Battle for Wanat [Merged]

[The Bread Guy]

Latest, shared with the usual disclaimer, from....

Associated Press:  "U.S. troops on Monday reinforced a remote military outpost after well-armed militants got inside and killed nine American soldiers in the deadliest assault on U.S. forces in Afghanistan in three years ....  Militants with machine guns, rocket-propelled grenades and mortars attacked the remote base in the village of Wanat in the mountainous northeastern province of Kunar at about 4:30 a.m. Sunday, with insurgents firing from homes and a mosque.  It was a "concerted attempt" to overrun the small base near the Pakistan border that was built only about three days ago, said an official with NATO's International Security Assistance Force.  The official, who spoke on condition of anonymity because he wasn't authorized to release the information, estimated the attacking force was several hundred.  An unknown number of militants got inside the outpost, the reason the fighters were able to inflict such high casualties, said a second military official who also spoke on condition of anonymity.  After the breach, U.S. troops pushed back against the invading militants, and attack helicopters swooped in. The second official said more than 40 insurgents were killed in the fighting. Fifteen U.S. soldiers also were wounded ...."

Voice of America:  "NATO officials say insurgents who carried out Sunday's deadly assault on a remote NATO outpost in eastern Afghanistan were able to penetrate the base before they were driven away by U.S. air strikes. Nine American soldiers were killed in the assault. Fifteen other U.S. troops and four Afghan soldiers were wounded. From Islamabad, VOA's Barry Newhouse has more on one of the single deadliest attacks for U.S. forces since the 2001 invasion.  The attack began early Sunday at a NATO outpost built just last week in Kunar, a province in eastern Afghanistan that borders Pakistan.  NATO officials said a large group of insurgents had secretly moved into a nearby village, where they launched a complex assault that lasted for much of the day.  NATO spokesman Mark Laity told reporters in Kabul that while insurgents regularly attack combat outposts, Sunday's assault was larger than normal and insurgents managed to fight their way inside fortified walls.  "They attempted to break into that base. They did make some penetration.  But over all they were repelled and they took very heavy casualties themselves," Laity said. "And then we brought in air power to stabilize the situation in a fight that then lasted for several hours." ...."

Reuters:  "A Taliban attack that killed nine U.S. soldiers, the biggest single American loss in Afghanistan since 2005, was a well-planned, complex assault which briefly breached the defences of an outpost near the Pakistan border.  "The insurgents went into an adjacent village, drove the villagers out, used their homes and a mosque as a base from which to launch the attack and fire on the outpost," said NATO spokesman Mark Laity on Monday.  "Some of the insurgents also then attacked. I think it looks as if they made a brief breach into the base and were repelled," he said.  Troops from NATO's International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and the Afghan army only moved into the combat outpost in the mountainous and forested Pech Valley district of Kunar province days before and the defences were not fully constructed.  The Taliban began their attack just before dawn on Sunday.  After driving back the assault, the defenders, numbering between 100 to 150, called in airstrikes from attack helicopters and warplanes. Fierce fighting went on till mid-afternoon.  Scores of Taliban fighters were either killed or wounded.  "There was very heavy fighting and they suffered very heavy casualties," Laity said.  Tens of Taliban were killed, an Afghan Defence Ministry spokesman said ...."

BBC Online:  "More than 100 insurgents breached a US outpost in north-eastern Afghanistan on Sunday, killing nine US troops in hours of fierce fighting, Nato says.  The militants used rocket propelled grenades and homemade mortars to bombard the base, close to Pakistan's border, from several sides.  The attack caused one of the single worst losses of life for foreign troops since operations began in 2001.  It came as international and Afghan forces fought militants in many areas ...."

Agence France Presse:  "Afghan President Hamid Karzai on Monday directly accused Pakistan's intelligence agency of being behind a recent series of attacks by extremist Islamic militants that have killed scores of people ....  The president's comments followed one of the deadliest incidents involving international forces since they arrived in Afghanistan in late 2001 to drive out the Taliban government.  The storming on Sunday of a military outpost in the remote Kunar province, near Pakistan, left nine US soldiers dead and 15 wounded, officials said.  "It was a well-organised attack, it was a ferocious attack," said a spokesman for NATO's International Security Assistance Force, Captain Mike Finney. Officials have suggested the attackers were from bases in Pakistan.  Hours of fighting, including air strikes, prevented the militants from taking over the base, with rebel casualties in the "high double figures", said Finney.  There were reports that several civilians were also killed but they could not be immediately confirmed.  Between 400 and 500 militants from various anti-government factions including Taliban, Al-Qaeda and the Hezb-i-Islami faction were involved, a senior Afghan defence ministry official said on condition of anonymity ....."

 

[tomahawk6]

http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/15/world/asia/15afghan.html?hp

KABUL, Afghanistan — The Taliban insurgents who attacked a remote American-run outpost near the Pakistan border on Sunday numbered nearly 200 fighters, almost three times the size of the allied force, and some breached the NATO compound in a coordinated assault that took the defenders by surprise, Western officials said Monday.

The attackers were driven back in a pitched four-hour battle, and they appeared to suffer scores of dead and wounded of their own, but the toll they inflicted was sobering. The base and a nearby observation post were held by just 45 American troops and 25 Afghan soldiers, two senior allied officials said, asking for anonymity while an investigation was under way.

With nine Americans dead and at least 15 injured, that means that one in five of the American defenders was killed and nearly half the remainder were wounded. Four Afghan soldiers were also wounded.

