Divining the right role, capabilities, structure, and Regimental System for Canada's Army Reserves

[C-Aitchison]

Lutheran - you aren't wrong.

But that is a bit of a difference than saying the Militia wasn't engaged at all.  Many soldiers in the CEF were Militiamen (who had to be trained at Valcartier, Salisbury Plains and Etaples prior to going to the trenches) and many others were recruited through the Militia.

You are the second person to refer to me as Lutheran this week! The first was when I was canvassing in a neighbourhood for a local federal candidate, and the gentleman attended Waterloo Lutheran.

I completely agree with your statement though.

 

[jhk87]

Lutheran - you aren't wrong.

But that is a bit of a difference than saying the Militia wasn't engaged at all.  Many soldiers in the CEF were Militiamen (who had to be trained at Valcartier, Salisbury Plains and Etaples prior to going to the trenches) and many others were recruited through the Militia.

Those in the Militia had to enlist the CEF which was under a seperate ministry altogther, making the militia's impact negligble. The numbers and level of training were far, far too low to have an impact in mobilising an expiditionary force.

Most of the training conducted in Valcartier was overseen by Permanent Force regulars and Salisbury Plain was overseen by the British. Even then, troops were not on the line until 1915.

The point remaining that the Militia was not effective structure for mobilisation in 1914 and was superifical in 1939. Those wars were fought and won with professionalised citizen-soliders, not miltiamen, and before there is a sensible discussion about the roles and way forward of the PRes, we need to break the "Militia Myth" which clouds a lot of discussion.

 

[Kirkhill]

Horses for courses JHK

Many nations manage to integrate both "Professional Soldiers" and "Citizen Volunteers".  In Canada ..... its like my kids squabbling at the table.

By the way: Cool name change.

 

[OldTanker]

It is with interest I note the comments directed at "volunteers", particularly the notion that we (yes, I have volunteered much of my time in semi-retirement to help out my Regiment) are examples of what serving soldiers should not become and somehow are lesser persons. I know we are not as gung-ho and fit and aggressive as the serving soldiers, but maybe we were once. When we dole out rum and clam chowder to the soldiers after a cold Remembrance Day parade are we providing examples of what soldiers shouldn't become when they get old? When we organize fund-raising for money to purchase ceremonial kit for the serving soldiers and bands that the government won't, is that providing a poor example? Are we wasting our time running Regimental museums so new soldiers can understand what old soldiers have done and the traditions they are expected to follow? I could go but I'm sure there are lots of other examples we have all seen of those who have served providing useful service to those who do serve. If the comment was aimed at those who seek to meddle in the running of the serving unit, I understand the sentiment, but please don't disrespect us all.

 

[daftandbarmy]

Summer 1 (Graduating High School) - 12 weeks BMQ + 12 weekends at the armoury
Summer 2 (1st Year) - 12 weeks Trades (DP?) + 12 weekends at the armoury
Summer 3 (2nd Year) - Exercises + 12 weekends at the armoury
Year 4 - 12 weekends at the armoury
Years 5 to 8 minimum service Supplist OR can volunteer for continuing Class A service

Supplist Reserves and Class A Reserves available for call up with current skills.

That could work... if we could keep the plot for that long  :

 

[Humphrey Bogart]

That could work... if we could keep the plot for that long  :

Hahahaha!

 

[Kirkhill]

That could work... if we could keep the plot for that long  :

Can't take credit - it is a direct steal from south of the line.

 

[Edward Campbell]

Perhaps you would be happier if we just created numbered independent companies.

Actually, I  would be happier if we had any sort of rational structure for the reserves.

  First step: four, regional reserve brigades ~ not brigade groups;

  Second step: about a dozen to as many as 20 independent artillery batteries - about 100 howitzers, under a separate, national, artillery HQ;

  Third step: 12 to 15 infantry battalions, each composed on three to six community based companies;

  Fourth step: four to 12 independent armoured squadrons ~ with some sort of kit;

  Fifth step: four to six engineer squadrons, with some useful equipment;

  Sixth step: sour signal squadrons, with some useful equipment; and

  Seventh step: about a dozen independent service support companies, each with a lot of regular force support, especially in the maintenance elements. This is the most complex problem.

I have no idea what the C2 superstructure ought to look like ~ I am confident it will be overweight and top heavy (in both the organizational and personal aspects), but I suspect it can be rendered harmless.

