C3 Howitzer Replacement

[Colin Parkinson]

DND built the first new armoury in decades in Vancouver, to house the Seaforths, a Sigs Sqn and Bde HQ. AFAIK it cost $70m + and took five years. Ostensibly, the main reason they did it was to support the 2010 Olympic Games.

I think BC has seen it's last 'investment' in that kind of infrastructure for the foreseeable future....

Of course it doesn't help that PWGS forgot to include communications equipment and wiring in the contract and that apparently led about a years delay, or so I heard.

 

[FJAG]

FJAG the RCAF and RCN will likely disagree with you, the infrastructure needs were included in the replacements of the Frigates and the Fighters, as they are as important as the kit. What is the point of having fancy equipment that rots outside and does not get the maintenance it needs. Not to mention securing artillery guns and MLRS in a parking lot in a urban environment. I fear your plans will not survive contact with the enemy (politicians, PW and TB) and the friction on the ground, (Regimental associations, existing infrastructure and shrinking budgets).

Army gear isn't that fragile. In 3 RCHA only our M109s were in the gun shed, all the other tracks and trucks were outside in Manitoba's winters and summers. Infantry battalions as well keep the bulk of their fleets outside in Wainwright, Petawawa and Valcartier. The vehicles do not rot. If it doesn't get the maintenance it needs it's not because it wasn't in a heated building but because the maintenance system is failing. Our equipment isn't as fragile and maintenance intense as airplanes that need 30-50 hours of maintenance for every flight hour, nor ships which have very specialized shore facilities.  There definitely needs to be a plan to ensure that equipment receives the required periodic maintenance it needs but that can easily be arranged for. Most larger urban areas have base facilities where proper maintenance and storage of equipment can be done. Hell, if an MRT needs to do the maintenance in a fenced compound instead of a workshop then it's training for them.

As to training, we didn't train on our M109s in the gun sheds. We took them outside for training - summer or winter. Most army training simulators fits easily within existing armories.

Colin. I realize procurement isn't as simple as: "I'll take 150 of those". On the other hand, if we constantly wring our hands and worry about which honourary colonel might object and what will the local MP think or require and where will we park the thing, and can we get it through that doorway, we'll never make any progress. That's what we've been doing since the early 1970s when the armoured corps retired the last reserve Sherman tank. It's time to get more aggressive with what capabilities we need filled and stop sweating the little issues. I personally don't want to see our troops die because we balked on getting them the gear they really need. I also think we need a much greater can-do attitude about our reserves so that we can start saving money on full-time staff in order to be able to buy and maintain that needed equipment. Almost all the equipment that's been discussed in this thread is gear that our reserves could handle if given the chance.

:cheers:

 

[MilEME09]

Army gear isn't that fragile. In 3 RCHA only our M109s were in the gun shed, all the other tracks and trucks were outside in Manitoba's winters and summers. Infantry battalions as well keep the bulk of their fleets outside in Wainwright, Petawawa and Valcartier. The vehicles do not rot. If it doesn't get the maintenance it needs it's not because it wasn't in a heated building but because the maintenance system is failing. Our equipment isn't as fragile and maintenance intense as airplanes that need 30-50 hours of maintenance for every flight hour, nor ships which have very specialized shore facilities.  There definitely needs to be a plan to ensure that equipment receives the required periodic maintenance it needs but that can easily be arranged for. Most larger urban areas have base facilities where proper maintenance and storage of equipment can be done. Hell, if an MRT needs to do the maintenance in a fenced compound instead of a workshop then it's training for them.
:cheers:

Unfortunately this requires two things to happen. First for the CAF to have enough techs, Unfortunately no one is willing to do what it takes to clear the 300+ pers on PAT platoon in borden to address the tech shortage. Second we need to get away from just in time delivery of spare parts, it doesn't work for what we are. I should be able to deploy with extra C6 sears or extra bushings for a g wagon. Our SPSS capabilities do not match what doctrine says we should have because of DRIMIS. A first line maintenance element should have 15 DOS of technical stores, a second line unit should have an additional 30, you would be lucky of we had 2 days right now.

 

[FJAG]

Unfortunately this requires two things to happen. First for the CAF to have enough techs, Unfortunately no one is willing to do what it takes to clear the 300+ pers on PAT platoon in borden to address the tech shortage. Second we need to get away from just in time delivery of spare parts, it doesn't work for what we are. I should be able to deploy with extra C6 sears or extra bushings for a g wagon. Our SPSS capabilities do not match what doctrine says we should have because of DRIMIS. A first line maintenance element should have 15 DOS of technical stores, a second line unit should have an additional 30, you would be lucky of we had 2 days right now.