American and Afghan forces started building the makeshift base just last week, and its defenses were not fully in place, one of the senior allied officials said. In some places, troops were using their vehicles as barriers against insurgents.

The militants apparently detected the vulnerability and moved quickly to exploit it in a predawn assault in which they attacked from two directions, American officials said.

It was the first time insurgents had partly breached any of the three dozen outposts that American and Afghan forces operate jointly across the country, according to a Western official who insisted on anonymity in providing details of the operation.

The surprise attack underscored the vulnerability of American forces in Afghanistan, which are increasingly stretched thin as they are dispatched to far-flung and often isolated mountainous outposts with their Afghan allies. The United States now has about 32,000 troops in Afghanistan, about one-fifth the number in Iraq, even though Afghanistan is half-again as large as Iraq.

American commanders and NATO military officials said the assault had also reflected boldness among insurgents who had benefited from new bases in neighboring Pakistan.

It underscored the deteriorating situation in Afghanistan, where the number of war casualties has jumped this year and where American commanders have said repeatedly that their force is too small.

The fact that the base, on the western side of Kunar Province, was staffed by just 70 soldiers was first reported Monday by The Los Angeles Times. The death toll amounted to the worst single loss for the American military in Afghanistan since June 2005 and was one of the worst since the Taliban and their Qaeda associates were routed in late 2001.

American and Afghan soldiers inside the base were hit by flying fragments from bullets, grenades and mortar shells that insurgents fired from houses, shops and a mosque in a village within a few hundred yards of the base, several officials said.

At the lightly fortified observation post nearby, American soldiers came under heavy fire from militants streaming through farmland under cover of darkness. Most of the American casualties took place there, a senior American military official said.

American warplanes, attack helicopters and long-range artillery were urgently summoned to help repel the militants.

But the insurgents made it so far that a few of their corpses were found inside the base’s earthen barriers, and others were lying around it, Tamim Nuristani, a former governor in the region, said after talking to officials in the district.

The attack was unusually bold. Taliban and other militants in Afghanistan rarely attack better-armed allied forces head on, preferring suicide bombs and hit-and-run ambushes against foot patrols and convoys. But they have made occasional attempts to overrun lightly staffed or otherwise vulnerable outposts.

“Quite clearly they wanted to overrun the outpost,” the Western official said of the insurgents. “It was a well-planned surprise attack.”

The United States and Afghanistan have been establishing dozens of military outposts, often in remote areas controlled by the Taliban or their allies. “We’re looking at places to stop the flow of insurgents and establish relations with the local tribes,” a senior American military official said.

Allied and American officials said the attack began at 4:30 a.m. Sunday. Fighters who had infiltrated the hamlet of Wanat overnight and ordered the villagers to leave opened fire on the outpost from the west and southwest.

At roughly the same time, American officials said, another group began the second prong of attack, firing on the observation post from the east. Some fought through to the main outpost a few hundred yards farther.

American ground commanders immediately called in artillery and airstrikes from a B-1 bomber, as well as A-10 and F-15E attack planes. Apache helicopter gunships and a remotely piloted Predator aircraft fired Hellfire missiles at the insurgents, military officials said.

Many of the village houses were damaged in the strikes, but there were no civilian casualties because the villagers had left, Mr. Nuristani said.

Insurgents have been present in the area for months, including Pakistani militant groups like Lashkar-e-Taiba, a group that was originally formed to fight in Kashmir, he said.

The American and Afghan army soldiers had moved into the base at Wanat just days before, after abandoning another base higher up a side valley where they had come under repeated attack from insurgents.

“But this even surprised me that so many Taliban were gathered in one place,” Mr. Nuristani said.

He said some local people might have joined the militants since a group of civilians were killed in American airstrikes on July 4 in the same area. “This made the people angry,” he said. “It was the same area. The airstrikes happened maybe one kilometer away from the base.”

Mr. Nuristani strongly criticized those airstrikes, saying that 22 civilians had been killed. The provincial police chief confirmed that at least 17 civilians had been killed. The American military said planes had struck vehicles of insurgents but it has announced an investigation. Days after his comments, Mr. Nuristani was removed from his post.

He said that the security in the region of Nuristan and northern Kunar Provinces was precarious and that insurgents had freedom of movement from the border with Pakistan through 60 miles of Nuristan to the base at Wanat. “They can bring men, weapons and cars,” he said.

Local people and police have also battled insurgents in Barg-e-Matal, in another part of Nuristan, and complained that they were not getting enough help from the central government.

NATO officials gave little further detail of the attack on Monday. “It has been quiet overnight,” said Capt. Mike Finney, a spokesman for the NATO force in Kabul. “The insurgents had been pushed away.”

 

[GAP]

U.S. troops pull out of Afghan base after attack
Updated Wed. Jul. 16 2008 6:30 AM ET The Associated Press
Article Link

KABUL, Afghanistan -- Afghan police say U.S. troops have pulled out of a remote base where militants killed nine American soldiers earlier this week.

Nuristan province police official Ghoolam Farouq says American and Afghan troops left the newly constructed base near Wanat village Tuesday evening.

Farouq said Wednesday that a small police force is left in the village, and that another 50 police officers are on their way to reinforce them.

