Canadian Artillery-5 Years[and counting] of Artillery Thoughts

[Gunner]

Couple of questions to start a discussion on the black art of indirect fire:

1.  Currently in the Royal Regiment of Canadian Artillery we use in the Regular Force the M109A3/A4, the LG1, and the C3 (Reserve Force primarily).  The Army's vision for 2020 sees the Artillery developing a rocket (MLRS type) capability.  

a.  Is this a good thing for the Canadian Artillery?

b.  Where should the capability lie?  In the Regular Force or the Reserves.  It would fit in well for the Regular Force to concentrate on a close support task and the Reserve Force would concentrate on general support and reinforcing tasks.  Is this an option?

2.  Air Defence Artillery.  Is it time to admit that we've destroyed whatever capability that we once had in Air Defence.  When 1 CMBG was augmented by gunners from 4 AD Regt and 18 AD Regt, there was a general consensus that the gunners had lost their combined arms skills and we not equiped to take part in a "modern" Battle Group.  Where do we go from here?

3.  Finally, who should provide the mortar platoon in an infantry battalion?  The Artillery or the Infantry as a secondary skill?

 

[madorosh]

Dad was a gunner, so I‘ll throw my two cents in.

1. How do rocket artillery compare to Guns in terms of a) accuracy, b) cost, c) ease of training, d) deployability (ie do you need a crane to emplace your launchers, or can you whip em around with an ML like you can a 105?)

3. I think your mortar platoon should be manned by infantry - who learn it as a PRIMARY skill. The 60mm is already taught as a secondary skill, yes? I would have dedicated troops manning the battalion mortars - teach it as a secondary skill to as many as you can, but have your best mortarmen in the mortar platoon.

 

[Gunner]

1. Rocket Artillery (I‘m not an expert on rockets, however, I‘ve seen pictures! <grin>):

a. Accuracy - with rockets you sacrifice accuracy for an extremely large footprint (MLRS Battery covers approx 1.2 Km sq). As well you are maximizing the shock action of the artillery. The MLRS salvos are fire and forget ... same as current tube artillery so I would have to say its not a large difference.

b. Cost - one MLRS launcher packs the same punch as a complete battery of artillery. I‘d have to say that MLRS is more expensive then tube artillery.

c. ease of training - hmm...as I‘m not an expert, I‘ll have to deduce that the number of gunners that are required is less, however, there is a longer logistical tail required for MLRS.

d) deployability - the MLRS being looked at is the type (name escapes me right now) is a MLRS launcher on a wheeled truck. Hence it would be deployable just about anywhere.

2. Mortar Platoons - So you agree with the status quo. However, if the artillery are the indirect fire experts...does it make sense to cross train infantrymen to do a non-standard task. Moreover, does it make financial sense to train a grunt to do a herbies job? Moreover the same can be said for engineers and the pioneer platoon.

 

[madorosh]

Regarding the status quo - I think there are intangibles that come into play too - if you have a Patricia mortar platoon firing in support of fellow Patricias - do you see what I‘m getting at? Not that the gunners haven‘t historically worked themselves to the bone to support the infantry, but I think you get that indefinable extra iota of effort if the guys you are firing in support of wear the same cap badge as you. It would mean that much more when out of action too - easier to integrate the mortar platoon into other battalion activities away from the firing line. Not the main consideration or perhaps even an important one, but something to consider nonetheless.

As for financial sense - if the medium mortar is only found in infantry mortar platoons, you‘re going to have to train x number of men on them, whether they come from the RCA or the infantry, so I‘m not sure where the burden comes in. Can you explain?

Gunners are experts at indirect fire - but they are not the only ones who use it. Infantry are the "experts" at digging slit trenches, but everyone in the battle zone does it, yes? Tank drivers are the best - but the infantry has Bison and Grizzly drivers - should we turn their vehicles over to the Armoured Corps? No. We have a regimental system, for good or for bad - and I think it is for good. Personally, I HATE wearing the paper clips (Log branch) badge because I am a clerk - I belong to an infantry regiment, and I wore the regimental badge for 8 years as a musician. I think morale issues are as important as questions like training time.

Just one opinion among many, I‘m sure....

 

[garb811]

Hehehe...this discussion reminds me of an satirical article I was reading the other day in the Doctrine journal about a infantry Bn in 1954 that was down to a lone infantryman due to the various branches reaching out and taking control of "their area of expertise" like you‘ve been talking about.

