This was Emailed to me by a friend as he know‘s I‘m an Engineer and we do Battle Field Clearence and E.O.D. work.(Unexploded Ordenance)
Below are link‘s into what D.U. round‘s are made from and what active isotope‘s are still active in them,how they react on contact and what‘s left after,what are the health effect‘s for those clearing U.X.O.‘s etc.
There is a lot of info and will take some time but I suggest every one read the info and make your selve‘s aware what to expect over sea‘s where these round‘s have been used and be carefull!!!!
"All, especially veterans of Desert Storm, veterans or current in Kosovo
and
> current in Afghanistan.......
>
> Following my obsession with deminer safety, I have been exchanging
messages
> with a very clued up medical guy on DU and the hazard. I will post his
> report if there is sufficient interest (it reads well, is packed with
> authoritative sources (often DoS/DoD) and not packed with anti-military
> "evil-guys" rhetoric).
>
> But to start the ball rolling....... here is his summary of the hazard and
> some clips from his recent exchanges.... Please let me know what‘s what
from
> your point of view.
>
> The main hazards of DU are safety issues:
>
> 7 Risks of fire. DU can ignite at relatively low temperatures (500 C).
>
> 7 Heavy metal toxicity: Uranium is a heavy metal and its oxides are
reported
> to be of similar toxicity to Arsenic oxide, particularly affecting the
renal
> system. This may not appear significant from small inhaled quantities but
> could be serious in acute exposure to explosion dust and debris with a
high
> load of DU oxides entering nose and throat and swallowed.
> 7 Risks of radioactive contamination by inhaling DU oxide dust and
ingesting
> it from dust in the mouth, in water or in food. DU burns into a very fine
> black dust or ‘aerosol‘ with a combination of soluble and insoluble
Uranium
> oxides. Larger particles may coat the immediate target area with what
looks
> like soot. But 60%+ are less than 1.5 microns, widely dispersed by wind
and
> small enough to remain suspended in the atmosphere in smog-like
conditions.
> Airborne oxides may be captured in rain or snow and re-suspended in hot
> weather. DU contamination was recorded up to 25 miles away from one
> manufacturing site in the USA.
>
> DU‘s radiation hazards are its most controversial feature. Pure U238
emits
> alpha-radiation - high energy but very short range (a few millimetres)
plus
> traces of Beta and Gamma from the Thorium and other "daughter" isotopes
> released as it decays.
>
> For military purposes this low-level radiation appears to be low risk for
> external exposures e.g. when handling DU in its metal form (e.g. as shells
> or armour) provided gloves are worn. But some spent munitions have been
> reported with higher levels of radiation possibly due to inconsistent
> processing and higher contamination with U235 and other isotopes. DU
> quality control and contamination (isotopic mix) is likely to vary
> significantly by manufacturing date, process and country of origin.
>
> The greatest hazard is when insoluble Uranium oxides are inhaled into the
> lungs. Particles may migrate into the lymph and blood system and Alpha
> radiation will permanently irradiate adjacent tissue. See research on
> health effects of Low Level Radiation at:
> http://www.llrc.org/health/healthpage.htm
>
> Adverse health effects will depend on exposure level - a combination of
the
> quantity of DU oxide dust inhaled or ingested, frequency and duration of
> exposure. Most DU research to date has assumed low dose exposure for fit
> troops from small and medium calibre weapons (from 30 to 120 mm) weighing
> from 275 grams up to 4.5 kilograms per penetrator. However if DU is used
in
> much larger quantities - in warheads weighing 300 kg to 2 tons - then
humans
> within several hundred metres may suffer severe contamination and acute
> health effects. Civilians living in DU targeted areas are vulnerable to
> ongoing contamination. These wider effects need new analysis.
>
> .......................................
>
> You set me wondering what health effects might arise for deminers working
> in DU contaminated zones. The obvious large one was the Gulf. Does anyone
> keep tabs on longer term health problems for deminers?
>
> If DU was used in guided bombs in 1999 Kosovo, I think it would have been
> fairly localised to the Albanian border and high value targets in Serbia.
