Close Air Support in the CF: Bring back something like the CF-5 or introduce something with props?

[SeaKingTacco]

OS,

With respect to your near death experience in 1973- I was not trying to be condescending.  I, too, am FAC and FOO qualified, in addition to having dropped/fired aerial weapons as a TACCO.  I have half a clue about the complexity of dropping aerial weapons... Max has a point about it being somewhat more complex than pushing a button on a laptop.  If that happens when the aircraft is out of configuration (either moving to fast or slow, pulling G or turning the wrong way, etc) lots of bad things could happen... unless the technology is configured in such a way to prevent an out of envelop launch/drop...which I don't think is possible with our current equipment.

And your CF-5 pilot from 1973 would have been responsible for his mis-placed bomb, because he was an idiot not to listen to a good target read-in.

 

[WingsofFury]

Just to change the mood here...

Wouldn't this be a similar reason as to why a FAC wouldn't take control of something like a Predator once it is in a "kill" zone?

 

[Colin Parkinson]

If I recall correctly a CF-5 strafed a OP by accident in Suffield around 1984 with it's 20mm, no one was hurt.

 

[Journeyman]

Wouldn't this be a similar reason as to why a FAC wouldn't take control of something like a Predator

I'm not intentionally being obtuse here, but isn't what a similar reason?  ???

 

[Old Sweat]

Wouldn't this be a similar reason as to why a FAC wouldn't take control of something like a Predator once it is in a "kill" zone?

The reason why a FAC would take control of a Predator or a manned aircraft is so that its weapons are best utilized to support the ongoing land battle. The aim is not to usurp the pilot's authority; the aim is to employ the weapons in the most effecitve manner. In my opinion, it would be a very foolish pilot who would decide that he knew better than the FAC and dropped his weapon despite being ordered not to. Remember the A Coy 1 PPCLI incident in 2002. An AWACS was trying to clarify the situation when the F16 pilot declared self defence under dubious circumstances and used his weapon.

There also is the question of airspace control to keep, say, 155mm rounds and flying machines from occupying the same bit of sky at the same time.

 

[SupersonicMax]

The reason why a FAC would take control of a Predator or a manned aircraft is so that its weapons are best utilized to support the ongoing land battle. The aim is not to usurp the pilot's authority; the aim is to employ the weapons in the most effecitve manner.

You won't make it a more effective employment, simply because FACs don't have experience in dropping the weapons and weaponeering and to be honest, I believe it's outside their scope of employment and rightly so.  They don't have the experience of utilizing weapons with the aircraft.  It takes more than groundschool.  It takes experience IN an aircraft. The one that is the best suited to make the call in the end, is the pilot (be it UAV or Manned).  He has SA of more than the 100mX100m area around your TIC.

In my opinion, it would be a very foolish pilot who would decide that he knew better than the FAC and dropped his weapon despite being ordered not to. Remember the A Coy 1 PPCLI incident in 2002. An AWACS was trying to clarify the situation when the F16 pilot declared self defence under dubious circumstances and used his weapon.

In CAS, the pilot does not have a blanket authority to drop anywhere, except in a Type 3 scenario to some extent(kill box essentially) .  CAS procedures are set and respected.  Type 1 and 2 requires a specific clearance to drop (Cleared Hot).  Even if I am cleared hot, I have the last call to decide wheter or not it's safe to drop, for the troops and for me.  My fear as a pilot would be a FAC that has no clue or little experience with safe separation or safe escape (and that he doesn't care, it's not his pink ass in the cockpit) and he drops the bomb and I fly in the frag.  It is far more complicated than setting a floor, especially for shallow dives.

Every time we brought FAC with us airborne for famil flights, they were amazed by the amount of things to consider and the 3rd dimension that is now incorporated.  What you see on the ground is definately not what I see from my cockpit.

In the case you mentionned, IIRC they were going back home and the pilot felt he was under attack.  I don't believe he was under JTAC control at that point, but I could be wrong.  It wasn't only his mistake (even though he was partly responsible) a whole bunch of things happened and the holes in the swiss cheese aligned.

There also is the question of airspace control to keep, say, 155mm rounds and flying machines from occupying the same bit of sky at the same time.

