Canadian Armoured Cavalry

[Zipper]

I have just finished reading the entire armoured bulletin. Wow, great stuff.

I found it rather alarming after reading about how the US is going to be using the MGS and how it DOES NOT replace the tank, and how we are going to use it in conjunction with the TUA and MMEV's.

It seemed to me that we are intending to use it as "close" support of infantry operations, even in "complex terrain"? Will someone please tell me that it is only be looked at as such?

I agree that it would be a useful tool in uncomplex terrain, but to take it into close quarters when it does not have full tactical awareness sounds to me like a recipe for disaster.

Another part that caught me completely by surprise is the fact that the MMEV (ADATS) must take as much as 15 minutes to set up? Doesn't this severely disable rapid maneuver that these wheeled vehicles are supposed to enjoy? It seems to me that the cavalry you've talked about won't be able to use this vehicle. As well, the MMEV does not have self-protection abilities, thus needing additional close protection.

Is this truly the way we are going? Or is there some light at the end of the tunnel that you guys always seem to show me?

 

[Kirkhill]

Well, I have always looked at the MGS as a combination of the world's largest sniper rifle and a self-propelled anti-tank gun.  If used as you would use those two systems I can see it having its merits.  Fighting from concealed, prepared positions or from positions out of range of anything the enemy can throw at you.

It would not be used as a tank, but it could be used like German 88mms in WW2 or the British 17 pdr or more currently like the 105mm trailed guns used by a number of European countries to thicken up their anti-tank lines. Together with Javelin/Spike, Tow and/or Hellfire and Brimstone (Not necessarily the ADATS missile - the ADATS missile may be just one missile the MMEV could launch), not to mention a good thickening of Arty support, I think a Canadian force could wage a fairly successful anti-tank battle and hold ground. 

Now assaulting and taking contested ground will be another matter entirely.

However I think its primary purpose is to supply flanking protection in the close terrain battle and prevent enemy combatants entering or leaving the battle area.  This seems to have been the primary role of the MBTs in Iraq, standing in an open area (at least 200m from cover - the effective range of the RPG)  and dominating boulevards and freeways, thus cutting the towns up into bitesize morsels for the Infantry to chew on.  As well it would be a pretty useful bunker buster.

 

[Zipper]

However I think its primary purpose is to supply flanking protection in the close terrain battle and prevent enemy combatants entering or leaving the battle area.   This seems to have been the primary role of the MBTs in Iraq, standing in an open area (at least 200m from cover - the effective range of the RPG)   and dominating boulevards and freeways, thus cutting the towns up into bitesize morsels for the Infantry to chew on.   As well it would be a pretty useful bunker buster.

If it was used is such ways, I could understand. Bagdad and other large cities have nice large open spaces from which the MGS could fire in support of Infantry without being in range of RPG's. I'm just wondering about this, since we have tended not to have such spaces to operate in. Being assigned smaller towns and villages (besides Kabul) for the most part. As well, the article was mentioning going to 3 vehicle troops (instead of 4) in order to better cover maneuvers inside of an urban area. This makes me think of tighter spaces.

If this is indeed the case, then that would also severely restrict the TUA's over watch ability and completely eliminate the MMEV's role. Although I'm sure the 2 and 2 troop of TUA and MMEV would not be tasked to go anywhere near an urban enviro.

Well, I have always looked at the MGS as a combination of the world's largest sniper rifle and a self-propelled anti-tank gun. If used as you would use those two systems I can see it having its merits. Fighting from concealed, prepared positions or from positions out of range of anything the enemy can throw at you.

I'm surprised you made this assumption Kirk? You believe that all conflicts we get involved in, in the future are only going to involve an opponent that cannot hit us beyond 2 kms (the effective range of the 105mm on the MGS)?

I'm looking forward to 2B's, CW's, and Majoor's thoughts on the use of the MGS in a maneuver formation. From reading that article, and your understanding of its use Kirk. I would consider it a enabler and nothing more.

