Divining the right role, capabilities, structure, and Regimental System for Canada's Army Reserves

[daftandbarmy]

WRT how it should be done, I am looking at the UK's 77 Brigade, which has an almost 50/50 split between full and part time elements. The full time is important because this provides continuity and corporate knowledge, as well as a Roto 0 capability and the ability to undertake research and development of the capabilities. The part time elements provide the "surge" capabilities and manning for follow up Rotos. The 77 Bde model provides an outline as to how *we* could actually create an IA capability.

Yeah, like the CAF will sanction the stand up of a Canadian equivalent to the Neo-Chindits.  :

The 77th Brigade is a British Army formation, created in January 2015 under the Army 2020 concept.[3] It is the renaming of the Security Assistance Group which was created under the Army 2020 concept.[4][5] It is based at Denison Barracks in Hermitage, Berkshire and will be fully operational by April 2015.[6][7]

The brigade was named the 77th in tribute to the 77th Indian Infantry Brigade, which was part of the Chindits, an Indian Army guerilla warfare force led by Orde Wingate who used unorthodox tactics against the Japanese in Burma in World War II. The arm badges of the revived 77th will show a mythical Burmese creature in reference to the Chindits.[6]

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/77th_Brigade_(United_Kingdom)

 

[MedCorps]

It is interesting to note that the final composition of 77 (UK) Bde will be 53% Reserve (235 personnel).

http://www.parliament.uk/business/publications/written-questions-answers-statements/written-question/Commons/2015-02-25/225426/

MC

 

[a_majoor]

Yeah, like the CAF will sanction the stand up of a Canadian equivalent to the Neo-Chindits.  :

Well that is really the point, isn't it. We can give as much lip service as we want to "enablers" and the capabilities they can bring to the table as we want (while resourcing an entire new "Brigade" HQ capability [CAEG]), or we could actually, you know, resource the capability and use it.

Like I said, the way IA is being organized and employed right now does not create any "value added" to the CAF (and I am speaking from the inside of the beast), so if the powers that be are truly interested in maintaining and utilizing the capability and its effects, then they will have to bite the bullet and put some real time and effort and resources into this, or admit that they made a mistake and put a stake through its heart and rely on US CA and MISO and other allied powers to create these effects for us.

Of course, that answer applies to virtually any of the capabilities of the Armed Forces in general, outside of mega HQ organizations...

 

[daftandbarmy]

Well that is really the point, isn't it. We can give as much lip service as we want to "enablers" and the capabilities they can bring to the table as we want (while resourcing an entire new "Brigade" HQ capability [CAEG]), or we could actually, you know, resource the capability and use it.

Like I said, the way IA is being organized and employed right now does not create any "value added" to the CAF (and I am speaking from the inside of the beast), so if the powers that be are truly interested in maintaining and utilizing the capability and its effects, then they will have to bite the bullet and put some real time and effort and resources into this, or admit that they made a mistake and put a stake through its heart and rely on US CA and MISO and other allied powers to create these effects for us.

Of course, that answer applies to virtually any of the capabilities of the Armed Forces in general, outside of mega HQ organizations...

You're right, of course.

Now, if we only had a proper Divisional/Corps/Army level organization that you could slot this capability into... hmmmm

 

[FJAG]

Is the Naval Reserve Division an alternate model worth considering - entirely force-generation, without even the pretense of being any kind of "field" or fighting formation?

I don't think so. The navy has a finite resource in its ships and therefore the "manning the equipment" concept easily allows for a force generation reserve model.

The army on the other hand is an "equipping the man" concept where the operational elements are more dependant on the various teams to have trained together to develop efficiency. During Afghanistan each roto used a certain number of existing units/subunits but their own internal turnover and the heavy augmentation by individuals from external units required an extensive pre-deployment training cycle.