Couldn't agree more.

In any organization working for profit, heads would role.

:cheers:

 

[daftandbarmy]

Couldn't agree more.

In any organization working for profit, heads would role.

:cheers:

You'd be surprised... seriously  :nod:

'We have learned to live in a world of defects as if they were necessary to life.'

W. Edwards Deming

 

[MJP]

Unfortunately this requires two things to happen. First for the CAF to have enough techs, Unfortunately no one is willing to do what it takes to clear the 300+ pers on PAT platoon in borden to address the tech shortage. Second we need to get away from just in time delivery of spare parts, it doesn't work for what we are. I should be able to deploy with extra C6 sears or extra bushings for a g wagon. Our SPSS capabilities do not match what doctrine says we should have because of DRIMIS. A first line maintenance element should have 15 DOS of technical stores, a second line unit should have an additional 30, you would be lucky of we had 2 days right now.

We don't have a JIT system for the most part and people can build stock holdings that automatically replenish once you breach max/mins. There are many issues with DRMIS but many of the SPSS issues are due to our own lack of knowledge and are largely self-inflicted. Nothing stops the orgs I worked with from deploying with stock holdings, it shouldn't stop you. If ya want I can drop ya some great aide memoirs and power points that can help maint control shop and supporting spare parts sect identify issues and fix them.

Army gear isn't that fragile. In 3 RCHA only our M109s were in the gun shed, all the other tracks and trucks were outside in Manitoba's winters and summers. Infantry battalions as well keep the bulk of their fleets outside in Wainwright, Petawawa and Valcartier. The vehicles do not rot. If it doesn't get the maintenance it needs it's not because it wasn't in a heated building but because the maintenance system is failing.

Our vehs are getting more and more sophisticated to the point where we do need to store them inside when not in use for some of them. It is actually a requirement of the contract for TAPV (part of our ISS reqs) which is why they built TAPV barns along with the getting the vehs themselves. Not everything needs to be outside but it is getting tha way.

Regardless the vehs themselves are getting huge and the current infra just is not sufficient or conducive to getting maintenance done.

 

[MilEME09]

We don't have a JIT system for the most part and people can build stock holdings that automatically replenish once you breach max/mins. There are many issues with DRMIS but many of the SPSS issues are due to our own lack of knowledge and are largely self-inflicted. Nothing stops the orgs I worked with from deploying with stock holdings, it shouldn't stop you. If ya want I can drop ya some great aide memoirs and power points that can help maint control shop and supporting spare parts sect identify issues and fix them.

Our vehs are getting more and more sophisticated to the point where we do need to store them inside when not in use for some of them. It is actually a requirement of the contract for TAPV (part of our ISS reqs) which is why they built TAPV barns along with the getting the vehs themselves. Not everything needs to be outside but it is getting tha way.

Regardless the vehs themselves are getting huge and the current infra just is not sufficient or conducive to getting maintenance done.

That would be appreciated

 

[NavyShooter]

As a Technical Inspector at Base Logistics in Halifax, it is VERY Notable that many LCMM's are not well acquainted with their role and are learning as they go.  Many contracts are missing standard clauses, and many items that are stock coded in CFSS have been entered incorrectly.  I had a pallet of material the other week that had a selection of items which had been assigned a shelf life, that obviously should not have (nuts and bolts with shelf life?  I can see Nyloc nuts, but regular stainless bolts???) so the LCMM is going back to redo a bunch of his cataloging work again.

DRMIS is a beast - a monster - it has best been explained to me as a maintenance management tool that's had supply and inventory management grafted on as an additional layer, and then all the financials associated with the supply side got plugged in too.

On ship, I 'found ways' to get a supply of critical spares onboard, even when that was formally denied to me as a Technician.  For single layer redundancy systems, that's kind of important.

NS

 

[MilEME09]

As a Technical Inspector at Base Logistics in Halifax, it is VERY Notable that many LCMM's are not well acquainted with their role and are learning as they go.  Many contracts are missing standard clauses, and many items that are stock coded in CFSS have been entered incorrectly.  I had a pallet of material the other week that had a selection of items which had been assigned a shelf life, that obviously should not have (nuts and bolts with shelf life?  I can see Nyloc nuts, but regular stainless bolts???) so the LCMM is going back to redo a bunch of his cataloging work again.

