Conservatives plan to legislate CAF unification into history?

[RedcapCrusader]

I think Unification was done in the wrong fashion. The idea behind it was fine, but the execution not so much. That is why, in my opinion, we see so much animosity towards the Unified model. Now that we have returned to 3 separate identities within a unified CAF, we are a more effective fighting force, but those that were around during unification will still fight against it.

 

[CombatDoc]

...Now that we have returned to 3 separate identities within a unified CAF, we are a more effective fighting force, but those that were around during unification will still fight against it.

Considering that Unification was announced 46 years ago, I doubt if there are any still serving who were around at that time. However, it may be a different matter for some of the honouraries, regimental patrons, etc.

 

[Halifax Tar]

The problem is, as E.R. Campbell commented, that unification was never given a chance.  Service pride fought it from the very beginning, and it has incrementally been rolled back by the same service pride and environmental empire building ever since.

I know you love to kick this horse until its ground beef,  and frankly its getting old,  but if you think there are no empires in the "unified" CAF Branches you must open your eyes.  The Log Branch is IMHO a great example of an "empire" that needs to be toppled. 

In fact I would say there are many empires within this empire, some regional some based on uniform. 

ERC has also stated the unification went too far in destroying service identities and pride, don't be selective in what you choose to represent, paint the whole picture not just the part you want people to see.

Besides if unification was such a success why wasn't it copied by others ?  And why has it been allowed to slowly unravel sense the mid 80s ?  Surly our political masters wouldn't let something go that was saving oodles of money and resources.

 

[sandyson]

I think the word distinction needed herein is integration versus unification.  Having been commissioned RCOC (ordnance) I was sent on the first logistics course at the CFSAL Borden in the Service Corps (RCASC) lines. We were all retrained as finance, transport, and supply officers to serve at whim on ship, in the field, or on an air station.  I recall that from the start of the course the Navy and Army officers lined up against the Air Force.  The interchanges were sometimes frustrating and heated.  The Navy and Army said that the spread of three specialities into one was probably far too much, but the notion of posting an army log officer from the field to a ship at sea was ridiculous.  Environments were much more than just the physical ones. A log officer had to know the one of conflict as well as the social one. The Air Force said an officer could easily switch between the two e.g. a ration depot was just a ration depot. The Navy and Army agreed on integrating the log procedures but not the environmental ones. A duty officer in any one environment was very different from the other and so it went for five long months.  I hope people are now applauding integration and not unification. The latter proved very foolish.

 

[Halifax Tar]

I think the word distinction needed herein is integration versus unification.  Having been commissioned RCOC (ordnance) I was sent on the first logistics course at the CFSAL Borden in the Service Corps (RCASC) lines. We were all retrained as finance, transport, and supply officers to serve at whim on ship, in the field, or on an air station.  I recall that from the start of the course the Navy and Army officers lined up against the Air Force.  The interchanges were sometimes frustrating and heated.  The Navy and Army said that the spread of three specialities into one was probably far too much, but the notion of posting an army log officer from the field to a ship at sea was ridiculous.  Environments were much more than just the physical ones. A log officer had to know the one of conflict as well as the social one. The Air Force said an officer could easily switch between the two e.g. a ration depot was just a ration depot. The Navy and Army agreed on integrating the log procedures but not the environmental ones. A duty officer in any one environment was very different from the other and so it went for five long months.  I hope people are now applauding integration and not unification. The latter proved very foolish.

I don't know if your aware Sandyson, but AFAIK Log Os are now element specialized, meaning a Sea Log O wont be employed in first line Army or Air units as an example, and the same rings true for the Army and Air Log Os as well.  The same cannot be said,  sadly,  for the CPO1/CWO and below Log types.

As well I agree with integration, but not unification.  1 common Supply system with common trg for all and employment within your element,  for example again.

Obvious exceptions to this can be JHQs and other J UICs. 

( J = Joint )

 

[McG]

ERC has also stated the unification went too far in destroying service identities and pride, don't be selective in what you choose to represent, paint the whole picture not just the part you want people to see.

I have never suggested every element of unification was done well.  But the contrary, that unification was all bad, is also wrong ... But that has been argued in efforts to toss the baby with its bath water.

... if you think there are no empires in the "unified" CAF Branches you must open your eyes.  The Log Branch is IMHO a great example of an "empire" that needs to be toppled. 

In fact I would say there are many empires within this empire, some regional some based on uniform. 