> Any deminers been working in those areas? If so how is their health? But
> Kosovo/Serbia/Albania had nothing like the scale of bombing in the last 3
> months in Afghanistan. I am concerned for everyone operating in
Afghanistan,
> including urban areas which received fairly intensive bombing in the first
3
> weeks.
>
> I think CDI suggested 6000 tons of guided munitions were used. Perhaps a
> third might have had a DU content. About 50% of weight may be DU. I think
I
> stay with 1000 tons as a feasible high-end estimate if DU is the mystery
> metal I am trying to track down.
>
> This could be important. There are far more deminers in Afghanistan ....
> Plus deminers are hazard aware. And their leaders are part of the
> acceptable expatriate landscape. Deminers are potentially one of the
higher
> at risk groups i.e. likely to be involved in recent bombing locations -
> especially urban (I have just been reading an MSF report on mines in
> Afghanistan).
>
> I am looking for pragmatic solutions to identifying potential DU hazards
> the fastest way possible. UNEP may take months to get a team there.
>
> Of those messages you forwarded, the most serious quote is one from Tommy:
>
> > Always tried to stay away from copper because it reacts
> > with so many pyrochemicals and forms sensitive salts over
> > time. If longivity of a device is not a player in a
> > particular scenario then copper would probably work OK --
> > but I still think I would be careful of what I put it into
> > intimate contact with.
>
> This is not just slightly serious. Read some of the stuff about
Mavericks
> having a 10 year shelf life. Not with copper shaped charges by the sound
of
> this. Never mind the extra hassles of DU. It comes in a wide variety of
> alloys with very different qualities according to function (including
> corrosion resistance). But its melts a lot easier than tungsten.
>
> The problem with DU pollution as that no one is going to know that it‘s
> there - at levels sufficient to cause potentially serious problems in a
> year‘s time. My guess is that the leukaemia cases in KFOR were involved
in
> post-combat target assessment or inspection - like hundreds of people in
> Afghanistan. And since DU warheads "don‘t exist" they may not have been
> warned.
>
> My deepest concern is about apparently systematic strategy from deep (or
> high) within several systems to spread the belief that "DU is safe"
belief
> over the last 10 years. .... But in fairness most people have to believe
> what they are told and so accept the DU is safe story. On the same basis,
> so was blue asbestos in the 60‘s.
>
> I think the jury is still out on some cluster bombs, more so since Tommy‘s
> comment above. Unfortunately they may use the cover of the same weapon
code
> with/without suspected DU as they have done with the GBU‘s. They still
have
> 10-15 year old designations but many now with advanced penetrator options.
> The GBU-28 must have evolved a long way from the legendary 1991
prototype -
> artillery barrels stuffed with HE. They have a whole test centre
dedicated
> to developing HDBTDC weapons - China Lake? (see FAS). Perhaps the same
> goes for cluster bomb liners. I am still very suspicious about the S-M
plate
> liners.
>
> But at this stage I am as concerned for deminers as the local civilians in
> Afghanistan. And kind of hopeful that they may be a key to checking the
DU
> connection, if only for self-preservation. Perhaps you could post a field
> detection of DU hints and tips page?
>
> (PS you are welcome to quote bits of this message to your network if
> relevant. Likewise any relevant extracts from the report. Useful if I
can
> get it on line somehow to save you posting the lot.)
>
>
> UNMAS TECHNICAL NOTE:
> To recap on where we are now, the following is extracted from the UNMAS
> Technical Note 09.30 02 2001 Depleted Uranium (version 2). It may be a lot
> easier to follow if you visit their site and see it laid out properly.
(See
> http://www.gichd.ch/). So guys, what‘s what with the DU hazard in
demining?
> Anyone using PCMs? Anyone care? What do you think?
>
>
> Introduction
> There has been recent major media speculation and interest in the
potential
> hazards presented by DU contamination in post-conflict environments. This
> has resulted in the publication of speculative material about the possible
> risks to health from DU. Much of this recently published material is not
> supported by the existing scientific knowledge of the real health hazards
> posed by DU.