It is not an issue now.  JTAC is responsible to keep us safe.  Not only from 155mm rounds but also from other aircraft, enemy MEZ, restricted areas, etc.  And I believe having a FAC control the airplane would make it LESS safe.  Again because we have a greater big picture SA that the guys on the ground do, just by the nature of where we sit and what we have access to in the cockpit (that FACs don't have access to, and will not with only a rover)

 

[McG]

The reason why a FAC would take control of a Predator or a manned aircraft is so that its weapons are best utilized to support the ongoing land battle.

Is that aim not achieved by communication and cooperation? 

 

[rampage800]

OS,

I understand what you're saying but essentially the JTAC is controlling the jet, he's just not the guy who actually pickles the weapon. Every single time a pilot drops in a CAS situation he needs a Clearance (Type 3s as well, its a Cleared to Engage coupled with a Call Engagement complete) from that Controller. To be honest JTACs become task saturated pretty quick, especially when multiple users are in the airspace like you elude to, its not out of the norm for a UAV, OH-58s or other helos, arty rds and a couple a/c to all be in the same airspace at the same time and be in a TIC and all trying to help. For reasons mentioned earlier about release parameters etc I honestly believe its too much for 1 dude to handle, let pilots do what pilots do and let the Controllers do what they do. Is there pilots out there like that CF-5 and Maj Schmidt (wasn't under control of a JTAC, called in on self defense) who are complete morons, absolutely and they get weeded out very quick but to be honest theres Controllers out there who would run a/c together in the same alt block during a stack if it weren't for pimping from the pilot. We don't expect the FOO to compute data, issue it, lay the gun, pull the lanyard and then observe the tgt, why would we expect the JTAC to do essentially the same thing.

Yesterday Brutus brought up this point but essentially it already has for Danger Close situations, it should also be noted that the JTAC doesn't make the ultimate decision to drop, the GFC (Ground Force Commander) does, the JTAC works for him as just as much as a pilot would be in crap for dropping without Clearance, so to would the JTAC without authority from the GFC, Anyhow I'm off subject, heres the quote

I think one could logically assume that if control of an aircraft's weapons shifts to a ground controller, so would the responsibility for them. Obviously, that would take some changing of orders, such as the one you quoted.

From the JFire

The GFC must accept responsibility for the risk to friendly forces when tgts are inside the 0.1% PI (percentage of incapacitation) distance. The GFC will pass his/her initials to terminal controllers to pass to the attacking a/c indicating acceptance of the risk inherent in in ordnance delivery inside the 0.1 PI

To briefly explain, the 0.1 PI for a Mk-82 (500lb bomb) is 230m, the GFC is accepting responsibility to the fragging of any of his own guys within that distance.......thats in a very very brief nutshell

The JFire is a JFCOM Pub which is basically the bible (as is JP 3 09 3), maybe 1 CAD Flying Regs say one thing but JTACs don't know that, the JFire is what they know. I know Max yesterday said he needs to see Friendlies, maybe in Canada as a flying reg but then what happens on operations when you have a cloud deck and have to do a BOC with a GBU-12, your not going to drop ? At some point there has to be a trust factor, both with allowing the JTACs allowing the pilots to do their jobs and vice versa.

Anyhow, my 2 cents............

 

[Brutus]

Yesterday Brutus brought up this point but essentially it already has for Danger Close situations, it should also be noted that the JTAC doesn't make the ultimate decision to drop, the GFC (Ground Force Commander) does, the JTAC works for him as just as much as a pilot would be in crap for dropping without Clearance, so to would the JTAC without authority from the GFC, Anyhow I'm off subject, heres the quote

From the JFire

To briefly explain, the 0.1 PI for a Mk-82 (500lb bomb) is 230m, the GFC is accepting responsibility to the fragging of any of his own guys within that distance.......thats in a very very brief nutshell

The JFire is a JFCOM Pub which is basically the bible (as is JP 3 09 3), maybe 1 CAD Flying Regs say one thing but JTACs don't know that, the JFire is what they know. I know Max yesterday said he needs to see Friendlies, maybe in Canada as a flying reg but then what happens on operations when you have a cloud deck and have to do a BOC with a GBU-12, your not going to drop ? At some point there has to be a trust factor, both with allowing the JTACs allowing the pilots to do their jobs and vice versa.

Anyhow, my 2 cents............

Thanks for that. That makes total logical sense.

I'm finding this discussion to be very fascinating, and of course way beyond my arcs now.

