on the Russian side. The only problem was that the Russians had bottomless manpower and an ever increasing pool of equipment.

In the post war world Manstein was re-habilitated after a fashion and was a military advisor to the Willi Brandt government as the Bundeswehr was brought into NATO. As an old soldier he had the ear of the veterans but time had passed him by and the reality of fighting on a nuclear battlefield had left the son of those who served with von Schlieffen standing on the platform as the train of modern warfare left the station.

Both books are well worth the read.

Lost Victories LINK http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Erich_von_Manstein

Manstein - A Portrait LINK http://ezinearticles.com/?Book-Review-Of-Field-Marshal-Von-Manstein,-The-Janus-Head,-A-Portrait&id=1885679

The Commissar Order  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Commissar_Order

 

[vonGarvin]

Field Marshall von Manstein.  It was fortunate (for us) that he fought on the Eastern Front.  He was the one who came up with the invasion plan for the battle of the Low Countries in 1940.  As a reminder, this saw the BEF ejected from Europe and France surrender within 6 weeks of H Hour.  As a corps commander in Army Group North, his 56th Panzer Corps advanced an incredible distance on 22 June 1940.  He later earned his Field Marshall's baton as commanding general of 11 Army by seizing the fortress of Sevastapol.  His army was earmarked to do the same to Leningrad later in 1942; however, this plan was scrapped due to the early successes of "Fall Blau" ("Case Blue"), which saw 6 Army and 4 Panzer Army bust into southern Russia.  When Stalingrad was encircled, his estimate of the situation, which is available in "Lost Victories" is often touted as a shining example of how to conduct an appreciation.  He planned and commanded operation "Winter Tempest", which was the relief of Stalingrad.  He marshalled forces from across the Eastern Front and was able to make it over halfway to the so-called "Cauldron"; however, given the restriction imposed by Hitler to both retain Stalingrad and relieve 6 Army, it was an impossible task.
During the subsequent battles immediately following 6th Army's surrender in early 1943, von Manstein was able to parry all Soviet thrusts through a manoeuvre known as "hitting them on the back hand".  This arose to the saying of the "Back hand blow".  Though he evacuated Kharkov against direct orders, his backhand manoeuvre allowed his forces to regain it.  The Soviet losses were horrific and once again, the Eastern Front stalemated.
In 1943, Hitler ordered Operation "Citadel". von Manstein was opposed, opting instead for another backhand blow against the Soviets to destroy their tank forces.  He was vetoed, and he did his duty in the best of the Prussian traditions.  He commanded the southern wing of a two-pronged offensive against a salient that the Soviets had prepared for months.  In spite of the extensive preparations, his southern wing not only broke into the defences, but achieved a clean break through, albeit suffering heavy losses in the process.  Due to the failure of the northern pincer to achieve even a break in, and due to the Anglo Allies' landing in Sicily on 10 July 1943, Hitler ended up cancelling Citadel.  von Manstein opposed, arguing that his forces were on the verge of eliminating the salient.  To support his argument, he illustrated how his forces had just rendered the Soviet 5th Guards Tank Army combat inneffective at Prokhorovka (spelling?).  As a reminder, 5th Guards Tank was the soviet reserve, which had been committed much earlier than the Soviets had planned.  With 5th Guards Tank out of the picture, his forces could have carried on the attack, thus sealing the pocket at Kursk, argued von Manstein.  He was again vetoed, and his forces returned to the start line.  From that point forward, the Soviets had complete strategic initiative, and it was only through his clever husbanding of forces and employment of Panzer "Fire Brigades" was he able to avoid a complete collapse of the Eastern Front in 1943 and 1944. 
His book "Lost Victories" (English Version) has an abridged and perhaps completed amended  chapter on the Battle of Kursk. The title comes from several cases of Command interference and how it prevented his forces from achieves victories in the East.  In my opinion, had the Field Marshall been fighting us on the Western Front in 1944, things may well have been much different for us. 
As an aside, he had nothing but contempt for Rommel and his ilk.  von Manstein earned his Field Marshall's baton in the traditional manner, whereas Rommel, and many others, had received theirs without achieving any of the traditional criteria, several of which von Manstein himself had earned.  Erich von Manstein resigned (was resigned?) in 1944 over differences with OKW (read: Hitler).  Though he clearly made some poor professional decisions (along with many in the German Generalship), his prowess on the field of battle makes others such as Patton, Montgomery and Zhukov pale in comparison.