One issue with the mortar Pl is that the CO doesn‘t have to worry about the mortars being tasked with fire missions in support of other units unless he expressly allows it. Would the reassurances be the same when the Arty OC Pl comd is being pressured by his big boss (who he knows he‘ll be working again some day) to release the tubes?

 

[JO]

By the way, I think the name of the wheeled MLRS system we‘re looking at is called HIMARS - High Mobility Artillery Rocket System. It carries one launcher box - the tracked MLRS carries two - so it has only half the rockets available to fire at any one time when compared to MLRS; but it can be carried on a Herc. I don‘t think the Artillery is thinking of losing all its guns in favor of rockets - I think they want the HIMARS/MLRS capability as part of the deep battle concept or to augment the tube artillery. I was talking to a senior arty officer a couple months back who told me that they are looking at the GIAT Caesar - a 155mm howitzer on a truck similar to the one used for HIMARS. I think that due to the trend in the army in general over the past few years, whatever the artillery gets, tube or rocket, it‘ll be wheeled and C-130 transportable. I don‘t believe we‘ve seen the last of the 155mm yet.

 

[bossi]

Well, I suppose my comments are heresy to gunners (I‘m a grunt), but my long-held opinion is that artillery in general should be the domain of the reserves - after all, we really only use artillery during war (when reserves would be called up/committed). In peacetime, the demand is for infantry and armour (for peace-keeping missions) - The recent deployment of arty (with their guns) on a peace-keeping mission is a "blip" - normally the gunners were re-roled as infantry on all previous missions.

Thus, we should have a battery of Regulars in each Army Area as the training cadre, RHQ/etc. at the arty school or CTC - said batteries could quickly be amalgamated to form a regiment if one were needed "overnight", while the reserves would gear up for hostilities.

However, I know my suggestion will never happen in Canada - it would entail "trusting" the reserves, and actually respecting the fact they would be needed in wartime - something our peacetime Regular mentality steadfastly refuses to accept.

Dileas
M.A. Bossi, Esquire

 

[Gunner]

Hey...great discussions so far. In response:

a. The mortar platoon does provide an infantry CO with his own dedicated fire support and because of that I don‘t think the mortar platoon should ever be taken away from him. However, I‘ve never been one for the hat badge arguement and I don‘t know if gunners would not work as hard at sending rounds down range if their battalion is being attacked...remember that the mortar baseplate will be set up somewhere in the battalion lines. With regard to responding to calls of fire the mortar platoon is capable of fighting in the indirect battle, however, it is not its role. My financial arguement was if gunners have the indirect fire role as their primary role, why cross train grunts to do it if they‘re only going to do it for a couple of years.

b. Yes, that‘s it...the rocket artillery being considered is HIMARS...brain fart on me...sorry.

c. The idea of scrapping the Regular Force Artillery has been bandied around for awhile and happily discarded. I think you will see the Reg F artillery reduced by one battery in the near to mid future. Unfortunately we are in a situation with all types of new gear coming in that require alot of FCS Techs, etc. The Bns/Regts don‘t have the technical manpower to properly service the Coyotes and LAVs entering service. Take 2 PPCLI (an M113 Bn)How much of their fire control systems can go wrong? Hint..M113s don‘t have a fire control system. With LAV III it is a different ball of wax entirely.

 

[herr_scooter]

Being an ex-mortarman myself I‘ll through my 2 cents into the fray.

The role of the 81mm Mortar Pl, is to provide indirect fire support to the Btl Gp Commander in all phases of war. Note it is Bde Commander. Very rarely will the FSCC order a Mor Gp to fire a brigade target, with the possible exception of illumination. Furthermore the Bn Comd/Btl Gp commander has a trained staff that is able to advise him on indirect fire support, through the Pl Comd and FSCC from an infantry perspective.

Also do not forget that the 81mm Mortar is a very different weapon than a howitzer. It is employed differently, drills are different, and Mortar Gp Battle Procedure is different from the way it is done with the guns. Also the Bn Mortar Pl is the most heavily armed pl in the Btl Gp. (supposedly 1LMG, 1 84mm, (.50 cal/C-6 if mechanized). Furthermore a high standard of battle and fieldcraft is required as a Mor Gp is required to often operate away from the battle group in order to employ the weapon most effectively. Mortar FC‘s are best as infantrymen as they understand the Coy picture when providing support during an action. In addition the 81mm Mortar when employed to at its peak effectiveness often provides better fire support than the 105mm (for example the leathal radius with an 81 is 40m vs. 50m for the 105mm, it provides high angle fire which is better for destroying dug in targets, it has a higher rate of fire, Mortar fire unless converged provides a beaten zone,and it definatley provides much better illumination.