Keep (almost) all the cap badges and regimental colours and silver and honoraries and, and, and ...but give the regional battalions (1st BC, 2nd Alberta, 3rd Saskatchewan, etc, etc) some useful training goals and tasks (train platoons in a company context) and give the soldiers and subalterns some challenges. Or, maybe, just give up on the reserve army ...

 

[Kirkhill]

Actually, I  would be happier if we had any sort of rational structure for the reserves.

  First step: four, regional reserve brigades ~ not brigade groups;

  Second step: about a dozen to as many as 20 independent artillery batteries - about 100 howitzers, under a separate, national, artillery HQ;

  Third step: 12 to 15 infantry battalions, each composed on three to six community based companies;

  Fourth step: four to 12 independent armoured squadrons ~ with some sort of kit;

  Fifth step: four to six engineer squadrons, with some useful equipment;

  Sixth step: sour signal squadrons, with some useful equipment; and

  Seventh step: about a dozen independent service support companies, each with a lot of regular force support, especially in the maintenance elements. This is the most complex problem.

I have no idea what the C2 superstructure ought to look like ~ I am confident it will be overweight and top heavy (in both the organizational and personal aspects), but I suspect it can be rendered harmless.

Keep (almost) all the cap badges and regimental colours and silver and honoraries and, and, and ...but give the regional battalions (1st BC, 2nd Alberta, 3rd Saskatchewan, etc, etc) some useful training goals and tasks (train platoons in a company context) and give the soldiers and subalterns some challenges. Or, maybe, just give up on the reserve army ...

Good enough for me.

Except that I would be ensuring that all of those limited available days (37.5 to 70) would ALL be dedicated to Training.  Adm and Support should NOT be a Reserve function.  It is a full time occupation.

The Reserves have the opposite problem to the Regs.  The Reserves have too few training hours available.  The Regs have too many.

If that were not the case then people wouldn't be trying to figure out what to do with their troops in garrison (and there wouldn't be so many idle officers for NDHQ to occupy filling out interminable forms).  Put more of them to work filling out forms and creating classes and exercises for the Reserves.

 

[blackberet17]

I know the Sigs complain about kit as much as any other trade, but "sour" Signal Sqns? Wassat?

>

 

[Edward Campbell]

I know the Sigs complain about kit as much as any other trade, but "sour" Signal Sqns? Wassat?

>

Sorry for the typo. I was trying to say four.

And thanks for giving me an opportunity to expand a bit more. Signals and Logistics are challenges for the reserves: the equipment and training time, especially for Signals and RCEME, are expensive and hard to acquire. In my opinion both Signals and RCEME squadrons/companies (there are no units, except regional (amalgamated) infantry battalions) above squadron/battery/company level in my reserve model) need more, many more regular force personnel than most other units ~ both trainers and workers. Reserve RCEME companies should be able to do second line repair on some (many? most?) reserve vehicles, radios, weapons and electronics, but they will need to be something like 25/75 or even 40/60 units to do that.

 

[daftandbarmy]

Sorry for the typo. I was trying to say four.

And thanks for giving me an opportunity to expand a bit more. Signals and Logistics are challenges for the reserves: the equipment and training time, especially for Signals and RCEME, are expensive and hard to acquire. In my opinion both Signals and RCEME squadrons/companies (there are no units, except regional (amalgamated) infantry battalions) above squadron/battery/company level in my reserve model) need more, many more regular force personnel than most other units ~ both trainers and workers. Reserve RCEME companies should be able to do second line repair on some (many? most?) reserve vehicles, radios, weapons and electronics, but they will need to be something like 25/75 or even 40/60 units to do that.

From my point of view, as an uneducated stubble jumper, the sigs reserves are doing a fantastic job. Every time we have had them on an exercise they have exceeded my (un edumecated) expectations.

Especially since they make me coffee all the time  ;D

 

[Remius]

From my point of view, as an uneducated stubble jumper, the sigs reserves are doing a fantastic job. Every time we have had them on an exercise they have exceed my (un edumecated) expectations.

specially since they make me coffee all the time  ;D

Same.  but we could use more of that.  Coffee too

 

[MilEME09]

Sorry for the typo. I was trying to say four.

And thanks for giving me an opportunity to expand a bit more. Signals and Logistics are challenges for the reserves: the equipment and training time, especially for Signals and RCEME, are expensive and hard to acquire. In my opinion both Signals and RCEME squadrons/companies (there are no units, except regional (amalgamated) infantry battalions) above squadron/battery/company level in my reserve model) need more, many more regular force personnel than most other units ~ both trainers and workers. Reserve RCEME companies should be able to do second line repair on some (many? most?) reserve vehicles, radios, weapons and electronics, but they will need to be something like 25/75 or even 40/60 units to do that.