 

[SupersonicMax]

To briefly explain, the 0.1 PI for a Mk-82 (500lb bomb) is 230m, the GFC is accepting responsibility to the fragging of any of his own guys within that distance.......thats in a very very brief nutshell

I'm actually fully aware of the JFIRE and know it pretty much like the back of my hand.  I understand what danger close is and will drop in such case, again with friendlies and the target visual/tally.

Every single time a pilot drops in a CAS situation he needs a Clearance (Type 3s as well, its a Cleared to Engage coupled with a Call Engagement complete) from that Controller.

That's why I said to some extent.  I can get a cleared to engage, kill whatever I need to and 30 minutes later call Engagement Complete.

On type 1 and 2 I need a cleareance on every pass.

The JFire is a JFCOM Pub which is basically the bible (as is JP 3 09 3), maybe 1 CAD Flying Regs say one thing but JTACs don't know that, the JFire is what they know. I know Max yesterday said he needs to see Friendlies, maybe in Canada as a flying reg but then what happens on operations when you have a cloud deck and have to do a BOC with a GBU-12, your not going to drop ? At some point there has to be a trust factor, both with allowing the JTACs allowing the pilots to do their jobs and vice versa.

JFIRE is not regulatory.  You will not get court martialed for not following the JFIRE.  1 Cdn Air Div are.  I don't believe we have a rule saying we need to see friendlies and target (although I doubt the controller will allow you to drop if you don't call tally), however I personally want to see the friendlies.  Most talk ons I have had always included a talk on to the friendlies.  It gives me a confirmation that my attack axis is optimal to avoid friendlies.

No, I will not drop a GBU-12 through clouds in a CAS scenario and I don't know many pilots that would to this idiotic idea!  How the hell do you know that the bomb will have sufficient time to guide?  How do you know if the laser energy will be in the seeker FOV when it breaks out of cloud??  What about the effect of humidity on the seeker as it emerges below the clouds?  GBU-49? Yes.  GBU-12? Not a chance in hell.

A GBU-12, before it guides, is essentially a dumb bomb.  And I would not drop a Mk82 through clouds.

 

[Loachman]

If I recall correctly a CF-5 strafed a OP by accident in Suffield around 1984 with it's 20mm, no one was hurt.

It was during RV 83 or 85 but, yes, in Wainwright. I met the pilot in the Officers' Mess in Edmonton a few days later. He eventually got a flight safety award for not hitting his intended target.

I also almost got bombed by a CF5 in Gagetown on my FAC course in October 1984. The pilot said "Oops" when told.

 

[rampage800]

No, I will not drop a GBU-12 through clouds in a CAS scenario and I don't know many pilots that would to this idiotic idea!

Nice.......its not too condescending I guess Max, you're right, it could never happen, nobody else knows anything about CAS except you.

 

[SupersonicMax]

I don't think a FAC will know more about GBU-12 employment than a fighter pilot.

 

[PuckChaser]

Isn't that their job, though? Employing CAS and knowing certain munitions and how to effectively utilize them? They're not going to know every single detail like you need to, since you've got upwards of 500lbs of HE strapped a couple feet from your cockpit, but they're still going to be very knowledgeable if they take their job with any seriousness.

 

[fireman1867]

I don't think a FAC will know more about GBU-12 employment than a fighter pilot.

How many Canadian FAC's have been deployed and utilized operationaly in the past 6 years vs Hornet pilots?

 

[SupersonicMax]

In my experience, they have a very, very broad and generic understanding of the weapons and their employment.  There are too many variables that are not controllable by the FAC to have a precise understanding of how to use the weapons. The effects of a Mk-82 one day may be very different the next day because of things like fuse settings, arm times, nose type, weather (how high is the ceiling, which will have effects on the max dive angle for dive deliveries and altitude for LGBs), which in turn will have effect on the impact angle and impact velocity.  The pilot is the one controlling some of those parameters and assessing all of the parameters, not the FAC.

Fireman1867:  I personally know at least a dozen Hornet drivers that deployed as JTACs and all of us drop live weapons a few times a year.  We weaponeer almost on a daily basis as part as our training.  Because we didn't deploy doesn't mean we don't know our weapons.  I can guarantee I know more about any weapon in our inventory than any army FAC.

 

[rampage800]

Max,

You should know more about weapons in our inventory than JTACs but why don't you go ahead and tell us a bit about the AGM 114K or the GBU-38v4 ? What about the SCL of B-1B ?  Why don't you tell us what a GBU-12 will do to a Grape Hut Max, thats in our inventory ?