( ;D I learned two new terms today.)

 

[Kirkhill]

No Zipper what I was saying was that IF the enemy had the ability to reach out and touch at 5 km, and the ground left me unconcealed, then I wouldn't be entering into a fight with only a 2 km system.  At that point I might have to rely on the TUA and the MMEV.  Or find another place to fight.  Or refuse the fight entirely.

On the other hand, if all the enemy can bring to the fight is what he can carry on his back, then having a 105mm rifle in my back pocket doesn't seem like a bad thing.

It's a matter of looking at your capabilities compared to those of your enemy and choosing your ground to suit.  Sometimes the appropriate thing to do is to refuse battle and wait for a better opportunity.

As to the use of the MGS in cities - my sense, from 9,000 miles away admittedly, is that the Iraqi cities,  like most Old cities are rabbit warrens with highways and boulevards and open areas creating natural fault lines along which they can be cut up.  A 2 km sightline along a Highway is conceivable with little or no dead ground, this seem to make it difficult for the opposition to infiltrate and exfiltrate across these "cut lines", isolating the cordoned area effectively.

 

[Infanteer]

http://www.defence.gov.au/army/lwsc/Publications/AAJ_Winter_2004.pdf

Check out this article in the latest edition of the Australian Army Journal - seems that the Aussies have some of their own ideas on the "CAV" structure.

(The PDF file is the entire journal, so look for the article "Australian Light-Armoured Vehicles (ASLAV) as Mounted Cavalry: Vanguard for the Hardened Army by Lieutenant Colonel Roger Noble).

It seems that the Aussies run their "Cav" in a Squadron of 3 Troops.   Each Troop has 4 Bricks which consist of: 3 ASLAV's and a four man scout team (with various weapons systems).   So, not only is their an infantry/armoured grouping at the Troop level, but the article states that in a pinch, the Cavalry can act as transport for Light Infantry, with a Cavalry Squadron "mechanizing" a Light Infantry Company.

Interesting stuff.

 

[Kirkhill]

I couldn't let this pass by-------

It is worth noting that, while the US Marines
in their march north towards Baghdad during
the Second Gulf War in early 2003 suffered
multiple hits from enemy weapons systems on
their light-armoured vehicles, no single vehicle
was comprehensively destroyed by enemy
action.

This Aussie Cavalry Commander seems reasonably comfortable with his kit

 

[Zipper]

Very interesting. I found that his idea that the Cavalry NOT be a mainly reconnaissance force very interesting. As he said that it did not work in WWII for them or the US, and yet it did work for us? I think it adds some good points and thoughts to what 2B may be thinking though.

Kirk - I agree. We would have to choose our terrain carefully, as well as choosing whether or not to engage. All these things are important. I am just of the opinion that it is not always OUR choice.

As to the "older" cities in the world. I would agree. They tend to be quite choppy and broken up, which is not conducive to MGS use. I think Bagdad is a more modern city in that it has wide straight roadways that would be well covered by MGS fire support. Other cities in Iraq are of the old type though.

There just seems to be some very glaring holes in our way of thinking and our choice of formations that may prove costly in the long run.

 

[Kirkhill]

Zipper:

I think that you will find that Basra and Sadr City, at least judging from aerial photographs, are pretty congested as well.  In Basra it was apparently so tight that they couldn't get Landrovers down some streets.

Tanks and Warriors were largely used to establish cordon perimeters as far as I can see.

 

[Kirkhill]

By the way, after reading the article on the DFS Squadron and the role of the MMEV, I just became a bit more of a potential fan.

The keyword for me was networking.  Apparently if one ADATs vehicle can see a target it can launch all the missiles on the three accompanying vehicles as well.  So if this is a "wireless network" and the rest of the Squadron can be incorporated in the network then it leaves open the option of an MGS sighting an MBT Squadron, designating targets and, assuming that all 6 MMEVs discussed are within 8 km of the target, launching up to 48 missiles from launchers  that are 8 km from the target.  The MGS may not have to unmask itself.