 

[Brad Sallows]

1.a) Yes. Footprint, range, and TOT-like effects married to undeniable shoot-and-scoot ability are advantages. I think the cost is less than for equivalent gun systems. The logistical disadvantage is offset by range, which should allow systems to deploy with access to good routes. Definitely an asset for prosecuting deep battle at brigade level and higher.

1.b) As with everything, a regular-reserve mix best compromises between readiness and cost. A single regular battery would ensure the capability is available at relatively short notice on a scale sufficient to support a brigade group.

2) ADA needs to be revisited. It would be useful to have MANPADs at the battalion level. This doesn‘t necessarily mean another infantry trade (see below).

3) Mortars, recce, pioneers, anti-armour (TOW) (and maybe ADA) at the unit level all need to be revisited with regard to trades. Do service support trades have difficulty identifying with a regiment or battalion when posted in? Maybe Coyote, LAV and TOW should be crewed by crewmen; mortars and ADA by gunners; and pioneer platoons by engineers. We could eliminate a bunch of courses, increase viability and opportunity for some trades, and increase the expertise present in the infantry battalion. If the A Ech benefits by having the same training and knowing how its counterparts in the Service Battalion operate, what advantages are we missing by not doing the same with the specialties in the F Ech?

 

[Gunner]

Herr Shooter, you bring up some very valid points in your posting, however, (and we‘ve had this discussion extensively using this service) you cannot compare mortars with artillery.

Indeed the mortars provide a battle group commander with his own limited indirect fire resource. Mortars by there very nature are not a flexible weapon with the logistical tail to sustain devastating amount of firepower upon the modern battlefield. To insinuate that the pl comd of the mortar pl is only capable of providing the rudimentary ideas of how indirect fire can play a key role in accomplishing the battle group commanders mission. The artillery FSCC gives the Battle Group Commander access to a wide range of artillery, air defence, rockets, atk aviation, naval gun fire, close air support and support from flanking and allied artillery resources. The artillery is capable of coordinating all these assets and delivering it as a "orchestra of fire".

Is this to say that mortars are not important? Hardly, the mortar is an extremely versatile and simple to use weapon capable of sending a large amount of bombs into the air in a very short amount of time. The problem is in its long time of flight, its vulnerability to enemy indirect fire, and as I mentioned before, it limited logistical capability.

 

[herr_scooter]

Gunner said: To insinuate that the pl comd of the mortar pl is only capable of providing the rudimentary ideas of how indirect fire can play a key role in accomplishing the battle group commanders mission. The artillery FSCC gives the Battle Group Commander access to a wide range of artillery, air defence, rockets, atk aviation, naval gun fire, close air support and support from flanking and allied artillery resources. The artillery is capable of coordinating all these assets and delivering it as a "orchestra of fire".

Good points, however:

1. Never forget that with 1 armd regt per bde. (Which in all reality is 1 sqn of tanks), all Btl Gp‘s the Canadian Army fields in the forseable future will be Infanrty heavy.

2. Most taskings by which the Army participate in will be UN taksings and as such 105mm Artillery will not be allowed in the mission area (judging on most UN mandates). Which leads me to ask why are the artillery interested in Mortars? Because the Artilley needs to justify it‘s existence in the kinder gentler army of the 21st Century. Let‘s face it here folk‘s no artillery regt has been deployed overseas (as a whole) on a UN/operations other than war mission since Cyprus.

3. What I said is that a Mor Pl Comd, being an Infantry
Officer, has a background of experience that and Artillery FOO or Bty Comd does not, the Mor Pl Comd has been a rifle Pl Comd, and understands the facts of life when it comes to the infantry pl and company in battle (or at least to a higher degree than an artillery officer.

4. I do not mean to slag the artillery. What I am simply saying is that the role of the artillery is furhter up the food chain. Mortars are used to provide fire support within the Btl Gp Comd‘s immediate AO, they cannot really "reach out and touch someone.". Just cause a mortar is fired indirectly does not make it the exclusive ballywick of the artillery. It is the same with TUA. TUA is employed much differently than the weapons systems that the Armoured Corps uses. Does this make TUA a replacement for the tank, no, what it is a platform which allows for the infantry to counter the armour threat within the BG AO.

 

[Brad Sallows]

Artillerists may not understand the platoon in battle. But a FOO (captain) hangs out with company and squadron commanders (majors) and is intimately involved with the company/squadron battle. Given their greater understanding of fire support, it can be argued an experienced FOO has at least equal if not greater understanding of the company battle than infantry or armour officers of equivalent rank.