I'm not sure where your distrust of JTACs come from, personally I don't give a s**t, I think your posts are condescending and from personal experience most Hornet dudes I know are great guys, you're the definitely the exception instead of the norm !!!

Go read your JFire again Max, really really memorize it this time  :

 

[SupersonicMax]

Max,

You should know more about weapons in our inventory than JTACs but why don't you go ahead and tell us a bit about the AGM 114K or the GBU-38v4 ? What about the SCL of B-1B ?  Why don't you tell us what a GBU-12 will do to a Grape Hut Max, thats in our inventory ?

Have I ever said I had to know about every weapons in every aircraft inventory?  I am sure the B1B pilots know more about their weapons than the JTAC or me for that matter.  I can't tell you what a GBU-12 does to a grape hut because I need more information.  What altitude was it dropped?  What dive angle?  What was the fusing on the bomb?  See where I am going? 

I'm not sure where your distrust of JTACs come from, personally I don't give a s**t, I think your posts are condescending and from personal experience most Hornet dudes I know are great guys, you're the definitely the exception instead of the norm !!!

I don't distrust JTACs. I don't trust they have the knowledge and experience to physically control the delivery of any weapon on any platform. I think they have a job, I have mine.  Mine is the safe and effective use of my aircraft and weapons.  The JTACs is the safe and effective conduct of CAS procedures. If they tell me they need my only GBU-12 on something that doesn't make sense because of whatever factor, it's my job to suggest something more appropriate to the situation.  It is not their job to "fly" my aircraft.  Nor is it my job to decide where firepower should be delivered.  How the firepower is delivered is where the teamwork begins.  It's not just the FAC, not just me.  I know the weapons, the FAC knows the situation on the ground.

I just don't think that they should be allowed to pickle the weapons off.  As the Aircraft Captain, I should have the hammer on the decision to drop or not, after being cleared hot for the reasons explained before. 

I don't give a shit what someone on an internet forum thinks about me.  This is what I think and I am not ashamed of it.

Go read your JFire again Max, really really memorize it this time  :

I know the JFIRE you don't have to worry.  Don't forget, it's mostly procedures and a bit of rough gouge on weapons and effects.  It's definitely not the bible for weaponeering.  If you are ever out East, I'll gladly bring you to the squadron and show you how real weaponeering is done and explain you live why I think it's not a good idea to have JTACs "in our cockpits".

 

[Journeyman]

Remember the A Coy 1 PPCLI incident in 2002. An AWACS was trying to clarify the situation when the F16 pilot declared self defence under dubious circumstances and used his weapon.

In the case you mentionned, IIRC they were going back home and the pilot felt he was under attack.  I don't believe he was under JTAC control at that point, but I could be wrong.  It wasn't only his mistake (even though he was partly responsible) a whole bunch of things happened and the holes in the swiss cheese aligned.

I guess that's the difference between those of us who have actually served in Afghanistan (Kosovo, Bosnia, etc) and those who have merely defended the Primrose Air Weapons Range. To you, Canadian soldiers' deaths are nothing more than 'holes in the swiss cheese' aligning.


Personally, I find it reprehensible that you would defend Maj "Psycho" Schmidt, ignoring the transcript of his court martial, and the testimony of the Canadian soldiers who managed to survive his attack.

Yes, his 'claim' of self defence came once there was a lawyer at his side....even after his element lead had ordered him to break off his attack.

Maj Harry M. Schmidt

Charge I: Violation of the UCMJ, Article 92
Specification: In that Major Harry M. Schmidt, 170th Fighter Squadron (ANG), then--
constituted as the 170th Expeditionary Fighter Squadron, 332nd Air Expeditionary
Group, United States Air Force, then—deployed at a forward operating location, who
knew or should have known of his duties as the wingman and an aircraft commander in a
two-ship flight of F-16 aircraft, in the vicinity of Kandahar, Afghanistan, on or about 17
April 2002, was derelict in the performance of those duties in that he willfully failed to
exercise appropriate flight discipline over his aircraft and failed to comply with the
applicable rules of engagement and special instructions to airmen in effect on that date in
that area of operations, as it was his duty to do.