If they can make that work then they are much of the way to the capability that a_majoor has been describing with his hellfire and brimstone LAV.

 

[Zipper]

The keyword for me was networking.   Apparently if one ADATs vehicle can see a target it can launch all the missiles on the three accompanying vehicles as well.   So if this is a "wireless network" and the rest of the Squadron can be incorporated in the network then it leaves open the option of an MGS sighting an MBT Squadron, designating targets and, assuming that all 6 MMEVs discussed are within 8 km of the target, launching up to 48 missiles from launchers   that are 8 km from the target.   The MGS may not have to unmask itself.

If they can make that work then they are much of the way to the capability that a_majoor has been describing with his hellfire and brimstone LAV.

I would agree. But I think the optics on the MGS, LAV, and TUA are different enough for this idea not to work. But MAN, if it did. ;D BOOM BABY!

 

[a_majoor]

It isn't a matter of optics, old 031 me with a pair of binoculars, a compass and a map can do the same thing so long as the MMEV is programmed somewhere in my CEOI; either in person ("Tango 31c this is India 11a, fire mission, over), or through a digital link from the ISTAR CC (As I make a contact report to my CS 1, the ISTAR operator listening in identifies that a masked MMEV troop is in range, and the standing orders allow him to transmit the coordinates and fire order).

This frees me of the responsibility of trying to keep track of where everything is (I need to focus on my job first); and is conceptually applicable to any sort of weapons system available on the battlefield, from a pike wielding phalanx to an aerospace fighter loitering in Low Earth Orbit (assets beyond the moon are  considered strategic reserves  ).

The true key to the Revolution in Military Affairs is not the sexy hardwear like fire and forget missiles, but rather the organization that allows you to use them to the best effect. The French invented a reasonably effective machine gun in the 1860s, but decided it was a form of artillery, so it never was employed to any great effect in the Franco Prussian war of the 1870s. In the same war, Prussian Infantry were shot down in great numbers because they were still fighting using organizations and tactics from the "Black powder" era, despite the fact both sides had breach loading rifles!

Lets move beyond the hardwear issues, unless there is a technical deficiency which renders the hardwear ineffective in the intended role (i.e. MGS has a crap autoloader and only 18 rounds available, or ADATS is strictly LOS [as far as I can tell]). Conceptually, a wheeled gun platform can be effective (see the AMX-10 RC), and substituting a true long range fire and forget missile like Brimestone or FOG-M would make the missile carrier effective to the 8km mark.

 

[Steel Badger]

I agree with Artorius

It was the organization and C3 of the German Army that allowed their inferior equipment to defeat their Superior French equivalents....
But the Panzer Divs were more flexible a weapon than the DLM's and DCM's (Division Legere Mechanique and Division Curiasseur Mechanique?).....The Russians suffered from the same issue until they improved their C3

Perhaps the we should consider the army as a whole when discussing RMA....remembering the Germans created their "new model army" units first and added the cutting edge equipment later.....

What will a brigade task force (or the Army as a whole) look like,  post-transformation?

What units will perform the screen, close combat and support roles?
How will the larger unit commander employ and control his units?
How can we make our kit...pried from the tightly clenched fist of the Finance minister,  defeat equipment that is qualitatively superior?

A brigade with :
1 Armoured Cavalry Unit (along the lines discussed by 2Bravo and Artorius, including an "assault" squadron or two ) all "black-hatted"
(all trades in the unit wear black hat indicated role...Corps = role)
2 Mechanized Infantry units (in Lav III Apcs w/ the stryker weapon station, an MGS "assault gun" platoon, a pioneer pl, recce pl and 120mm mor sp lav pl)
(All pers badged inf)

1 Fire Support regt of the RCA w/ 3 MMEV Batteries, 1 Mor Battery and an ISTAR /  UAV Battery
1 Field Engineering Squadron on Lav hulls
1 Logistics support unit.

