Britain should be prepared for a 15-year struggle in Afghanistan
After Britain's toughest year in Afghanistan, our defence correspondent argues that the public needs to be convinced that the campaign in Helmand is worth fighting
By Thomas Harding
Last Updated: 12:50AM GMT 05 Jan 2009
The death on New Year's Eve of Corporal Liam Elms, a 26-year-old Royal Marine from Wigan, took the total number of British fatalities in Afghanistan last year to 51, making it the bloodiest year of the campaign by a wide margin. The following day saw the first British death of 2009, as an explosion in the province's Garmser district accounted for another soldier's life: Sergeant Christopher John Reed, a Territorial Army soldier with the 6th Battalion The Rifles.
In the context of our deployment in Afghanistan, every year is a vital one. But there is a growing sense that 2009 will be more decisive than most. So much hangs in the balance: will the local population reject the presence of foreign forces? Will the Nato alliance hold together, despite the in-fighting that is weakening its command structure? What difference will be made by President Obama, and by the presence of 20,000 more American troops, in a "surge" of the kind that worked so successfully in Iraq? And, most importantly for those of us in Britain, will we be able to sustain another year of high casualties without seeing any tangible gains on the ground?
The numbers of dead are harrowing – but they do not tell the whole story. This is a counter-insurgency campaign, in which the measure of success is more likely to be determined by the miles of new roads built than the numbers of Taliban – or Britons – killed. And even though we have been in Helmand for four years now, almost as long as the First World War, military planners are preparing for a prolonged campaign.
"If we take more casualties this year, the world will not end," says one of the officers involved in plotting our strategy. "Britain will not leave with its tail between its legs. The thing that's keeping us going is that we understand this is a long-term thing, not something that's a quick fix. We have the mindset that this is a 15-year endeavour."
In fact, the main problem might not be in the fields of Helmand, but in the living rooms of Britain and America. The public must be convinced that the war in Afghanistan is worth fighting. The current Defence Secretary, John Hutton, has appreciated more than most the need for Western countries to be in Afghanistan, and for Nato to remain unified. If we do not fight militant Islam in the mud-brick compounds of Helmand, we will be battling it on the streets of London. We should also frequently remind ourselves of where the September 11 attacks came from.
Unfortunately, all too often the only news that reaches the public from Afghanistan is of the deaths of more British troops. It is a complaint that irks those on the front line and undermines morale, because much has been achieved in Helmand despite the bloodshed.
The problem is compounded by the officials who fail to grasp the need for the media to report the story from the front line, or for honest and open debate about our presence and tactics. The Government now seems to be using the system of embedding reporters to reward those who broadcast good news and punish those who reveal difficult truths. But the tone was set from the start of our deployment in Helmand, when we slipped in a force of 3,300 paratroopers, clinging to the forlorn hope, as expressed by the then Defence Secretary, John Reid, that not one bullet would need to be fired. Several million rounds later, that force could soon have increased fivefold: 12,000 British soldiers, reinforced by an extra 5,000 Americans from this spring.
Such measures are long overdue. Following a visit to Helmand in 2006, an officer told me that, rather than the light brigade that was then battling the Taliban, we would need a division of up to 20,000 troops to bring the province to heel. He, like many others, knew that to fight a counter-insurgency you need boots on the ground, to take and hold territory. The current British force of 8,000 can probably secure five major districts, but this means that in the rural areas there is little to protect the population from Taliban warlords.
I spent much of June accompanying the Parachute Regiment as they patrolled on foot through the province's villages. The locals kept their distance, because they knew in a few days the British would be gone and the Taliban would be back, asking questions. We need the numbers in Helmand to reassure the population that if they take the West's side, they need not fear retribution.
It is going to be tough to summon the extra 4,000 British troops for the campaign – and the request will not be warmly received by military chiefs, who know that the Army is exhausted after six years of fighting in Iraq. But our leaders will probably answer the call from the White House, not least because Gordon Brown will want to cement his relationship with the new president.
One positive point is that the equipment failures that hampered the mission are being addressed, albeit in many cases thanks to reports in the media. British commanders should finally get the helicopters needed to fight a campaign that has been ridiculously handicapped by the presence of just eight Chinooks to serve 8,000 troops.
Counter-insurgency is about agility and surprise. The Russians learnt that air assaults against the Mujahideen were mightily effective (at least until the Americans supplied the insurgents with Stinger surface-to-air missiles). By the middle of this year, the first of up to eight Merlin helicopters will arrive in Helmand, followed by a dozen refurbished light Lynxes and another eight heavy Chinooks. Finally, commanders will be able to mount operations that can respond quickly to intelligence on "high-value targets". It will also mean fewer movements by road, which are becoming more of a target for the Taliban's increasingly effective roadside bombs.
Many will also welcome the news that the flimsy Snatch Land Rover will be withdrawn from operations outside our camps' perimeters by the end of this year, and the presence of two US brigade combat teams, which could, along with their substantial air mobility, be crucial in preventing the flow of fighters and guns to the Taliban from over the Pakistan border. The result should be the creation of a breathing space for coalition forces in the centre of Helmand.
Some of our troops' most important accomplishments, however, have little to do with set-piece battles. This summer saw 16 Air Assault Brigade achieve a remarkable feat: getting a third turbine up to Kajaki dam, which will by 2010 be able to bring electricity to much of southern Afghanistan. It was an operation that has enormous potential to win hearts and minds, not to mention an improvement in the Afghans' lives, even though it went largely unnoticed.
Then there is the vexed issue of opium. For four years, we have had to live with British soldiers patrolling through fields of poppies that produce the heroin that sends up to $500 million into Taliban coffers. In 2006, John Reid made great play of tackling Helmand's drug problem, one responsible for 90 per cent of the heroin on Britain's streets. But in order to avoid taking food out of the mouths of impoverished Afghan farmers, we have, in practice, ignored the issue.
With American reinforcements arriving in Helmand, however, the stage is set for us to take on the drug barons at last. That, of course, will stir up an even more vigorous reaction. But if our road-building operations go as planned, farmers' fruit will not rot on the way to market as it does now, making it a more viable crop than non-perishable opium. Similarly, the illegal checkpoints that fleece drivers will go, and Afghan security forces will be able to manoeuvre between towns more easily, despite the risk of roadside bombs.
That last is especially important, because one of the lessons learned from the American success in Iraq was that local security forces are key to fighting an insurgency. The Afghan National Army is to be doubled to 134,000 troops over the next five years, and will, it is hoped, gradually replace the 51,000 Nato troops. For that to happen, however, the soldiers will have to be paid more than the current pittance, which is outstripped by the rewards for service in the Taliban.
"It is going to be an enduring, almighty scrap," says a former British commander in Afghanistan. It is hard to disagree – but withdrawal from the country is unthinkable.
We have got to accept the setbacks that will inevitably come. But we also have to convince the public that the death of a British soldier is not a defeat, but an unfortunate necessity in making Afghanistan, and the rest of the world, a safer place.
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/4077401/Britain-should-be-prepared-for-a-15-year-struggle-in-Afghanistan.html