Officials for neither the U.S.-led coalition nor NATO forces in Afghanistan could immediately confirm the pullback.
More on link

 

[The Bread Guy]

Names of the fallen released by DoD (.pdf version attached to posting in case link doesn't work):

DoD Identifies Army Casualties
U.S. Department of Defense, News release No. 603-08, 16Jul08
News release link

            The Department of Defense announced today the death of nine soldiers who were supporting Operation Enduring Freedom. They died of wounds suffered when their outpost was attacked by small arms fire and rocket propelled grenades from enemy forces in Wanat, Afghanistan, on July 13. They were assigned to the 2nd Battalion, 503d Infantry Regiment (Airborne), 173rd Airborne Brigade Combat Team, Vicenza, Italy.

            Killed were:

            1st Lt. Jonathan P. Brostrom, 24, of Hawaii.

            Sgt. Israel Garcia, 24, of Long Beach, Calif.

            Cpl. Jonathan R. Ayers, 24, of Snellville, Ga.

            Cpl. Jason M. Bogar, 25, of Seattle, Wash.

            Cpl. Jason D. Hovater, 24, of Clinton, Tenn.

            Cpl. Matthew B. Phillips, 27, of Jasper, Ga.

            Cpl. Pruitt A. Rainey, 22, of Haw River, N.C.

            Cpl. Gunnar W. Zwilling, 20, of Florissant, Mo.

            Pfc. Sergio S. Abad, 21, of Morganfield, Ky.

            For more information media may contact the Southern European Task Force public affairs office at 011-39-0444-71-7011/-8020, or after hours at (328) 733-2167.

 

[Eye In The Sky]

RIP troops.  God bless the families of the fallen and wounded.

 

[tomahawk6]

An account of the battle at Wanat.The heroism of these men is really inspirational.There was no quit in these men.Heroes all.

http://www.stripes.com/article.asp?section=104&article=56237

Soldiers recount deadly attack on Afghanistan outpost
By Steve Mraz, Stars and Stripes Mideast edition, Saturday, July 19, 2008

Everything was on fire. The trucks. The bazaar. The grass.

It looked surreal. It looked like a movie.

That was what Spc. Tyler Stafford remembered thinking as he stepped onto the medical evacuation helicopter. The 23-year-old soldier would have been loaded onto the bird, but the poncho that was hastily employed as his stretcher broke. His body speckled with grenade and RPG shrapnel, the Vicenza, Italy, infantryman walked the last few feet to the waiting Black Hawk.

That was Sunday morning in eastern Afghanistan’s Kunar province. At a forward operating base — maybe as big as a football field — established just a few days prior.

Outnumbered but not outgunned, a platoon-plus element of soldiers with 2nd Platoon, Company C, 2nd Battalion, 503rd Infantry Regiment (Airborne), 173rd Airborne Brigade Combat Team accompanied by Afghan soldiers engaged in a fistfight of a firefight.

After maybe two hours of intense combat, some of the soldiers’ guns seized up because they expelled so many rounds so quickly. Insurgent bullets and dozens of rocket-propelled grenades filled the air. So many RPGs were fired at the soldiers that they wondered how the insurgents had so many.

That was July 13. That was when Stafford was blown out of a fighting position by an RPG, survived a grenade blast and had the tail of an RPG strike his helmet.

That was the day nine Chosen Company soldiers died.

It was just days before the unit was scheduled to leave the base.

———

The first RPG and machine gun fire came at dawn, strategically striking the forward operating base’s mortar pit. The insurgents next sighted their RPGs on the tow truck inside the combat outpost, taking it out. That was around 4:30 a.m.

This was not a haphazard attack. The reportedly 200 insurgents fought from several positions. They aimed to overrun the new base. The U.S. soldiers knew it and fought like hell. They knew their lives were on the line.

"I just hope these guys’ wives and their children understand how courageous their husbands and dads were," said Sgt. Jacob Walker. "They fought like warriors."

The next target was the FOB’s observation post, where nine soldiers were positioned on a tiny hill about 50 to 75 meters from the base. Of those nine, five died, and at least three others — Stafford among them — were wounded.

When the attack began, Stafford grabbed his M-240 machine gun off a north-facing sandbag wall and moved it to an east-facing sandbag wall. Moments later, RPGs struck the north-facing wall, knocking Stafford out of the fighting position and wounding another soldier.

Stafford thought he was on fire so he rolled around, regaining his senses. Nearby, Cpl. Gunnar Zwilling, who later died in the fight, had a stunned look on his face.

Immediately, a grenade exploded by Stafford, blowing him down to a lower terrace at the observation post and knocking his helmet off. Stafford put his helmet back on and noticed how badly he was bleeding.

Cpl. Matthew Phillips was close by, so Stafford called to him for help. Phillips was preparing to throw a grenade and shot a look at Stafford that said, "Give me a second. I gotta go kill these guys first."

This was only about 30 to 60 seconds into the attack.

Kneeling behind a sandbag wall, Phillips pulled the grenade pin, but just after he threw it an RPG exploded at his position. The tail of the RPG smacked Stafford’s helmet. The dust cleared. Phillips was slumped over, his chest on his knees and his hands by his side. Stafford called out to his buddy three or four times, but Phillips never answered or moved.

"When I saw Phillips die, I looked down and was bleeding pretty good, that’s probably the most scared I was at any point," Stafford said. "Then I kinda had to calm myself down and be like, ‘All right, I gotta go try to do my job.’ "

The soldier from Parker, Colo., loaded his 9 mm handgun, crawled up to their fighting position, stuck the pistol over the sandbags and fired.

Stafford saw Zwilling’s M-4 rifle nearby so he loaded it, put it on top of the sandbag and fired. Another couple RPGs struck the sandbag wall Stafford used as cover. Shrapnel pierced his hands.

