Divining the right role, capabilities, structure, and Regimental System for Canada's Army Reserves

[Eye In The Sky]

What is it augmenting? Drivers who can't drive the regular force vehicles, NCOs/officers who can't crew command reg force vehicles, and no one with gunnery skills.

Core skills are just as important to driving, gunning and CCing a veh.  Hide/harbour occupation, OP occupation drills, veh/ptl/tp SOPs, RAS tasks, prep and conduct of RAPZ tasks, the list could go on.

In short, there is much more to learn, know and develop than the (yes, very important) PCF skills that are linked to specific veh's.

Your PRES crewman can augment a Reg Force Troop with a few weeks of training (excluding tank gunnery) and pick up the rest of the sub-unit SOPs on the fly, as a lot of the stuff I mentioned above is fairly common to any blackhat subunit. 

So, IMO, the PRES armour units are doing exactly what they are supposed to be doing with the lower-end "AFVs" they are given to train on.  :2c:

 

[Eye In The Sky]

No.  But we need to be realists in our force structure; why not have a single Res Bde for Atlantic Canada?  If we scale the P Res down to say 6 Bde Gps, then those Bde HQs can take on some functions currently done by the Divs - and then we can get rid of some Div HQs as well.

Right now, in Halifax, we have both Div & Bde HQs - so if there's an incident in Halifax, we lose MARLANT and two Army HQs all at once.  From a "force destruction" perspective, very effective; from a survivability perspective, much less so...

36 and 37 were supposed to be merged into a single CGB but it never happened.  But it should have, and you'd have the saving there of one complete CBG HQ. 

For your HQ location redundancy, MARLANT in Hfx, 5 Div in Gagetown and the CBG HQ remains in Moncton (and central to all its sub-units in NS, NB, Nfld and PEI) vice Halifax would be the way to do that.  No one wants to pay for parking at RA Park anyways...

 

[Eye In The Sky]

Its an advantage that NAVres (some not all) and the RCAF Res (?) has that the Army Res is missing.

ARAF folks, RCAF Reserves whatever you want to call them, they have the same trg as the Reg Force RCAF folks IIRC.  There is no "ARAF Avn Tech QL3" and "Reg Force Avn Tech QL3".  It is a Avn Tech QL3.  That is why a lot of ARAF folks are ex-Reg RCAF.

 

[Eye In The Sky]

And you're entitled to that opinion. I however think that there is ZERO requirement for EIGHTEEN reserve armour regiments. Amalgamate the 18 into, say 3 to keep low level expertise for reg force augmentation than that's palatable. 18 is ludicrous.

On this I agree; my former PRES Armd Recce unit (a res Regiment) used to at least be a Sqn when I was there (and had 3 Sqns prior to my time...), the last time I visited they had a hard time forming a 5 car Troop.  And there is still a Res Regt HQ element to command this understrength troop.  :facepalm:

Finally, I too have seen good arty reservists come into the regular force, but have also seen bad ones that by all rights should have been demoted instantly. People will always be the same.

A soldiers, sailors or airman/woman's component doesn't dictate if they are a shitpump or not.  We've all seen shitpumps in the Reg and Res and in all 3 Messes.  8)

 

[Old Sweat]

Let's step back and look at a bigger picture. If we accept that a role for the reserve is to provide individual augmentation to the regular force, then maybe we should ask how many and for how long? For the sake of discussion, let's say the operational requirement is to provide 20% of a brigade group for a series of one year deployments, including the replacement of casualties. I didn't haul either figure completely out of my butt. Un ABCA discussions Canada used to use a brigade group as the basis for its commitment, and it seems probably about what we could sustain for a few years given our existing equipment stocks.

So, how much is that in numbers? Perhaps 1500-2000, with a preponderance of infantry, although I haven't crunched any numbers. I know there is a NATO table, which by the way was greatly abused in force planning for a possible land contingent in Gulf 1 to the extent that in 30 days 4 CMBG was predicted to suffer more casualties in 30 days in the desert than either the Canadian Corps at Passchendaele or First Canadian Army in Normandy.

