• Thanks for stopping by. Logging in to a registered account will remove all generic ads. Please reach out with any questions or concerns.

FARP mobility?

The only problem I see is that moving all that kit ( to protect r


I would use this as another argument for increasing the supply of soldiers with rudimentary training so that they can take on the burden of security, gate-guards, D&S, LOC patrols and leave the highly qualified technicians to get on with their jobs. The techs are few and far between and shouldn't be tied up with fighting. They are going to be busy enough doing their jobs while dodging bullets, tearing down and setting up, relocating and repairing.

And if GR66 is right about the system of redundancy, based on multiple nodes, with each node (logistics or command or sigs) needing a platoon of security guards and strong backs, then there is going to be ample work for SQ/BMQ(L)/YTEP trained reservists. 6 weeks of marksmanship and making loud noises.
No. Platoons for force protection are very limited. And even with force pro, there is still a need for being able to defend themselves.
 
No. Platoons for force protection are very limited. And even with force pro, there is still a need for being able to defend themselves.

I agree that Force Pro platoons are limited. That is why I am suggesting creating lots more - primarily from the reserve force with minimal training - the same amount of training that you are recommending the technicians get to defend themselves.

At very least the Force Pro platoon will ensure the technicians get some opportunities to sleep - and can assist in set up and teardown.
 
I agree that Force Pro platoons are limited. That is why I am suggesting creating lots more - primarily from the reserve force with minimal training - the same amount of training that you are recommending the technicians get to defend themselves.

At very least the Force Pro platoon will ensure the technicians get some opportunities to sleep - and can assist in set up and teardown.
Man power is a very limited resource. War or not. And force pro is up the commanders at higher levels who gets them in priority.

One must ALWAYS be prepared to fight and defend themselves. When I left the army in 2018, believe me, I saw abysmal basic battle skills outside the combat arms.
 
My understanding is that the BMQ(L) materiel is being incorporated into trades training for those that require it, otherwise the basics will be done as unit level training, or on pre-deployment training.

The problem with SQ/BMQ(L) is not what it taught, but how it was done. Apparently the course was treated as an extension of BMQ, which was a major dissatisfier when Cpls waiting for PLQ/promotion were sent back to "basic training".
For most it basically was a recruit course, but I could see remusters being a bit less enthused about playing recruit games again.

I agree that Force Pro platoons are limited. That is why I am suggesting creating lots more - primarily from the reserve force with minimal training - the same amount of training that you are recommending the technicians get to defend themselves.

At very least the Force Pro platoon will ensure the technicians get some opportunities to sleep - and can assist in set up and teardown.

I was part of a Force Pro platoon in Kandahar assembled almost entirely of reservists. It’s absolutely doable, but it’s not a ‘break glass in case of emergency’ solution. A group of reservists coming in for that role will need a bunch of individual training for vehicle, equipment, and other operational skills, and then will need a decent and aggressive bit of collective training to prepare them for the potential fight.

In my year’s work up training I frankly felt we were almost entirely an afterthought when it came to the latter, both in force on force exercises with WES, and in live field firing ranges. I’m sure the minimum necessary boxes were ticked in our case; I’m equally sure little else was. I’ve done better live fire dynamic ranges on a PRes weekend exercise than I did on task force work up for Afghanistan. We were attached to an S&T company that seemed to have some idea of what they’d use us for, but little idea of how to train us to do it.
 
For most it basically was a recruit course, but I could see remusters being a bit less enthused about playing recruit games again.
Depends on the timeframe and occupation. Many people in my occupation ended up on BMQ(L) just before their PLQ, so they had been in the CAF and gainfully employed in the occupation for 5-6 years. The bonus part that made it a major dissatisfier in my occupation, and a waste of CAF resources, was that a tiny portion of them ever went on to spend a night in the field after BMQ(L).

To circle this back to the topic of FARP, it makes no sense to send all AVN Techs on a BMQ(L) , when most won't ever be sent to a Tac Hel Sqn anyway. It makes far more sense to make the field training required for the task a unit level course, and then make space in the unit schedule for it to be done.
 
Man power is a very limited resource. War or not. And force pro is up the commanders at higher levels who gets them in priority.

One must ALWAYS be prepared to fight and defend themselves. When I left the army in 2018, believe me, I saw abysmal basic battle skills outside the combat arms.

Not doubting the need for people to be able to defend themselves.

But am arguing for the need for man power - and conventionally man-power comes from the civilian market in the form of reserves, volunteers and conscripts. People who have very limited military training. And often even less military inclination.

