6 Maritime Coastal Defence Vessels being no longer Mothballed

[Sailorwest]

Now back to topic: All I am advocating is this: If you mothball three MCDV's per coast, why not do it in such a way that you can easily reactivate two or three of them for three to four months every summer and run them with the real part-timer reservists out on short class A or B employment? It may  not be sufficient for them to learn new material, but it would be good for morale, retention and at the least, it would maintain their skill level through practice. This more than anything else could help with the "total force" idea of "seamlessly going from part-time to full-time" employment . 

The challenge with this idea, I think, is the level of complexity of the engineering of the KIN Class and the cost of maintenance. We stood up NAN in 2006 for COJT. Not too dissimilar from what we did in the 80's and early 90's. It took over a month to get things up to speed, including addressing all the supply issue for a ship which had been 'scavenged' for spare parts and tools while sitting alongside for 6 months. Of that crew, over 1/2 were full time reservists att posted to the ship for the summer, with a minority coming from the Cl A world.  Today there are very few Cl A MESO's that would be able to come out and do this. They tend not to return to the NRD's. Although many of the command/control, commuications, and deck functions are not too different, the engineering is. This isn't your father's MCDV.

 

[Monsoon]

As for Hamiltongs, be kind to your seniors. People like me are not referred to as "old guard" but as "dinosaurs". However, we do not like to be referred to as people tending bars.

You're not the "old guard" - the old guard are the diehard C&PO/Lt(N)/LCdrs who to this day continue to come in once every three weeks or so despite not having ever seen let alone sailed on a Kingston class ship. They're not doing "a weekend a month and two weeks a year", they're just taking up space in the org chart for senior personnel while contributing at a level that would see an LS shown the door.

As for the "in case of emergency, break glass" function - you denied it, but then went on to describe the role of a reserve to be to provide an easily disposed-of wartime recruiting base. Given the choice of being part of an organization that does nothing until a war is declared (and let's be honest, no war will ever be "declared" in the future), then I'd just as soon wait until the war gets underway to sign up.

As for the rusted skillset theory - I don't buy it. If someone on the SupRes can't do the job after a couple of years, how can someone in the Reg F posted to Ottawa for two back-to-back postings ever be expected to go to sea again? The Reg F does practically nothing by way of refresher for people posted out of environment. Also, the SRR is composed of ex-reservists, who generally get out younger than their Reg F counterparts. If wartime mobilization is your priority (and I think it's pretty clear that it isn't at DND), then improve the SRR, don't downgrade the PRes.

All that aside, my point is this: in the absence of a clear day-to-day mission in addition to a wartime augmentation role, the organization will flounder, particularly as the majority of current serving members joined under Total Force. It's been over a decade and a half now; time to move on.

 

[Colin Parkinson]

Lex
The CCG does not normally operate in the North during the winter months, our icebreakers are not “heavy class”, more medium in the scheme of things. The Polar 8 was supposed to be able to over winter and be very capable in thick multi-year ice, but that’s a faded memory.

Oldgatedriver
Merchant ships disappear on a regular basis and reappear under new colours with new crews (the fate of the old crew is only guessed at) It would be difficult but not impossible to equip a standard merchant ship with mine laying capability, disguised as a fuel tank or such dropping out of the bottom. Only a few onboard would need to know the true intent, the rest would assume drug smuggling or something and accept the bribes to ignore anything odd. The ship would be registered in a 3rd world country with several front companies owning it.
The biggest trick would be to keep the shipyard crew who modified it to keep quiet (Not a problem in North Korea) and then to arrange that that ship to be in or near the right harbour when you want to start hostilities. Beyond the resource of the terrorist groups for now, but not of some rather unethical countries.

This thread reminds me of the amalgamation of the CCG, Science and DFO fleets, vessels were disposed of that were later needed.

 

[Oldgateboatdriver]

All good point everyone.

Colin, I know what happens to merchies - I read the intel - but what you say confirms what I said: The threat is negligible, which in naval termes does not equate zero but is sufficiently low "at this time" to provide the required lead time to deal with when it becomes necessary.

I take it from your post that you are Coast Guard, so I do not know your level of mine warfare knowledge. Basically, true mine hunters (as suggested by both Ex-D and I, would be useful) are the single most expanseve warship to build on a per-ton basis. So in a tight budget, it becomes: what are the biggest threat I can deal with within my budget.