Yes there are many empires that have evolved since unification.  It is why I did not suggest things are utopian and why I noted there is potential we have not tapped.  I would not suggest Logistics is a particularly concerning example; at least it is still decentralized into the supported commands.  MP and medical, who's silos reach all the way to the national HQ, have only been riding the arguments the services used to rebuild themselves.  If everything that flies can only be managed by a stratification stovepipe owned by pilots, then surely the same applies to medicine and doctors ... Right?  I suspect the CAF has facilitated an environment conducive to empire-building through the desire of environments to work in competition as opposed to in cooperation.

... why has it been allowed to slowly unravel sense the mid 80s ?  Surly our political masters wouldn't let something go that was saving oodles of money and resources.

Because they don't really care about the CAF?  Because it is easy to score cheap political point by making a spectacle of reversing what the other party did while it was in power?

Besides if unification was such a success why wasn't it copied by others ? 

There are plenty of nations with single service militaries, but you would dismiss any examples that are not from a "peer" military.  So, we could see that the IDF has a fairly unified military.  Like Canada, they have different uniforms (but common rank insignia) for Navy, air and ground forces.  Unlike Canada now, they do not have big, strong environmental commands separating these forces from the national HQs.  That is potentially a model we should take a look into.

 

[Monsoon]

There are plenty of nations with single service militaries, but you would dismiss any examples that are not from a "peer" military.  So, we could see that the IDF has a fairly unified military.  Like Canada, they have different uniforms (but common rank insignia) for Navy, air and ground forces.  Unlike Canada now, they do not have big, strong environmental commands separating these forces from the national HQs.  That is potentially a model we should take a look into.

While I'm inclined to broadly agree with you about unification, I'll take exception with the comparison to the IDF, which I feel is irrelevant to the Canadian context. The IDF enjoys continuous and generally growing budgetary and political support. In Canada, the forces are almost continuously in budgetary straitened circumstances, emerging briefly (as we did in the mid-80s and late 2000s) every generation or two. In that context, strong service identity allows minority services to maintain important capabilities in the face of the "tyranny of the majority".

Consider a naval CDS in a "strong centre" organization. Budget cuts come down and where do they land? Because he has limited to no exposure to, say, the patrol pathfinder capability, he doesn't appreciate its cost-benefit and it's put on the chopping block because there's no strong service to mount a reasoned defence of it. Now consider the much more likely scenario of an infantry or armoured CDS and pretty much every naval capability beyond troop transport and shore bombardment and you'll understand why the RCN and RCAF tend to favour a service-oriented structure.

What we often refer to as "service parochialism" is really just a natural human bias in favour of what we understand over what we don't. The sum of all military capabilities really is too much for one man to know thoroughly. Except in the unique context of the IDF's stable-and-growing budget, in the absence of service-level control crucial capabilities end up getting dropped because of inherently biased decision-making.

Again - I'm not arguing strongly against unification (especially as it has recently evolved), but I do think a strong service culture protects commanders from their unknown unknowns.

 

[Halifax Tar]

While I'm inclined to broadly agree with you about unification, I'll take exception with the comparison to the IDF, which I feel is irrelevant to the Canadian context. The IDF enjoys continuous and generally growing budgetary and political support. In Canada, the forces are almost continuously in budgetary straitened circumstances, emerging briefly (as we did in the mid-80s and late 2000s) every generation or two. In that context, strong service identity allows minority services to maintain important capabilities in the face of the "tyranny of the majority".

Consider a naval CDS in a "strong centre" organization. Budget cuts come down and where do they land? Because he has limited to no exposure to, say, the patrol pathfinder capability, he doesn't appreciate its cost-benefit and it's put on the chopping block because there's no strong service to mount a reasoned defence of it. Now consider the much more likely scenario of an infantry or armoured CDS and pretty much every naval capability beyond troop transport and shore bombardment and you'll understand why the RCN and RCAF tend to favour a service-oriented structure.

What we often refer to as "service parochialism" is really just a natural human bias in favour of what we understand over what we don't. The sum of all military capabilities really is too much for one man to know thoroughly. Except in the unique context of the IDF's stable-and-growing budget, in the absence of service-level control crucial capabilities end up getting dropped because of inherently biased decision-making.

Again - I'm not arguing strongly against unification (especially as it has recently evolved), but I do think a strong service culture protects commanders from their unknown unknowns.

I agree with you Hamiltongs. 

I was on HMCS Toronto during the RCNs initial anti piracy patrol.  The commander of CFECOM, Gen Gautier, came on board for a visit. 