DRMIS is a beast - a monster - it has best been explained to me as a maintenance management tool that's had supply and inventory management grafted on as an additional layer, and then all the financials associated with the supply side got plugged in too.

On ship, I 'found ways' to get a supply of critical spares onboard, even when that was formally denied to me as a Technician.  For single layer redundancy systems, that's kind of important.

NS

Also see the auditor general's report on our supply system. Some items managers have items set to 0 on hand so they are only ordered from a supplier after a request from a unit.

 

[MJP]

As a Technical Inspector at Base Logistics in Halifax, it is VERY Notable that many LCMM's are not well acquainted with their role and are learning as they go.  Many contracts are missing standard clauses, and many items that are stock coded in CFSS have been entered incorrectly.  I had a pallet of material the other week that had a selection of items which had been assigned a shelf life, that obviously should not have (nuts and bolts with shelf life?  I can see Nyloc nuts, but regular stainless bolts???) so the LCMM is going back to redo a bunch of his cataloging work again.

The institutional supply side is weak but getting better (at last marginally but I tend to agree that they SMs and LCMMs are not very good at using the tools at their disposal. Over rigid release controls, inability to forecast and basic item management are some of the big picture things. Your example is a great one, my favourite is a nut that had low stock also had the replacement nut that you could order once stock was depleted. SAP/DRMIS allows you to connect those two items so if one is depleted then the order automatically goes to the other. Instead of doing that it takes manual intervention and staff work to contact the LCMM and get the alternative NSN. The other one is not putting the specs in for common nuts, bolts, washers etc which can in many cases be LPO'd if needed but with/out the specs from the system.

DRMIS is a beast - a monster - it has best been explained to me as a maintenance management tool that's had supply and inventory management grafted on as an additional layer, and then all the financials associated with the supply side got plugged in too.

All that and more including people, hell you can see pay if you know what you are looking for.


Most Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) software is a beast because it is very integrated often completely so within an org. Since we rolled DRMIS out very ad hoc and in some cases some modules years before other, most people can't conceptualized the inter-connectness. Instead they think of it as being similar to their previous used software (MIMS for example. Understanding that inputs in one place affect another is hard but it also gives us a powerful analytic tool if our data is good (even if it isn't good you can work with it but its harder). The RCN is leading the charge on analytics but it is a VCDS priority (or was) to get good at it CAF-wide.

 

[NavyShooter]

Just in timen't.

I get asked to inspect items put in stock decades ago to see if it's still serviceable too - I checked over the Gearbox tool set that we got from SJSL in 1992 - perfectly preserved in grease wraps.  Beautiful. 

I also look at other 'bits and pieces' like O-rings - the Sub project bought us a $28K IRHD tester so that we can test their O-rings upon receipt, or when re-certifying/extending shelf life. 

Doing work on Test equipment last year, I found a frequency generator from HMCS Bonaventure in stock.  It went for disposal (guided towards a museum though.)

Stepping away from the plight of our supply chain, back to the discussion of howitzers, I'll ask some questions:

1.  If we get an equivalent howitzer to our current one, will we need the same number?

2.  If we get a more advanced howitzer, would we get less?

3.  Recognizing that the 105's seem to be a mostly PRes tool, how many guns can a PRes unit reasonably maintain and support?

Now that I'm in a PRes unit, I would posit that without a larger RegF maintenance section supporting them, it would be challenging to expand their role, or their gun numbers (though I'm in an Infantry unit, not Artillery) and it would be practically impossible to add a motorized advanced gun system without increasing the establishment for full time staff for maintenance.

NS

 

[FJAG]

As a Technical Inspector at Base Logistics in Halifax, it is VERY Notable that many LCMM's are not well acquainted with their role and are learning as they go.  Many contracts are missing standard clauses, and many items that are stock coded in CFSS have been entered incorrectly.  I had a pallet of material the other week that had a selection of items which had been assigned a shelf life, that obviously should not have (nuts and bolts with shelf life?  I can see Nyloc nuts, but regular stainless bolts???) so the LCMM is going back to redo a bunch of his cataloging work again.

DRMIS is a beast - a monster - it has best been explained to me as a maintenance management tool that's had supply and inventory management grafted on as an additional layer, and then all the financials associated with the supply side got plugged in too.