Stafford low-crawled to another fighting position where Cpl. Jason Bogar, Sgt. Matthew Gobble and Sgt. Ryan Pitts were located. Stafford told Pitts that the insurgents were within grenade-tossing range. That got Pitts’ attention.

With blood running down his face, Pitts threw a grenade and then crawled to the position from where Stafford had just come. Pitts started hucking more grenades.

The firefight intensified. Bullets cut down tree limbs that fell on the soldiers. RPGs constantly exploded.

Back at Stafford’s position, so many bullets were coming in that the soldiers could not poke their heads over their sandbag wall. Bogar stuck an M-249 machine gun above the wall and squeezed off rounds to keep fire on the insurgents. In about five minutes, Bogar fired about 600 rounds, causing the M-249 to seize up from heat.

At another spot on the observation post, Cpl. Jonathan Ayers laid down continuous fire from an M-240 machine gun, despite drawing small-arms and RPG fire from the enemy. Ayers kept firing until he was shot and killed. Cpl. Pruitt Rainey radioed the FOB with a casualty report, calling for help. Of the nine soldiers at the observation post, Ayers and Phillips were dead, Zwilling was unaccounted for, and three were wounded. Additionally, several of the soldiers’ machine guns couldn’t fire because of damage. And they needed more ammo.

Rainey, Bogar and another soldier jumped out of their fighting position with the third soldier of the group launching a shoulder-fired missile.

All this happened within the first 20 minutes of the fight.

Platoon leader 1st Lt. Jonathan Brostrom and Cpl. Jason Hovater arrived at the observation post to reinforce the soldiers. By that time, the insurgents had breached the perimeter of the observation post. Gunfire rang out, and Rainey shouted, "He’s right behind the sandbag."

Brostrom could be heard shouting about the insurgent as well.

More gunfire and grenade explosions ensued. Back in the fighting position, Gobble fired a few quick rounds. Gobble then looked to where the soldiers were fighting and told Stafford the soldiers were dead. Of the nine soldiers who died in the battle, at least seven fell in fighting at the observation post.

The insurgents then started chucking rocks at Gobble and Stafford’s fighting position, hoping that the soldiers might think the rocks were grenades, causing them to jump from the safety of their fighting hole. One rock hit a tree behind Stafford and landed directly between his legs. He braced himself for an explosion. He then realized it was a rock.

Stafford didn’t have a weapon, and Gobble was low on ammo. Gobble told Stafford they had to get back to the FOB. They didn’t realize that Pitts was still alive in another fighting position at the observation post. Gobble and Stafford crawled out of their fighting hole. Gobble looked again to where the soldiers had been fighting and reconfirmed to Stafford that Brostrom, Rainey, Bogar and others were dead.

Gobble and Stafford low-crawled and ran back to the FOB. Coming into the FOB, Stafford was asked by a sergeant what was going on at the observation post. Stafford told him all the soldiers there were dead. Stafford lay against a wall, and his fellow soldiers put a tourniquet on him.

From the OP, Pitts got on the radio and told his comrades he was alone. At least three soldiers went to the OP to rescue Pitts, but they suffered wounds after encountering RPG and small-arms fire.

At that time, air support arrived in the form of Apache helicopters, A-10s and F-15s, performing bombing and strafing runs.

When the attack began, Walker was on the FOB. He grabbed an M-249 and started shooting toward a mountain spur where he could see some muzzle flashes. Walker put down 600 to 800 rounds of ammunition.

He got down behind the wall he was shooting from to load more ammo and was told they were taking fire from the southwest. He threw the bipod legs of his machine gun on the hood of a nearby Humvee. A 7.62-millimeter caliber bullet struck Walker’s left wrist, knocking him to the ground. A soldier applied a tourniquet to Walker and bandaged him.

Walker and two other wounded soldiers distributed their ammo and grenades and passed messages.

The whole FOB was covered in dust and smoke, looking like something out of an old Western movie.

"I’ve never seen the enemy do anything like that," said Walker, who was medically evacuated off the FOB in one of the first helicopters to arrive. "It’s usually three RPGs, some sporadic fire and then they’re gone … I don’t where they got all those RPGs. That was crazy."

Two hours after the first shots were fired, Stafford made his way — with help — to the medevac helicopter that arrived.

"It was some of the bravest stuff I’ve ever seen in my life, and I will never see it again because those guys," Stafford said, then paused. "Normal humans wouldn’t do that. You’re not supposed to do that — getting up and firing back when everything around you is popping and whizzing and trees, branches coming down and sandbags exploding and RPGs coming in over your head … It was a fistfight then, and those guys held ’ em off."

Stafford offered a guess as to why his fellow soldiers fought so hard.

"Just hardcoreness I guess," he said. "Just guys kicking ass, basically. Just making sure that we look scary enough that you don’t want to come in and try to get us."

 

[The Bread Guy]

And a little more detail from the boss of the troops involved (highlights mine), shared in accordance with the "fair dealing" provisions, Section 29, of the Copyright Act.

Commander: Media reports on Afghanistan outpost battle were exaggerated
173rd’s fight not symbol of more violent Afghanistan, says Preysler
Mark St.Clair, Stars and Stripes, 20 Jul 08
Article link - .pdf version attached below if link doesn't work

"The sky is not falling," Col. Charles "Chip" Preysler, commander of the 173rd Airborne Brigade Combat Team, said Saturday from Jalalabad, Afghanistan.