Anyway, back on track. How do we generate and absorb into a regular formation that number of troops every year from the reserves? I'm not an expert, as unlike many of you I have never served in a reserve unit. I suggest we take a look at the concept and see what we cam make of it.

 

[Underway]

In the process of pre-deployment training it was remarked to me by my then OC that up to the rank of Cpl and Lt for reservists there is essentially no difference between them and their RegF counterparts.  Its at the Capt, MCpl level where the experience, courses and time in really begin to tell.  At the lower rank levels IMHO there is essentially no difference.  That may be a function of the fact that platoons have brand new troops all the time, a function of no money for proper training or just a function of just experience, I don't know.  But there is lots of time in battalion where troops do nothing but repair kit, do PT and have smoke breaks. 

Quite frankly during pre-deployment just as many RegF pers were not able to operate or field troubleshoot RWS, .50 cal or were qualified to drive LAV-UP (6.0), LAV III, RG-31's, Cougars or whatever vehicle that was fosted upon us.  Everyone had to re-qual on C9, C6 anyways.  Armoured PRes were further ahead than their infantry counterparts in many respects, as many were driver qualified on Bison, RG's and associated vehicles and were very familiar with the C6.  PRes officers were well versed in convoy, resupply protection, base security and if they were not then pre-deployment sorted them out.  PRes signalers were integrated into the unit in order to train those unfamiliar with the radios and act as a corporate knowledge base.

Learning to drive and crew command a TAPV should not be that big of a stretch that a one month course or training couldn't sort out, and RWS training is all of two weeks IIRC.  I doubt very much that PRes armour will ever end up in a tank so just throw that argument out.  The RegF will keep tanks as their own and the idea of training a reservist on tanks seem to me rather a waste of time.  Hell, over half the RegF armour can't event operate a tank so I don't see the point in using that as an argument.

PRes training also isn't a black and white issue.  With the every changing mix of Class A, B, C, overseas experience, previous RegF experience you never know what could be called up with what experience or training.

So all this rambling to say that at the end of the day you would be doing well if the PRes Army was trained to a minimum standard that could easily be plugged into a 2-3 month intensive refresher/pre-deployment system to agument holes in the RegF.  Giving them jobs that maximize their more limited military leadership experience (base security, convoy escort, gunner/loader etc...) in an overarching mission is smart and plays to the strengths of the entire team, freeing up the more experienced RegF to go hunt down the bad guys while the PRes guards home base so to speak. 

Being realistic modern deployments will probably consist of a RegF unit first on the ground anyways, with follow on units generated as needed.  The only reservists I see being on the ground with lead elements in a modern deployment are CIMIC which a reserve specialty anyways (though many RegF pers have the qualification). 

 

[Kirkhill]

What would happen if the only Lt Col in a Reserve Regiment were the Honorary?  And the highest "deployable" rank was Captain?  And the number of "deployable" troops per armoury were something in the 30 to 100 range?

The discussion seems to be suggesting, and it is my opinion as well, that the primary benefit of the primary reserves is that it supplies a body of troops that are versed in a bunch of army stuff so that they can plugged in to vacancies when the Reg Force needs them. The more troops that are available with knowledge and skills picked up by whatever means: weekends and wednesdays, summer camps, previous service, deployments, personal interest..... reduces the training burden and shortens the time necessary to get vacancies filled.

Maybe it isn't absolutely necessary for the PRes to be anything more than it is/was and should be accepted as such.  Perhaps the focus should be on reducing the costs of administration by converting the Regimental positions to voluntary positions and by trading pay dollars for training dollars.

I know that back in my day it was not uncommon in some Regiments that the officers were required/expected to donate their pay to the Regiment and were still expected to buy the fripperies and frivolities (fancy sgian dubh's and sporrans, kilts with ribbons and bows, mess kits) out of their own resources.