The point I'm making is that the CF is ill serving Canada by continuing to hold on to a force structure whose major day to day expense is in providing for salary and benefits for a standing regular force that is not essential for the type of operations that Canada is likely to commit to day to day. Our operational deployments over the last half century have been few and it seems unlikely we will see another extensive effort like Afghanistan in the foreseeable future. We need to limit our standing forces to a moderately sized high readiness special operations force as well as a moderate sized roto 0 infantry force. The remaining deployable forces including all armour, artillery, engineers and service support should be a fully-equipped, well-trained part-time force with various full-time leaders and technical experts.

Unfortunately I'm pessimistic that the rice bowl holders in the CF will ever see the writing on the wall. They shouldn't forget that two of the three political parties vying for power only see us going on unarmed UN blue beret humanitarian missions. Maybe they'll get the point when the only full-time people within DND/CF are civilians. It's time for a radical change; the time of the death by a thousand cuts needs to stop.

:cheers:

 

[quadrapiper]

I don't think so. The navy has a finite resource in its ships and therefore the "manning the equipment" concept easily allows for a force generation reserve model.

The army on the other hand is an "equipping the man" concept where the operational elements are more dependant on the various teams to have trained together to develop efficiency. During Afghanistan each roto used a certain number of existing units/subunits but their own internal turnover and the heavy augmentation by individuals from external units required an extensive pre-deployment training cycle.

Should have been clearer - meant for reserve units, due to the prevalence of individual augmentees. Consider the Regular unit the "ship."

 

[Colin Parkinson]

I don't think so. The navy has a finite resource in its ships and therefore the "manning the equipment" concept easily allows for a force generation reserve model.

The army on the other hand is an "equipping the man" concept where the operational elements are more dependant on the various teams to have trained together to develop efficiency. During Afghanistan each roto used a certain number of existing units/subunits but their own internal turnover and the heavy augmentation by individuals from external units required an extensive pre-deployment training cycle.

The point I'm making is that the CF is ill serving Canada by continuing to hold on to a force structure whose major day to day expense is in providing for salary and benefits for a standing regular force that is not essential for the type of operations that Canada is likely to commit to day to day. Our operational deployments over the last half century have been few and it seems unlikely we will see another extensive effort like Afghanistan in the foreseeable future. We need to limit our standing forces to a moderately sized high readiness special operations force as well as a moderate sized roto 0 infantry force. The remaining deployable forces including all armour, artillery, engineers and service support should be a fully-equipped, well-trained part-time force with various full-time leaders and technical experts.

Unfortunately I'm pessimistic that the rice bowl holders in the CF will ever see the writing on the wall. They shouldn't forget that two of the three political parties vying for power only see us going on unarmed UN blue beret humanitarian missions. Maybe they'll get the point when the only full-time people within DND/CF are civilians. It's time for a radical change; the time of the death by a thousand cuts needs to stop.

:cheers:

The problem for making predictions is that had you in May 2001 stated that Canada would spend around a decade in a ground war in Afghanistan taking causalities, bombing Libya and Hunting Pirates off the coast of Africa, you be laughed out of the mess.  My gut feeling is things are going to get worse globally and it's very likely the west is going to get dragged kicking and screaming into several more more conflicts. Hell even the Afghans guys were saying : "The Cold War is over" but it's not and we are seeing combatants conducting Soviet style combat in the Ukraine complete with MBT's, Grad strikes and active AD shooting down aircraft. 

 

[Jed]

The problem for making predictions is that had you in May 2001 stated that Canada would spend around a decade in a ground war in Afghanistan taking causalities, bombing Libya and Hunting Pirates off the coast of Africa, you be laughed out of the mess. My gut feeling is things are going to get worse globally and it's very likely the west is going to get dragged kicking and screaming into several more more conflicts. Hell even the Afghans guys were saying : "The Cold War is over" but it's not and we are seeing combatants conducting Soviet style combat in the Ukraine complete with MBT's, Grad strikes and active AD shooting down aircraft.

Isn't that the truth? I think we all should keep our wits about us and be prepared to engage on short notice to move.

 

[Kirkhill]

...