On ship, I 'found ways' to get a supply of critical spares onboard, even when that was formally denied to me as a Technician.  For single layer redundancy systems, that's kind of important.

NS

A badly designed and configured stock management system is why Target wrote of a 2 billion dollar investment and left Canada. On the other hand, there are many examples of systems which are highly complex and functioning perfectly. Everything from Ford Motor Co to Amazon. As target found, there are two major elements to any such system a) a properly designed database that functions smoothly and intuitively; and b) a well designed data entry system that allows for the myriad of stock items and stock reorder/movement rules to be properly populated into the system. The latter is where Target fell down badly what with having to learn to deal with bilingualism and the metric system when much of their stock suppliers (which already worked with the US company) did not integrate seamlessly. Transforming such a system is a monstrously complex job.

...
Stepping away from the plight of our supply chain, back to the discussion of howitzers, I'll ask some questions:

1.  If we get an equivalent howitzer to our current one, will we need the same number?

2.  If we get a more advanced howitzer, would we get less?

3.  Recognizing that the 105's seem to be a mostly PRes tool, how many guns can a PRes unit reasonably maintain and support?

Now that I'm in a PRes unit, I would posit that without a larger RegF maintenance section supporting them, it would be challenging to expand their role, or their gun numbers (though I'm in an Infantry unit, not Artillery) and it would be practically impossible to add a motorized advanced gun system without increasing the establishment for full time staff for maintenance.

NS

1.  That all depends on whether we stay configured the way we are in which case probably. Most regiments have four to six guns which are sufficient for training. On the other hand if we change our organization to deal with more artillery related tasks, then we might be able to do with less. For example, if we acquire air defence and assign certain regiments to that task then they wouldn't need guns. Similarly, some reserve regiments could be allocated to locating functions where their primary equipment is radars or UAVs. Then there's rocket. I could go on but you see the generally idea.

2.  IMHO the degree of sophistication shouldn't matter as the number should be predicated on whether: a) they will be guns capable of operational use and what size of formations will we need to support, and b) how many guns do we reasonably need for training. Practically speaking, sophisticated guns are expensive and therefore we will most probably get less. Also speaking realistically, at present if we pool all our artillery regiments' personnel, we could probably fully man around 3 to 4 regiments which at 18 guns per means we could probably reasonably make use of 80 or so guns (including spares and training establishment ones.) and again assuming we will not be allocating personnel to AD, locating, or rocket.

3.  The 105 C3 series is a very robust piece of kit that requires very little in the way of routine user maintenance (barring issues like cracking barrels etc) The odd tire change, hydraulic recoil adjustment, and calibrating/fixing sights. Most of this work is done at RCEME base workshops and not the reserve unit nor the reserve service battalions. If reserve regiments continue to be configured as tools for individual training rather than as a deployable operational resource then there would probably be little need for maintainers at the unit level but there might be a need to upgrade the maintenance capabilities at the support base maintenance unit.

As you may have noticed, I'm a strong advocate of retooling/overhauling the reserve structure to make reserve units (not just arty but all) operationally deployable. That requires a full support structure and, as you point out, the more equipment that there is and the more sophisticated it becomes, the more you will need a full-time maintenance component, either directly within the unit or, alternatively in direct support of the unit, in order to keep the equipment serviceable. Note though that reserve equipment receives much less wear and tear than a comparable Reg F unit's and has more slack time between exercises and equipment usage, so the full-time component could be smaller than a Reg F unit equivalent.

:cheers:

 

[MilEME09]

1.  That all depends on whether we stay configured the way we are in which case probably. Most regiments have four to six guns which are sufficient for training. On the other hand if we change our organization to deal with more artillery related tasks, then we might be able to do with less. For example, if we acquire air defence and assign certain regiments to that task then they wouldn't need guns. Similarly, some reserve regiments could be allocated to locating functions where their primary equipment is radars or UAVs. Then there's rocket. I could go on but you see the generally idea.

2.  IMHO the degree of sophistication shouldn't matter as the number should be predicated on whether: a) they will be guns capable of operational use and what size of formations will we need to support, and b) how many guns do we reasonably need for training. Practically speaking, sophisticated guns are expensive and therefore we will most probably get less. Also speaking realistically, at present if we pool all our artillery regiments' personnel, we could probably fully man around 3 to 4 regiments which at 18 guns per means we could probably reasonably make use of 80 or so guns (including spares and training establishment ones.) and again assuming we will not be allocating personnel to AD, locating, or rocket.

