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Cutting the CF/DND HQ bloat - Excess CF Sr Leadership, Public Servants and Contractors

devil39 said:
You are not wrong, however I don't believe the problem with rank creep is a CF problem.  We dropped the ranks of Bde Comds from BGen to Col, along with a bunch of other reductions years ago, and I don't believe we have had too much rank creep since then.  At the strategic level we are almost always under-ranked in comparison with our US colleagues, but are usually on par with our AUS partners. 

As I understand it, EX level Public Servants have greatly increased during the period of Afghanistan deployments and multiple Federal elections under the current DM.  Is this an NDHQ urban myth or is it factually valid?

Our GOFO strength is roughly 50% above the target set in the 1997 MND report.  This suggests a problem area to be examined and addressed.  Remember, while the Army may represent ~ 1/3 of the Reg F total strength, they have only ~10% of Reg F GOFOs.

There has been growth in EX positions in the PS as the overall size of the PS grew.  Haven't seen how much, proportionally, it grew; the real test is whether the numbers will shrink as the rest of the public service cohort is reduced.
 
Kirkhill said:
WRT MND McKay:

My read of his situation since Minister Ambrose was tossed the procurement file is "good riddance to bad rubbish".

Instead of defending kit and practices he seems happy enough to say "PWGSC". 

F-35 - PWGSC
AOPS - PWGSC
MSVS - PWGSC
NSPS - PWGSC
FWSAR - PWGSC

Next question?


Two things:

First: PWGSC is the "lead" for all procurements, it's not just a problem, it's THE problem. The system was designed so that DND did three things ~ a) specified the requirement; b) found the money from within its budget; and c) certified/accepted the final product. In so far as only two agencies, DND and PWGSC, are involved it's not a bad system - it worked at least as well as the US system. But starting back in the 1950s, with e.g. the Avro Arrow and the St Laurent class destroyers, procurements got bigger and bigger and they attracted more and more political interference and other departments, like Industry Canada (as it is now) and all the various and sundry "regional" agencies got involved - providing some (never very much) money and demanding disproportionate influence. Now the system is broken: too many cooks and all that.

Second: this PM has displayed a marked fondness for hiring teams of "outside experts" (not always real outsiders) to address sensitive industrial straegies: the shipbuilding "strategy" (a team of DMs from outside DND/PWGSC), the aero-space strategy (former minister David Emerson) and the F-35 (a team of outsiders). The technical results have been satisfactory and the politics excellent: if it's all right the PM looks smart for bringing in outsiders to undo the damage the line departments have caused; if it all goes wrong he can blame the outsiders. There are worse systems - see the USA, again.

Some procurements worked fairly well: despite some (lots of) internal to DND agony in defining the airplane, the CF-18 was a success; ditto the CPF, despite some problems which the builder (Saint John Shipbuilding) had to sort out on the fly. Others - the maritime helicopter, for example - have been disasters. Not all of the disasters are the fault of DND or PWGSC. While I think systemic reform is needed for defence procurement, whatever system is adopted or evolves will still have: a) a disconnect between "requirements" and the actual business of procurement; and b) political interference.
 
Is it possible there is a third aspect to the problem?

Perhaps there is a problem with the "system" being too infrequently exercised - a problem exacerbated perhaps by the recent "decade of darkness".

How strong are the relevant cadres in DND and PWGSC?  How much experience do they have in these big "political footballs"?  How much experience do they have working with each other?

Until Paul Martin restarted the pumps it had been a long time between purchases.  And historically (F18 purchase, Halifax purchase, EH101 purchase, Bristol Aerospace F18 contract) there is not much to indicate a strong foundation even as far back as the 80s.
 
I am working with a ministry that has about 3000 people in it and an annual budget of $1.5B, give or take. They serve over 150,000 clients either directly or indirectly.

The nature of their work? If these civil servants screw up, people could die.

The Deputy Minister has 5 staff working directly for him in his officve: one Executive Director and the rest senior admin people. His Executive Team, mostly ADMs, has 6 people in it, including him.

Is there something we could learn from this type of staffing level?

* modified to add 100,000  ;D
 
Smaller is better?

Not just a staffing option but also a purchase option.

I get the logistical burden but.....