The army on the other hand is an "equipping the man" concept where the operational elements are more dependant on the various teams to have trained together to develop efficiency. During Afghanistan each roto used a certain number of existing units/subunits but their own internal turnover and the heavy augmentation by individuals from external units required an extensive pre-deployment training cycle.
...

You know, I am not sure that "equipping the man" actually does still clearly define the modern army.  More and more we seem to be "manning the equipment" - be it crew served man portable weapons, artillery pieces, tanks, recce vehicles, trucks, communications systems and don't forget HQs and ASICs and drones and radars and assorted sensors.  We actually have very few "men" to equip in the sense that Sam Hughes would have understood the concept.    Equipping the man is useful shorthand when you are talking about about an infantry army supplemented by mounted rifles on horse back.   

MedCorps' guy is onto something.  We keep talking about the need to support the forces in being (I don't mean red tshirts and yellow ribbons here) and it is those same missing support elements that are most often missing from disaster zones and third world armies.  Those "soft" assets can buy us a lot of street creds, while working with other armies would build up our experience levels while also minimizing the physical and political risks and the loss of blood.  The counter-vailing proposition is the we would have to expend more treasure.

 

[FJAG]

The problem for making predictions is that had you in May 2001 stated that Canada would spend around a decade in a ground war in Afghanistan taking causalities, bombing Libya and Hunting Pirates off the coast of Africa, you be laughed out of the mess.  My gut feeling is things are going to get worse globally and it's very likely the west is going to get dragged kicking and screaming into several more more conflicts. Hell even the Afghans guys were saying : "The Cold War is over" but it's not and we are seeing combatants conducting Soviet style combat in the Ukraine complete with MBT's, Grad strikes and active AD shooting down aircraft.

I'm fully in agreement with you but, politically speaking, if there is one thing that the Afghan experience has done is made us more timid in responding. ISIS is arguably a greater threat internationally than the Taliban ever were but look at our (and the international community's) current tepid response. Same for the Ukraine. I really agree with you that at some point in the future, we will have to become involved with a more credible forces than we are capable of generating today and that we should take the opportunity of the pause that we have right now to figure out how to do that.

I think that we are all agreed that our current level of defence spending is inadequate. Most people on this board (as well as NATO) is advocating for Canada to increase defence spending. I don't believe that increased spending is a realistic possibility even if we were to re-elect another Conservative majority.

For me the math is very simple: if we want to have more people, better equipment and a deployable, trained organization then we need to find that money within current funding levels and the only way that I can see to do that is to replace a large number of the people who are paid 365 days per year with ones that are paid 60 - 90 days per year.

There is no doubt that such a reserve heavy deployable field force concept comes with challenges BUT the biggest challenge is simply accepting that such a concept change is essential. All other challenges that need to be faced in making a reserve heavy force an effective one are comparably small once the need to move to such a system is recognized.

The Conservatives have pledged an increase in the reserve force by 5,000. That's an interesting move in itself showing that they do recognized a need for more forces. The trouble in my mind is that with our current military bureaucracy's inertia favouring a reg centric system, such increases will be paid for out of existing, or slightly augmented, funds leaving reserve equipment and training standards most probably worse than they are now.

Remember that when Leslie made his Report on Transformation, his recommendations pointed almost exclusively at preserving the regular force "front line" numbers by reducing bloat in headquarters (military civilian and consultant). His Thrust 2 Army Force Generation Structure called for a two division force (1 Regular, 1 Reserve) where 2 Div's responsibility is domestic response and augmentation to 1 Div. His team had a defined goal: "the explicit goal of the transformation team was to identify areas where we could reduce overhead and improve efficiency and effectiveness, to allow reinvestment from within for future operational capability despite constrained resources" and guiding principles to work with the first of which was: "the need to make every dollar count in the terms of the pursuit for operational efficiency".