3.  The 105 C3 series is a very robust piece of kit that requires very little in the way of routine user maintenance (barring issues like cracking barrels etc) The odd tire change, hydraulic recoil adjustment, and calibrating/fixing sights. Most of this work is done at RCEME base workshops and not the reserve unit nor the reserve service battalions. If reserve regiments continue to be configured as tools for individual training rather than as a deployable operational resource then there would probably be little need for maintainers at the unit level but there might be a need to upgrade the maintenance capabilities at the support base maintenance unit.

As you may have noticed, I'm a strong advocate of retooling/overhauling the reserve structure to make reserve units (not just arty but all) operationally deployable. That requires a full support structure and, as you point out, the more equipment that there is and the more sophisticated it becomes, the more you will need a full-time maintenance component, either directly within the unit or, alternatively in direct support of the unit, in order to keep the equipment serviceable. Note though that reserve equipment receives much less wear and tear than a comparable Reg F unit's and has more slack time between exercises and equipment usage, so the full-time component could be smaller than a Reg F unit equivalent.

:cheers:

I'll give an example here, My unit is in charge of CSS for task force south Alberta based out of Calgary. In order to support Calgary, Lethbridge, and Medicine hat we have a reg force CSS element with our HQ platoon. Some trades are not required to be posted in due to how little they are needed like say EO tech's, however if you replaced the C3 with a more complicated gun with a fancy FCS, and in enough quantity that every unit in Canada has what they need, then the maintenance organization would need to expand to support the more complex equipment. There is a down side to receiving much wear and tear, if something sits too long it can be bad too, Hydraulics are very bad for this and seals will crack if not worked frequently.

 

[FJAG]

I'll give an example here, My unit is in charge of CSS for task force south Alberta based out of Calgary. In order to support Calgary, Lethbridge, and Medicine hat we have a reg force CSS element with our HQ platoon. Some trades are not required to be posted in due to how little they are needed like say EO tech's, however if you replaced the C3 with a more complicated gun with a fancy FCS, and in enough quantity that every unit in Canada has what they need, then the maintenance organization would need to expand to support the more complex equipment. There is a down side to receiving much wear and tear, if something sits too long it can be bad too, Hydraulics are very bad for this and seals will crack if not worked frequently.

Ran into the seal problem in 1970 when my regiment was flown into Montreal and issued brand new, never used 3/4 ton and 2 1/2 ton trucks out of our war stocks (when we had them). The vehicles were 1952 and 1954 manufacture and all had less than 50 miles on the odometers and very quickly developed seal leaks.

There's no question that more complex kit will be a consideration that would need to be catered to. I keep pointing down south. The National Guard there runs complex gear including ITAS TOW systems, Avenger AD systems, HIMARS, M109 Paladins, M777s, Strykers, M1 tanks, M2 Bradley's etc. While I don't doubt there are maintenance issues there too, they certainly maintain large amounts of gear on-the-road. They are just as dispersed as we are (although while we have small armories with few people and call it a battalion, their armories mostly house company strength organizations at closer to full-strength.

:cheers:

 

[Colin Parkinson]

Just in timen't.

I get asked to inspect items put in stock decades ago to see if it's still serviceable too - I checked over the Gearbox tool set that we got from SJSL in 1992 - perfectly preserved in grease wraps.  Beautiful. 

I also look at other 'bits and pieces' like O-rings - the Sub project bought us a $28K IRHD tester so that we can test their O-rings upon receipt, or when re-certifying/extending shelf life. 

Doing work on Test equipment last year, I found a frequency generator from HMCS Bonaventure in stock.  It went for disposal (guided towards a museum though.)

Stepping away from the plight of our supply chain, back to the discussion of howitzers, I'll ask some questions:

1.  If we get an equivalent howitzer to our current one, will we need the same number?

2.  If we get a more advanced howitzer, would we get less?

3.  Recognizing that the 105's seem to be a mostly PRes tool, how many guns can a PRes unit reasonably maintain and support?

Now that I'm in a PRes unit, I would posit that without a larger RegF maintenance section supporting them, it would be challenging to expand their role, or their gun numbers (though I'm in an Infantry unit, not Artillery) and it would be practically impossible to add a motorized advanced gun system without increasing the establishment for full time staff for maintenance.