Back then I would cheerfully have accepted a system where Class B and C service were paid positions and Class A pay were diverted to buying bullets and grenades for more time on the range.  Students that joined the reserves could be directly compensated by having their tuition paid or at least supplemented.

As to professional development - most of us spent a whole lot more time buying books, reading magazines and journals, and boring our non-service friends silly - and even keeping fit - outside the armouries than we ever spent inside.  You would have been hard put to find a reservist that didn't have his Firearms Acquisition Certificate and owned at least one personal weapon.

We picked up QR&Os and summary investigations on the job with the RSS looking over our shoulders.  We learned MOI and VPs and the organization of our units.  We sucked up whatever we could find on weapons available, and what their capabilities were and their tactical employment.  Just being allowed access to Restricted documents was a privilege we thoroughly enjoyed and took advantage of.  It reduced the cost of buying out of date Field Manuals from Allied Forces at second hand book stores.

I don't think that many of us considered ourselves trained soldiers.  We expected to have to be trained to deployment standards - and some/many did.  But we went out of our way to do as much as we could on our own on our own time.

This is what the old Territorials in Britain were, and what the Unpaid Volunteer Home Guard in Denmark and Sweden still is.  They are civilians willing to do their bit when time allows or the situation demands.

In the meantime the community gets another body of willing and organized volunteers, with some decent useful kit, to assist during local events and crises.

Perhaps iIt is too much to expect that a group of civilians, no matter how willing and motivated, can supply a Reg Force quality Platoon/Troop that can slot into deployed, active service on zero notice.

Edit - PS

Getting into the office I am suddenly reminded - The Militia is where I learned about man-management (in an environment where you had to cajole and not command) and also how to write a clean and simple Ops Order (I still use SMESC in my civilian projects), conduct a sound time appreciation, map recce and field recce and prepare a clear, concise report.

 

[Bird_Gunner45]

Thank you for your outside looking in opinions on another Trade other than your own.  Perhaps, therein lies the problem.  Too often in the CAF as a whole, decisions are being made by those who have no idea of what they are talking about or designing.  I have seen it in the construction of tank hangars where designs were changed to cut costs and when the building was finally finished, tanks would not safely fit through the doors.  A new and larger hangar having to be built was the end result.  Now we have two expensive buildings build due to someone trying to cut corners and costs.  The same can be said to non-Trades pers making decisions on what a Trade needs or should look like.

Perhaps sometimes decisions are made by people who have too much emotional attachment to the issue resulting in stovepipes and emotional decisions.

 

[GGHG_Cadet]

I'm in 100% agreement with Bird_Gunner45.

Reservists dont have the time to get proficient on complex technical equipment while in a class A status.

Over the last couple of years, I've had several reservists fill CFTPO tasks in both my troop and squadron. These augmentees were keen and motivated, but lacked the experience to be useful as recce soldiers. Due to a lack of qualifications, they were mostly employed as GIBs (no, not surv ops since they weren't qualified) or as co-drivers in the echelon. They made the effort to learn the jobs they were given and generally performed well, but they were little more than warm bodies to fill the holes we couldn't. Overall, they were happy to be employed, but were demoralized by their bit-part roles.

Also, LAV turret is extremely different than sitting in a LUVW.

For those saying that it takes two weeks to qualify a reservist CComd on the 25mm, try six weeks and lots of money/bullets that we don't have.

But I'm guessing that you're not going to reason here and admit that EIGHTEEN armour reserve units with no armour equipment is ludicrus.

Don't forget that these 18 armour reserve units don't even have enough G-Wagens to form real troops. Not to mention, that they generally operate without GIBs- which is the only real job that your normal, straight from the street reservist can do within a Reg Force troop without completing further qualifications that are 3-6 weeks in length.

Let's face it, having 18 armour reserve regiments with personnel who cannot easily augment their Reg Force counterpart is ridiculous. It's sad that there are many professional and motivated armoured reservists who can only be used in bit part jobs; it's not fair to them, and it doesn't work for us.

