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DRDC Paper: How many Hornet pilots do you need to get job done?

The Bread Guy

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"The Effects of Aircrew Illness and Aircraft Availability on Manning Rates for Selected CF188 Force Employments,"  D. Gregory Hunter; DRDC CORA TM 2010-217; Defence R&D Canada – CORA; October
2010 - attached.

From the executive summary:
In April of 2009, DRDC CORA received a request for operational research support from A3 Fighter
at 1 Canadian Air Division. The object of the project was to determine the optimum manning levels
for a tactical fighter squadron, focusing on the number of pilots required to meet a number of
specified tasks.

The tasks ranged in duration from as little as 2 to 14 days for a point defence scenario, up to
6 months for some international commitments. The intensity of operations for the international
scenarios went from 12 hours per day, 5 days per week to 24 hours per day, 7 days per week. The
initial request envisioned a highly detailed assessment incorporating pilot unavailability due to a
variety of reasons, including but not limited to professional development courses, parental leave,
and other leave types. In the end, a simplified view of the problem was taken. Individual scenarios
were modelled using a stochastic simulation of personnel (un)availability due to illness. The chance
of meeting the scenario requirements was then assessed as a function of the total number of pilots.

The request coincided with a task the author received from The Technical Co-operation Program
(TTCP) AER TP-1 to investigate this sort of problem. This report is presented in fulfillment of both
tasks.

The initial results of this project were communicated to the sponsor in a letter report in June 2009.
Following this, additional work was done, expanding the range of situations considered by incorporating
into the simulations the effects of different aircraft serviceability rates, and considering under
what conditions the assumptions used for the simulation would continue to be valid.

The scenarios under consideration (described below) are relatively simple; it is possible to determine
the minimum number of aircrew required using a simple spreadsheet and applying the known sortie
requirements and aircrew flight rules. The real problem is not how many personnel are required in
the ideal case, but how many are required to cover illness and other unforeseen tasks and events that
take personnel away from flying duties. There is also the matter of ensuring that the crew rest and
maximum accumulated flying time regulations are adhered to. However, it is the author’s conjecture
that manning rates sufficient to guarantee that the planned sorties can be performed, given a certain
rate of pilot absence due to illness, will render this last concern moot in most cases.

Scenarios
The following scenarios were examined:
1. A continuous (24 hour) Air Patrol over a domestic location during the month of January.
Patrol durations of 1, 3, 7 and 14 days are considered.
DRDC CORA TM 2010-217 iii
2. A continuous (24 hour) Air Patrol over a domestic location during the month of July.
Patrol durations of 1, 3, 7 and 14 days are considered.
3. An international deployment 6 months in duration, during which 12/5 operations are
maintained continuously. Deployments of 6 and 12 CF188 are considered for both summer
and winter health conditions, together with a variety of mission parameters.
4. An international deployment 6 months in duration, during which 16/7 operations are
maintained continuously. Deployments of 6 and 12 CF188 are considered for both summer
and winter health conditions, together with a variety of mission parameters.
5. An international deployment 6 months in duration, during which 24/7 operations are
maintained continuously. Deployments of 6 and 12 CF188 are considered for both summer
and winter health conditions, together with a variety of mission parameters.

All scenarios were examined using constant daily sorties rates roughly equivalent to 70% for the
first sortie of the day and 50% for subsequent sorties. To explore the effects of different aircraft
serviceability rates, scenario 3 was re-examined using simulated daily aircraft availability with four
different sets of rates.

Results
The main outcome of the study is a set of graphs and tables relating personnel requirements by
scenario to the degree of sortie completion, the season, and the probability of success. Success
is defined as having sufficient available personnel over the scenario to meet or exceed a specified
sortie completion rate ....
 
I'm no expert, but I find the conclusion weak. It does not give a solid answer.

Otherwise, has something similar been done for other manning level of trades? MP guardhouses comes to mind...
 
My first thought is a competent experienced Squadron commander should be able to come up with an  approximately similar result, considering illness and other factors.
 
I'm probably waaayyy out of my lane here, but it seems to me that the conclusion of this research paper can be summarized as follows:

"If you don't have enough pilots to run the mission you want to run, you'll either have to cut back on what you're trying to achieve or accept higher risk of failure (or should it read "pilots dying"?). As to what level of manning your fighter squadron should have to avoid that problem, we at DRDC haven't got a clue 'cause we don't know how the next war will unfold or what the attrition rate will be so we'll just give you a guess."

I am open to being trounced for this comment if anyone thinks I'm totally wrong.
 
I totally read the topic subject wrong when I first saw it and click on it to see the punch line.

How many Horny Hornet pilots do you need to get job done?
 
Well, this document doesn't do much does it?  At least for Scenarios 1 and 2.

1- Why the hell would you fly someone 2X2 hrs in a 16 hrs VUL?  Fly the person 5 hrs straight with A-A Refueling at night.  Send him home after 8hrs of duty time and 12 hrs later (crew rest), get him back to work to fly a 5 hrs day VUL.  That would make MUCH more sense.

2- It doesn't take into account that you need to overlap the VUL times.  You cannot just send someone off station before someone has taken over.  It would be an approximate 30 minutes addition before and after, hence the 5 hrs on point 1. 

3- It doesn't take into consideration a much more important aspect, especially in today's world, the Lead to Wingman ratio.  2 Wingmen cannot hold a VUL by themselve.  You need 1 Element Lead with 1 Wingman ot 2 Element Leads. 
 
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