Divining the right role, capabilities, structure, and Regimental System for Canada's Army Reserves

[Brad Sallows]

My estimate of the maximum "tempo" of the part-time reservist from Sep through May is 45 days: one evening per week, one weekend per month (less Dec and any month in which a concentration might be held), and one full day (Sat or Sun) session per month. (The full monty would be slightly more than 45.)

To that can be added at least one conference per year for selected appointments, and several conferences for COs and RSMs.

On top of it all there are winter (weekend) courses to be staffed.

Finally, one may consider what the annual calendar of activity must be for some people in units which are short a hand or two of filling all key appointments.  I hear and read a lot about the waste of overborne reserve units, but not much thought about how underborne units fare under the weight of administrivia.

 

[gnplummer421]

I was reading a column out of a Renfrew paper, which stated that not only Reg Force soldiers could try out for the new regiment in Pet, but also Reserves. My question is; the 3RCR will supply the initial batch of soldiers, and then the selection/training phase begins in April. With these units being shortstaffed already, will the new recruits come fast enough to fill up the ranks of the remaining Infantry Regiments? Or do you think that we will be even more severly understaffed...Am I just lulled into a false belief that our military is finally going to get some much needed money and troops?

As an ex-soldier, I find myself excited about the prospect of our miltary finally getting some attention...but..I've also been let down too many times by our politicians..Is this really going to be the start of a new era for our troops?

To all you Reserve soldiers..strive to be good enough to pass the test and join an elite group of soldiers in Petawawa, you will have to be at your absolute best. The time is now to narrow the gap between the level of skills between Reg and Res. We need a large crop of new soldiers and we want them to be top notch.... time to go Reg. Force

 

[pbi]

  I hear and read a lot about the waste of overborne reserve units, but not much thought about how underborne units fare under the weight of administrivia.

I suppose that there may be regional differences, but my impressions (and certainly my recent experiences in 38 CBG) suggest very strongly to me that we have very, very few units today with too many officers, WOs and NCOs. I think that the opposite is more often the case: units struggle to fill key appointments with anybody at all, let alone the best person for the position. I think the image of a typical Reserve unit having overstocked Officers' and Sgts' Messes is probably ten to twenty years (or more...) out of date. What does still exist, in my view, is a "legacy" command structure whose billets can no longer be filled properly.

Cheers

 

[skydiver]

I know that most units around here are hurtin at some rank level. It sure was better in the early 90s. I can remember over 30 WOs and Snr NCOs from our Regt sitting around the gunnery round table at the mess in Gagetown on a gun camp weekend. Back then it was nothing to see 3  or 4 guys promoted top Sgt in a batch. Now..1 every 3 years maybe?

Then we got totally forced and they even had people reduce in rank if they wanted to stay in. It was a no-no to have too many of whatever rank for the positions available.

Now we can't buy a Senior NCO or an Lt.

Wah!

Doog

 

[Kirkhill]

Adding grist to the mill.  From National Defence Magazine.

January 2006

With an Overstretched Military, U.S. Should Create 'Home Guard'

By David Abshire and Jonah Czerwinski

The United States holds an enormous stake in Iraq. Although initiated to counter a perceived terrorist threat, the U.S. presence in Iraq has in many ways made near-term gains in the war on terror more difficult and thrown America's homeland security into question. But a creative solution with roots reaching far back into American history may be the answer.

Today, the presence of coalition troops in Iraq provides terrorists with a virtually constant training ground to develop battleground experience. As when Mujahedeen battled the Soviets in Afghanistan 20 years ago, which spawned Al Qaeda's evolvement through the 1990s, Iraq today has itself become a "cause for Jihad."

In fact, Iraq has eclipsed Afghanistan as a terrorist seedbed. A recent CIA report suggests that the urban nature of the war in Iraq affords assailants opportunity to learn how to carry out assassinations, kidnappings, car bombings and other kinds of attacks that were never a staple of the fighting in Afghanistan during anti-Soviet campaigns.

Today, insurgents in Iraq average 90 attacks daily - the highest amount since Saddam Hussein was overthrown.