Hopefully the introduction of the TAPV will help close this employment gap; however, the fact that these vehicles are likely going to be housed centrally at the division training centres again raises the question of why have so many reserve regiments who don't have the means to form real troops and squadrons, and will have to travel to a centralized location to train.

 

[Dissident]

Getting into the office I am suddenly reminded - The Militia is where I learned about man-management (in an environment where you had to cajole and not command) and also how to write a clean and simple Ops Order (I still use SMESC in my civilian projects), conduct a sound time appreciation, map recce and field recce and prepare a clear, concise report.

So much this.

In my organization our parent company is a reserve entity on paper, but is really staffed by RegF pers (well, there is one class B slot, but he's been class B so long, he might as well be RegF). Often my job is to manage troops expectations. Having a RegF cadre who doesn't understand that even if you were in good faith, misrepresenting yourself even once can destroy years of built up trust. If you fuck around a RegF troop, he's going to stick around until he releases. You screw over a PRes troops, you are going to have to cajole him so he doesn't go ED&T.

Almost every time I have used my authority, I have regretted it. Presenting the challenge or situation to the troops and letting them sort it out has generally had incredibly positive results. The end result for me has been (humble brag alert) having troops/section/platoon who have taken top honours on national courses. Hell, one just left us and graduated top of his depot troop and I will miss him dearly.

Having ongoing friction with RegF leadership whom I feel are stealing resources to plug operational gaps and are mismanaging troops, brings me to the conclusion that managing/commanding reservist domestically needs to be under a PRes Structure up to the highest possible level.

 

[Kirkhill]

So much this.

In my organization our parent company is a reserve entity on paper, but is really staffed by RegF pers (well, there is one class B slot, but he's been class B so long, he might as well be RegF). Often my job is to manage troops expectations. Having a RegF cadre who doesn't understand that even if you were in good faith, misrepresenting yourself even once can destroy years of built up trust. If you fuck around a RegF troop, he's going to stick around until he releases. You screw over a PRes troops, you are going to have to cajole him so he doesn't go ED&T.

Almost every time I have used my authority, I have regretted it. Presenting the challenge or situation to the troops and letting them sort it out has generally had incredibly positive results. The end result for me has been (humble brag alert) having troops/section/platoon who have taken top honours on national courses. Hell, one just left us and graduated top of his depot troop and I will miss him dearly.

Having ongoing friction with RegF leadership whom I feel are stealing resources to plug operational gaps and are mismanaging troops, brings me to the conclusion that managing/commanding reservist domestically needs to be under a PRes Structure up to the highest possible level.

Infamously I was once "Ordered" to lie to my troops. Fortunately I had a long-service CSM overseeing me.

Brigade had offered to supply support to a Boy Scout Jamboree.  It was tasked across the armoury floor to our Unit.  I received word from my OC that I was OPI and to tell the troops that they were working this weekend and tell them they were coming in for an FTX. Under no circumstances was I to tell the troops they were to be putting up tents for Boy Scouts.  It was understood that if the troops found out they wouldn't show.

I checked with the other subbies to find out if this was standard practice.  I was told to follow orders.

By the time classes had finished for the evening, BOR was closed and I was the last commissioned officer standing.  I found myself taking the last parade and passing along the news about the Exercise on the upcoming weekend.  The inevitable question came: "Sir. What are we doing?".  CSM Joe Doucette, watching from the Coy Office, said "Tell them Sir." 

Standing in front of 40 Reservists and confronted with disobeying orders or telling the truth.  I opted to tell the truth.

Of the 40 or so on parade about 10 showed up on the weekend.  We put up a couple of tents, dropped some supplies off around the site and came home.

Nothing was ever said about the exercise after.  No reports. No commentaries. No mentions in O-Groups. No repercussions.

But I knew I had at least 10 troops that I could count on to work with me in the future.  And Joe Doucette covered my back.