>
> This Technical Note has been written, as an advisory document, to remind
> mine action managers and field staff of all the potential hazards of DU
and
> to provide guidance on the establishment of a safe operating environments
> and procedures.
> The DU clearance tasks should only be undertaken by appropriately
qualified
> EOD personnel or other qualified staff; they are not a task for basic
> deminers or other field staff.
>
>
> Clearance of depleted uranium (DU) hazards
> 1. Scope
> This Technical Note establishes principles and provides guidance on the
> clearance of depleted uranium (DU) hazards encountered during demining
> operations in a permissive post conflict environment.
> 2. References
> A list of normative references is given in Annex A. Normative references
> are important documents to which reference is made in this Technical Note
> and which form part of the provisions of this Technical Note.
> 3. Terms and definitions
> A list of terms and definitions used in this Technical Note is given in
> Annex B. In the Technical Notes series, the words ‘should‘ and ‘may‘ are
> used to indicate the intended degree of compliance. This use is
consistent
> with the language used in International Mine Action Standards (INMAS) and
> guides.
> a) ‘should‘ is used to indicate the preferred requirements, methods or
> specifications.
> b) ‘may‘ is used to indicate a possible method or course of action.
>
> 4. Background
> Recent conflict has seen the limited use of DU munitions by both air and
> ground forces to destroy ground targets, mainly AFVs. The legacy of the
> use of these munitions remains and could be a clearance task for demining
> organisations in, currently, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kuwait and Kosovo and
> following other future conflicts.
> DU ammunition is known to be currently in service with the armed forces of
> Israel, Russia, UK and USA, and is reportedly under development by India.
> It is thought that DU ammunition is restricted to the following generic
> types of ammunition;
> a) Armour Piercing Fin Stabilised Discarding Sabot (APFSDS) tank and AFV
> ammunition in calibres including 25mm, 105mm and 120mm;
> b) 20mm cannon rounds for the U.S. Navy‘s Close-In Weapons System (CIWS),
> commonly referred to as "Phalanx"; and
> c) Cannon rounds, both 25mm and 30mm, for U.S. ground attack aircraft,
> including the A-10 "Warthog," and the AV-8B "Harrier."
>
> 5. Reasons for DU hazard clearance
> There are numerous reasons why the clearance of DU hazards may be
desirable
> in a post conflict situation. These include:
> a) to reduce risk to human health;
> b) to allow destruction of unserviceable or unstable ammunition;
> c) to safeguard the environment;
> d) to permit environmental clearance of the area;
> e) to allow the EOD clearance of armoured fighting vehicles (AFV).
> 6. The DU threat
>
> 6.1. Uranium
> Natural uranium is a material of low radioactivity, which can be handled,
> worked and stored with simple safety precautions. When enriched uranium is
> manufactured from natural uranium, a residue of depleted uranium is left,
> which is markedly less radioactive than the initial uranium; it is no more
> chemically toxic than lead.
> Natural uranium exists as three isotopes of different half-life and
> different radioactivity in the following proportions:
> ISOTOPE ABUNDANCE(ATOM %) DISCHARGES / MINUTE HALF-LIFE(YEARS) REMARKS
> 238 U 99.200% 105 109 The parent of the natural uranium series.
> 235 U 0.720% 106 108 the parent of the natural actinium series.
> 234 U 0.006% 1010 105 A daughter product of 238U decay.
>
> The 235 U and 234 U are more active and are therefore more commercially
> useful isotopes. In order to provide the commercial uranium industry with
a
> standard for the activity of uranium, a level of 0.711 weight% (wt%) of
235
> U is considered to be natural uranium. 235 U was chosen for this
standard
> because it is the most relevant isotope for use as fuel in nuclear
reactors.
> To exceed this 0.711wt% requires processing, to produce what is known as
> "enriched uranium". The remaining uranium substrate from which the 235 U
> has been removed to enrich other uranium is known as "depleted uranium"
> (DU). This DU usually has less than 0.2wt% 235 U content.