Him and his RSM came into the main cave.  He opened and closed his speech with this "I have no idea what you guys are doing out here but if you have any questions about Afg I will field those".  That was from our commander.  I guess this is what you get in an Army centric military.  Anything that isn't green or on land is threatening to some.

 

[Jungle]

"I have no idea what you guys are doing out here but if you have any questions about Afg I will field those".  That was from our commander.  I guess this is what you get in an Army centric military.  Anything that isn't green or on land is threatening to some.

I heard a similar speach from a Naval officer, who was commanding the Canadian contribution to the INTERFET coalition in East Timor. I also heard about an Admiral who did not know we had Paras in the CAF. So there is no monopoly on this kind of thing.

 

[blacktriangle]

I heard a similar speach from a Naval officer, who was commanding the Canadian contribution to the INTERFET coalition in East Timor. I also heard about an Admiral who did not know we had Paras in the CAF. So there is no monopoly on this kind of thing.

Sounds like the CAF should be educating members on the big picture and how we all fit together and have our respective roles. I have no idea what a supply tech does, and I know they have no idea what I do.

Maybe someone needs to put together a PD program where NCMs and Officers can learn about different trades/organizations and what each of us brings to the table.

We can even award stupid pins to those that complete the PD and pass a test or something.  ;D

 

[Scoobie Newbie]

Are you being serious?  My sarcasm meter is on the fritz today.

 

[blacktriangle]

I'd really rather not have to take it that far.

Maybe people could...you know, learn a bit about the military they serve in? Rather than just having blinders on and only paying any attention to their trade/empire/element? It seems like there is a fair bit of ignorance in such matters, all the way up to the GOFO level.

 

[Old EO Tech]

Sounds like the CAF should be educating members on the big picture and how we all fit together and have our respective roles. I have no idea what a supply tech does, and I know they have no idea what I do.

Maybe someone needs to put together a PD program where NCMs and Officers can learn about different trades/organizations and what each of us brings to the table.

We can even award stupid pins to those that complete the PD and pass a test or something.  ;D

I don't have any SA on officer PD, but for NCM's this is done during the ILP/ALP/SAP etc, were you get to sit and chat with your peers from other elements.  I got more from time at the mess and coffee than the formal TP during these courses :-/  My syndicates have included Navy surface guys, submariners, SOF guys, a few hard Air guys, and lots of us Army guys from all over.  I will say as Army CSS, we have much more in common with the RCN that you would think. 

As to the original subject, I'd be interested in seeing how the government plans on amending column 3 in the rank table without putting it all in force....not that I personally would mind that, but that is another discussion.

 

[Monsoon]

Sounds like the CAF should be educating members on the big picture and how we all fit together and have our respective roles. I have no idea what a supply tech does, and I know they have no idea what I do.

Maybe someone needs to put together a PD program where NCMs and Officers can learn about different trades/organizations and what each of us brings to the table.

That programme exists - it's called the Joint Command and Staff Program, but even that year-long, quite intensive overview delivered right before promotion to LCol/Cdr can't provide completely comprehensive coverage of all the "nooks and crannies" that exist in CAF capabilities, and you won't be kept abreast of subsequent changes.

You don't make it to flag/general rank without being bright, motivated and eager to learn - none of the men in the anecdotes above are stupid, they're just admitting their weaknesses. My point is that such weaknesses are inherent and can't be got around in an organization this size; the natural solution is to parcel the organization into manageable chunks and let the experts in their field hash out priorities at a macro level together while letting them individually manage their own respective micro priorities.

 

[PuckChaser]

That programme exists - it's called the Joint Command and Staff Program, but even that year-long, quite intensive overview delivered right before promotion to LCol/Cdr can't provide completely comprehensive coverage of all the "nooks and crannies" that exist in CAF capabilities, and you won't be kept abreast of subsequent changes.

I don't think you'll ever find someone that knows every "nook and cranny" of every job in every trade in the CF. Do we need another PD program? Maybe. But the information is out there, if people are willing to learn on their own time. I took the time to visit HMCS Kingston when it was here, specifically so I could learn a little bit more about what the RCN does and what a sliver of what kit they have.

 

[McG]

... I'll take exception with the comparison to the IDF, which I feel is irrelevant to the Canadian context. The IDF enjoys continuous and generally growing budgetary and political support. In Canada, the forces are almost continuously in budgetary straitened circumstances, emerging briefly (as we did in the mid-80s and late 2000s) every generation or two.