Edited to clear an error in logic.

 

[a_majoor]

This has been mentioned in other threads, but the individual augmentation idea has bad repercussions in the RegF as well. Cole has mentioned that having understrength companies with 3 platoons that can throw 1.5 sections each out the back of a LAV makes training the RegF inefficient as well.

So to reiterate an idea that exists on other threads; consolidate the RegF so they have full strength platoons, and focus their development on the advanced skillsets they will need to progress (LAV courses, Recce patrolman etc.). The empty slots should be filled by formed ResF sections or possibly platoons, who can do the manpower intensive but lower skilled jobs that still need to be done. By this model, each Company could be able to field 2 platoons on its own, and have a full compliment of LAV crews and specialists, with the other platoon being reservists.  The fourth (D&S company could also be made up of reservists. If desired, the two platoons could be split up to provide leadership and mentorship to the incoming reservists, but this negates one of the advantages of consolidation: team building. Once everyone is comfortable with working with a well established "team", pulling them apart to mix&match destroys that cohesion, and it needs to be rebuilt all over again with the new "team".

For the Guns, separate troops and batteries (with the advanced gunnery skills being provided by the RegF), for Armour, the bulk of Reserve Armoured might be gainfully trained and employed as the "Assault troops" (the separate vehicles and skillets won't be so much of a disadvantage here). Similar logic could be applied to Engineers, service and support troops and so on.

The idea that Reservists are training for real roles and can deploy into "real" jobs that compliment their RegF partners should be good for recruiting, retention and morale, and also make employment and training of the Reserves more palatable for the RegF as well.

 

[daftandbarmy]

When one looks at this, the horror tends to overwhelm one:


"Army Reserve

Canada's Army Reserve is organized into 143 units, located in 177 cities and communities across the country. The role of the Army Reserve is to provide the framework to mobilize, augment and sustain the Canadian Forces and serve as a link between the military and civilian communities as guided by the key Connect with Canadians initiative.

After a period of very high operational tempo, the Army Reserve is focusing its efforts on reconstitution and expanding to meet its funded strength target of 19,471 part-time soldiers. It continues to provide augmentation to the Regular Force for domestic and international operations and to backfill Regular Force personnel shortfalls within the land forces and the CAF at all levels of responsibility. These demands will be balanced against the needs of the Army Reserve for its own leadership and management of personnel.

Domestically, the Army Reserve continues to develop and refine the force employment concepts of Territorial Battalion Groups (TBGs), Domestic Response Companies (DRC) and Arctic Response Company Groups (ARCG). These nascent capabilities represent the force employment framework through which the Army Reserve will leverage existing unit structures and capacities and eventually take the land forces lead in domestic operations, with support from the Regular Force as required.

Internationally, the role of the Army Reserve has expanded to provide 20 per cent of required land force personnel to expeditionary operations through individual and formed capability augmentation."

http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/about-reports-pubs-report-plan-priorities/2013-other-reserve-force.page

RANT ON

143 units... 177 cities/ communities. Really? How can that be even remotely considered good business sense and 'bang for the buck' considering that most of those units will be at less than full strength, but are drawing down on a lot of high paid help from the Reg F, as well as the usual Class A senior staff and other overhead, like facilities, weapons and other tools of the trades?

The problem of sustaining this vast, tottering network of redoubtable outposts will be compounded as the baby boomer generation passes into retirement, of course.

If you read through this web page, the multiple list of many, varied, and less than complimentary 'roles' loaded onto a part time organization is also truly staggering and fantastical. It's a strategic error of the greatest magnitude to not be able to focus the energies of a part time force on one or two things that they must do really well.

Someone up top is writing cheques that I don't think we can keep on cashing.

RANT OFF

 

[LightFighter]

Canada's Army Reserve is organized into 143 units, located in 177 cities and communities across the country.

the Army Reserve is focusing its efforts on reconstitution and expanding to meet its funded strength target of 19,471 part-time soldiers.

