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Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)

The 1946 Canada-United States Defence of North America plan committed us to provide an airborne brigade. Can anyone confirm if it is still on the books? I think it probably is, but that's a guess.

This led to the MSF 1948-1955 of three parachute battalions, artillery, engineers, etc, etc followed by the DCF of three airportable battalions each with an airborne company plus that was in turn replaced circa 1968 by the Canadian Airborne Regiment. We are sort of back to the 1956 model.

A senior intelligence officer once confided to me that he had to jump through all sorts of hoops to keep justifying a threat assessment large enough to keep the airborne community in both countries active. Be that as it may, I think while Edward's solution is probably the minimum force structure, it is not robust enough to satisfy the airborne world and the three infantry regimental mafias.
 
E.R. Campbell said:
Maybe light infantry able to deploy to anywhere in Canada, on relatively short notice and conduct low intensity operations ...

    1. Airborne, almost certainly

    2. Since the "enemy" would likely be minimal ... maybe a Russian repeat of the (1943) German Weather Station Kurt ...

         
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          ... then no need for tanks, artillery, mortars, HAWs or attack helicopters; but

    3. Need, probably, airborne infantry, engineers, signals (including air support signals), medical and logistics; and

    4. Need, e.g.

         
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    5. Since short notice is required, then at least five, say six "teams" based around one company of infantry and one troop of engineers with airfield building equipment ~ two infantry battalions plus support in a light brigade?

                   
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We already have this, it's called JTF2. 

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Old Sweat said:
The 1946 Canada-United States Defence of North America plan committed us to provide an airborne brigade. Can anyone confirm if it is still on the books? I think it probably is, but that's a guess.

This led to the MSF 1948-1955 of three parachute battalions, artillery, engineers, etc, etc followed by the DCF of three airportable battalions each with an airborne company plus that was in turn replaced circa 1968 by the Canadian Airborne Regiment. We are sort of back to the 1956 model.

A senior intelligence officer once confided to me that he had to jump through all sorts of hoops to keep justifying a threat assessment large enough to keep the airborne community in both countries active. Be that as it may, I think while Edward's solution is probably the minimum force structure, it is not robust enough to satisfy the airborne world and the three infantry regimental mafias.


That was, indeed, the "model" for my guesstimate.

With regard to JTF-2:

    1. It doesn't meet my requirement of being sort of "fencible," always available for the DoC role; and

    2. It isn't public enough ~ one aspect of a good DoC force should be its constant presence in the media. Secret squirrels are not really very good for "showing the flag" operations.
 
I'll continue to punt for 3 small, light (heliborne - with para capability) brigades, a heavy brigade group (tanks and rockets and such) and a Militia force with varying degrees of readiness.

The critical function of the Militia is to supply trainable, disciplined odd-job men and women that the Government can throw into the breach, come what may.  Not a lot of specialization.  Just General Service soldiers.

The light capability would be to supply deployable company combat teams both domestically and overseas when based off the RCN's ships. 

The Heavy Brigade Group could deploy independently or be beefed up with a Light Brigade, or could supply a Battle Group to beef up a Light Brigade, of a Combat Tm to a Light Battle Group.






 
E.R. Campbell said:
That was, indeed, the "model" for my guesstimate.

With regard to JTF-2:

    1. It doesn't meet my requirement of being sort of "fencible," always available for the DoC role; and

    2. It isn't public enough ~ one aspect of a good DoC force should be its constant presence in the media. Secret squirrels are not really very good for "showing the flag" operations.
And there's not enough of them.

I expect a Defence of Canada force built around un- or lightly-armoured trucks, tracks, and ATVs and airmobile/airborne delivery in Canada would reinvigorate the local militia concept, while providing the GS augmentee base that Chris mentioned. Could see a fork: "Fencibles" and Reserves, with the latter being focused on retaining part-time already-trained personnel. I understand the USMC does something similar.
 
Defence promises are only going to shrink.

At approximately $22B, the defence budget is roughly comparable in size to recent projections for the size of the FY16-17 deficit.

The Liberals have a lot programs they want to restore, initiate, and increase before they get around to buying trucks and ships and combat aircraft.  Virtually all of their recently announced repeals and changes come with price tags - they are basically undoing many of the cuts the previous government chose to make so that it could balance the budget without cutting into transfers.
 
E.R. Campbell said:
That was, indeed, the "model" for my guesstimate.