The length of engagement and nature of daily conflict provide rich propaganda for terrorist recruiters - especially al-Qaeda and its associates - to use in the all-important battle for hearts and minds among the youth of the Middle East, Africa, Asia, and Europe.

The advent of the Internet ignited terrorist communications. The CIA's National Intelligence Council finds that terrorists are enabled to converse, train, and recruit through the Internet, and their threat will become "an eclectic array of groups, cells and individuals that do not need a stationary headquarters." According to a study by Gabriel Weimann, a professor at Israel's University of Haifa, terrorist websites have increased from around a dozen to 4,500 in the last four years.

The July bombings in London further bolster the notoriety of terrorist organizations. British engagement in Iraq was among several reasons cited by those claiming responsibility. This sort of propaganda upends the notion that by fighting terrorists in Iraq, we avoid facing them in the streets of New York, Atlanta or Los Angeles.

The stresses are internal, too. While America's military in Iraq struggles in this context, it is composed largely by an overstretched National Guard and Reserve Force. Repeat call-ups, extended tours, low recruitment and re-up rates, and poor supply reflect a massive crack in the system. The Army National Guard recruitment for 2005 missed its goal by more than 12,000 and the Army Reserve recruitment was off by more than 5,000. Moreover, troops at home are not fully equipped for homeland security scenarios because the inventories from non-deployed units are being sent overseas.

The original purpose of the Guard has transformed - so should its organization, supply, and support. If the military draft was the Achilles' heel to the Johnson war effort, the overextension of Reserves and National Guard may become ours today.

A home-front strategy is perhaps the most important aspect in a layered defense, regardless of how Iraq fares. President Bush should convene a group of bipartisan best minds to increase credibility with the public and Congress about the looming crisis in our military. Recognizing that we never anticipated and prepared for the new kind of warfare that came with 9/11, this bipartisan group will review home-front capabilities, mobilization, tactics and strategy. This bipartisan group should collaborate with the Commission on National Guard and Reserves, recently established by Congress.

Without waiting for the commission, however, the president should dramatically reinforce the National Guard.

This is not just a matter of changing policy and practices. The National Guard touches every community in the nation, their small businesses and families. A strengthening of the National Guard and Reserves should include their support groups, families, small businesses, the wounded, and the children and spouses left behind. An emergency grant from Congress matched with a review of existing laws and programs should provide better support structures, such as medical services to those most affected by deployed National Guard units.

The president also needs to make a call for national service. Doing so requires creating a voluntary, well equipped, well organized, congressionally funded and locally based corps. A non-expeditionary "Home Guard" is a strategic solution rooted in American history. Today's application should be composed of citizens from the community, who wear uniforms, train on weekends, and help prevent the chaos from a natural disaster or a weapon of mass effect. In the case of a terrorist attack or natural disaster, there would be an immediately deployable group of trained citizens from each community under control of the state governors ready to share the burden with the Red Cross, police, FEMA, local fire departments and National Guard.

A Home Guard would help mobilize the nation as we did during the Second World War. In some communities, where a percentage of first responders are in Iraq, such a trained force would help manage the shock following a terrorist attack or major natural disaster. Trained in the elements of security, engineering, civil affairs, and basic medicine, the Home Guard would recruit citizens already possessing these critical skills as well as individuals retiring out of the National Guard, active military and the Reserves. For the shorter term, enlistments in the National Guard could be followed by extended duty in the Home Guard. Citizens would have the opportunity to shift experience while retaining earned rank. Even more efficient would be the use of medically discharged or disabled veterans, who can still offer knowledge, skill and low-intensity service.

The untapped talent in the Civil Air Patrol and Coast Guard Auxiliary could serve as a starting point for building the Home Guard. Along our border, it would become a constructive outlet in place of ad hoc voluntary militia attempting to provide border protection in some states. Leaders drawn from their local communities would be trained in crisis communications and crowd control.