Preysler spoke via telephone less than a week after his paratroops and their Afghan allies were involved in a fierce attack at a small post near the village of Wanat. In the July 13 battle, nine of his men were killed and 15 others wounded.

But the attack is not a sign of conditions worsening in the country, he said.

The battle occurred just after dawn at a temporary vehicle patrol base near Wanat. A platoon-sized element of Chosen Company, 2nd Battalion, 503rd Infantry Regiment (Airborne) soldiers and a smaller Afghan National Army force were occupying a hastily built area as they had done many times over the 15 months they’d been in country, Preysler said. The soldiers were there on a reconnaissance mission to establish a presence and find a good location to connect with the local government, populace and Afghan National Police, he said.

The small outpost had been built just days before the attack and consisted of protective wire and observation posts surrounding strategically placed vehicles. "That’s all it was, a series of vehicles that went out there," Preysler said.

"People are saying that this was a full-up [forward operating base]/combat outpost, and that is absolutely false and not true. There were no walls," Preysler said, latter adding, "FOB denotes that there are walls and perimeters and all that. It’s a vehicle patrol base, temporary in nature."

But that doesn’t mean the soldiers were not prepared to take on the enemy, he said.

"Now, obviously when you halt, you start prepping your defenses, and in this case we had [observation posts] and protective wire, we had the vehicles deployed properly to take advantage of their fields of fire, and we set up like that all over the place, and we do it routinely," he said.

The Army did not "abandon" the base after the attack, as many media reporters have suggested, Preysler said.

He said the decision to move from the location following the attack was to reposition, which his men have done countless times throughout their tour, and to move closer to the local seat of government.

"If there’s no combat outpost to abandon, there’s no position to abandon," he said. "It’s a bunch of vehicles like we do on patrol anywhere and we hold up for a night and pick up any tactical positions that we have with vehicle patrol bases.

"We do that routinely.... We’re always doing that when go out and stay in an area for longer then a few hours, and that’s what it is. So there is nothing to abandon. There was no structures, there was no COP or FOB or anything like that to even abandon. So, from the get-go, that is just [expletive], and it’s not right."

He also didn’t like the media’s characterization that his men were "overrun."

"As far as I know, and I know a lot, it was not overrun in any shape, manner or form," an emotional Preysler said. "It was close combat to be sure — hand grenade range. The enemy never got into the main position. As a matter of fact, it was, I think, the bravery of our soldiers reinforcing the hard-pressed observation post, or OP, that turned the tide to defeat the enemy attack."

Though Preysler and his staff have seen several reports on the fight and numbers of enemy, he said true specifics still remain unclear.

"I do not know the exact numbers. But I know they had much greater strength than one U.S. platoon," he said. "I believe the enemy to number over 100 in that area when he attacked. I don’t know the casualties that he took, but I know that it’s got to be substantial based on the different reports I’m getting. We may not know the true damage we inflicted on the enemy, but we certainly defeated his attack and repulsed his attack and he never got into our position."

Preysler and his staff also object to media reports that because of the size of the attack, it could be a harbinger of change in the way militants fight in eastern Afghanistan.

"I think people are taking license and just misusing statistics, and I refuse to do that," he said. "We’re in the middle of the fighting season. When we first got here last summer and started fighting here in June, we were only seeing the enemy and engaging him first about 5 percent of the time. Now we’re between 25 and 40 percent. We see the enemy, and we’re engaging him first."

When the 173rd arrived last summer, it marked the first time that a brigade-sized element operated in the upper provinces near of the Pakistan border, allowing for a much larger presence.

"By sheer numbers and sheer volume of patrols — I mean this [battalion] has had 9,000 patrols in 15 months — we’re out there taking the fight to the enemy," We’re out there taking the ground that he used to own exclusively, and we have separated him from the people in many locations," Preysler said. "This is one area that is still contested, and we’re going to have to go back in there and fight hard to separate the insurgents from the population, and that is exactly what we’re going to do.

"Now, the problem is we are in the middle of a transition, [but] I would not characterize this as anything more than the standard fighting that happens in this area in good weather that the summer provides. The harvest is in, and it’s the fighting season. I don’t see massive enemy pushes into our area. The sky is not falling, and this is what we’ve been facing all along in the summer."

Preysler ended the interview by lauding his soldiers.

"I get emotional about this, you’ll have to forgive me," he said. "These guys have fought for 15 months, and they have fought harder, and I mean this literally, they have fought harder and (had) more engagements, more direct-fire engagements, than any brigade in the United States Army in probably the toughest terrain. These guys are absolutely veterans and they know what they’re doing and they have that airborne spirit and they fought a very, very tough battle and held the ground and did everything they were supposed to do.

"I would like to also say I wish my guys who were wounded a speedy recovery and obviously condolences to the families, and that’s very close and personal to us. It’s tough to take casualties toward the end of any combat tour for any unit, but it signals that we’re in a fight, and we’re going to continue to fight."

 

[The Bread Guy]

Along the same lines again, shared with the usual disclaimer...

Troops Angry At Media Bias and Laziness
Strategy Page, 21 Jul 08
Article link

July 21, 2008: American troops in Afghanistan are not happy with how a July 13th battle with the Taliban was reported. In that action, some 200 Taliban attacked a U.S. "base" and killed or wounded more than half the 50 or so U.S. and Afghan troops found there. Actual U.S. casualties were nine dead and fifteen wounded (including walking wounded).