>
> To display sufficient radioactivity to be commercially useful, uranium
> requires enrichment to more than 8.0wt%. At this level, the radiation
> hazard exceeds the metal‘s toxicity. DU, with a 235 U component of less
> than 0.2wt% emits too little radiation to cause serious harm, and
therefore
> the hazard is metal toxicity.
>
> DU is a by-product of the uranium enrichment process and is also widely
used
> as ballast or counterbalances in ships and aircraft. It is also used as
> radiation shielding and in non-nuclear civil applications requiring
> high-density material.
>
> DU is comprised almost entirely of 238 U isotopes; it is approximately 60%
> as radioactive as natural uranium and behaves, chemically and physically
in
> the same way as natural uranium.
>
> The uranium industry has been operating for over 50 years and the
experience
> gained from handling uranium in its raw, enriched and depleted state over
> this period has provided the basis for the handling and use of DU. As a
> result of this experience, care and safety standards have been developed
to
> reduce the potential hazards of handling and using DU to a minimum.
> 1.2.6.2. Advice and International Responsibilities
> Advice on radiation safety and on the disposal of radioactive waste can be
> obtained from either:
> International Atomic Energy Authority (IAEA)
> P.O. Box 100
> Wagramer Strasse 5
> A-1400 Vienna, Austria
>
> Tel: (+43) (1) 2600-0
> Fax: (+43) (1) 2600-7
> E-Mail: Official.Mail@iaea.org
> http://www.iaea.org/worldatom/Press/P_release/2001/du_background.shtml
>
> World Health Organisation (WHO)
> Avenue Appia 20
> 1211 Geneva 27
> Switzerland
>
> Tel: (+41) (22) 791 2599
> Fax: (+41) (22) 791 3111
> E-Mail: inf@who.int
> http://www.who.int/inf-fs/en/fact257.html
>
> The IAEA has statutory responsibilities for establishing standards for the
> protection of health against exposure to ionising radiation and for
> providing for the application of these standards at the request of any
> State. In fulfilment of these functions, the IAEA has established a
> comprehensive corpus of radiation safety standards in close collaboration
> and consultation with other relevant organisations in the United Nations
> system.
> The International Basic Safety Standards for Protection against Ionising
> Radiation and for the Safety of Radiation Sources (Basic Safety
Standards),
> which were established jointly with the International Labour Organisation
> (ILO) and other international organisations including the WHO, are the
> authoritative radiation protection standards for assessing the potential
> radiological impact of the uses of DU.
> The exposures to which the requirements of the Basic Safety Standards
apply
> are any occupational exposure, medical exposure or public exposure.
However,
> they only cover risks of radiation and do not cover the toxic risks that
may
> be associated with uranium intake. In the past, the IAEA, based on its
> statutory mandate and competence has prepared comprehensive scientific
> radiological impact assessments.
> 1.3.6.3. DU ammunition
> DU is used in kinetic energy attack munitions because of its metallurgical
> properties; it is metallurgically similar to steel, thereby allowing
similar
> production and processing techniques to be used. The very high density
> allows for much higher kinetic energy levels to be delivered to the
target
> than an equivalent round made of, for example, steel. A secondary effect
is
> that the DU oxidises readily, thereby proving a pyrophoric effect within
the
> target.
> The combination of design, high mass and high velocity allows the DU round
> to penetrate the target using the principle of hydrodynamic penetration.
> The pressures involved are so high that the armour of the target flows
away
> from the DU penetrator
> 1.4.6.4. Identification of DU fragments
> DU fragments have the following physical characteristics:
> a) non-magnetic;
> b) extremely heavy. In relation to size DU is 60% more dense than lead;
> c) jet-black lumps or dust, possibly with a greenish tinge. After three to
> four weeks they will turn green;
> d) honeycombed. The fragment will have an aerated texture;
> e) they retain heat. DU fragments will retain heat to the point where they
> will cause serious burns for three to four hours after firing. A red hot
> core may be coated with black dust and therefore appear cool; and
> f) sparking. When cold, if struck with a metallic object such as a pick or
> shovel, they will spark in a similar fashion to a lighter.