Hurricane Katrina proved the lynchpin role played by the National Guard and Reserve. The poor federal response underlines the need for a Home Guard. The aftermath also gives America some idea of the necessary preparation to react following an attack with a weapon of mass effect. This Home Guard would connect the first responders with the very people they serve. In fact, the Home Guard would become a highly organized group of newly recruited first responders

David Abshire is president of the Center for the Study of the Presidency in Washington, D.C. Jonah J. Czerwinski is senior research associate and director of homeland security projects at the Center for the Study of the Presidency.

 

[Echo9]

First a couple of disclaimers:
1.  there's absolutely no chance whatsoever of something like this happening, so it's for discussion purposes only
2.  I'm wading deep here, in an attempt to stir up some poop, but here goes:


There are a few things that we know right now about coming force structures:
1.  There's an additional 25k pers coming between reg and reserve.
2.  Much of that added pers is going to have to go to the pointy end, specifically, outside of Ottawa, and
3.  There are a number of "new" potential battalions:
  - 3-4 rapid reaction battalions
  - CSOR (and Para Regt?)
  - 8-12 "city" regiments, combined between reg and res
  - LFRR growth
  - unspecified other growth (though this is more likely to fill out the hollow army)
4.  The above units (less the CSOR and Paras) will want to be affiliated with one of the Infantry Regts, as I would think that they're going to be primarily based around the Infantry. 

Now, for my more controversial bits:
1.  Rather than simply make a 4th or 5th battalion of the current regiments, the regiments that were stood down in the 60s (QOR, RHC, CG?) could be revived.  Some of this might mean that existing battalions are renamed- 2 RCR becomes 1 RHC again, 2 VP becomes 1 QOR- to build up some of a base of personnel.
2.  The city units, with combinations of reg/ res, are going to be unholy messes of cap badges in many places (think of Toronto, Montreal, Ottawa, or Vancouver).  These should also be affiliated (and badged) under one of the regiments.
3.  With the above and LFRR also combining unit HQ's, it's finally the time to put a bunch of cap badges out to pasture.  While the collected Honourary Colonels won't let this happen lightly, one way of potentially defusing the issue- partially- would be to badge under the regular regiments- I get the impression that almost as much of the resistance to merging is the refusal to wear the hat badge of the cross town rival as it is to see theirs go down.
4.  If that's a step too far, you could even allow what the Brits have done in their re-org and allow battalions to carry distinctive titles that bear witness to their histories ie. 7 RCR (Lincoln & Welland).

The end result- you have probably 2-3 regular battalions and perhaps 3-4 reserve battalions per Regiment, with a total of 5 (or more) Regiments.  Because of the growth, you have no large change in the career management pool for each Regiment.

I think that you lower the barriers between reg and res, since you're all wearing the same hat badge.  For those who dismiss this point, I'll note that there's generally much better relations in my own trade (engineers), which I think is at least partially a result of the family aspects of showing up wearing the same accoutrements.

You still have the benefits of the regimental system, while eliminating it's shallow end of the gene pool.  For those who note that you're doing away with the pride of the regimental histories, my immediate suggestion is that a regiment that parades 50 isn't doing much to support those histories itself.  We have the units and force structure that we have now because the WW2 ORBAT has been set in aspic since the armistice (with some nibbling away).  Most other armies have done this kind of re-org, and I think that we haven't gone down this route yet because we haven't mattered enough.

In other posts, I've noted that I'm generally against changes unless there's a big operational improvement.  Well, I think that there's just such an improvement here- from the perspective of more seemlessly operating between reg and res.  Those who believe strongly in the regimental family should allow their thoughts to carry to the logical conclusion- if it's good for cohesion, then it's good for cohesion.  With the amount of reserve augmentation going on right now, that's something useful.



The down side?  Well, the RCR would need a new alphabet....

 

[dglad]

Two thoughts--

1. While your idea has merits, I think you're underestimating the likely resistance to such sweeping change, as well as the considerable resources and tenacity of those who would mount such resistance; and

2. I think you're overestimating the "friction" that exists between the Reg F and Res F in the cbt arms (I presume you're referring to inf and armd primarily, since those two branches are the most obvious place for cap-badge wars to occur).  Back in the late 70s and into the early 90s, I agree that there was an almost institutional bias across the Reg F towards Res F members (which was, in various respects, both deserved and not deserved).  However, with the impressive and essentially seamless performance of Reservists (especially lately), a great deal of that friction has eased.  Certainly, there are individuals in both components that remain "difficult", but Reservists are suffering hardships and spilling blood beside their Reg F comrades.  From experience, cap badges very quickly "disappear" in an operational setting, leaving only soldiers.