Charge II: Violation of the UCMJ, Article 119
Specification 1: In that Major Harry M. Schmidt, 170th Fighter Squadron (ANG), then--
constituted as the 170th Expeditionary Fighter Squadron, 332nd Air Expeditionary
Group, United States Air Force, then-deployed at a forward operating location, did, in the
vicinity of Kandahar, Afghanistan, on or about 17 April 2002, by culpable negligence,
unlawfully kill Sergeant Marc Daniel Leger, “A” Company, 3rd Battalion, Princess
Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry, 1 Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group, Canadian
Forces, by causing mortal injuries upon his person with a 500 pound laser guided bomb.

Specification 2: In that Major Harry M. Schmidt, 170th Fighter Squadron (ANG), then--
constituted as the 170th Expeditionary Fighter Squadron, 332nd Air Expeditionary
Group, United States Air Force, then—deployed at a forward operating location, did, in
the vicinity of Kandahar, Afghanistan, on or about 17 April 2002, by culpable
negligence, unlawfully kill Corporal Ainsworth Dyer, “A” Company, 3rd Battalion,
Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry, 1 Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group,
Canadian Forces, by causing mortal injuries upon his person with a 500 pound laser
guided bomb.

Specification 3: In that Major Harry M. Schmidt, 170th Fighter Squadron (ANG), then--
constituted as the 170th Expeditionary Fighter Squadron, 332nd Air Expeditionary
Group, United States Air Force, then—deployed at a forward operating location, did, in
the vicinity of Kandahar, Afghanistan, on or about 17 April 2002, by culpable
negligence, unlawfully kill Private Richard Anthony Green, “A” Company, 3rd Battalion,
Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry, 1 Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group,
Canadian Forces, by causing mortal injuries upon his person with a 500 pound laser
guide bomb.

Specification 4: In that Major Harry M. Schmidt, 170th Fighter Squadron (ANG), then--
constituted as the 170th Expeditionary Fighter Squadron, 332nd Air Expeditionary
Group, United States Air Force, then—deployed at a forward operating location, did, in
the vicinity of Kandahar, Afghanistan, on or about 17 April 2002, by culpable
negligence, unlawfully kill Private Nathan Lloyd Smith, “A” Company, 3rd Battalion,
Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry, 1 Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group,
Canadian Forces, by causing mortal injuries upon his person with a 500 lb laser guided
bomb.

Charge III: Violation of the UCMJ, Article 128
Specification 1: In that Major Harry M. Schmidt, 170th Fighter Squadron (ANG), then—
constituted as the 170th Expeditionary Fighter Squadron, 332nd Air Expeditionary
Group, United States Air Force, then—deployed at a forward operating location, did, in
the vicinity of Kandahar, Afghanistan, on or about 17 April 2002, commit an assault
upon Sergeant Lorne Ford, “A” Company, 3rd Battalion, Princess Patricia’s Canadian
Light Infantry, 1 Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group, Canadian Forces, by directing at
or near him a means likely to produce death or grievous bodily harm, to wit: a 500 pound
laser guided bomb.

Specification 2: In that Major Harry M. Schmidt, 170th Fighter Squadron (ANG), then—
constituted as the 170th Expeditionary Fighter Squadron, 332 Air Expeditionary Group,
United States Air Force, then—deployed at a forward operating location, did, in the
vicinity of Kandahar, Afghanistan, on or about 17 April 2002, commit an assault upon
Corporal Rene Paquette, “A” Company, 3rd Battalion, Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light
Infantry, 1 Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group, Canadian Forces, by directing at or
near him a means likely to produce death or grievous bodily harm, to wit: a 500 pound
laser guided bomb.

Specification 3: In that Major Harry M. Schmidt, 170th Fighter Squadron (ANG), then—
constituted as the 170th Expeditionary Fighter Squadron, 332 Air Expeditionary Group,
United States Air Force, then—deployed at a forward operating location, did, in the
vicinity of Kandahar, Afghanistan, on or about 17 April 2002, commit an assault upon
Corporal Brett Perry, “A” Company, 3rd Battalion, Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light
Infantry, 1 Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group, Canadian Forces, by directing at or
near him a means likely to produce death or grievous bodily harm, to wit: a 500 pound
laser guided bomb.