> 6.5. Depleted Uranium (DU)
> 6.5.1. Health hazards
> The health hazards depend on:
> a) the route of exposure, (inhalation, ingestion or contact in wounds);
> b) the magnitude of exposure; and
> c) the particle size and solubility of DU.
> Effects due to external exposure would be limited to radiological effects,
> whilst the effects due to internal exposure include both radiological and
> chemical toxicity effects.
> Information on the health and environmental effects of DU is limited.
> However, since uranium and DU are essentially the same, except for the
> composition of their radioactive components, scientific studies on natural
> uranium are applicable to DU.
> Notwithstanding these hazards, the real risks have been assessed as
minimal,
> provided appropriate safety precautions are taken and followed.
> 1.1.2.6.5.2. Radiation dose rate
> DU emits alpha, beta and gamma radiation. Alpha radiation will not
penetrate
> clothing or even skin. The radiation dose rate at the surface of
unshielded
> DU is approximately 2.3 milli sieverts per hour (mSv/hr). A large
proportion
> (98%) of this dose rate is attributable to beta radiation.
> The density of DU means that only radiation emitting from the surface is a
> factor, as the DU itself shields the internal emissions.
> Despite this decay rate, it is emphasized that DU is not a nuclear,
> radiological or chemical weapon; the DU is used because of its high atomic
> mass/density and metallurgical properties.
> 1.1.3.6.5.3. Hazard reduction
> The bare DU material (either as a complete round or as pieces of a fired
> penetrator) would have to be handled in excess of 200 hours before the UK
> Safe Exposure Limit (SEL) of 500mSv (for the hands) is exceeded. This SEL
is
> extremely conservative. The external radiation hazard to the hands can be
> significantly reduced by the wearing of gloves that attenuate the beta
dose
> further, giving safe times of up to 5000 hours per year.
> The risk can therefore be considered to be low and it becomes negligible
> once gloves are worn.
> 1.1.4.6.5.4. DU dust
> A slightly increased hazard to those undertaking EOD clearance arises from
> the presence of DU dust produced as a result of fire or explosion.
> Ingestion, inhalation or the passage through an open wound or abrasion of
DU
> particles could, but is very unlikely to, affect the kidneys and lungs.
> Insoluble DU particles could accumulate in the lung parenchyma; this
> presents a low toxic risk because of the insolubility, but could lead to
> localised low-level radiation damage.
> Soluble DU particles at a low concentration level can be rapidly excreted
by
> the kidneys without damage. At very high concentrations, there is a
> possibility of renal necrosis followed by regeneration. However, to reach
> these high levels, an individual would have to be exposed to DU dust
> particles, without any form of personal protection, for a very long time.
> Normal EOD operations require the use of PPE, and are completed long
before
> there is any real risk of surpassing even the low concentration levels.
> The UK Defence Radiological Protection Service (DRPS) consider the
> precautions recommended in this Technical Note are more than adequate to
> provide protection. Good personal hygiene, such as the covering of cuts
and
> grazes before work commences and the washing of hands after work will
> further reduce the already small hazard.
> The respiratory protection requirement is related more to the chemical
> toxicity of DU than to its radioactivity. The danger from heavy metal
> poisoning may exceed the radiation hazard.
> 1.1.5.6.5.5. DU contamination from stored or unbroken fired rounds
> In all DU ammunition, the DU component of the projectile or round is
> contained within a steel or aluminium jacket. Should it be obvious that
the
> projectile or round is intact, being either unfired or having impacted on
a
> soft surface, and the jacket appears to be unbroken, the rounds have
almost
> nil hazard.
> 1.1.6.6.5.6. DU fragments and contamination from fired rounds
> As the sub-projectile, (penetrator), of DU ammunition hydro-dynamically
> penetrates through a target it breaks up into fragments, some of which can
> be quite large. At the same time, very high temperatures are generated
> within the DU and DU oxide is dispersed into the atmosphere, albeit in
very
> small quantities.
> DU fragments will be in all shapes and sizes. Some may still be oxidizing
> and, as such, their cores will remain red hot up to some hours after
firing.