There will be change, but it will likely be much more incremental and will probably be more organizational in the context of existing cap-badges e.g. rather than merging units, grouping them in some fashion to streamline the number of actual unit HQs (since our important force generation in the Reserves involves soldiers and junior leaders, not unit-level resources)  and reduce the hollowness of the Res F as a whole.

 

[PPCLI Guy]

There will be change, but it will likely be much more incremental and will probably be more organizational in the context of existing cap-badges e.g. rather than merging units, grouping them in some fashion to streamline the number of actual unit HQs (since our important force generation in the Reserves involves soldiers and junior leaders, not unit-level resources)  and reduce the hollowness of the Res F as a whole.

Echo9 had some interesting points, but I believe that dglad has hit upon the answer - functional and geographic groupings.  When the SD&G Highlanders hit the beaches of Normandy, they had an SD&G HQ and a coy, the PWOR had a coy, and the Brocks had a coy - sounds like a natural grouping to me...

Dave

 

[McG]

Much has been touched on geographic groupings here: http://forums.army.ca/forums/threads/25713.0/all.html

One interesting notion is that you do not need a battalion structure to sustain a regimental identity.  A single company can wear a capbadge if the desire is to keep a unit's lineage alive and active.

 

[big bad john]

Much has been touched on geographic groupings here: http://forums.army.ca/forums/threads/25713.0/all.html

One interesting notion is that you do not need a battalion structure to sustain a regimental identity.  A single company can wear a capbadge if the desire is to keep a unit's lineage alive and active.

In the UK  Companies have kept regimental traditions alive in a post amalgamation world.  It is a common fact of life there.  Battalions are doing it in the new Super Regiments.

 

[dglad]

One interesting notion is that you do not need a battalion structure to sustain a regimental identity.  A single company can wear a capbadge if the desire is to keep a unit's lineage alive and active.

Quite true.  The trick is going to be reconciling this fact with the interests of--among others--Honouraries and Senates.

Another important point to note is that even if the Royal Highland Polar Bear Regiment ends up being a sub-unit grouped under another infantry RHQ, that doesn't mean the RHPBR's own HQ has to cease to exist.  It can simply be zero-manned, and remain available to "reinflate" in time of national requirement.  There are those that will argue that you can't easily reconstitute a unit from a sub-unit in time of emergency--at least with any degree of cohesiveness--but I would counter that the Res F is currently incapable of filling its bill of COs, RSMs and unit HQ staff anyway, so we're already playing a shell game with our Res units.  If we can only generate a portion of the LCols and CWOs we need for our current structure, then the current structure obviously needs to be changed.  It's within the detailed nature of that change where the devil resides.

 

[McG]

One additional recommendation (discussed in the linked thread) was to zero-man all regimental Bn HQs and create regional Bn HQs free of regimental affiliation (so neither the RHPBR nor the Kootney Highlanders can complain about being under the other's HQ).

 

[Brad Sallows]

The proposal to create new 20/80 (give or take) battalions provides a way to make an end run around obstacles to change.  Support the new establishments, and let the old ones wither on the vine if they don't meet expectations (don't reinforce failure).  If in a city/district there is a 20/80 battalion with high standards of administration and training, doing useful things and with access to interesting resources and training activities, what young recruit will prefer to join a 5/95 militia regiment to do endless cycles of MLOC (or whatever it is being called now)?  The supporting "establishments" outside the chain of command will have two options: bitch about the competition (never seemly), or rise to the competition and lean on the current unit leadership cadres to make the units well worth joining, supporting, and perpetuating.  In fairness, this would mean providing resources commensurate with expectations to the measurably successful 5/95 units.

 

[Echo9]

I do recognize that this concept would represent radical change, and that there would be substantial friction in accomplishing it (hence my original comment that there would be no chance in hell of it occurring).