U.S. troops were irked that, once again, the mass media got lazy and didn't bother to report the action accurately. For one thing, there was no "base". What the Taliban attacked was a temporary parking area for vehicles used to conduct patrols of the area. These are set up regularly, and have been used for years. These are secure areas, but basically a parking lot surrounded by barbed wire and several sandbagged observation posts. This one was set a few days before the attack, and was due to be taken down soon, as the patrol activity moved to another area.

Such defensive precautions are taken any time U.S. troops stop for more than a few hours. That's a tactic pioneered by the Romans over two thousand years ago. In this case, it paid off. The Taliban infiltrated several hundred fighters into a nearby village, and opened fire from homes, businesses and a mosque. The U.S. and Afghan troops called in air support and kept fighting until the Taliban fled, taking most of their dead and wounded with them.

The troops are angry because, while the Taliban got lucky (such attacks are rare), the enemy did not succeed in taking the U.S. position, and fled the battlefield after suffering heavier casualties. The U.S. troops are much better shots, and know they killed far more of the Taliban. Moreover, they saw smart bombs and missiles hitting buildings that Taliban were firing from. From long experience, they know that people inside bombed buildings rarely survive the explosion.

Finally, the troops involved were from the 173rd Airborne Brigade, and paratroopers do not like anyone implying they were beaten at anything. Especially because, in this case, they weren't.

 

[The Bread Guy]

If one believes the New York Times, it appears this may have been an inside job - highlights mine, shared with the usual disclaimer....

Afghan Officials Aided an Attack on U.S. Soldiers
ERIC SCHMITT, NY Times, 3 Nov 08
Article link

An internal review by the American military has found that a local Afghan police chief and another district leader helped Taliban militants carry out an attack on July 13 in which nine United States soldiers were killed and a remote American outpost in eastern Afghanistan was nearly overrun.

Afghan and American forces had started building the makeshift base just five days before the attack, and villagers repeatedly warned the American troops in that time that militants were plotting a strike, the report found. It said that the warnings did not include details, and that troops never anticipated such a large and well-coordinated attack.

The assault involved some 200 fighters, nearly three times the number of Americans and Afghans defending the site.

As evidence of collusion between the district police chief and the Taliban, the report cited large stocks of weapons and ammunition that were found in the police barracks in the adjacent village of Wanat after the attackers were repelled. The stocks were more than the local 20-officer force would be likely to need, and many of the weapons were dirty and appeared to have been used recently. The police officers were found dressed in “crisp, clean new uniforms,” the report said, and were acting “as if nothing out of the ordinary had occurred.” ....

More on link

 

[geo]

ANP continues to be a major stumbling block to a stable Afghanistan

 

[The Bread Guy]

Just spotted this blog, claiming to have the after-action reports in full:
http://www.battlefieldtourist.com/content/2008/11/07/the-road-to-want-wanat-part-2/

 

[MarkOttawa]

Thomas Ricks is going over the fight in great detail at his blog, The Best Defence (Foreign Policy magazine):
http://ricks.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/01/28/inside_an_afghan_battle_what_happened_at_wanat_last_july_i

Just before dawn last July 13, Taliban fighters attacked an outpost in eastern Afghanistan being established by U.S. Army soldiers and fought a short, sharp battle that left many American dead -- and many questions. But the U.S. military establishment, I've found after reviewing the Army investigation, dozens of statements given by soldiers to investigators, and interviews with knowledgeable sources, simply has not wanted to confront some bad mistakes on this obscure Afghan battlefield -- especially tragic because, as the interviews make clear, some of the doomed soldiers knew they were headed for potential disaster.

First, here's my account of what happened that day, drawn from the official investigation and other sources:

The 45 Americans, mainly from 2nd Platoon, Chosen Company, 2nd Battalion, 503rd Infantry Regiment, part of the 173rd Airborne Brigade, had begun building a patrol base in the Waygul River valley village of Wanat on July 8. There also were three Marines present, who were training Afghans, and 24 soldiers from the Afghan army. (The initial Army report said two Marines, but subsequent documents corrected this.) The platoon's leader was there the whole time, but the company commander was busy elsewhere and only arrived the day before the attack. None of their superiors visited the outpost during that time. Significantly, there was no overhead surveillance by unmanned aerial vehicles because of bad weather, according to Army documents.

At 4:20 a.m., just before sunrise, volleys of rocket-propelled grenades began to hit the base. There were approximately 200 attackers, according to the Army investigation. They began by concentrating on the American's heavy weapons -- a 120 millimeter mortar, a TOW missile system, and a .50 caliber machine gun. It felt like "about a thousand RPGs at once," Spec. Tyler Hanson later told an Army interviewer. With the first two heavy weapons knocked out, the Taliban moved in to fight just feet away from the Americans, making it difficult to call in air strikes against them. Enemy fighters threw rocks into their Americans' fighting holes, apparently hoping they soldiers would mistake them for grenades and jump out, exposing themselves to fire. Enemy fire was coming from every direction. "The whole time we were thinking we were going to die," said Spec. Chris McKaig.   

Many did. When most of the fighting was over, about an hour later, nine American soldiers were dead and another 27 were wounded. Between 21 and 52 of the attackers were killed. The Americans held the outpost, which is impressive, considering their 75 percent casualty rate.

Those are the facts of the matter. They are not in dispute, except for the size of the Taliban force, which one account claims is smaller than the Army's estimate of 200. You can read a redacted version of the Army's 15-6 investigation at the "Wanat" page on Wikipedia. Also, here is a Army Times' outstanding view of the battleground.