Rather than bundling programmes into megaprojects that happen infrequently if at all, perhaps the solution could be found in regularly exercising a system buying small (functional) quantities of materiel as it is needed.  If it works then a secondary buy could occur levelling out the logistics.  If it doesn't.... buy something else.

I think that constantly feeding small meat to the supply chain will keep them more content than starving them and offering them the prospect of the occasional feast.
 
daftandbarmy said:
I am working with a ministry that has about 3000 people in it and an annual budget of $1.5B, give or take. They serve over 50,000 clients either directly or indirectly.

...

Is there something we could learn from this type of staffing level?
3000 people serving a total of 50,000 clients? No. I can say with absolutely no hesitation that there is nothing DND can or should learn from that organization.
 
E.R. Campbell said:
So who should decide how the CF should be organized? The CDS? No, it's not, really his job - advise? yes, decide? no. The DM - Not really his job, either, but he does have a vital advisory role. The MND? Yes. It is his job. He should seek professional military and bureaucratic advice, including from allies, but, in the end he should decide and direct and the CDS and the established must do as he says or resign. Much as I admired RAdm Landymore and LGen Moncel for their principles, they were wrong to oppose the Minister (Paul Hellyer) before they resigned.

I guess it depends on your interpretation of the Act:

The minister "has the management and direction of the Canadian Forces" while the CDS is "charged with the control and administration of the Canadian Forces."  The DM is there to function as the minister tells him or her to.

To me, "control and administration" means command and control, positions, structure, report lines, units, operational capability - the nitty gritty of administering the CAF and structuring it in a way that a) responds to government needs and priorities; and b) enables the CAF to be an effective fighting force capable of successfully completing a variety of missions and objectives.

This is moreso than the minister, whose role is to manage and direct the CAF.  If the minister says "we need to cut $2 billion" as the strategic direction the department and CAF needs to take, the CDS should be the one implementing that vision.

:2c:
 
Bruce Monkhouse said:
But Edward you still have the same problem I brought up.

All those "professional military and bureaucratic advice, including from allies" will consist of folks who will be thinking "Hmmm, if I give advice to cut this then that could be my turn next if it works for them".

How many here have (anonymously or not) contacted the minister's office with suggestions they feel need to be taken?
 
ARMY_101 said:
I guess it depends on your interpretation of the Act:

The minister "has the management and direction of the Canadian Forces" while the CDS is "charged with the control and administration of the Canadian Forces."  The DM is there to function as the minister tells him or her to.

To me, "control and administration" means command and control, positions, structure, report lines, units, operational capability - the nitty gritty of administering the CAF and structuring it in a way that a) responds to government needs and priorities; and b) enables the CAF to be an effective fighting force capable of successfully completing a variety of missions and objectives.

This is moreso than the minister, whose role is to manage and direct the CAF.  If the minister says "we need to cut $2 billion" as the strategic direction the department and CAF needs to take, the CDS should be the one implementing that vision.

:2c:


We agree that the MND can say "we need to cut $2 billion" and the CDS et al must take that as strategic direction. I suggest he can, and should, also say, with equal "directiveness" (is that a word?) "we need to cut 20% of the GOFOs and reduce C2 overhead by n,nnn PYs."

While the old Interpretation Act was more specific, see the current version, specifically §24(4) which tells us that the DM is the ministers alter ego. Given how DMs are appointed and moved, by the PM, it is evident - to me anyway - that they do not "function as the minister tells him or her to." Nor, despite what the NDHQ org charts suggest, are the DM and the CDS colleagues - they have different roles and responsibilities, and it is a Constitutional mistake to think that they should have to cooperate or coordinate in order to spare the MND the burden of thinking.
 
ARMY_101 said:
How many here have (anonymously or not) contacted the minister's office with suggestions they feel need to be taken?

Or, for that matter, the Defence Renewal Team:

Internal_communications_internes@forces.gc.ca
ATTN: Defence Renewal Team
 
While this article, which is reproduced under the Fair Dealing provisions of the Copyright Act from Foreign Policy, appears, at first, to touch on US grand strategy, for which we have a thread, it is, as a read of most of it will attest about HQ bloat and what is, in my opinion, the source of our own, Canadian, bloat problem: the Pentagon:

http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/06/05/it_aint_about_the_hardware?page=0,0
My emphasis added
It Ain't About the Hardware
Will the wars of the future be won by management consultants?