For comparison, the USMC Reserve has approx 40,000 pers, and 184 training centers.

Those 40,000 pers are organized into five organizations - 4th Marine Division(ground combat element), 4th Marine Aircraft Wing(aviation combat element), 4th Marine Logistics Group(logistics combat element), Force Head Quarters Group, and Command Element.

4th Marine Division, made up of
1x HQ Battalion
2x Infantry Regiments
1x Artillery Regiment
1x Assault Amphibian Battalion
1x Combat Engineer Battalion
1x Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion
1x Reconnaissance Battalion
1x Tank Battalion
2x Force Reconnaissance Companies

4th Marine Aircraft Wing - 25 subordinate units, plus 1 HQ
4th Marine Logistics Group - 2x Combat Logistics Regiments, 1x Engineer Support Battalion, 1x Medical Battalion and 1x Dental Battalion)
Command Element - Deployment Processing Command West, Environmental Services Division, Marine Corps Band New Orleans, Environmental Services Detachment.

 

[Brasidas]

...184 training centers.

=armouries+training areas?

 

[Kirkhill]

For comparison, the USMC Reserve has approx 40,000 pers, and 184 training centers.

Those 40,000 pers are organized into five organizations - 4th Marine Division(ground combat element), 4th Marine Aircraft Wing(aviation combat element), 4th Marine Logistics Group(logistics combat element), Force Head Quarters Group, and Command Element.

4th Marine Division, made up of
1x HQ Battalion
2x Infantry Regiments
1x Artillery Regiment
1x Assault Amphibian Battalion
1x Combat Engineer Battalion
1x Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion
1x Reconnaissance Battalion
1x Tank Battalion
2x Force Reconnaissance Companies

4th Marine Aircraft Wing - 25 subordinate units, plus 1 HQ
4th Marine Logistics Group - 2x Combat Logistics Regiments, 1x Engineer Support Battalion, 1x Medical Battalion and 1x Dental Battalion)
Command Element - Deployment Processing Command West, Environmental Services Division, Marine Corps Band New Orleans, Environmental Services Detachment.

If I understand the US Marines Reserves correctly the officers go through the same selection and training as the reg force counterparts. The difference is that after training, when Regular Officers are assigned to Regular Units, Reserve Officers are assigned to Reserve Units, at which time they become "part time" Marines.

Marine ORs all go through Parris Island for 12 weeks regardless of whether they are Regs or Reserves.

This would put them on a par with the Swedish Homeguard which demands 85 days of training before a Homeguard contract can be signed.

None of these apply to the Canadian "Reserves".  The Canadian Army "Reserves" or Militia, is manned more along the lines of the unpaid volunteers of the Danish Homeguard.  In some senses the Militia has/had more in common with the Rangers and Cadets, or even St John's Ambulance.

I believe there is a place for both types of organizations.  The Army needs a functioning Reserve - but that Reserve needs to be a proper, deployable force.  That will require time and money and a commitment to making it happen. It needs to be an Army led exercise - so that the Army can expand to, and fully exploit,  its authorized strength of 50,500.

The Canadian Army is the largest element of the Canadian Armed Forces:

21,600 members serve as full-time soldiers in the Regular Force
24,000 are part-time, volunteer soldiers in the Reserve Force
including 5,000 Rangers who serve in sparsely settled northern, coastal and isolated areas of Canada
4,900 civilian employees who support the Army

One question that comes to my mind is: "If the Reserve Force were as professional as the US Marines or, perhaps, the Swedish Homeguard, could some of the FTE PYs be shifted from sweeping hangar floors and busy work to the Reserve?" 

Could that have a positive effect on skills retention in the force? 

The Swedish Home Guard
The Swedish Home Guard is a branch of the Swedish Armed Forces. It is comprised of local defence units and 23 national auxiliary defence organisations.

Although units of the Home Guard had been formed before the World War II, it was after the beginning of this war that officially the Riksday established it in May 1940.

