There are very few countries that are willing to challenge the US in conventional warfare, because we have demonstrated an ability to quickly destroy and adversary in that kind of war. It is critical that we demonstrate a capacity to destroy enemies using insurgency warfare, are we will be dealing with a lot more small wars. On a strategic level that is the most important reason for winning the war in Iraq.
I stumbled across this on a website called
Prairie Pundit. The issue at hand was a Ralph Peters article apparently beating up on the Co-In Field Manual (widely believed to be authored by or with Petraeus).
It seems to fit with this discussion. The primary article says that Western Democracies/the US are allowed to fight and can win big general mobilization wars (not tested since 1941) and small black ops (debatable given the CIA although FARC has been engaged "covertly" for a while). At very least western "enemies" are reluctant to take on the US in those arenas. However, the mid-size Korea/Vietnam/Iraq engagements demonstrate a western vulnerability. A government has about 18 months to engage the enemy and then withdraw from the headlines. As Prairie Pundit says the US/we need to get very good, very fast at dealing with an exposed flank otherwise we will be continually drawn into these types of operations.
It seems to be conventional wisdom, judging by the reports that Edward is submitting from his latest symposium, that there are a whole lot of opportunities for the "enemy", whoever that may be, to engage us in the near future.
If we can't figure this one out and come up with an economical strategy for countering these attacks then we bleed bodies and treasure and credibility.
I DON'T think it is an appropriate response to tuck our collective heads in our collars, block out the world and say "I'm alright Jack". That will preserve bodies in the short-term (maybe) and treasure for a little longer (until we run out of goods to trade).
BUT is an extremely fast route to lack of credibility - and then the other side wins. They want us to be seen to be selfish cowards.
So... how do you set the ground work to defeat an insurgency in 18 months? It will obviously take longer than that but how do you get it off the front pages in that time so that you can continue with the same level of coverage that UNFICYP or the Kashmir or even 4 CMBG got?
Is there a mechanism/solution that would allow for 12 months of kinetics and then establishment of something like the British South Africa Constabulary in conjunction with tribes/concerned citizens/firqats/kandaks?
If such a strategy WERE possible (no guarantees) it seems to me that in the prevailing "peaceful" pre-war environment that means an awful lot more useful "political" intelligence from people on the ground. Much as Edward has been saying Foreign Affairs needs to be more gainfully employed gathering intelligence. Not Military Intelligence on weapons and such but political intelligence on who's who, who they represent and what they think.
Also could we get pro-active in mentoring failing states before they fail? Take the Lessons Learned in Afghanistan and take them to "friendly" governments, or at least those that are amenable to bribery (development aid) and coercion (sanctions).
