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CMMA - replacing the CP140 Aurora

The infographic includes under the Payload list "4 anti-ship missiles"

And from the Quick Facts section of the release:
  • The P-8A will specialize in anti-submarine and anti-surface warfare and is optimal for C4ISR. This capability will also be upgradeable, resilient, and interoperable with the RCAF’s joint, interagency, multinational and public partners, and provides an operational advantage over adversaries.
Hopefully it won't be a "fitted for but not with" situation.
 
I quickly listened to the press conference but one thing stood out. The question was why a competition not held to look at other options. The answer given was because the RCAF said the P-8 was the only option that met their criteria. If only it's that easy for future procurements.
 
No. I have not filed this under the wrong thread.

The issue is A2AD.

My sense is that NORAD and North Command have as a priority the maintenance of an A2AD bubble around North America.

And the US wants Canada to secure the territory that Canada claims as sovereign or others might follow up on the offer from the RN officer of a year or so ago and do it for us.


...our core challenge is not actually how to pop that A2AD bubble; we do not actually want to seize and hold any territory currently held by the People’s Liberation Army. It is actually the inverse: how can we create our own robust anti-access aerial denial around our bases and allies, with our own cost advantages? This is the actual path to ensure that China is deterred from ever choosing the path of conflict.

When the situation is viewed this way, it reveals three lines of effort that we would do well to bolster.

The first is to recognize the shared challenge for every nation now contending with the Chinese military: Defense of territory and effective and affordable aerial and maritime domain awareness. Gray-zone operations have become the norm. Daily incursions test the defenses of nations, whether by forcing Japanese and Taiwanese fighter jets to scramble to escort yet another PLAAF jet flying into their air zones to Chinese fisheries and militia harassing the Philippines. The goal of our adversary is to wear us down gradually, to strain our systems, exhaust our people and budgets, and, most of all, erode the norms, until it is the incursion zones that become the new borders.

The second is the need for the real networks that underscore the kind of meaningful partnerships to meet this challenge. Look at the U.S.-Japan alliance; it goes beyond mere treaties and shared military hardware. Its strength lies in both the human relationships and shared information networks. These extend from air defense computer and sensor networks to officer exchanges into joint staffs. This interconnectedness improves deterrence, sending a clear message to potential aggressors. Extending this model beyond Japan and Australia to more of our Southeast Asian nations is not just strategic; it is essential.

Finally, our spending to meet these challenges should align with the real needs of our allies. If we want to succeed, we must resist the allure of expensive capabilities that can be operated only in limited numbers and by only the wealthiest of nations.

If we want aerial and maritime domain awareness, it needs to be a plug-and-play network, open and accessible to every state
. Think of NATO’s Maritime Unmanned Systems Initiative. (MUSI), or the Task Force 59 model now being tested out by the U.S. Navy’s Fifth Fleet and its partners in the Middle East, which are working to turn the region’s seas transparent. Rather than a handful of sensors, what these point the way to is a network of thousands of sailors and hundreds of businesses, from tens of nations, deploying scores of cheap aerial and naval drones. This network and scale not only foster cooperation, but also facilitate the rapid sharing of information and human expertise, building the real kind of partnerships that matter in times of conflict.

The same holds for the systems that don’t merely sense but strike, which is also needed to make real these networks and partnership. It certainly appeals to sell our partners expensive warships, high-performance jets and drones, and exquisite missiles; every product they buy not only creates profits for American firms, but also drives down our own military’s purchase costs. But large, costly systems are neither what the lessons of the Ukraine war are teaching is good for them or us. Nor are they what our partners can afford in scale.


The first ...: Defense of territory and effective and affordable aerial and maritime domain awareness.
This suggests to me US interest in Canadian backyard operations. And in the near term.

cf F35s, P-8A Poseidons, SkyGuardian, Radarsat Constellations, and conceivably an arctic capable brigade to conform with the 11th Airborne


Admiral Topshee has just announced that he can't keep his Offshore Fleet (his frigates) and his Inshore Fleet (MCDVs and AOPVs) in the water at the same time and that his successors will be challenged to sustain his time expired frigates to 2040 when their replacements will be on line.

Which does the US consider a greater benefit? Two or three hard pressed Canadian frigates in the China Seas and the Med? Or standing patrols in North American waters by the MCDVs and AOPVs? My guess is that North Com would prefer a greater focus on the AOPVs and the MCDVs with emphasis on mine, counter-mine and UUV operations.