Israel is surrounded by enemies and does not have access to infinite resources.  National survival depends on the military making the right capability developments and trade-offs.  I see no good reason to dismiss the IDF as an example of a successful first world military that is not based upon strong, separate peer services.

... strong service identity allows minority services to maintain important capabilities in the face of the "tyranny of the majority".

Consider a naval CDS in a "strong centre" organization. Budget cuts come down and where do they land? Because he has limited to no exposure to, say, the patrol pathfinder capability, he doesn't appreciate its cost-benefit and it's put on the chopping block because there's no strong service to mount a reasoned defence of it. Now consider the much more likely scenario of an infantry or armoured CDS and pretty much every naval capability beyond troop transport and shore bombardment and you'll understand why the RCN and RCAF tend to favour a service-oriented structure.

What we often refer to as "service parochialism" is really just a natural human bias in favour of what we understand over what we don't. The sum of all military capabilities really is too much for one man to know thoroughly. Except in the unique context of the IDF's stable-and-growing budget, in the absence of service-level control crucial capabilities end up getting dropped because of inherently biased decision-making.

Again - I'm not arguing strongly against unification (especially as it has recently evolved), but I do think a strong service culture protects commanders from their unknown unknowns.

You don't make it to flag/general rank without being bright, motivated and eager to learn - none of the men in the anecdotes above are stupid, they're just admitting their weaknesses. My point is that such weaknesses are inherent and can't be got around in an organization this size; the natural solution is to parcel the organization into manageable chunks and let the experts in their field hash out priorities at a macro level together while letting them individually manage their own respective micro priorities.

The ideas do not seem compatible.  Do we have bright, motivated GOFOs or do we have GOFO who will retreat to their comfort zones and not utilize the specialists on their staffs?  Do we need strong, isolated tribes to square-off against each-other in defence of Navy, Army, Air Force, Medical, Police, Communications, etc?  Maybe there is a better way.  Maybe it is more frequent cooperation and exposure at more junior levels?  Somewhere there is a right balance of separation and unification.  Anecdotal evidence has implied some of our allies may see us as closest to that right balance.

• Ask the average ADF member and they would think that our unified military is great, just because our empire-building, duplication of effort (basic training, admin) etc. is less visible.

I think we are in a good place as far as that balance goes (and I think you agree), but I also think we are moving away.  Legislating the three services back into the NDA will take us away from that balance.

 

[Privateer]

Here is the actual (proposed) text of the amendments to the NDA, as contained in Division 7 of Part 6 of Bill C-31, styled the Economic Action Plan 2014 Act, No. 1, (apologies for the wonky formatting):

NATIONAL DEFENCE ACT

Amendments to the Act

168. Section 17 of the National Defence Act is replaced by the following:

    17. (1) The Canadian Forces shall consist of those of the following elements that are from time to time organized by or under the authority of the Minister:
(a) commands, including the Royal Canadian Navy, the Canadian Army and the Royal Canadian Air Force;
  (b) formations;
(c) units; and
  (d) other elements.

      (2) A unit or other element organized under subsection (1), other than a command or a formation, shall from time to time be embodied in a component of the Canadian Forces as directed by or under the authority of the Minister.

169. Section 21 of the Act is replaced by the following:

    21. (1) For the purposes of this Act, the ranks of the officers and non-commissioned members of the Canadian Forces shall be as set out in the schedule.

          (2) A person holding a rank set out in the schedule shall use, or be referred to by, a designation of rank prescribed in regulations made by the Governor in Council but only in the circumstances prescribed in those regulations.

170. The schedule to the Act is replaced by the schedule set out in Schedule 5 to this Act.

171. (1) Section 168 comes into force 60 days after the day on which this Act receives royal assent.

        (2) Sections 169 and 170 come into force on a day or days to be fixed by order of the Governor in Council.

Schedule 5 just lists the current ranks, using the standard (current) army names.  So the updated/backdated names (depending on how you look at it) to be used in everyday speech and writing will actually be set out in a future regulation.

 

[Monsoon]

Israel is surrounded by enemies and does not have access to infinite resources.  National survival depends on the military making the right capability developments and trade-offs.  I see no good reason to dismiss the IDF as an example of a successful first world military that is not based upon strong, separate peer services.

I'm not "dismissing" the IDF as a first world military, I'm saying that it's not a relevant comparator to Canada exactly because its circumstances are not ours. Canada is NOT surrounded by enemies and our national survival (generally) does NOT depend on our military. As such, our military is periodically surged in size and budget but for the majority of its existence is being pared back. That just ain't the IDF.