Mortars are not inherently inflexible; we just don‘t employ them to the same degree as some armies.

I‘ve seen figures which (if valid) indicate that a mortar round can have up to 3 times the lethal area of an equivalent calibre of gun and 2 times that of an equivalent calibre of howitzer (chiefly dependent on the angle of an incoming round relative to the ground - mortars generally come in high and consequently have a more even distribution of fragments).

 

[Mr Magoo]

I‘d like to get back to some of the earlier arguments.

Artillery is vital in battle. That‘s why it should be
kept as a Regular and Reserve Force element. Artillery is
a integral part of the Cbt Arms. Are we so brain-washed that
anyone would seriously consider getting rid of Arty because
"UN missions don‘t reqr it"? I hope to God that you are
kidding.

Militiamen in Canada, of which I am one, can not be sent
overseas without their permission, and can only be sent
to war by way of legislation. Without Regular Artillery
we‘ll be so hamstrung we‘ll never get into a war.

I can‘t believe that people on this board would suggest
such a thing. You‘re supposed to be the ones championing
us to the citizenry and government. We‘ve lost our aircraft
carrier, our heavy bombers, our heavy lift helos, soon our
tanks, and you‘re willing to piss away our guns. More
casualties were caused in the World Wars by indirect fire
than direct fire.

 

[bossi]

Thank you for proving my point!

You said "Artillery is vital in battle. That‘s why it should be
kept as a Regular and Reserve Force element..."
(and, my proposal would do so)

However, you were off-target with "... anyone would seriously consider getting rid of Arty because ‘UN missions don‘t reqr it‘?".
(the day we cease to have artillery is the day we cease to be an army - however, if they‘re looking at peace-time cost-saving, then it makes perfect sense to scale back on wartime-only units such as artillery)

By the way, why on Earth would you want Canada to get into a war, and why do you have such a poor opinion of artillery reservists? (you said "Without Regular Artillery we‘ll be so hamstrung we‘ll never get into a war.") The Regular batteries distributed amongst the Areas would be the basis upon which we would "immediately" react, augmented by reserves (as always), with full war-time mobilisation reinforcing in due course.

I am acutely aware "... We‘ve lost our aircraft carrier, our heavy bombers, our heavy lift helos, soon our tanks,...".
It is exactly for this reason I‘m proposing to protect our artillery from being "pissed away" (which you incorrectly attributed to the suggestion of economising during peacetime by reducing Regular artillery and increasing reserve artillery).

More casualties are caused over the Net on bulletin boards by misunderstandings than by nose-to-nose slugfests.

Dileas Gu Brath
Mark Bossi, Esquire

 

[JO]

It was pointed out that to send reservists to war requires legislation. In that light it should be pointed out that the last two wars we fought in, the Gulf and Kosovo, we didn‘t declare war (ie. no legislation). I know that in the Gulf we did next to nothing on the ground, but we got a lot closer to a fighting ground commitment in Kosovo. In light of the present political climate where governments are extremely reluctant to actually declare war, wouldn‘t making artillery primarily a reserve function in "peacetime" tie the hands of the government in case of crisis? Look at the US - they haven‘t declared a war since 1941, and since then they‘ve fought in Korea, Vietnam, Grenada, Panama, the Gulf, Somalia, and Kosovo. I‘m not sure, but I don‘t think the Brits formally declared war over the Falklands, either (I could be wrong). How would the government justify the required legislation in support of a combat operation here in the Canadian political climate without the authority of a formal declaration of war?

 

[herr_scooter]

I am not advocating the elimination of artillery regts. from the Regular or Reserve orders of battle. What I am saying is that the operational demands on the army have increased 3 fold since 1992. The artillery (both AD and Fd) have played a lesser role in these operational commitments that the other Corps/Branches of the Army (Infantry, Armd, Engineers and Various CSS pls, coys and Bn‘s). If some one asked me right now which branch of the combat arms would not exist in 20 years, without bias I would say the artillery.

Face facts:

a) the M-109 is aging and IIRC they are only issued on a basis of 1Bty per regt. It is most likely the last SP gun the Canadian Army will own

b) the majority of guns in the artillery are C-3 howitzers. This is a 50 year old gun. Despite the modernization project that took place in the mid 90‘s, I find it hard to believe (as an infantryman mind you) that artillery technology has not changed that much in 50 years as to render the gun obsolete

c) the LG1 is a great piece of kit (so I‘ve heard) but, it can‘t be effectivley slung under a helocopter. and the fact that theve been peicemealed out at 1Bty per Regt instead of having 1 light artillery regt leads one to question the great plan for the LG1

d) The reg. force artillery is structured so to provide one GS regt per Bde. Most of our allies have supplanted 105 with 155mm guns.