It is an interesting case to study especially because of the discrepancy between what is known about the incident and what has been learned from it. In other words, the facts gathered by Col. Mark Johnstone in the Army investigation are compelling, but the conclusions drawn from those facts are not. Rather, the Army appears determined to shy away from the lessons indicated by those facts. Here is what the Army concluded -- basically that we did OK, we should have had a Predator overhead, and that we shouldn't have trusted those lousy Afghans. And then let's talk about how brave our soldiers were...

Mark
Ottawa

 

[dapaterson]

Interesting seven piece article on an attack on an American outpost in Afghanistan, together with discussion and analysis of lessons learned.

http://ricks.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/01/28/inside_an_afghan_battle_what_happened_at_wanat_last_july_i

 

[Kirkhill]

I'd be interested in hearing the comments of Infidel-6 and OWDU on this one.

I don't think I'm very surprised to read that a Carbine fired on full auto during a TIC of multiple hours (at least 12 mags in 1.5 hours) overheated and jammed. Especially in a "target rich environment" (2 platoons, 1 US + 1 ANP? vs 200 insurgents).

The M249 jamming after 600 rounds is more questionable - I thought it had a quick change barrel.

Weapons failed US troops during Afghan firefight

Oct 11, 8:28 AM (ET)

By RICHARD LARDNER

WASHINGTON (AP) - In the chaos of an early morning assault on a remote U.S. outpost in eastern Afghanistan, Staff Sgt. Erich Phillips' M4 carbine quit firing as militant forces surrounded the base. The machine gun he grabbed after tossing the rifle aside didn't work either.

When the battle in the small village of Wanat ended, nine U.S. soldiers lay dead and 27 more were wounded. A detailed study of the attack by a military historian found that weapons failed repeatedly at a "critical moment" during the firefight on July 13, 2008, putting the outnumbered American troops at risk of being overrun by nearly 200 insurgents.

Which raises the question: Eight years into the war against the Taliban in Afghanistan, do U.S. armed forces have the best guns money can buy?

Despite the military's insistence that they do, a small but vocal number of troops in Afghanistan and Iraq has complained that the standard-issue M4 rifles need too much maintenance and jam at the worst possible times.

A week ago, eight U.S. troops were killed at a base near Kamdesh, a town near Wanat. There's no immediate evidence of weapons failures at Kamdesh, but the circumstances were eerily similar to the Wanat battle: insurgents stormed an isolated stronghold manned by American forces stretched thin by the demands of war.

Army Col. Wayne Shanks, a military spokesman in Afghanistan, said a review of the battle at Kamdesh is under way. "It is too early to make any assumptions regarding what did or didn't work correctly," he said.

Complaints about the weapons the troops carry, especially the M4, aren't new. Army officials say that when properly cleaned and maintained, the M4 is a quality weapon that can pump out more than 3,000 rounds before any failures occur.

The M4 is a shorter, lighter version of the M16, which made its debut during the Vietnam war. Roughly 500,000 M4s are in service, making it the rifle troops on the front lines trust with their lives.

Sen. Tom Coburn, R-Okla., a leading critic of the M4, said Thursday the Army needs to move quickly to acquire a combat rifle suited for the extreme conditions U.S. troops are fighting in.

U.S. special operations forces, with their own acquisition budget and the latitude to buy gear the other military branches can't, already are replacing their M4s with a new rifle.

"The M4 has served us well but it's not as good as it needs to be," Coburn said.

Battlefield surveys show that nearly 90 percent of soldiers are satisfied with their M4s, according to Brig. Gen. Peter Fuller, head of the Army office that buys soldier gear. Still, the rifle is continually being improved to make it even more reliable and lethal.

Fuller said he's received no official reports of flawed weapons performance at Wanat. "Until it showed up in the news, I was surprised to hear about all this," he said.

The study by Douglas Cubbison of the Army Combat Studies Institute at Fort Leavenworth, Kan., hasn't been publicly released. Copies of the study have been leaked to news organizations and are circulating on the Internet.

Cubbison's study is based on an earlier Army investigation and interviews with soldiers who survived the attack at Wanat. He describes a well-coordinated attack by a highly skilled enemy that unleashed a withering barrage with AK-47 automatic rifles and rocket-propelled grenades.

The soldiers said their weapons were meticulously cared for and routinely inspected by commanders. But still the weapons had breakdowns, especially when the rifles were on full automatic, which allows hundreds of bullets to be fired a minute.

The platoon-sized unit of U.S. soldiers and about two dozen Afghan troops was shooting back with such intensity the barrels on their weapons turned white hot. The high rate of fire appears to have put a number of weapons out of commission, even though the guns are tested and built to operate in extreme conditions.

Cpl. Jonathan Ayers and Spc. Chris McKaig were firing their M4s from a position the soldiers called the "Crow's Nest." The pair would pop up together from cover, fire half a dozen rounds and then drop back down.

On one of these trips up, Ayers was killed instantly by an enemy round. McKaig soon had problems with his M4, which carries a 30-round magazine.

"My weapon was overheating," McKaig said, according to Cubbison's report. "I had shot about 12 magazines by this point already and it had only been about a half hour or so into the fight. I couldn't charge my weapon and put another round in because it was too hot, so I got mad and threw my weapon down."

The soldiers also had trouble with their M249 machine guns, a larger weapon than the M4 that can shoot up to 750 rounds per minute.

Cpl. Jason Bogar fired approximately 600 rounds from his M-249 before the weapon overheated and jammed the weapon.