I would agree with you on the RCEME side, our full time staff try to pull in guys for class A or if possible Class B as much as they can because with only a couple full time staff you can only get so much done on vehicles. Weapons side I haven't seen an issue as weapons don't tend to break as much, now if units could just clean their weapons regularly.....

 

[George Wallace]

And thanks for giving me an opportunity to expand a bit more. Signals and Logistics are challenges for the reserves: the equipment and training time, especially for Signals and RCEME, are expensive and hard to acquire. In my opinion both Signals and RCEME squadrons/companies (there are no units, except regional (amalgamated) infantry battalions) above squadron/battery/company level in my reserve model) need more, many more regular force personnel than most other units ~ both trainers and workers. Reserve RCEME companies should be able to do second line repair on some (many? most?) reserve vehicles, radios, weapons and electronics, but they will need to be something like 25/75 or even 40/60 units to do that.

I think you may have come up with the correct solutions for those types of Reserve Units.  It would allow them to function efficiently and capable of supporting other Reserve units, yet permit the recruiting and mentoring of Reservists.  Your next dilemma would be the properly equipping of those units, necessitating an increase in procurements.

 

[PuckChaser]

Sorry for the typo. I was trying to say four.

And thanks for giving me an opportunity to expand a bit more. Signals and Logistics are challenges for the reserves: the equipment and training time, especially for Signals and RCEME, are expensive and hard to acquire. In my opinion both Signals and RCEME squadrons/companies (there are no units, except regional (amalgamated) infantry battalions) above squadron/battery/company level in my reserve model) need more, many more regular force personnel than most other units ~ both trainers and workers. Reserve RCEME companies should be able to do second line repair on some (many? most?) reserve vehicles, radios, weapons and electronics, but they will need to be something like 25/75 or even 40/60 units to do that.

You'll never get more RegF Signallers into PRes units, the RegF is short as it is. I do completely agree, however, that PRes Signals units be trained and optimized at providing support to Battalion level and below. There is too much of a technology and training gap when you start talking about strategic/rear link comms and Bde CPs. PRes Signallers should be specialists at providing Pl/Coy/Bn support in the TacRad environment, and if focused there, could easily move to augment RegF at those levels with minimal delta training. You're not going to get a PRes Signaller proficient on a TSS/HCLOS/etc link working 2 weekends a month and a handful of Thursdays.

Radio equipment will always be an issue to supply the PRes units, as the Army never buys enough to even kit out the RegF. Radios aren't cheap (a new 117G is ~$35k USD) and are replaced far more frequently due to advances in cryptography/waveforms/etc.

 

[Colin Parkinson]

Actually it may help retain Sigs as people that have doing a lot of field/frontline work can then rotate into a more relaxed posting with good opportunities for their families. This would help Reg force Sigs work on their leadership skills and help maintain up to date SOP's and knowledge for the PRes. Further for people with specialized skillsets, can transition out of the their Reg force career into a Reserve position and be guaranteed X amount of money in exchange for X amount of time for X amount of years. The money would flow into the Brigade to pay that position as they become the custodian of a asset for the whole forces.   

 

[The Bread Guy]

Moved the more detailed "what should the Reserves look like?" here to join up with other discussion on same - keep up the great input, folks!

Milnet.ca Staff

 

[George Wallace]

Actually it may help retain Sigs as people that have doing a lot of field/frontline work can then rotate into a more relaxed posting with good opportunities for their families. .....

Hold your horses there.  They would still have to deploy to the field; perhaps a lot less that elsewhere, but still will have to deploy from time to time.  RSS postings for people who think it is just a holiday are detrimental to all.  The Reg Force member's career can suffer.  The Reserve unit gets little satisfaction out of the RSS member.  The Reg Force members will still have to maintain a high sense of dedication to their job.

On the Reg Force retention issue, it may help, in that this would open up a wider variety of postings to choose from, and permit the member a better quality of life for them-self and their families. 

 

[MilEME09]

perhaps RSS positions can be a way to help when you have to many reg force members sitting on there hands for short periods of the year. Have a brigade EX coming up? okay we are going to send a couple sections, maybe more over to the Reserves, help train them up, get them ready, and go out and work with them for that entire EX. Call it a short term RSS, a quick shot in the arm, especially in a service battalion, a influx of say a section of techs mixed with reservists to shadow/train with would allow skill transfer and keep equipment ready to go.