A Headquarters capable of performing its functions via data-link...perhaps allowing reduced numbers in the HQ cells of all units....
(Except I.T.  perhaps the LOG Unit will contain an IT Support Platoon...... > )

Will we have 3 Maneuver Brigades and a light brigade? (all the light Battalions tasked with a ranger / commando role as discussed in several places on these forums...)

 

[a_majoor]

One thing we all need to look at is the CSS issue. Since I am not a loggie, this is difficult for me to conceptualize exactly how this is to be done, but either we need to find a way to make a Cavalry unit self sufficient like a wooden sailing ship, or have CSS roaming across the battlespace with some sort of "push" or "pull" system.

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

We did a JCATs exercise last week and CSS for the recce sqns was a big issue.  Coyotes and LAVs can go for a day or two without ammo or fuel (if they can bring their A ech with them), but casualty evacuation and recovery will always be major issues.  I've tried to address this in my paper but it may still need fleshing out.

The CSS concept of push and pull will still work, but the CSS elements must be able to move long distances through unsecure areas.  Armoured CSS vehicle and escorts are one way to go about it.  Using helicopters can help (especially for casualty evacuation) but you can't always rely on them (weather, air defence threat).

If the forward moving CSS elements were organized like an armoured Sqn A1 echelon with the SSM in a LAV III and several Bisons in the group then we are going in the right direction.  The UMS should be able to work well forward and have a protection element.

More to follow...

2B

 

[Kirkhill]

How about this:
http://www.military.com/soldiertech/0%2C14632%2CSoldiertech_SHERPA%2C%2C00.html

Plus this:
http://www.flug-revue.rotor.com/FRTypen/FRC-130J.htm

Or even this:
http://www.flug-revue.rotor.com/FRTypen/FRC-27J.htm

For logistic support for a wide-ranging force.

8-16 pallets (8-16 tonnes) of supplies dropped from 25,000 feet to within 100m  of a designated GPS coordinates.  Aircraft can be 9 miles away from the drop zone.  Ground personnel don't need to mark the drop zone.  Or even be anywhere near it.

Para-depots.

Concept of operations:

Drop people in, Drop or Drive vehicles in, Drop caches in for resupply, Helos to extract personnel.

Technological improvements is making the Burma campaign look more practical than it did in 1942.

 

[Zipper]

If the forward moving CSS elements were organized like an armoured Sqn A1 echelon with the SSM in a LAV III and several Bisons in the group then we are going in the right direction. The UMS should be able to work well forward and have a protection element.

Ok, excuse me for my confusion again. But what part of the equation is the CSS?

Is it the A ech or the B ech?

Because if it is the A ech formation, then I would think that a cavalry unit would follow its armoured examples and have its entire formation in LAV's or some armoured equivalent.

If it isn't, then I don't know. To have the B ech in LAV's as well would be expensive.

 

[a_majoor]

There are many ways to do this. The example which got me thinking of this was the American Infantry company driving across the desert in the Persian Gulf War to cut the Basrs-Baghdad highway. This was a "lash-up" convoy with 16 M-2s and 25 HEMMET trucks, clearly not the best way to go about supporting long range Cavalry missions.

Armoured CSS vehicles have advantages and disadvantages, and support one way of doing things. A fleet of high mobility trucks gives us different ORBATs and different concepts of operations. A mixed fleet would be expensive, but offers more flexibility as well. Lots of thinking and experimentation will have to be done to hammer out the right mix of equipment and organization to support Cavalry operations.

 

[Zipper]

By the sounds of it, your talking about B ech and maybe even further back in transport troop?

If that is the case, we can look at how we used to do it with 4CMBG in those semi armoured tractor vehicles that I for the life of me cannot remember right now. ???

So what if we came up with some kind of enlarged load area LAV transport with maybe an armoured trailer attached to carry the extra supplies? Have that escorted by a Cav. troop and you may make it through?

 

[Haligonian]

Tango2Bravo,

So did your paper ever get published?