With regard to JTF-2:

    1. It doesn't meet my requirement of being sort of "fencible," always available for the DoC role; and

    2. It isn't public enough ~ one aspect of a good DoC force should be its constant presence in the media. Secret squirrels are not really very good for "showing the flag" operations.

This is where we are in disagreement E.R.

I personally don't see a need for a Defence of Canada force.  What is the strategic imperative for such a force? 

We need a smaller, more agile Army that is optimized for expeditionary operations, unless of course you want your Defence of Canada force to also be capable of overseas operations.  Interestingly, given the geography of our country, a Defence of Canada force would also probably work very well in a brushfire war  :D

I see where you're going with this  ;D
 
For a defence of Canada type of force (and looking at the current government most likely to support concepts), a few points my crystal ball is telling me
-Correct enough, JTF2 and the rest of CANSOFCOM have a specific job to do (not DoC)
-Heavy (expensive) armoured forces, do not count it. Trust me, not likely going to be supported (gut feeling)
-An airborne force would be essential (best way to cover vast distances), in this case, it would best to have all airborne capable forces located at bases with/near airfields (Pet trucking down to Ottawa not too bad or is Pembroke airfield still operational?)
-I am thinking less Brigade structure and something more light infantry with some mobility assetts (think like Royal Marines Commando or a beefed up Rhodesian Light Infantry) that can fight remotely very well from platoon to battalion size
-Aerial re-supply and helicopters would be my ideal choice to supply them
-Training as well in some amphibious operations (nothing too high speed) and maybe get something similar to Royal Marines ORC (gunned up, armoured RHIBs) and Viking (modified BsV210).
-We do not need seperate airborne and amphibious forces (they can do the same job) as well make them capable of mountain ops (you only need a few Advance Mountain Operators formerly known as MOIs)
-For DoC and look at possible threat scenarios, we may find ourselves doing COIN in our country in the next twenty-thirty years (ya I know, stop licking aluminum)


 
ArmyRick said:
-An airborne force would be essential (best way to cover vast distances), in this case, it would best to have all airborne capable forces located at bases with/near airfields (Pet trucking down to Ottawa not too bad or is Pembroke airfield still operational?)

Pembroke Airfield is still operational, Hercs have been landing all week supporting a BPara course. I believe a CC-177 was supporting as well, but that's going off the A/C identification skills of my wife, she's usually not wrong though.

If we do push for more light infantry and airborne forces, we need that last C-17 whitetail purchased now. 6x A/C plus the J-model hercs lets us move about the country very quickly with light infantry/airborne forces.
 
Bring me up to speed, what is a C17 "whitetail"?

I know what a C17 is.

Specifically, whats a whitetail?

They have been doing Bpara in Pet? I know Edmonton had started running serials a few years ago. Interesting. Or is it just the J phase?

Agreed, the right aircraft are needed if we want to move reasonably quick from point A to point B in our nation.
 
3RCR ran a whole course here starting 2 weeks ago, J Phase is this week.

A whitetail is an aircraft built without a buyer, basically ready to go, just needs a country's paint scheme (hence the whitetail). Tories announced intention to buy one in Dec 2014, and it touched down in Trenton in March 2015. Very quick turn around.

The last one rolled off the line on November 29, 2015, and is waiting a buyer. http://www.ainonline.com/aviation-news/defense/2015-11-30/last-c-17-produced-california-departs-boeings-plant
 
ArmyRick said:
For a defence of Canada type of force (and looking at the current government most likely to support concepts), a few points my crystal ball is telling me
-Correct enough, JTF2 and the rest of CANSOFCOM have a specific job to do (not DoC)
-Heavy (expensive) armoured forces, do not count it. Trust me, not likely going to be supported (gut feeling)
-An airborne force would be essential (best way to cover vast distances), in this case, it would best to have all airborne capable forces located at bases with/near airfields (Pet trucking down to Ottawa not too bad or is Pembroke airfield still operational?)
-I am thinking less Brigade structure and something more light infantry with some mobility assetts (think like Royal Marines Commando or a beefed up Rhodesian Light Infantry) that can fight remotely very well from platoon to battalion size
-Aerial re-supply and helicopters would be my ideal choice to supply them
-Training as well in some amphibious operations (nothing too high speed) and maybe get something similar to Royal Marines ORC (gunned up, armoured RHIBs) and Viking (modified BsV210).
-We do not need seperate airborne and amphibious forces (they can do the same job) as well make them capable of mountain ops (you only need a few Advance Mountain Operators formerly known as MOIs)
-For DoC and look at possible threat scenarios, we may find ourselves doing COIN in our country in the next twenty-thirty years (ya I know, stop licking aluminum)

We've got 9 Infantry battalions and base loads of Arty, Engrs, Armd & CSS sitting around 'doing nothing much operational - wise' out of Canada. In Canada.