> 7. Equipment
> 7.1. Personal Protective Equipment (PPE)
> The following PPE should ideally be used by the EOD technician or
qualified
> staff member until the presence of DU can be positively discounted:
> a) inner cotton gloves;
> b) outer heavy PVC gloves of industrial quality;
> c) respirator or face mask; and
> d) protective trousers and overboots. (Optional to protect clothing).
> The aim of the PPE should be to provide complete overall protection from
> inhaled or skin-contact dust, and cuts from sharp fragments. Managers
> unable to obtain military equipment should use the best materials, and
> ingenuity, to achieve this requirement.
> 1.2.7.2. Thermoluminescent Dosimeter (TLD)
> The EOD technician should wear a TLD during DU clearance operations.
> Personal dosimetry and health checks should be co-ordinated with a local
> appropriately qualified medical facility. TLDs can be obtained from a
> variety of sources. The following have been identified from an Internet
> search; there will be many others:
> a) Landeur. (http://www.landaueriii.com/);
> b) Proxtronics Incorporated. (http://www.radiationmanagement.net/); or
> c) Rados Technology. (http://www.rados.fi/).
> Information on how thermoluminescent dosimetry works can be found at
> http://www.ab.ust.hk/sepo/tips/rp/rp002.htm.
> 1.3.7.3. Portable Contamination Meter (PCM)
> A Portable Contamination Meter (PCM) - Type Mini Monitor fitted with a
B-6-H
> GM Tube, is a small, sensitive but rugged instrument used for the purpose
of
> detecting DU contamination.
> An Internet search will provide a wide range of suppliers for these
> instruments.
> 1.4.7.4. Alternative methods
> Where dosimeters or PCMs are not available, and there is historical
evidence
> of the use of DU ammunition by one party to the conflict, then all AFVs
are
> to be considered suspect and full precautions taken accordingly.
> 8. DU clearance methodology
> 8.1. Detection of DU contamination
> 8.1.1. Use of PCM
> It may not always be possible to identify DU contaminated areas visually.
> Normal radiological instruments are not sensitive enough to be of any use;
> therefore it is recommended that a Portable Contamination Meter (PCM)
should
> be used.
> 1.1.2.8.1.2. Personal Dosimetry and Health Checks
> At least one member of each EOD or specialist team is to be nominated as a
> Control Member and issued with a Thermoluminescent Dosimeter (TLD), which
is
> to be worn whenever EOD duties are being carried out in areas where DU
> ammunition has been fired. In addition to wearing a TLD, which is to be
> exchanged each month, collection of a urine sample from the same Control
> Member of each team is to be arranged, again on a monthly basis. This
should
> be coordinated with a local appropriately equipped medical facility.
> The demining organisation should ensure that personnel medical records are
> annotated that they have worked in a potential DU environment to allow for
> regular monitoring in the future.
> 1.2.8.2. Personal protection
> WARNING 1: DU fragments. Do not let DU residue or fragments come into
> contact with exposed unprotected skin. DU fragments are not to be picked
up
> by hand; a scoop or other such tool is to be used.
> DU contamination is relatively harmless unless ingested or absorbed into
the
> bloodstream through open cuts. Fragments of the DU penetrator are
extremely
> sharp and liable to cause cuts if handled carelessly.
> 1.1.1.8.2.1. Simple precautions
> The following simple precautions will reduce the risk of DU contamination
> and serious risks to health:
> a) sleeves are to be rolled down and two pairs of gloves, inner cotton or
> nylon and outer heavy PVC are to be worn. Care is to be taken to avoid
sharp
> objects that may rip the gloves and expose the skin;
> b) allow a minimum of four hours to elapse after firing before attempting
to
> carry out range clearance. Fragments of DU penetrator are red hot
internally
> for up to four hours after firing;
> c) a respirator is to be worn at all times. This will protect against the
> ingestion of any DU oxide that is released due to the movement of
fragments.