I do, however, agree that regimental politics have gone too far in the army and is preventing the proper allocation of resources. Every one wants the shiny new kit but this is not really a realistic prospect. The Canadian Army should be structured with and Square Armd Brigade in Wainwright (2 Armd Regts, 2 Mech Infantry Bn‘s, 1 SP Regt, an Armoured Engineer Sqn and assorted attachments), a light infantry brigade in Petawawa and a motorized brigade in Valcartier with 2 RCR supported CTC. But this will never happen as regimental politics will not allow it.

 

[Mr Magoo]

The majority of my comments relate to Mr. Bossi‘s rejoinder.
I agree with the comments directly above.

Without Regular guns we might as well have a nice parade and
properly close out the Canadian Military. We‘ll be a simple
gendarmerie. No Army should be configured only for peacetime
purposes.

Fighting the guns is a complex thing involving use of ground
and airspace. To be done at its best, today, requires full-time
practitioners. With the proper lead-up training Reservists
can do a great job at the levels required for war, that is
above battery level.

Without Regular guns who‘s going to write the service papers?
Man the schools? Study the foreign armies, equipment and
tactics? Design the tactics for us? Liaise with our allies?
Test, purchase, or even make others aware of the requirement for
new guns? If you think the Arty is poorly off now, wait til
there are no Regular gunners.

If I didn‘t expect to fight a war, support war when all other
means of politics and diplomacy had failed why would I join the Army? No one should be in the Army if they simply desire a career, or a pension.

 

[Old Gunner]

Somewhere around here I have a quote from Field Marshal Montgomery. In it, he said that the artillery is a blend of the technical and tactical aspects of the army while the other arms and service specialize in one or the other areas. The gunners need to have the technical skills to place a specific type fire on a particular piece of ground and the tactical skill to ensure is used in the most effective way to support the battle.

The artillery is the only purely military technical service in the military. I am not suggesting that the infantry and armour don‘t have technical issues but, in the final analysis, their focus is almost entirely tactical. It‘s been a while, but I recall that it takes nearly a dozen specialized skilled technicians, both commissioned and otherwise, to fire a gun when you include not only the gun and its detachments, but also the survey parties, command post, computer people, FOOs and so on.

Moving from the battery to the regimental level enters into a whole new world of complexity. Stepping even further up to the DivArty level, the complexity is even more increased. Any gunner out there with any experience of these levels knows exactly what I am talking about.

One of the things that attracted me to the artillery was that their problems had finite answers: either your guns are located exactly that 10-figure grid reference or they aren‘t; your rounds hit that lone pine on the hill or they didn‘t. As most of us have experienced, the correct solution for the infantry and armour is the opinion of the senior officer present. This make the artillery the only branch of the army to train in peacetime exactly as they will operate in wartime.

Although I spent more that 20 years as a reserve gunner, I have to say that there is a critical need to keep the regular regiments. The reality of reserve service is that it is an uphill battle to maintain any degree of competency at the battery level let alone the very different requirements of the regimental level.

If extremely drastic cuts had to be made, I would rather see the regular infantry/armoured bns/regts reduced to coy/sqn and to preserve the artillery regiments as a critical military resource. I could even support the increase of reserve infantry/armoured and decrease of reserve artillery to support this.

I am certain that the non-gunners will have a lot to say about my closing comment. Keep in mind that my aim is to preserve military skills for later expansion and not to produce a rapid deployment force for the UN.

 

[RCA]

With the army restructure on the horizon, discussions are ongoing about the changing roles in the army. One of these is all indirect fire weapons move to the Artillery.

Now some officers are suggesting that some Res Arty Batteries/Regiments convert to 81mm mortars. The reasoning being that fire control, FSCC functions etc are the same. As well the 81 is easier to man and deploy. This again goes to prove that many officers (and some on this forum) don‘t have an understanding of the functions of the Artillery. Of all the combat arms, the Artillery is the most misused and least understood. Other than his sig, the Coy Comd is should always accompanied by his FOO, and the BC of the support Bty is always with the Bn Comd. Why is that?

As to converting to 81s, this would be short sighted and unwise. First, the infantry would lose their organic fire support, and secondly, the 81 doesn‘t have the range or power to fulfill the role and function mandated the Arty.