Why do we need another special home defence force of some kind too?
 
if the establishment is to be believed 90% of dom ops is to be PRes, and 90% of expeditionary ops are reg force. The reality is 90% is all reg force, the PRes lacks the support(both economic and political), training,and equipment to be useful in most dom ops situations, and with the Res force seemingly starting to get less training for some trades, less and less of a possible role for over seas operations. The result is an over stretched Reg force, and a Pres that isn't useful for any real task.
 
daftandbarmy said:
We've got 9 Infantry battalions and base loads of Arty, Engrs, Armd & CSS sitting around 'doing nothing much operational - wise' out of Canada. In Canada.

Why do we need another special home defence force of some kind too?


I think it's a wee bit of sauve qui peut. My guess is that this Liberal government will be even less inclined to spend on the military than was the last (Conservative) one. Stephen Harper was focused on balancing the budget in 2015, to appease (part of) his base, and Justin Trudeau will be, even more, focused on infrastructure with social value to appease (part of) his base.

I suspect the MND can try to leverage this sort of thing into something like a DCF. I doubt he's going to get anything for expeditionary forces ... not until someone actually attacks us, at home ... with something worse than this:

                       
multiple-shootings-canadian-parliament-oct-2014.jpg
 
daftandbarmy said:
We've got 9 Infantry battalions and base loads of Arty, Engrs, Armd & CSS sitting around 'doing nothing much operational - wise' out of Canada. In Canada.

Why do we need another special home defence force of some kind too?


And, maybe, the answer is that the MND re-roles about ⅓ of all that into a formally constituted DCF ... based in, let's just say, Valcartier (with, if necessary, some DND funded upgrades to Jean Lesage International Airport).

Then, maybe, we can manage to organize a light (expeditionary) brigade in Petawawa, with a reasonable mix of some armour, light infantry, artillery, engineers, etc, etc, etc, and a heavy (also expeditionary) brigade (mech brigade) out West with a lot of real armour, mech infantry, artillery and engineers and, and, and ...

It has to make some political sense, and, in my opinion, absent an existential threat to our security, wishing for big, robust expeditionary forces is just silly.
 
ERC,

Thanks. You hit the point. I was assuming when I talked about a genuine mobile, light infantry based DoC force, it was implied we would be taking existing units and re-rolling them.

Go back to the concept of the third battalion LIBs, maybe have an engineer, signals, medics and other required attachments POSTED to the LIBs. They would simply rotate through states of readiness. This is very achievable and can be done, needs political will from both the Army brass and our political leaders (lets face it, our MND is very in touch with our capabilities and potential missions). Training for such operations is not terribly expensive, takes will and some resources to commit to it.

The will is the biggest thing, I find there are many an old army creature (like my generation) that are still way too focused on the cold war combat team operations. I highly doubt we will be doing that type of operation, here or abroad. I am NOT saying get rid of LAVs and Tanks (we should hold onto what we have). How exactly to organize and deploy? I am not too sure. I do know that manning LAVs takes up huge loads of ammo, fuel and time to stay effective. Maybe a time has finally come to split infantry? Or make one regiment of armoured Tanks and the other two regiments Mounted with LAVs? I probably just royally p*ssed off people with that line of thinking.

Recently a few of my sergeants were discussing the very useless and outdated training we had done on an exercise, they put forth valuable suggestions, the OC yelled jokingly from his office down the hall "Get back in the box!". Now how much truth is there to that statement?

In August 2014, the reserve summer stalwart whatever ex for 4 div was held down in Welland Canal area. It consisted of operating in a semi-rural, to light built up environment with realistic task and operations (as opposed to modern day repeat of WWI defensive ops). Many people I spoke to, felt that is was excellent training value. If your going to bark off about why the ex did not work, please ensure you attended said ex, otherwise not interested.