> In the absence of a respirator, a damp face veil tied around the nose and
> mouth, or a medical or industrial face mask, will provide adequate
> protection;
> d) do not use the boot to turn over or move fragments. Always use a CV
Tool,
> stick, scoop or similar item as a remote tool; and
> e) in order to prevent contamination of personal clothing and footwear,
> coveralls and overboots are to be worn if considered necessary.
> 8.2.2. Casualties
> The appropriate medical authorities are to be informed of any casualties
> that occur whilst in a DU contaminated area.
> 1.3.8.3. Collection, disposal and decontamination
> 8.3.1. Collection
> 8.3.1.1. Box Preparation
> The container used must be a robust metal box of suitable size and without
> holes. The box must be strong enough to carry the heavy weight produced by
> even a small quantity of DU and it must be capable of being secured so as
to
> prevent any leakage of the contents. Wooden or cardboard boxes are not to
be
> used as they will absorb contamination.
> A 20 mm lining of a suitable material such as sand or earth is to be
> inserted into the box. This lining is used as a packing medium to hold the
> DU fragments, absorb any DU oxides and prevent fire. The 20 mm lining
should
> be built up around the sides and on top of each layer of fragments as the
> box is filled. A final layer of sand or earth is to be added to the top
> before the box is closed.
> 1.1.1.2.8.3.1.2. DU Fragments
> When collecting DU fragments, a little earth or sand should be lifted with
> the fragment. This process assists in masking any oxides that may surround
> the DU fragments.
> 1.1.1.3.8.3.1.3. Box Marking
> Once filled with fragments and topped with sand or earth the box is to be
> closed and sealed to prevent leakage. The box is to then be marked CAUTION
> RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL - DU FRAGMENTS and the appropriate Trefoil sign
> applied.
> 1.1.1.4.8.3.1.4. Manual Transportation
> Although DU fragments only represent a low toxicity Alpha source hazard,
> filled boxes should not be carried close to the body. They should be held
> away from the body as far as is reasonably possible. Two or three boxes
may
> be carried between two persons using a robust 6 ft pole through the
handles.
> 1.1.2.8.3.2. Disposal
> Filled boxes should be moved to a collection point, (fenced off and
suitably
> marked and signed), and stacked ready for removal by a specialist
hazardous
> and radiological waste disposal company.
> It should be noted that because DU is so dense it acts as radioactive
> shielding, as a result the internal boxes in a stack are shielded by the
> outside boxes. In addition the dose rate at the surface is reduced by
> distance based on the Inverse Square Law. A relatively small distance will
> reduce the level of absorbed radiation appreciably and therefore fencing
> need only be 1 m from the stack.
> 1.1.3.8.3.3. Decontamination
> 8.3.3.1. Surface decontamination
> Decontamination of the ground surface by the removal of spent but unbroken
> penetrators or rounds can be achieved by physical removal of the items.
The
> same precautions as for DU fragments (Clause 8.3.21.2) should be used in
the
> event of jacket rupture, and the fragments should be stored whilst
awaiting
> specialist removal in accordance with Clause 8.3.2.
> 1.1.1.2.8.3.3.2. Target decontamination
> Decontamination of targets can be achieved by vigorously throwing several
> shovelfuls of sand or earth at the target in the area of penetration. This
> removes any traces of DU oxide on the surface and any residual DU
fragments
> in the target can then be collected. Using the PCM, check the area
> immediately below the target for contamination and collect any
contaminated
> sand or earth. Any fragments or contaminated sand or earth must be boxed
in
> accordance with the procedure laid down in Clause 8.3.1.
> 1.1.1.3.8.3.3.3. Jammed penetrators
> Occasionally a partial penetration of a target resulting in a jammed
> penetrator may occur. The surface is to be decontaminated in accordance
with
> the procedure laid down in Clause 8.3.3.1. The penetrator is then to be
left
> for between 7 to 14 days. During the weathering process the penetrator
will
> shrink and can then be removed with a sharp knock.
> 1.1.1.4.8.3.3.4. Cross contamination
> Having taken all precautions to prevent injury and contamination in the
area
> of operations it should be remembered that clothing and footwear may have
> become contaminated and could remain so for a considerable period of time.