NS

The beauty of the 105mm C1/C2/C3 was it's utter simplicity. The only ongoing maintenance it needed at the unit level was cleaning, checking the tires, greasing/oil and exercising the recoil system (using a ancient but reliable chain and comealong system). There were a few checks for the sights and sight mounts. All of that could be done in 0ne by the gun crew.
I did help to pull down one C2 that had a recoil failure (thanks to 202 workshops leaving metal filings in the system) It's really not a complicated system. It would take little to teach a competent vehicle tech how to do most of the more advanced maintenance on it. the whole gun is WWII tech and was pretty robust. I never seen a M777 gun up close, but looking at the pictures and video, your starting to get into Hydraulics systems and more electronics. You could not leave those outside year after year and expect them to function reliably.   

 

[GR66]

The beauty of the 105mm C1/C2/C3 was it's utter simplicity. The only ongoing maintenance it needed at the unit level was cleaning, checking the tires, greasing/oil and exercising the recoil system (using a ancient but reliable chain and comealong system). There were a few checks for the sights and sight mounts. All of that could be done in 0ne by the gun crew.
I did help to pull down one C2 that had a recoil failure (thanks to 202 workshops leaving metal filings in the system) It's really not a complicated system. It would take little to teach a competent vehicle tech how to do most of the more advanced maintenance on it. the whole gun is WWII tech and was pretty robust. I never seen a M777 gun up close, but looking at the pictures and video, your starting to get into Hydraulics systems and more electronics. You could not leave those outside year after year and expect them to function reliably. 

Curious, is it the hydraulics of a larger gun that require greater maintenance or the electronics?  It would be nice if the Reserves could have the same M777 as the Reg Force in order to simplify supply and training.  However, at least as Wikipedia is concerned, the Denel G7 105mm towed howitzer has has a similar range capability as the M777.  As an added bonus it's the same gun as GDLS trialed in the Stryker 105mm howitzer.  I'm guessing that most modern guns have similar electronic components for targeting, positioning, etc. so whatever gun we get that element will be similar.

 

[daftandbarmy]

Of course it doesn't help that PWGS forgot to include communications equipment and wiring in the contract and that apparently led about a years delay, or so I heard.

Yes! What  schemozzel... it was like they had built this giant edifice according to 1963 office specs. No idea of they've ever fully recovered, of course

 

[MilEME09]

Curious, is it the hydraulics of a larger gun that require greater maintenance or the electronics?  It would be nice if the Reserves could have the same M777 as the Reg Force in order to simplify supply and training.  However, at least as Wikipedia is concerned, the Denel G7 105mm towed howitzer has has a similar range capability as the M777.  As an added bonus it's the same gun as GDLS trialed in the Stryker 105mm howitzer.  I'm guessing that most modern guns have similar electronic components for targeting, positioning, etc. so whatever gun we get that element will be similar.

The Hydraulic system is a lot more complicated compared to the C3 which also uses hydraulic recoil. The electronics of the FCS are its own beast the requires some diligent care from the user and EO techs, over all its a tri trade effort of Weapons techs (the gun and recoil mech), vehicle techs (tires, brakes), and EO for the FCS. Electronics are a touchy thing when they do not want to work, so you really need an EO near by in case something happens.

 

[Colin Parkinson]

The gun crew on a 105 really had two adjustment to the recoil system, there is a little pin on the top cylinder that should be flush at normal temperatures and one could add oil by using a funky device that screwed into a orifice near the pin and then you pushed oil into the cylinder by turning a screw handle. that ensure there was enough oil in the system. If the detachment commander noticed the recoil was not functioning correctly, they could use a bent rod to adjust an air valve under the barrel to moderate the rate that air was escaping, can't recall if that was for going back into battery or in the recoil. If you had to add oil beyond a certain frequency it was time to call the gun plumbers.
I suspect the M777 recoil system require a bit more intensive interventions. 

 

[GR66]

The Hydraulic system is a lot more complicated compared to the C3 which also uses hydraulic recoil. The electronics of the FCS are its own beast the requires some diligent care from the user and EO techs, over all its a tri trade effort of Weapons techs (the gun and recoil mech), vehicle techs (tires, brakes), and EO for the FCS. Electronics are a touchy thing when they do not want to work, so you really need an EO near by in case something happens.

So, if we were to go for a towed replacement for the C3, given the option between the M777 (larger shell and commonality with the Reg Force, but more complex for maintenance) and a 105mm with similar range (smaller shell, less complex for maintenance, but different gun/ammo than the Reg Force - unless we eventually get the 105mm LAV vehicle), which route would the gunners here prefer to go?