Also, I'll note that the ideas of reducing hat badges to single companies with merged (or neutral) Bn HQ's is actually the currently planned approach.  So, the idea of the SD&G, PWOR and Brock is actually the most likely course of action.

I guess my stir of the pot is that this seems to be a typically Canadian dodge, and that there may be valid reasons for going a step farther.  I think that the Reg/Res integration has more to it than simply at the soldier level- something that I think we're going to see is something much more like the US terms of service, where people go to active or reserve status with relative ease- you sign a contract for continuous service for a period, and then revert to reserve terms of service at the end of contracts.  In such a scenario, the ability to maintain a constant regimental affiliation becomes much more attractive, and actually provides value to the CF in terms of maintaining soldier belonging to the organization.  If the transition means changing your uniforms, you're less likely to do it than if you can simply transfer from the 1st Battalion, RHPBR to the 4th Battalion.

I would suggest that with a single company, particularly an understrength company, isn't really doing much to perpetuate the honour of the regiment, and that without a certain critical mass, the regimental identity will not be maintained.  And hey, perhaps that ends up being the genius of the current approach- merge the units first, get rid of some of the honouraries and senates, and then go with the bigger plan. 

 

[pbi]

get rid of some of the honouraries and senates, and then go with the bigger plan. 

Based on my experiences with our LFRR proposals in 38 CBG in 2003/2005, this is an unfair generalization. In particular, we proposed to amalgamate our three Gunner units into a single large unit, and our three Svc Bns in a similar manner. The Army got "cold feet" over the "A word" so we sucked back a bit an proposed "tactical grouping". We issued the orders and started the machinery moving.(Since I left the Bde, this has moved ahead to some degree...dglad could probably give us an update). We engaged the affected Honoraries from the get go, and we had their willing support throughout. I was sometimes surprised by their frank assessments of their units' actual conditions (particularly the horrible and widespread succession problem for COs and RSMs). They never obstructed us, once. The obstruction and fear-mongering came from Res 2000, who waged a particularly ill informed and (IMHO) unsavoury campaign to try to stop us.

Honoraries, in my opinion, are very important. This is why the Govt takes such an interest in who they are and how they are appointed. If you get the right person, you get a great supporter for the unit in the community. If the Bde Comd and HQ make the effort to keep them well informed, bring them into the fold, and consult with them as appropriate, I believe you will get much more back than the little they cost DND. We always did this with our Hons: they were regular attenders at all Bde Comd Confs.

In the past history of our Army, all too often, the only people outside the Res unit who even cared about it at all were the Honoraries. It certainly wasn't the Regular Army, and sometimes not even the Militia's own hierarchy. If the Hons became somewhat parochial and defensive, maybe that is understandable.

Cheers

 

[WLSC]

  In the 60's and 70's almost half of the reserve units in Québec were almalgamated.  Today, we are still facing the same problem plus one more.  In the Montréal island, their is 5 inf units, 1 armd, arty and eng each.  In the immediate subburb, 2 more unit.  Each of these units parade around 130 pers/month.  We have, in SQFT 2 Brigades group (34 and 35) of around 9 units.

  Their is however a big succession problem mostly with the RSM.  I do not think that an another set of amalgamation will not help very much but a neutral bn HQ might do.  You have to consider that each of those regimental coy would have to keep their recruting cell and probably their Colors.  As for building, you have to keep some were they are to keep the link with the population.

 

[paracowboy]

I think you are over-estimating the actual numbers that will be available, anyway. The numbers that are being touted will not reflect reality when you consider the number of personnel leaving the Forces and the numbers that will be recruited and not trained, spending their entire BE in PAT Platoons across the nation or simply get tired of the wait and leave before their BE is complete. This talk of multiple new battalions is just that: talk.

 

[McG]

I guess my stir of the pot is that this seems to be a typically Canadian dodge, and that there may be valid reasons for going a step farther.  I think that the Reg/Res integration has more to it than simply at the soldier level- something that I think we're going to see is something much more like the US terms of service, where people go to active or reserve status with relative ease- ...  If the transition means changing your uniforms, you're less likely to do it than if you can simply transfer from the 1st Battalion, RHPBR to the 4th Battalion. 