Never once in the report is there an analysis of the courses open vis a vis the army's regular/reserve mix; it jumps to and maintains (if not entrenches even further) the current model of a divided ref/res force with all of its inherent inefficiencies and financial burdens. I don't doubt for a minute that there is a downside to a mixed reg/res deployable field force but without a proper analysis of the pros and cons how will we know whether or not the cons are insurmountable? IMHO Leslie utterly failed in what was his primary job; presenting DND/CF (not to mention the government) with a full range of options to consider and pursue. :2c:

:cheers:

 

[dapaterson]

Army generals situating the estimate to preserve the status quo of the various regiments, branches and corps to the detriment of the larger institution?  What a novel idea.

 

[FJAG]

You know, I am not sure that "equipping the man" actually does still clearly define the modern army.  More and more we seem to be "manning the equipment" - be it crew served man portable weapons, artillery pieces, tanks, recce vehicles, trucks, communications systems and don't forget HQs and ASICs and drones and radars and assorted sensors.  We actually have very few "men" to equip in the sense that Sam Hughes would have understood the concept.    Equipping the man is useful shorthand when you are talking about about an infantry army supplemented by mounted rifles on horse back.   

MedCorps' guy is onto something.  We keep talking about the need to support the forces in being (I don't mean red tshirts and yellow ribbons here) and it is those same missing support elements that are most often missing from disaster zones and third world armies.  Those "soft" assets can buy us a lot of street creds, while working with other armies would build up our experience levels while also minimizing the physical and political risks and the loss of blood.  The counter-vailing proposition is the we would have to expend more treasure.

I know where you are coming from. My point was more to do with responding to the question of a navy reserve force generation model. In my mind once the navy decides that it's a twenty ship navy, it has locked itself into a force structure and most likely it's reserve force tasks will be simply to generate additional people to help keep those ships at sea. I see the air force in a similar vein.

I still like the concept of the army's mission ultimately turns on that soldier (most probably infantry) who needs to occupy a certain piece of ground and that everything else turns on making sure he can get there and stay there as long as we need.

In one respect I agree with you totally. In the end it strikes me that much of our defence planning is budget based and the decision about the army's organization is how many and what type of units can we get out of our allocated PYs. I think that if our defence planning was based on how many battalions/brigades/divisions do we need to equip and man and how much overall budget is available then our reg/res structure might finally be reconsidered. If you need a division (like Leslie suggests) but if, with your reg force PY's, you can only man it to 40% of it's establishment while with a reg/res mix you can man it to 100% then maybe you would start getting serious about creating a credible, deployable reserve force system so that you can in fact "man the equipment".

I personally don't like the concept that the reserves role is or should be to "support the forces in being" (which to most people means the reg force). In my mind (and for that matter under the National Defence Act) reserve forces are in fact "forces in being" who are in a stand-by mode capable of being called-up on a moments notice by the Governor in Council.

For me the true distinction between a regular force member and a reservist should simply be: which individuals/units/formations need to be in existence on a full-time, day to day basis (whether for administrative/leadership purposes, high readiness requirements or complex technical skills) and which can instead be in existence on a part-time, stand-by basis (primarily because their services-whether combat or support) are not needed on a full-time basis but will most probably be needed to support government objectives (whether internationally or domestic)?

:cheers:

 

[Kirkhill]

I know where you are coming from. My point was more to do with responding to the question of a navy reserve force generation model. In my mind once the navy decides that it's a twenty ship navy, it has locked itself into a force structure and most likely it's reserve force tasks will be simply to generate additional people to help keep those ships at sea. I see the air force in a similar vein.

I still like the concept of the army's mission ultimately turns on that soldier (most probably infantry) who needs to occupy a certain piece of ground and that everything else turns on making sure he can get there and stay there as long as we need.

In one respect I agree with you totally. In the end it strikes me that much of our defence planning is budget based and the decision about the army's organization is how many and what type of units can we get out of our allocated PYs. I think that if our defence planning was based on how many battalions/brigades/divisions do we need to equip and man and how much overall budget is available then our reg/res structure might finally be reconsidered. If you need a division (like Leslie suggests) but if, with your reg force PY's, you can only man it to 40% of it's establishment while with a reg/res mix you can man it to 100% then maybe you would start getting serious about creating a credible, deployable reserve force system so that you can in fact "man the equipment".