Bogar was killed during the firefight, but no one saw how he died, according to the report.

---

Edit:  Or is there a possibility that these Section Machine Gunners have not read this and this

Vague recollections about the advantages of siting in pairs, co-ordinating fire and fire control, the need for a number two to maintain a sustained ammunition supply and to handle barrel changes.....  Which leads into discussions about Section / Platoon organization and tactics and the advantage of a dedicated MG det/section.

 

[1feral1]

I think a lot of this is media hype, an over reaction and a story for the public to ponder.

To sum up anything negative makes news. We know the media is the biggest enemy of all. Weapons have stoppages.

The media did the same thing here about our weapons in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Many factors, including mud/dust/sand, overheating, lubrication, dirty link etc, and Murphy's law come into play.

I am late for work.

Regards,

Wes

 

[vonGarvin]

As stated, many factors could be at play here.  Maintenance may have been a issue.  There may have been overheating factors, or even Mr. Murphy came along to play.  Heck, they may have been treating their Machine Guns as belt-fed rifles for all we know.

I do suspect that when 8 US Soldiers die at the hands of the Taliban, people want a scapegoat, something to blame.  In this case, technology?  I mean, it's not stated, but it's hard to fathom that brown people can actually better the White Man.  (sarcasm fully intentional).

I suspect that this is hype.  Just my thoughts.

 

[MG34]

Not to cast doubts on the actions of the fallen or those involved in the action but... The M4 Carbine is not a support weapon, it is not intended for sustained automatic fire. The above report contains some media errors I think. One thing that stands out is the soldier throwing awayhis hot weapon! Had the weapon been cooled by water from his Camelback or other source , and relubed it should have resumed working. Like any machine once you burn away the lubricant it will stop working. This speaks more to a training issue than a weapons issue.
There is an officiual US Army BOI coming out on this action that will hopefully provide better info on this case.

 

[KevinB]

Big Army has the M4: SAFE, SEMI, BURST (3rd)
SOCOM M4A1: SAFE, SEMI, AUTO

From what I posted on Lightfighter.



quote:

Originally posted by Dirt: "I had shot about 12 magazines by this point already and it had only been about a half hour or so into the fight. I couldn't charge my weapon and put another round in because it was too hot, so I got mad and threw my weapon down."

Let me translate.



"I am a s**tty shot and do not know the difference between aimed fire and wasted ammuntion."





Yes Afghans can attack like ceaselss swarms of cockroaches (maybe we should bring back Flamethrowers for FOB defense, or Quad .50's?)



However I really can't see anyone firing 336-360 rds within 30min for good effect in the OEF AOR.  Due to terrain, this COP was in a bowl (not the best from a definsible standpoint) and surround by hills, rocky outcrops etc. 
Quiet honestly a good 75% of non-SOF forces I have seen in OEF and OIF as both mil and a contractor, had weapons that where in a serious need of both PM and suffering a serious lack of weapons skills.



The other point, is damn as smart as we think we are, sometimes in this day and age you can get overun by a vastly numerically superior force.  Taliban are not dumb, they will try to flank you and supress you so you don't know where they are moving to. Its not like playing wack-a-mole with Madhi Army types in '04 Iraq. Your not goint to get a great amount of enemy exposure.



I will say for 99% of the time that I have seen it, is that "suppressive" fire, isn't. Accurate fire suppresses and causes casualties, inaccurate fire wastes ammo.



There is nothing wrong with the M4 (well I'd have everyone go M4A1 as the 3rd burst system makes my head bleed with its stupidity, and I'd remove the auto-sears from 3/4 of the guns. Combat Marksmanship is terrible these days - judging distance and placing accurate fire off the KD range is lacking.

What is needed is more realistic training for soldiers.



Lube - for f**ks sakes people, its 2009, we have been fighting for 8 years in Afghan, and guns are still not getting properly lubed That is a HUGE chain of command failure.



Mags -- PMAG's have a f**king NSN now - use it.



Ammo - M855 may not be the best, its way better than it was in the past, and its way better than 7.62x39 for shooting people with. That said a new 5.56mm ammo like the BH/Barnes 70gr OTM would IMHO be better for both accuracy and terminal effects since we are not fighting an enemy in soft armor and plates.



I carried a M16FOW for over 20 years - I've never been let down by one, and if I all of a sudden needed to lay my ass on the line today, that system would be my first pick.

 

[KevinB]

FYI - I taught a SR25/SR16 Armorers class here last week.  We allowed student to do some fun shooting with and 11.5" SR16E3 with our Triple Tap Enhanced Compensator.
Weapon in question

Some of the State Department guys shot some video as well (which I dont have yet)

Within 20 min over 1200 rds had been shot thru this gun.
    The Inconel enhanced compensator was glowing red hot
Most people shot 30 rd bursts to test the controllability of the gun with the compensator on it.

No stoppages  - so while I think we make the finest 5.56mm gun out there, I dont think the Colt M4 is a slouch either and I have shot over 3500rds thru a suppressed Colt Mk18 (10.3" barrel) in Afghan in one day - just adding lube

 

[GAP]

After watching both in person long ago, and in video clips of Afghanistan and (not so much, but it probably happens) Iraq, I see guys lifting their rifles over their heads and running through a clip on auto in the general direction (ANA mainly with AK 47/74's). I just shake my head....that is so useless.

It was no different in Viet Nam....ending up with overheated/jammed weapons and the little guys still plinking at you ......The only heads it kept down was the shooter's.