> Any item suspected of being contaminated should be cleaned immediately and
> checked using a PCM.
> Normal personal hygiene of washing the face and hands or taking a shower
> will overcome any further possibility of cross contamination.
> 9. Safety brief
> Demining organisations should ensure that all of their managerial,
demining,
> administrative and support staff are briefed as to the hazards of DU if
they
> have to move in a potential DU environment. (Their EOD or specially
> qualified personnel should already be trained in the hazards of DU).
> Although such personnel will not be actively involved in the clearance of
DU
> hazards, they may inadvertently place themselves in a potentially
hazardous
> situation by examining targets hit by DU munitions.
> The following safety brief should be made available to such personnel:
> DU is a heavy metal, which is used primarily in anti-armour ammunition in
> the main armament of battle tanks, and in the cannon of some ground attack
> aircraft. It is only slightly radioactive and it has a chemical toxicity
> similar to lead.
> There is no appreciable hazard when the DU round is intact, even after
> firing, but there is a minor hazard when the DU round strikes a hard
target.
> This can result in DU dust and fragments around the target to a radius of
> 50m. There is only a risk if particles are eaten, breathed in or enter
the
> body through an open wound. Even then, there is only a very slightly
> increased risk of cancer, or liver failure, over the next 50 years.
> You should be aware that it will not be possible, without special
> instruments, to detect whether a damaged target has been struck by DU. The
> following precautions should be taken.
> a) Do not enter or climb onto a damaged hard target, or loiter within 50
> metres, unless you are working in co-operation with an EOD technician.
> b) If your work requires you to work within 50 metres, wear a facemask and
> gloves, and roll your sleeves down. Cover any cuts and abrasions with
> waterproof dressings. Spend as little time as practicable on the task.
> c) Do not eat, drink or smoke near the damaged target. After completing
> your task, wash and shower as soon as practicable. Remove your outer
> clothing and, if feasible, replace it. Otherwise, have it laundered. Do
> not eat, drink or smoke until you have done so.
> d) If you suspect you have been exposed to DU, inform your medical support
> team.
> 10. Responsibilities
> 10.1. National mine action authority
> The National Mine Action Authority is responsible for warning all mine
> action agencies of any armoured conflicts that have taken place, and any
> history of the use of DU rounds. The Authority should be aware of these
> Notes, and make copies available, through the National Mine Action Centre,
> to all mine action agencies, including those involved in Mine Awareness.
> 1.2.10.2. Demining organisations
> The manager of any mine action team should also be aware of these notes,
and
> if the use of DU ammunition is suspected or proved, should include the
> recommendations of these notes in SOPs. The manager is also responsible
for
> ensuring the presence of a trained EOD staff member, or for sending a
staff
> member for specific training in DU hazards. Where a National Mine Action
> Authority of Mine Action Centre have not been established, managers are
> responsible for establishing amongst themselves a code of practice to
ensure
> the safety of mine action staff and locals.
> 1.3.10.3. Demining personnel
> All mine action staff working in areas of potential DU contamination,
should
> make every effort to keep themselves free from DU dust hazard by
> conscientious use of protective equipment, and strict observation to SOPs
> and the dictates of common sense.
>
>
> Annex A
> (Normative)
> References
>
> The following documents when referred to in the text of this Technical
Note,
> form part of the provisions of this guide.
> a) IMAS 04.10. Glossary of demining terms.
> The latest version/edition of these references should be used. UNMAS hold
> copies of all references used in this Technical Note. A register of the
> latest version/edition of the IMAS standards and references is maintained
by
> UNMAS, and can be read on the UNMAS web site: (See
www.mineaction.org).
> National mine action authorities, employers and other interested bodies
and
> organisations should obtain copies before commencing mine action
programmes.
> The latest version/edition of the Technical Notes can be read on the GICHD
> web site: (See http://www.gichd.ch/).
After reading this I thought to my self who‘s using weapon‘s of M.W.D. ?
It‘s a live topic in the U.K. and the U.S. right now to ban them due to the toxic residue‘s they leave which linger for year‘s!!!!!!
:bullet: 