Specification 4: In that Major Harry M. Schmidt, 170th Fighter Squadron (ANG), then—
constituted as the 170th Expeditionary Fighter Squadron, 332 Air Expeditionary Group,
United States Air Force, then—deployed at a forward operating location, did, in the
vicinity of Kandahar, Afghanistan, on or about 17 April 2002, commit an assault upon
Private Norman Link, “A” Company, 3rd Battalion, Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light
Infantry, 1 Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group, Canadian Forces, by directing at or
near him a means likely to produce death or grievous bodily harm, to wit: a 500 pound
laser guided bomb.

Specification 5: In that Major Harry M. Schmidt, 170th Fighter Squadron (ANG), then—
constituted as the 170th Expeditionary Fighter Squadron, 332 Air Expeditionary Group,
United States Air Force, then—deployed at a forward operating location, did, in the
vicinity of Kandahar, Afghanistan, on or about 17 April 2002, commit an assault upon
Corporal Brian Decaire, “A” Company, 3rd Battalion, Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light
Infantry, 1 Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group, Canadian Forces, by directing at or
near him a means likely to produce death or grievous bodily harm, to wit: a 500 pound
laser guided bomb.

Specification 6: In that Major Harry M. Schmidt, 170th Fighter Squadron (ANG), then—
constituted as the 170th Expeditionary Fighter Squadron, 332 Air Expeditionary Group,
United States Air Force, then—deployed at a forward operating location, did, in the
vicinity of Kandahar, Afghanistan, on or about 17 April 2002, commit an assault upon
Master Corporal Curtis Hollister, “A” Company, 3rd Battalion, Princess Patricia’s
Canadian Light Infantry, 1 Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group, Canadian Forces, by
directing at or near him a means likely to produce death or grievous bodily harm, to wit: a
500 pound laser guided bomb.

Specification 7: In that Major Harry M. Schmidt, 170th Fighter Squadron (ANG), then—
constituted as the 170th Expeditionary Fighter Squadron, 332 Air Expeditionary Group,
United States Air Force, then—deployed at a forward operating location, did, in the
vicinity of Kandahar, Afghanistan, on or about 17 April 2002, commit an assault upon
Master Corporal Stanley P. Clarke, “A” Company, 3rd Battalion, Princess Patricia’s
Canadian Light Infantry, 1 Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group, Canadian Forces, by
directing at or near him a means likely to produce death or grievous bodily harm, to wit: a
500 pound laser guided bomb.

Specification 8: In that Major Harry M. Schmidt, 170th Fighter Squadron (ANG), then—
constituted as the 170th Expeditionary Fighter Squadron, 332 Air Expeditionary Group,
United States Air Force, then—deployed at a forward operating location, did, in the
vicinity of Kandahar, Afghanistan, on or about 17 April 2002, commit an assault upon
Corporal Shane Brennan, “A” Company, 3rd Battalion, Princess Patricia’s Canadian
Light Infantry, 1 Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group, Canadian Forces, by directing at
or near him a means likely to produce death or grievous bodily harm, to wit: a 500 pound
laser guided bomb.

As for this:

I don't give a shit what someone on an internet forum thinks about me.  This is what I think and I am not ashamed of it.

Thank you for reaffirming that absolutely nothing has changed since you started posting here as a self-centred, but equally uninformed, RMC cadet  :




Edit: I had to come back to underline reprehensible, even if you never understand.

 

[SupersonicMax]

I guess that's the difference between those of us who have actually served in Afghanistan (Kosovo, Bosnia, etc) and those who have merely defended the Primrose Air Weapons Range. To you, Canadian soldiers' deaths are nothing more than 'holes in the swiss cheese' aligning.

The death of every canadian soldier in Afghanistan is saddening.  Yes. 

Having said that, to understand and prevent the same mistakes from happening, you need to look at it from an objective point of view.  The 'swiss cheese' model thing is something our flight safety team uses.  I was just trying to highlight that there is more than a pilot disobeying ROEs that lead to the tragedy.  Yes, the pilot disobeyed and was dealt appropriately.  Other things up the chain happened and shouldn't have (or didn't and should have) .

I was definitely not trying to downplay their sacrifice.

As for this:Thank you for reaffirming that absolutely nothing has changed since you started posting here as a self-centred, but equally uninformed, RMC cadet  :

Again, it's a forum.  You may think I'm a self-centered person.  That's okay.

The point I am trying to get across through all that chaff is that I won't tell an artilleryman how to fire his gun, I won't tell how a tank commander should deal with his firepower.  I don't expect someone with no experience in flying the F-18 to tell me how to use my airplane and weapons or worse, take control or them.