I will speak for reserve infantry (Thats me), we ARE very capable of doing most tasks at section, platoon and with some shake out, company tasks. We do very well on ARCG tasks. The biggest hinderance I have seen in the last few years is the hand cuffing on our recruiting (like last year we were allowed to take on 14 recruits for a whole regiment for the year. that allows almost no succession at all). Recruiting and training reserve infantry is less costly and fairly efficient. I know some other reserve trades are very much managable as a part time skill sets. I do realize that other reserve trades may not work on a class A lifestyle. I speak for the infantry, 25+ years of doing it (REg and Res)
 
If you accept the premise that Canada is probably not able (or likely) to deploy any force larger than a Brigade Group and be able to maintain it in action with the same types of equipment it begins with, maybe you could shuffle the existing forces in such a way as to have better defined roles and possibly less overhead.

One Expeditionary Mechanized Brigade Group of 2 x Infantry Battalions, 1 x Armoured Regiment, 1 x Artillery Regiment, 1 x Combat Engineer Regiment, etc.  The personnel to field this Brigade Group would be generated by two Reg Force Infantry Regiments (with readiness levels rotating between the three battalions) and three each Armoured, Artillery and Engineer Regiments.

Each regiment could also have a fourth battalion/squadron made up of affiliated Reserve regiments (each "regiment" contributing a company/troop to the unit) to promote joint training opportunities, easier integration of augmentees, etc.

Ideally you could use ERC's "big base" idea to have two large bases each with one regiment of each type co-located and a 3rd base (combat training centre?) with the 3rd non-infantry regiments co-located.

The third infantry regiment could be a re-roled as a light infantry regiment suited for the "defence of Canada" role but also suitable for less intense (or more rapid) expeditionary deployments.  Each battalion could have a jump company, two light infantry companies using vehicles like the Bv206 or BvS10, a support company and 2-4 Reserve companies (again each represented by a Reserve "Regiment") which could use vehicles in the G-Wagon class.

This integration of Reg & Reserve units in the DoC role would accept the reality that higher readiness Reg forces may need to be available for quick deployment even for domestic operations but also more closely integrate those units with the Reserve units which would follow on.
 
GR66 said:
This integration of Reg & Reserve units in the DoC role would accept the reality that higher readiness Reg forces may need to be available for quick deployment even for domestic operations but also more closely integrate those units with the Reserve units which would follow on.
Assuming with attention paid to planning for possible "just out the front gate" local operations by PRes units, especially on the western side of the Rockies.
 
At CDAI's blog The Forum:

"Canada is Back” – Part 2: Trudeau and the Use of Force

If the CF-​18s are withdrawn, and if there is no new combat role to replace them, Canada’s contribution will then be entirely non-​lethal, in the sense that Canadians will no longer be taking the fight directly to the enemy. That heavy lifting—the defeat of the enemy by actually seeking to kill them, disperse them, and expel them from their territory—will be left to others: either local forces on the ground or Canada’s other military allies in the Global Coalition.

In short, Trudeau’s ISIL policy suggests that Canada may be “back” in a less laudable way: “back” to being a country reluctant to use its armed forces. Trudeau’s reluctance to use force is certainly reminiscent of the Liberal government of Jean Chrétien, which had such an antipathy to the use of force that it would often refuse to even acknowledge when the CAF used force: for example, by purposely hiding a lethal engagement between Canadian and Croat forces in the Medak Pocket in 1993;…and not even acknowledging the record-​breaking performance of CAF snipers in Afghanistan in 2001–2002.

If antipathy to the use of force is indeed a prime driver under Trudeau fils, this certainly would be very much in keeping with the dominant self-​perception that Canada is a “peaceable kingdom,” a peacekeeper rather than a war fighter. In a revealing 2008 poll commissioned by the Department of National Defence, an overwhelming number of Canadians expressed the view that the proper purpose of the Canadian Armed Forces was not to use force in world politics, but to engage in humanitarian operations such as disaster relief. Indeed, when a focus group in the same poll was asked about its image of the CAF, one participant responded: “I do not picture a Canadian soldier carrying guns.”

The prime minister has given every indication that he too does not picture a Canadian soldier carrying guns. If that is so, then Canada may indeed be “back.”