BY GORDON ADAMS

JUNE 5, 2013

Folks in the defense universe in Washington, DC spend a lot of time in the arcade of debates. One of these debates is about U.S. military strategy in a changing world: Should we confront, contain, or partner with China? Should we engage or confront Iran? Should we intervene in Syria or let them work it through without deploying U.S. forces? Do we need to defend the global commons, or is that a cover for American military hegemony?

Another hardy perennial debate is about what the military should buy. More cyberdefense, or is that a cover for developing an offensive cyber capability? Is the F-35 the fighter of the future, or an expensive lemon we should put over the side? Do we need a new long-range bomber to prevail against a Chinese attempt to drive us from their borders, or is that another boondoggle we cannot afford?

Still another is about the future size and deployment of forces. Should they be forward, or held in the United States? Should the Army and Marines shrink, or stay the size they plan to be by 2016? Will the Navy get smaller and smaller, or grow to 300 ships or more?

Lovely, interesting questions, rife with huge disagreements among the military services, between the services and the Office of the Secretary of Defense, left-leaning think tanks versus right-leaning think tanks. Reams of paper, videos, testimony, the vast outreach of the defense-thinking complex.

It's all great stuff; it keeps consultants, bureaucrats, elected officials, and the "chatterers" busy. But, and here's the bottom line up front, if the Pentagon does not use the Strategic Choices and Management Review (SCMR), the next budget planning cycle, and the forthcoming Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) to deal with its management issues, and if Congress fails to heed the need for management reform, all that debate will be irrelevant.

It won't matter if you want more planes or fewer, more troops or a smaller force, the right hardware, or the opportunity to confront or befriend China. Declining defense budgets, already well underway, combined with the costs of people and property, will eat the tradeoff space that allows anyone to make sensible policy and hardware decisions.

It's not just me talking. There was a striking letter and event on Monday, June 3, in which defense analysts from left to right joined forces in petitioning the administration and the Congress to ditch the politics of defense and focus on the management dilemma.

Twenty-five defense analysts got together on the letter, folks who spend many a happy hour debating each other on defense and national security. They ranged from Mackenzie Eaglen and Tom Donnelly of the American Enterprise Institute, Dov Zakheim of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, and Todd Harrison of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, to Larry Korb from the Center for American Progress, Chris Preble of the CATO Institute, and myself and my colleagues Barry Blechman and Russell Rumbaugh from the Stimson Center.

And we agreed on some critical fundamentals that DOD, the White House, and Congress need to tend to: the encrusted and politically reinforced barnacles of pay and benefits for the troops and retirees, the sprawling physical infrastructure of the military, and what Secretary Hagel himself once described as the "bloated" back office of administration at the Pentagon. There is no mystery meat here, no new research discoveries that need be made. The need for reform in these three things has been blindingly obvious to any observer for a very long time.

The military compensation and benefit system, generous to the forces, is now eating defense resources at an alarming rate. As the letter points out, military compensation costs per active troop rose 56 percent in constant dollars from FY 2001 to FY 2012, doubling in current, inflated dollars.

Pay for the forces has not only caught up with, but has passed comparable private sector pay, factored for age, education, and experience. We have a well-compensated military. And it retires well, too, with lifetime health care, retirement benefits after 20 years (though more than 80 percent of the enlistees do not get there, so get no retirement at all), and access to subsidized groceries through the commissary system. (For more, read this terrific piece on commissaries by Rajiv Chandrasekaran at the Washington Post.)

But now the pressure is on, in budgetary terms, and the entitlements for the military are squeezing funds for capability. As retired Gen. Arnold Punaro put it: "We don't want the Pentagon to become a benefits operation that occasionally kills a terrorist."

Without breaking any faith with the forces, the system needs to be reformed. The Quadrennial Review of Military Compensation has proposed compensation and benefit reforms for a long time; they have not moved forward.

Todd Harrison of CSBA has argued we need to look at what servicemembers value most in their compensation and benefits -- pay increases over early retirement, for example -- and adjust the system accordingly.