Originally Home Guard units consisted of 8 to 15 men located in towns within factories and throughout Sweden;serving as defence in case of invasion or attack.



Members of these units were usually former military men, that had ammunition, rifles, machine guns and other war required materials such as medicine and protective gear. There was also the Women’s Voluntary Defence Service called the Lotta Corps, which did additional tasks that the Home Units was unable to do. Among the functions of the Lotta Corps, was administrative work and providing clothing such as socks and gloves.

The Home Guard has evolved to an organisation that is divided into battalions that cover a section of a county. Each battalion is then made up of companies and generally each municipality in the country of Sweden has one company. The task of all this is to guard all of Sweden by utilization of military and civilian installations.

Battalions in coastal regions also have marine companies and marine combat vessels. At least one Rapid Response Company is linked to each battalion. The Rapid Response Companies are more mobile and more trained for combative operations. It is expected that from 2014, most members of the Home Guard will be incorporated into the Rapid Response units.

From 2001 to 2012 there has been a significant decrease in the number of members in the Swedish Home Guard. However there has been a significant increase in the amount of quality equipment. The training of all Home Guards focuses on the competent use of weapons and guard duties.
The one asset of this branch of the Swedish Armed Forces is their local knowledge of any area, yet a Home Guard member may act anywhere within the country. A Home Guard is a trained and competent local combat fighter or defender.
Before being contracted as a Home Guard member, the person is to have experienced at least 85 days of basic military training. A contracted member of the Home Guards is generally obligated to train about 8 days a year and only 4 days a year if in support or non-Rapid Response Units. For Rapid Response units the training involves 2 sets of 4 day battalion training and for the other Home Guards it is one of the 4 day battalion training courses. It is customarily however for many of the members, also called soldiers, to spend far more time in military exercise.

Among the armoury of this branch are types of AK 4B rifles, machine guns and other rifles or pistols. To enhance the sensor system, trained sniffer dogs are also relied on. The Home Guard incorporates staff from 8 voluntary organisations, to support them in their functions or tasks.

http://www.sweden.org.za/swedish-home-guard.html

THE HOME GUARD WITH THE NATIONAL SECURITY FORCES
The Home Guard with the national security forces are part of the Swedish Armed Forces' mission-based organisation. The Home Guard is a unit and constitutes the basis for the protection of Sweden. It has the task of operating over the entire conflict scale, from societal support during great strains in peacetime to armed combat in times of war.
The units of the Home Guard have a response capability that is measured in hours, as opposed to days or weeks. The personnel is made up of locally recruited volunteers and consists largely of experienced soldiers and officers with a background in mission-based units.

When the Armed Forces are called in to help with forest fires, flooding or missing person searches, it often falls to Home Guard units to support the police and Rescue Services. Territorial surveillance, base security, escort duties, transport protection, target identification and artillery spotting are other typical Home Guard duties.

In addition to personnel who have completed their national service or Basic Military Training, the Home Guard includes a large proportion of specialists, for example, paramedics, motorcycle orderlies and dog handlers, that are recruited and trained by voluntary defence organisations.

http://www.forsvarsmakten.se/en/our-organisation/our-forces/the-home-guard-with-the-national-security-forces/

 

[Kirkhill]

For reference here is the wholly volunteer, unpaid Danish Homeguard.

The members of the Home Guard take part in the defence and support of the country on a voluntary and unpaid basis.

​Men and women from the age of 18 can apply for membership. A military background is not necessary. The wish to participate is more important.

