Eeyore,
Here is the more detailed reply that I promised...
Yes, the PRT is continuing on with reconstruction ops, and yes, they are ensuring that the "Afghan face" is maintained (thus gaining face for the Gov't of Afghanistan). As far as media coverage goes, I am sure that the local media is getting the word out, and we are just not hearing it in Canada.
The problem with the reconstruction effort that I saw (and have heard nothing to make me believe that the situation has changed) is that it is focused to our needs, not the Afghan's needs. All the smaller projects were very much "intelligence driven" wherein we stated that we would provide something in exchange for information in a specific area. It was not part of a coherent overall strategy.
WRT the large projects, they were very much too large. For example, if USAID (to name only one agency) wanted to have an effect in an area, they might build a fruit cannery. However, before they could build the cannery, they would have to build a road to get to the area, and they would also have to change the crops over to fruit from whatever was originally being grown. Finally, they would have to train the locals in how to operate it.
Well, since all these projects were "nested", what seemed to always happen was that all elements would be started, but they would not be carried through to completion. This was not the fault of the developing agency; this was merely a function of the facts that there were not enough agents, and their attentions were soon required elsewhere (usually for a small intelligence driven project). Thus, the locals never saw the complete benefit, and in the case of farmers who switched over crops, they often were actually harmed because they could not get any money from their new crops.
A further difficulty with the "large project" strategy was that there were very few contractors who could actually do the work. Many of these larger contractors were either inherently corrupt, or got all of their projects through nepotism. There were cases where contractors were provided with heavy machinery for a specific purpose (road construction), and rather than work on the road, the contractors would cite "security concerns" and then use the machinery somewhere else for personal gain. Obviously, this did not provide the desired effect with the locals.
Finally, I still feel that we are imposing too much of a Western flavour on the whole process. People always go with what they are familiar with. We know how to operate in the Western fashion, and the people with whom we are most comfortable dealing are those who speak English and understand how we conduct ALL our business in the West. These people, however, may not be the ones with whom we need to deal. Since Afghanistan is still a tribally dominated culture, we need to find those personnel who have real influence in their tribes, districts, religious sects, etc and deal with them. They may or may not be those personnel who have been elected or appointed to government positions (usually not in my experience).
If I had my druthers, we would approach Afghanistan in one of two ways (although with the understanding that the West would have to provide the main security umbrella while either of these two process were carried out):
1. We take the next generation and FULLY educate them in the Western political, economic, military, and governance functions; or
2. We create a cadre of personnel who will remain in Afghanistan until the job is done and fully educate them in the Afghan processes.
What I see now is that we have grafted a Western flavour on Afghanistan that is a mile wide and an inch deep. The Afghans as a whole do not understand what we are trying to do, and since they have not quickly seen concrete results do not support our actions. What we have are a number of people who have lived in the West who can take advantage of our presence simply because we can easily speak to them. Conversely, the people we have there now generally do not understand the Afghan way of doing things (and I do not pretend to be an expert myself) who are trying to go about their business in the way that they know how.
Overall, I think that we are aiming our reconstruction strategy too high. Rather than trying to impose the control of the central government, and then raising the standard of living through the (apparent) actions of the government, I think that we should raise the general standard of living immediately (and credit the government as being a partner in the process rather than trying to say that they are responsible. The Afghans know that the aid is coming from the West, not Kabul) and then try to extend the influence of Kabul. Happy people with full bellies will not shelter the Taliban - people who are being promised "pie in the sky, by and by" will soon lose their belief.
Hope this answers your question