I personally don't like the concept that the reserves role is or should be to "support the forces in being" (which to most people means the reg force). In my mind (and for that matter under the National Defence Act) reserve forces are in fact "forces in being" who are in a stand-by mode capable of being called-up on a moments notice by the Governor in Council.

For me the true distinction between a regular force member and a reservist should simply be: which individuals/units/formations need to be in existence on a full-time, day to day basis (whether for administrative/leadership purposes, high readiness requirements or complex technical skills) and which can instead be in existence on a part-time, stand-by basis (primarily because their services-whether combat or support) are not needed on a full-time basis but will most probably be needed to support government objectives (whether internationally or domestic)?

:cheers:

Agreement in the offing.

The other piece of the puzzle in my view is, in American terms, the difference between the Secretary of State's Army (Navy, Marines, (Edit to add the Special Operations community),CIA) versus the Secretary of the Interior's (??? I think I have that right) Army (Army, Air Force) and the National Guards.

In my view the Regs should be focused on Expeditionary support to national foreign policy.  They can do domestic response but the types of things they are going to be good at responding to are (hopefully) unlikely to happen in Canada.

The Domestic force could be organized along the National Guard / Hjemmegard lines with a VERY high proportion of voluntary  (unpaid) members.

Of course - in Canada - that could be a hard political sell: having an army, navy and air force dedicated to violent action beyond our borders in support of our national interests and values.

But....maybe.....Syria and Operation Haven 2015?

 

[Colin Parkinson]

I'm fully in agreement with you but, politically speaking, if there is one thing that the Afghan experience has done is made us more timid in responding. ISIS is arguably a greater threat internationally than the Taliban ever were but look at our (and the international community's) current tepid response. Same for the Ukraine. I really agree with you that at some point in the future, we will have to become involved with a more credible forces than we are capable of generating today and that we should take the opportunity of the pause that we have right now to figure out how to do that.

:cheers:

I suspect the coming crises will run the show with the western politicians being dragged kicking screaming to act by events beyond their control.    8)

 

[MilEME09]

I personally don't like the concept that the reserves role is or should be to "support the forces in being" (which to most people means the reg force). In my mind (and for that matter under the National Defence Act) reserve forces are in fact "forces in being" who are in a stand-by mode capable of being called-up on a moments notice by the Governor in Council.

For me the true distinction between a regular force member and a reservist should simply be: which individuals/units/formations need to be in existence on a full-time, day to day basis (whether for administrative/leadership purposes, high readiness requirements or complex technical skills) and which can instead be in existence on a part-time, stand-by basis (primarily because their services-whether combat or support) are not needed on a full-time basis but will most probably be needed to support government objectives (whether internationally or domestic)?

:cheers:

So then should Reserve Force units be deployable? and how would that work when you have members that usually cant drop their jobs to be deployed all the time.

 

[LightFighter]

and how would that work when you have members that usually cant drop their jobs to be deployed all the time.

Or have zero desire to deploy(not just a Reserve issue).

 

[daftandbarmy]

Or have zero desire to deploy(not just a Reserve issue).

We just have to make sure that we only participate in 'good wars' and that should take care of reservists' interest and willingness to be involved.

 

[Humphrey Bogart]

We just have to make sure that we only participate in 'good wars' and that should take care of reservists' interest and willingness to be involved.

HEY NOW!

Am I the only one that can't wait to tell their grandchildren? "I fought for oil!"

;D

 

[Jed]

HEY NOW!

Am I the only one that can't wait to tell their grandchildren? "I fought for oil!"

;D

It is all how you phrase it. "I fought for affordable energy"

 

[Humphrey Bogart]

It is all how you phrase it. "I fought for affordable energy"

LOL I fought for "Non-Renewable Resources!"

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