Infrastructure is another growing problem -- the letter points out that DOD estimates it has about 20 percent more infrastructure than it can use. Clearly, from a fiscal point of view, it is time for Congress to step up and legislate another base closure (BRAC) round. All the evaluation criteria we need to make sensible base closure decisions have been developed through four previous rounds; the administration has asked for a new one. Time to move ahead.

The big target for reform is the back office. The data are clear: DOD has too many duplicative offices, too much overhead, too much administration. The Defense Business Board estimated that the Pentagon's overhead is something like 40 percent of the total budget. A large number of people are minding this back office. On the military side, something like a fourth of the military billets are doing commercial, not military work. Nearly 40 percent of the force does not deploy. On the civilian side, there are nearly 700,000 civil servants and something like another 700,000 contractors doing civil service-type work, often in DOD offices (and this excludes hardware contractor employment). The last three defense budget declines have led to an average of more than 30 percent reduction in the civilian workforce; this one is likely to follow this course and it needs to be carefully planned.

It all sounds like common sense. Moreover, with budgets going south, if something isn't done about these management and personnel challenges, the funds to support strategy, forces, and equipment is what will get squeezed. The Center for Strategic and International Studies estimates that if the overhead and pay/benefits cost growth continue, by early in the next decade, they will reduce funding for forces and procurement to unprecedentedly low levels.

So merrily the Pentagon system rolls along, with overhead costs eating the tracks behind it. And Congress does little about these issues; they are part of the problem. They are politically vulnerable to the lobbies for military pay and retiree benefits, to the politics of even appearing to question current practices, to the communities where the infrastructure is located, and to the services who protect back office billets.

The politics are merciless; the risks of talking common sense are real.
I am certain this column will attract critique because of the politics. But the basic problem is pretty simple: If we don't find reasonable, efficient, cost-saving ways of reforming pay and benefits, infrastructure, and the back office, as Mackenzie Eaglen said on the June 3 panel, there is an important promise to the American people we will not keep: the certainty that the military we build is the right force with the right tools to do the right job.

On that, all of us agreed. Hopefully, Congress will too, and soon.


Ignore the bits about pay; the CF is well adequately, even paid, but your pay lags the civil service, by design.

Focus on the paragraph (4th from the end) that begins: "The big target for reform is the back office ..." It speaks to the problem that is very real in both Canada and the USA and it is a problem that we have inherited because GOFOs and bureaucrats think that - contrary to all the evidence - the modern US military is well properly adequately organized; it isn't.

 
E.R. Campbell said:
Ignore the bits about pay; the CF is well adequately, even paid, but your pay lags the civil service, by design.

Lags the civil service?  A major, the majority of whom in the CF are mid-level managers, all earn in excess of $100K per year before allowances, with early retirement provisions and larger government contributions to their superannuation plans.  Their public service peers earn 10-15% less, and pay a larger proportion of their superannuation costs.

 
dapaterson said:
Lags the civil service?  A major, the majority of whom in the CF are mid-level managers, all earn in excess of $100K per year before allowances, with early retirement provisions and larger government contributions to their superannuation plans.  Their public service peers earn 10-15% less, and pay a larger proportion of their superannuation costs.
Only if you accept the Public Service rank equivalencies at their face value. A Major can have upwards of 150 people working for them; an EX-1 "Colonel" equivalent seldom has more than a handful.
 
More of a rhetorical question, but what carries more weight?  A person that is in charge of a couple hundred persons for a few years, or a person that is in charge of a concept/idea that may influence 1000s of persons for a few decades?
 
hamiltongs said:
Only if you accept the Public Service rank equivalencies at their face value. A Major can have upwards of 150 people working for them; an EX-1 "Colonel" equivalent seldom has more than a handful.
Maj & LCdr to LCol & Cdr in NDHQ have the same number of subordinates as their civilian counterparts. 

Defence Renewal is supposed to address the sort of bloat within the CAF as is identified in Edward's article. 
 
hamiltongs said:
Only if you accept the Public Service rank equivalencies at their face value. A Major can have upwards of 150 people working for them; an EX-1 "Colonel" equivalent seldom has more than a handful.