This is the concept that differentiates this thread from the other Reserve regimental restructure thread (and in a way bridges the gap to the Regular Force Regimental formation thread).

Effectively, each Reg battalion would be a different regiment but each of these regiments would include several reserve battalions (some possibly being 20/80 battalions).  In this vision, would the regiment replace the CBGs as that reserve formation?  31 CBG would become the Royal Canadian Regiment (three sticks on the map symbol) with 1 RCR being regular force, 2 RCR being Hamilton, 3 RCR being Windsor, and 4 RCR being London.  Outlying regions likely would contain a company or platoon of one of  these battalions. 

 

[Echo9]

fair comment on the honouraries- they are often the one point outside of the regiment itself that cares.  They can also do a lot to get things for the army as a whole that the generals are unable to.  The Downsview (Denison) armouries are a prime example of this- they were largely built off the efforts of the honouraries in setting the stage with the government of the time.

I would, however, take issue with using the example of the amalgamation of 3 arty units, and largely for the reasons that I put forward in my original posting.  The key difference between the success of that endeavour and the task that's upcoming for the infantry is exactly the issue that I was suggesting needed to be addressed head on- that of hat badge.  Those of us wearing a corps cap badge already take advantage of the benefits.  I myself have been in 3 different units, without much impact through the change- again, the hat badge remained the same. 

There just doesn't seem to be the same propensity to carry over in the infantry.  I could be wrong- my sample size is relatively small- but that's the hunch that I get.

 

[dglad]

I would, however, take issue with using the example of the amalgamation of 3 arty units, and largely for the reasons that I put forward in my original posting.  The key difference between the success of that endeavour and the task that's upcoming for the infantry is exactly the issue that I was suggesting needed to be addressed head on- that of hat badge.  Those of us wearing a corps cap badge already take advantage of the benefits.  I myself have been in 3 different units, without much impact through the change- again, the hat badge remained the same. 

There just doesn't seem to be the same propensity to carry over in the infantry.  I could be wrong- my sample size is relatively small- but that's the hunch that I get.

There's a world of difference, however, between the relative mobility that a common corps badge may allow for its members as they move among units, and actually amalgamating those units.  In my experience, the guns are just as unit-proud as the infantry.  The concept of tactically-grouping some units, so that several share a unit HQ--has been implemented in 38 CBG and has been reasonably successful.  The artillery in 38 CBG, represented by two regiments (each with an outlying battery) and an independent field battery already had a culture of working together, simply because a troop- or battery-level exercise is of very limited use to the guns; the best training is at regiment level or higher.  It was recognized by the artillery leadership early on that exercising together (even though it means travelling literally hundreds of km in 38 CBG) was the only feasible way to train collectively.  As a result, when the tactical grouping occurred, it was essentially seamless, as it just formalized a practice that had been occuring anyway.  BUT--and this is a significan but--those units still remain distinct, with their own UICs and budgets.  So, even in the artillery, there is a profound desire to maintain unit integrity.

The infantry presents the greatest challenge, because the concept of those units training collectively has only been introduced fairly recently (at least in 38 CBG).  Inf training in 38 CBG (and, I suspect, in most other units) is typically conducted locally at platoon or, on occasion, company level.  Once upon a time, there were MILCONS that allowed training at company or even battalion level, but these were annual affairs that were not well-integrated with unit training and really did little more than stoke the fires of unit rivalry once a year (again, this was my experience in the old Prairie Militia Area.  Other Areas' mileage may vary).  It has now been generally recognized that it really is beneficial for the Royal Regina Rifles, the North Saskatchewan Regiment, the Royal Winnipeg Rifles, the Queen's Own Cameron Highlanders of Canada and the Lake Superior Scottish Regiment to train together, under a single command structure, and as often as possible.  However, I said concept at the outset of this paragraph, not culture, because it's not a culture yet for the 38 CBG inf to train together.  But there probably are definite advantages to group some or all of these five units in some fashion; the collective training and cohesion-building among their soldiers and leaders has to continue to smooth the way, as it did for the artillery.