Kim Richard Nossal is a professor in the Department of Political Studies and the Centre for International and Defence Policy, Queen’s University. His latest book, co-​authored with Stéphane Roussel and Stéphane Paquin, is The Politics of Canadian Foreign Policy, 4th edition, published by McGill-Queen’s University Press in November 2015
https://www.cdainstitute.ca/en/blog/entry/canada-is-back-part-2-trudeau-and-the-use-of-force

Mark
Ottawa
 
Article Link

Conrad Black: Canada’s planned defence review is an opportunity for our nation to take a giant stride

The defence review that the federal government has promised by the end of 2016 will be the first in more than 20 years. Given the amounts of money and numbers of people and strategic and industrial questions involved, and the infrequency of such searching examinations, it will be a very important initiative and is to the new regime’s credit that it is doing this. The previous government talked a good game and always spoke as an upholder of Canada’s military, but it was so inflexibly attached to the twin (and virtuous) constraints of a balanced budget and an HST incapable of being raised, that it fell far short in commitment of resources. The (Justin) Trudeau government inherits an annual defence budget of $19.1 billion, or about one per cent of GDP, which is half the NATO target and informal commitment level, albeit a target only the United States and Poland meet. Though the history of the Canadian military in action is a distinguished one, the history of military policy and strategic thinking by Canada’s federal government has been sluggish since Louis St. Laurent’s time, except, up to a point, for Brian Mulroney.

In 2010 we celebrated the 100th anniversary of the founding of the Royal Canadian Navy, but in fact, it did not really begin for some time. Sir Wilfrid Laurier’s Liberals adopted the idea of a Canadian navy, with a Canadian system for training officers and seamen and a domestic shipbuilding industry, as a compromise. Robert Borden’s Conservatives considered a Canadian navy imperial heresy and preferred instead simply to make a financial contribution to the Royal Navy, which would commission the construction of new battleships in British yards by British shipbuilders and man them with British sailors. The first such battleship was named HMS Canada, but was eventually sold to Chile, and the British did not remit the proceeds.

On the other hand, Henri Bourassa’s Quebec Nationalists, who had worked with Borden’s Conservatives to defeat Laurier in 1911 (their shared opposition to Liberals being almost the only thing they could agree on), opposed any contribution to any navy as likely to increase the chances of Canada becoming entangled in a European war that was no earthly concern of Canada’s. French Canada has never had any significant maternal attachments to France in the way English-speaking Canada has had to Britain. Although French-Canadians have always been militant about defending this country, and largely saved it from joining the American Revolution and from being annexed in the War of 1812, they have generally been rather isolationist and are more resistant to this day than English-speaking Canadians to supporting alliance initiatives overseas. The one exception to this was the Korean War. The Union Nationale government of Maurice Duplessis and the Roman Catholic Church leadership whipped the population up to such paroxysms of anti-Communism, Quebec was eager to send a larger contingent than Canada did to Korea. The archbishop of Quebec, the subsequent Cardinal Maurice Roy,had served in the chaplains’ corps in the Second World War, attaining the rank of colonel and receiving the Order of the British Empire for bravery in combat. He eventually became the chaplain general of the Canadian army.

Despite its deemphasis, defence remains a large budgetary item, and as I have written here and elsewhere ad nauseam, this is the most effective form of stimulative public spending, if it is done with that objective in mind, as the new government has pledged to do. Most procurement is in high-tech, high-growth economic areas, encouraging the most sophisticated segment of the work force. Construction is mainly of ships, aircraft and land vehicles, all relatively complicated manufacturing which ramifies throughout heavy industry: steel, aluminum, rubber, glass, and into top-end manufacturing of smaller items — controls and instruments, radar, optics, and engineered products of all kinds. The traditional multiplier effects on economic growth are very gratifying. Like the United States but on a smaller scale, the Canadian armed forces are incomparable engines of adult education and virtually all those who enlist in them get an incentive and ability to raise their academic qualifications as well as their technical skills that they would not enjoy anywhere else.

Without lapsing into the cant of the pretended veteran, there is also little doubt that service in the armed forces often promotes traits invaluable to almost all who have served in them, whether in or near combat or not. This was the secret of the so-called Greatest Generation of the United States: Franklin D. Roosevelt saved the youth of America from unemployment with his infrastructure and conservation workfare programs, then had brilliant commanding officers, Generals Marshall, Eisenhower, MacArthur, and Arnold, and Admiral Nimitz, lead them to victory in the most just of all wars, and then posthumously propelled them into lifetimes of achievement with the GI Bill of Rights that educated and financed the launch of the civilian careers of the 15 million returning veterans (in a population of 135 million people). There is no prospect now of a general war, but increased recruitment in the armed forces is a much better and prouder visa to a better life than the welfare system, and not greatly more expensive.