As of 31 March, there were 3722 Maj/LCdrs in the Reg F.  Unless the CF magically grew to 500K+, precious few of those 3722 had anywhere near 150 people under them.

Or for another example: Fewer than 10% of Reg F Infantry LCols are in command positions - the other 90% are staff.
 
dapaterson said:
Lags the civil service?  A major, the majority of whom in the CF are mid-level managers, all earn in excess of $100K per year before allowances, with early retirement provisions and larger government contributions to their superannuation plans.  Their public service peers earn 10-15% less, and pay a larger proportion of their superannuation costs.

Majs are paid about the same as experienced civil service ENG-04s

ENG-04 2013: $90,395 $93,397 $96,407 $99,414 $102,420 $105,427
Source: http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/pubs_pol/hrpubs/coll_agre/nr/nr07-eng.asp

Maj 2013: 8386 ($100,632) 8534 8679 8824 8969 9114 9259 9404 ($112.848)
(Source): http://www.cmp-cpm.forces.gc.ca/dgcb-dgras/ps/pay-sol/pr-sol/rfor-ofr-eng.asp

I used to employ both, I regarded my majors as ENG-05s and they, always, supervised ENG-04s and even, in one case, two ENG-05s. I regarded LCols as either ENG-06s ($115-135K) or EX-01s. I know my assessment of relative status was shared in both the DND engineering world and in some other government departments with which we worked closely on a day-to-day basis. But that was 20 years ago.
 
dapaterson said:
As of 31 March, there were 3722 Maj/LCdrs in the Reg F.  Unless the CF magically grew to 500K+, precious few of those 3722 had anywhere near 150 people under them.

Or for another example: Fewer than 10% of Reg F Infantry LCols are in command positions - the other 90% are staff.
You'll note that I said "can". Yes, perhaps only a few hundred of the 3722 Maj/LCds in the CAF have 50 or more people working for them, but I can say with certainty that the number of AS-06s (PS equivalents) with than many subordinates is zero. And yes, staffers with a limited number of subordinates can be as influential as line commanders - if not much more so. The point is that a Maj/LCdr is expected to be BOTH an effective line commander AND an effective staff officer. There is no PS position that I can think of that requires that level of breadth of employability. If you want the whole bundle of competencies in one person, then it makes sense to pay a premium to them over someone who provides just one competency.

If you're establishing a pay scale based on the employment we primarily want people to do, then establishing it on the basis of employment within NDHQ is a bad place to start.
 
I do not argue that a small number of miltiary personnel are in positions of signfiicant repsonsibility.  Military pay should probably be revisited and moved away from the current "team" concept, where the pay for all jobs at a rank level is the same, and recognize that certain positions are of increased responsibility and therefore should receive increased pay.  For example: an OC should probaly be paid more than a staff officer.  Of course, that means a posting could result in a pay cut, not an attractive option.  (Although, one could always sell it as an aspirational move, to encourage people to try to excel and get those positions).

Mind you, that approach is already in place with Senior Appointment CWOs, who have different pay scales from their peers.  Suggesting it be extended to officers, however, will not fly - I  suspect the 90% of Infantry LCols clogging NDHQ have more time and energy to devote to protecting themselves than the 10% in command positions have to try to improve their pay.
 
Don't get me wrong - I'm not complaining about my own pay, which I find to be generous. And even a Maj/LCol posted to a staff position in NDHQ is still expected to be ABLE to function as a line commander, so they still retain that skill competency (at least in theory - I grant you the obvious counter argument). We also expect them to accept postings every two to three years (even if they are local postings in Ottawa - a lot of public servants wouldn't accept that level of career churn), and it takes a minimum of about 15 years to make a Maj.

Contrast with an AS-06, who can be hired straight off the street out of their Master's degree (or not long thereafter, following a bit of contract work at the same level), and can choose to spend their entire careers working 8-to-4 days in Ottawa. Given the level of competition for PS positions, the supply certainly exceeds the demand and that would suggest that downward pressure on their salaries might be appropriate. If anyone needs a salary review, it's not the CAF. The fact that we lose fully trained LCol/Majs to the PS every year makes it clear that the relative salaries of CAF members and their PS equivalents don't compensate for the relative differences in the expectations of them, or the compromises made in quality of life.
 
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