When membership has been granted, members are admitted into one of the following branches:
The Army Home Guard
The Naval Home Guard
The Air Force Home Guard

The Home Guard is a volunteer military organisation.
The Home Guard had 46,651 members as of October 2014 .
The active force had 15,808 volunteer soldiers as of October, 2014. The remaining volunteers belong to the Home Guard Reserve.
Approximately 15 percent of all volunteer soldiers are women.
The task of the Home Guard is to support the Armed Forces – nationally as well as internationally.  In addition, the Home Guard supports the police, the emergency services and other authorities in carrying out their duties.
1,845 people applied for enrollment in the Home Guard, and 1,301 volunteers signed a contract in 2014 (as of November 2014).
868 of the new volunteers (68 percent) were aged 18-32.
The appropriation allocated to the Home Guard in the Finance Bill amounted to 498,4 m. DKK in 2014. (Edit: About 100 MCAD)

The Home Guard has a dual military - civilian leadership:


The Commander of the Home Guard, major general Finn Winkler, is responsible for the training and deployment of units and also for the overall supervision of the Home Guard

The Commissioner of the Danish Home Guard, Bjarne Laustsen, is responsible for recruitment and gaining support for the Home Guard in the Danish population.

I would suggest that Commissioner Laustsen's role is that which I was suggesting was appropriate for the old, honorary, structure of the Militia.  But note also that Training and Deployment is managed by the Military - not the Volunteers.

http://www.hjv.dk/sider/english.aspx
https://www.vistillerop.dk/
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vjZWBDOQAMY

 

[LightFighter]

If I understand the US Marines Reserves correctly the officers go through the same selection and training as the reg force counterparts. The difference is that after training, when Regular Officers are assigned to Regular Units, Reserve Officers are assigned to Reserve Units, at which time they become "part time" Marines.

Marine ORs all go through Parris Island for 12 weeks regardless of whether they are Regs or Reserves.

Officers and Enlisted both go through the same courses as their Active Duty peers. As well, Parris Island is not the only place Recruit Training is run from, males(all females go to Parris Island) on the western half of the US go to San Diego. After Boot Camp, pers would go on to their MOS School(Non Infantry Marines also do the Marine Combat Training course as well).

The Army needs a functioning Reserve - but that Reserve needs to be a proper, deployable force.  That will require time and money and a commitment to making it happen. It needs to be an Army led exercise - so that the Army can expand to, and fully exploit,  its authorized strength of 50,500.

Agreed

One question that comes to my mind is: "If the Reserve Force were as professional as the US Marines or, perhaps, the Swedish Homeguard, could some of the FTE PYs be shifted from sweeping hangar floors and busy work to the Reserve?" 

Could that have a positive effect on skills retention in the force? 

Personally, I'd rather see the Reg Force units fully manned, rather than cutting their numbers and sending more PYs to the Reserve. Also, would those positions be for full time positions within a Reserve unit or just be another Class A position?

 

[daftandbarmy]

For reference here is the wholly volunteer, unpaid Danish Homeguard.

I would suggest that Commissioner Laustsen's role is that which I was suggesting was appropriate for the old, honorary, structure of the Militia.  But note also that Training and Deployment is managed by the Military - not the Volunteers.

http://www.hjv.dk/sider/english.aspx
https://www.vistillerop.dk/
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vjZWBDOQAMY

1 PARA worked with the Danish Home Guard when we were with the AMF. We'd do our bit out of the airframe then roam the countryside doing what infantry do.... and some army stuff  ;D.

Apart from the really, really hot women they had working with them, what impressed me was that they had a clear purpose (e.g., defend the area of your home town from X to Y), they were well armed for that purpose, and they trained continually to be good at their mission.

The operations they trained for were all the usual things we practise (attack, defense, patrolling etc), except they practised right in their back yards. Digging up cabbage fields for Platoon defensive positions was a common pastime as I recall, complete with farmer's wife doling out the coffee and yummy Danish pastries, bless 'em.

They had (old) tanks and some cool MG42 upgrades but operated for all intents and purposes as fully integrated, infantry heavy, company sized units supported by arty, armour, air etc.

 

[Dissident]

Ohhhhhh, can you imagine the headlines:"Soldiers. In our back yards. Soldiers with guns. In our backyards. Guns in our backyards."

I'm totally down, but somehow I doubt that would fly with most people.