Following on from that, if Canada's frigates are stressed but can't be replaced for a decade at least is there an alternative platform that the RCN could man in the short term? Which brings us to the Canadian Patrol Submarine. Diesel/Hybrid subs would add to the backyard defence of North America but could also be usefully deployed overseas.

To go along with the F35s, Poseidons and SkyGuardians and upgrading radars and air to air missiles, could we see a change of emphasis towards the MCDVs and AOPVs and reducing the blue water commitments while enhancing the submarine capability?



The second is the need for the real networks that underscore the kind of meaningful partnerships to meet this challenge. Look at the U.S.-Japan alliance; it goes beyond mere treaties and shared military hardware. Its strength lies in both the human relationships and shared information networks.

In that context Canada is well established - so long as the politicians don't cock it up.


Finally, our spending to meet these challenges should align with the real needs of our allies. If we want to succeed, we must resist the allure of expensive capabilities that can be operated only in limited numbers and by only the wealthiest of nations.

We need to do "the other thing".



And my final...

This:

turn the region’s seas transparent

Rather than seeking to operate stealthily in an obscure environment it might be cheaper, and more generally beneficial to society, to remove the obscurity and let everybody see what is going on.
 
I quickly listened to the press conference but one thing stood out. The question was why a competition not held to look at other options. The answer given was because the RCAF said the P-8 was the only option that met their criteria. If only it's that easy for future procurements.

It can be if the politicians want it to be.
 
Mod edit: A news article referring to Canada’s P-8A purchase.
 
Last edited by a moderator:
No. I have not filed this under the wrong thread.

The issue is A2AD.

My sense is that NORAD and North Command have as a priority the maintenance of an A2AD bubble around North America.

And the US wants Canada to secure the territory that Canada claims as sovereign or others might follow up on the offer from the RN officer of a year or so ago and do it for us.






This suggests to me US interest in Canadian backyard operations. And in the near term.

cf F35s, P-8A Poseidons, SkyGuardian, Radarsat Constellations, and conceivably an arctic capable brigade to conform with the 11th Airborne


Admiral Topshee has just announced that he can't keep his Offshore Fleet (his frigates) and his Inshore Fleet (MCDVs and AOPVs) in the water at the same time and that his successors will be challenged to sustain his time expired frigates to 2040 when their replacements will be on line.

Which does the US consider a greater benefit? Two or three hard pressed Canadian frigates in the China Seas and the Med? Or standing patrols in North American waters by the MCDVs and AOPVs? My guess is that North Com would prefer a greater focus on the AOPVs and the MCDVs with emphasis on mine, counter-mine and UUV operations.
Frigates yes -- the MCDV and AOPV's don't have the sensors anyway, and a presence in the Pacific as opposed to poorly duplicating what the USCG and USN SSN's already do isn't needed.


Following on from that, if Canada's frigates are stressed but can't be replaced for a decade at least is there an alternative platform that the RCN could man in the short term? Which brings us to the Canadian Patrol Submarine. Diesel/Hybrid subs would add to the backyard defence of North America but could also be usefully deployed overseas.
Nope

To go along with the F35s, Poseidons and SkyGuardians and upgrading radars and air to air missiles, could we see a change of emphasis towards the MCDVs and AOPVs and reducing the blue water commitments while enhancing the submarine capability?
Nope
 
LRP aircrew today…

Happy Christian Bale GIF


CMMA Proj Os today…

Cat GIF


Bombardier et Al from the “Worse than Fisher Price aircraft” crowd…

Willy Wonka And The Chocolate Factory Tantrum GIF
 
I'd suggest poaching WestJet pilots as Reserve P8 pilots, but despite being fully 737 type qualified already, RCAF would insist on driving them through the full pilot training system, then insist they fly other platforms instead, after the decade or more of waiting for courses.
 
I'd suggest poaching WestJet pilots as Reserve P8 pilots, but despite being fully 737 type qualified already, RCAF would insist on driving them through the full pilot training system, then insist they fly other platforms instead, after the decade or more of waiting for courses.

I think the bigger consideration, given todays announcement:

NO MORE STANLEY CUP!!
 
Frigates yes -- the MCDV and AOPV's don't have the sensors anyway, and a presence in the Pacific as opposed to poorly duplicating what the USCG and USN SSN's already do isn't needed.



Nope


Nope

Go ahead Kevin. Just give us our shopping list.
 
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