The most important aspect of the military strength of a country is the influence such strength confers on it in the alliances and councils of the world. The fact that Canada was not invited to the recent meeting of the United States and its principal allies in the action against the Islamic State (ISIL) was not disconcerting to me because, in the interest of giving a new government the benefit of any doubt, I assume that the Trudeau government’s reduction of Canada’s contribution on that front is due to its doubts that the current alliance is altogether coherent [ :facepalm:]. The West, led by the United States, is making common cause with Iran and Russia, a dubious proposition on its face, in Sunni Iraq, around Baghdad, but in Syria is attacking the Iranian and Russian-sponsored Assad regime, while joining Iran and Russia in attacking ISIL, and even as those countries assault the Western entry in the Syrian civil war, the so-called moderate faction. The Kurds appear to be doing most of the heavy lifting and ISIL seems gradually to be losing ground, and probably has not more than 50,000 fighters in its demented crusade for a Caliphate for Sunni Muslims from Turkey to Iraq and through the Arabian Peninsula and across North Africa. It is possibly the most insane political endeavour that has attracted Great Power attention since the Cargo Cult of the Melanesian Pacific Islands wanted to buy President Lyndon Johnson in the mid-sixties and mystically replicate the American consumer society and economy. (Though just as other-worldly as the Islamic State, this was naturally a good deal less troublesome.)

The anti-ISIL cause is a good one, but the diplomatic effort is a farce. The answer isn’t the Liberal addiction to dropping blankets on refugees when they were in opposition, and the withdrawal of our six aging CF-18’s and three non-combat airplanes [CP-140s are combat aircraft dumbass  ::)] since their election is militarily irrelevant. But in addition to the economic benefits, Canada could move militarily, as it has economically, to a G7 status. Canada has one of the world’s 10 greatest National Products, among 198 countries (including Palestine, Taiwan, and the Vatican), but its military strength is much less formidable. The failure to meet more than half the official target as a percentage of GDP of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the most successful alliance in history, of which Canada was a co-founder, is on a par with the perennial failure of any country to pay any attention to its undertakings to reduce carbon emissions. But in the case of the military, we are failing in our ability to have a force that would enable us to have any weight in revitalizing the Western Alliance. NATO degenerated from “An attack upon one is an attack upon all” to “a coalition of the willing” to an incoherent talking shop and Tower of Babel. Apart from the United States, which has the muscle, but has elevated as commander in chief first a trigger-happy cowboy and then a pacifist and appeaser, nobody has any weight in NATO, except, in extremities, Britain and France because of their nuclear deterrents.

If Canada raised the HST marginally on elective spending, it could double its military strength, raise its position in the aerospace industry, be taken seriously by, and help to revive, NATO, and render immensely more assistance than its generous nature has been able to give in natural catastrophes such as tsunamis and earthquakes that strike unpredictably but inevitably. We should start with an aircraft or at least helicopter carrier; this is how a country shows its flag in the world. Thailand, Spain, and Brazil have one, and India and Italy have two, as Canada once did, and plenty are on offer. Pierre Trudeau scrapped our last aircraft carrier, the Bonaventure, in almost as serious an error as John Diefenbaker’s cancellation of the Arrow interceptor. It would also give us a powerful shot in the arm economically. While we’re at it, we can spruce up our military uniforms, which haven’t entirely recovered from the amiable champion of intergalactic life, Pearson Defense minister Paul Hellyer’s, stab at monochromatic unification of the armed forces 50 years ago.  :ignore: I am usually deluged with messages mocking me as a couturier wannabe when I write this, but I urge readers inclined to that response to put “Chinese women’s military parade” into their search engines and see what pride and ambition can be engendered in well-trained and crisply uniformed forces.

The defence review is an opportunity for Canada to take another giant stride, the greatest since the defeat of the Quebec separatists and the successful Mulroney-Chrétien-Martin assault on the federal budget deficit, to gain Canada the status it has otherwise earned as one of the world’s important powers.
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:dunno:  Why when I read that do I think of it as 'incoherent rambling'?
 
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