But they can be made useful. To relieve the workload on the professional soldiers and allow them to tackle the jobs needing high skill levels, and, later to train their replacements.
 
Depends on the timeframe and occupation. Many people in my occupation ended up on BMQ(L) just before their PLQ, so they had been in the CAF and gainfully employed in the occupation for 5-6 years. The bonus part that made it a major dissatisfier in my occupation, and a waste of CAF resources, was that a tiny portion of them ever went on to spend a night in the field after BMQ(L).

To circle this back to the topic of FARP, it makes no sense to send all AVN Techs on a BMQ(L) , when most won't ever be sent to a Tac Hel Sqn anyway. It makes far more sense to make the field training required for the task a unit level course, and then make space in the unit schedule for it to be done.

But, based on the FARP article, it would seem that the "unit" is not going to be deployed. AVN Techs are going to be deployed as scattered dets that are constantly on the move, fixing aircraft "on the fly". What sort of "unit" training would be appropriate?

It seems to me the primary element in any of these packages is going to be local air defence / light anti-aircraft / C-RAM assets that can also be employed against light ground targets.
 
To circle this back to the topic of FARP, it makes no sense to send all AVN Techs on a BMQ(L) , when most won't ever be sent to a Tac Hel Sqn anyway. It makes far more sense to make the field training required for the task a unit level course, and then make space in the unit schedule for it to be done.

There's a bizarre concept called "train to need" within the CAF's training system, that gets tossed whenever people play rank - paper - smart. "I, as an Inf Maj barred from ever commanding at my rank level or above for a combination of immediately obvious and more subtle hell-no reasons, buried in a doctrine office where my obesity, body odour and personality defects can remain hidden until I reach 35 years of service, feel that every RCN MMT must be able to set up a shelter half in Farnham."
 
But, based on the FARP article, it would seem that the "unit" is not going to be deployed. AVN Techs are going to be deployed as scattered dets that are constantly on the move, fixing aircraft "on the fly". What sort of "unit" training would be appropriate?

It seems to me the primary element in any of these packages is going to be local air defence / light anti-aircraft / C-RAM assets that can also be employed against light ground targets.
What I meant by unit level training, is that teaching things like C6, C6, Carl G, etc., should be conducted by the units, rather than making it a course that everybody in a particular trade must receive regardless of it's use or timeliness. So an AVN Tech posted to 430 Sqn (Tac Hel) will learn field stuff, but an AVN Posted to 443 Sqn (MH) wouldn't.
 
Giving Tac Hel to the Army would at least make Sigs have someone else to pity as being treated worse than them, and equally misunderstood on technical matters.
#QuietQuitting 😆
 
One of the things I find noteworthy is how quick people are to right off helicopters because they can't drop troops on to objectives. (Opens gate to Narmer vs LAV discussion again).

But the helicopter is a really fast all terrain utility vehicle. Even if it is limited to use out of contact it still creates value by being able to relocate troops to blocking positions, supplies to caches and functional nodes all over the place.

Every brigade should be integrating their heli lift assets into all their exercises - as logistics assets. No?
 
Maybe helicopters (and squadrons) should belong to the environment they primarily work with?
Here We Go Again GIF by GIPHY News
 
In my year’s work up training I frankly felt we were almost entirely an afterthought when it came to the latter, both in force on force exercises with WES, and in live field firing ranges. I’m sure the minimum necessary boxes were ticked in our case; I’m equally sure little else was. I’ve done better live fire dynamic ranges on a PRes weekend exercise than I did on task force work up for Afghanistan. We were attached to an S&T company that seemed to have some idea of what they’d use us for, but little idea of how to train us to do it.

That's a big problem, right there, verging on negligence at the highest levels IMHO.
 
One would think.

However the CA has proven time and time again that to be a piss poor idea.
I suspect it has to do with the various rice bowls and regimental mafias unwilling to suffer blood loss for the good of the whole.
The CA isn’t mature enough as an army of any meaningful influence to rise above regimental and branch squabbling yet. Any additional branches added would just ‘complexify’ the squabbling. That even Aviation under OPCON currently is less than smoothly-greased gears portends little advancement towards maturity branch stewardship of aviation. CANSOF, for all the critiques folks love to chuck at it, demonstrates responsibility with Aviation under OPCOM, so is already ahead of the Army on the Steward Resources Responsibly scale.
 
I realized from the get-go that I was immediately discussing imaginationland on the ‘elements owning helos’ thing. It sucks that our army lacks the maturity to be able to do that, but there it is.
 
Back
Top