The ideas do not seem compatible.  Do we have bright, motivated GOFOs or do we have GOFO who will retreat to their comfort zones and not utilize the specialists on their staffs?

I don't think you're being charitable to our GOFOs. Someone on "the track to greatness" will be each of a Cmdre/BGen, RAdm/MGen, and VAdm/LGen for three or ~maybe~ fours years apiece before succeeding to (if their spouse is supportive and they have a bent for masochism) the position of CDS. Each of these jumps is huge and they barely have time to learn the ins and outs of the Ottawa bureaucracy and the political interface mechanisms while doing each of the demanding jobs they're assigned, let alone to master the capabilities of the other services. In my (admittedly limited) experience of their lifestyles, there basically aren't enough hours in the day. At the same time, decisions we like to believe are subject to rigorous staff-thrashing are thrust on them with little notice in response to political imperatives and they have to make decisions as well as they can with what they have available to them: for the most part, preconceived notions.

 

[McG]

Here is the actual (proposed) text of the amendments to the NDA, as contained in Division 7 of Part 6 of Bill C-31, styled the Economic Action Plan 2014 Act, No. 1, (apologies for the wonky formatting):

For reference, the sections currently read as:

•     17. (1) The Canadian Forces shall consist of such units and other elements as are from time to time organized by or under the authority of the Minister.
  
      (2) A unit or other element organized under subsection (1) shall from time to time be embodied in such component of the Canadian Forces as may be directed by or under the authority of the Minister.

•     21. (1) For the purposes of this Act, the ranks of the officers and non-commissioned members of the Canadian Forces shall be as set out in Column I of the schedule.
  
      (2) The Governor in Council may make regulations prescribing the circumstances in which a person holding a rank set out in Column I of the schedule shall use, or be referred to by, a designation of rank set out in Column II, III or IV of the schedule opposite the rank held by that person.

As far as the amended text, I would rather not see "including the Royal Canadian Navy, the Canadian Army and the Royal Canadian Air Force" appended to organizational element of Commands.  There are some who will argue that the environmental staffs should be just that - staffs and not commands. The commands could be anything from joint regional commands to more environmentally pure operational level formations (ie. an Army Division) reporting directly to the CFHQ.  RCN, CA and RCAF can exist like Army regiments - extended families which may or may not be grouped as a monolithic organizational entity.  Regardless of your thoughts on the ideal organization, you can see that legislating these three specific commands will unnecessarily constrain flexibility of the minister's authority to organize the CAF.

Schedule 5 just lists the current ranks, using the standard (current) army names.  So the updated/backdated names (depending on how you look at it) to be used in everyday speech and writing will actually be set out in a future regulation.

With MCpl and MS plugged in?

I don't think you're being charitable to our GOFOs. Someone on "the track to greatness" will be each of a Cmdre/BGen, RAdm/MGen, and VAdm/LGen for three or ~maybe~ fours years apiece before succeeding to ... the position of CDS. Each of these jumps is huge and they barely have time to learn the ins and outs of the Ottawa bureaucracy and the political interface mechanisms while doing each of the demanding jobs they're assigned, let alone to master the capabilities of the other services. In my (admittedly limited) experience of their lifestyles, there basically aren't enough hours in the day.

The GOFO do not need to be masters of any particular element of the CAF.  They are the generalists who command the specialists who are the masters.  What they need to do is use their staffs ... like they do now.

At the same time, decisions we like to believe are subject to rigorous staff-thrashing are thrust on them with little notice in response to political imperatives and they have to make decisions as well as they can with what they have available to them: for the most part, preconceived notions.

If this is the case, then it is an endorsement of a stovepipe of excellence for every field that sees itself as too complicated for anyone else.  I don't believe we need medical, MP and communications empires ... but if a fighter pilot cannot be developed over a career to be responsible for fleets and mechanized brigades, then the same must be true of hospitals and so on.

 

[Old EO Tech]

I agree with you on listing the RCN. CA, RCAF as commands, I think it would be better to list them on the "other elements" line, that way you still give them official existence, but give the MND/CDS the flexibility to organize the CAF as needed.

But then this goes full back to the need for the elemental commands at all, when they are only Force Trainers, and CJOC being the only Force employer.  Can not the Divs/Wings/Fleets manage training on there own, or under a CFHQ,  with the elements acting as either staffs at CFHQ, and/or as you state just some glue holding the pan-CA/RCN/RCAF community together in a common direction.  Much like us RCEME and Log guys do, being spread out over the CA/RCN/RCAF, while maintaining a strong identity of our own.