P.S.: Conecerning wintering in the Arctic: Amundsen does it, but more importantly, if you go to the AOPS thread of this forum, you will see that the latest AOPS plan calls for ships about 5500 tons, Polar 3 capable only with a maximum continous speed of 17 kts , that will be very lightlyarmed with small  weapons you could bolt on just about any  merchant hull. Last time I checked, the river class icbreakers you mention, like Radisson and DesGroseillers were exactly that size and capable of 16.5 kts continous in open waters. They also had agreat big landing pad on their stern. So do we need to spend 3.1 B$ for an extra half knot or is it easier to get four or five more Radisson's for the Coast guard and from time to time strap light weapons on thier decks, embark military operators and deploy them on "sovereignty patrols"?

 

[MarkOttawa]

Oldgateboatdriver:  Good stuff on the Arctic.  Have a look at these posts at The Torch:

Coast Guard, not Navy, for Canadian maritime presence in the North
http://toyoufromfailinghands.blogspot.com/2010/01/coast-guard-not-navy-for-canadian.html

Arctic/Offshore patrol ships: More never never land
http://toyoufromfailinghands.blogspot.com/2009/06/arcticoffshore-patrol-ships-more-never.html

The icebreakers we should build
http://toyoufromfailinghands.blogspot.com/2007/08/icebreakers-we-should-build.html

Mark
Ottawa

 

[Oldgateboatdriver]

Thank you Mark. Glad to see I am not the only one thinking its an expansive half knot!

And thank you Hamiltongs. But trust me, I am a dinausor: I am about to be honourably discharged from the SupRes by Her Majesty as my ten years are up.

There is a thrid way for the future of the reserve which is neither the pre Kingston days, nor the current one but is closer to the "total force concept". I have been advocating it for years to whoever wishes to hear it: An american style reserve: Four regional reserve training centers  (East, Quebec, Ontario, West) manned by reg force administrative officers and relevant trade training personnel. These centers would have all the simulators, classroom and materiel training ressources required.

Once a reserve is recruited and enrolled by recruiting center, she would be processed through basic at St-jean like every regular force person, but mostly in the summer (to avoid screwing up school year). Then, the appropriate "regional center" would take her over and provide her with a schedule of ten monthly week ends  a year when she would be expected to show up for trade/skill maintenance training and two weeks of full time service. When trade qualified , he would be posted to an existing team of some sort (harbour defense, MCDV crew, inspection diving team, etc.). While on such team, the monthly week end and two week annual training would be with that team so that all the time would be devoted to team training and readiness maintenance. In case of need (wartime or otherwise) the whole team gets called out.

Now, that is "total force", but it is bold and goes against the organisation of reserves we have used for 83 years. However, it is important to remenber that until not so long ago (last 12 years, roughly, reserve units used to do their own recruiting, medicals, enrolment and provided most of the basic training and trades training internally. This is not so anymore and it then begs the question, what do we need the units for, other than maintaining 24 buildings?

Good pondering everyone.

 

[Neill McKay]

what do we need the units for, other than maintaining 24 buildings?

I'd suggest that Cmdre Hose's vision is still relevant: NAVRES divisions bring the navy to the hinterland.  Whether that application is being fully exploited or not is a matter for discussion.

 

[Lex Parsimoniae]

P.S.: Conecerning wintering in the Arctic: Amundsen does it, but more importantly, if you go to the AOPS thread of this forum, you will see that the latest AOPS plan calls for ships about 5500 tons, Polar 3 capable only with a maximum continous speed of 17 kts , that will be very lightlyarmed with small  weapons you could bolt on just about any  merchant hull. Last time I checked, the river class icbreakers you mention, like Radisson and DesGroseillers were exactly that size and capable of 16.5 kts continous in open waters. They also had agreat big landing pad on their stern. So do we need to spend 3.1 B$ for an extra half knot or is it easier to get four or five more Radisson's for the Coast guard and from time to time strap light weapons on thier decks, embark military operators and deploy them on "sovereignty patrols"?

AOPS is based on the Norwegian SVALBARD design but is being modified for Canadian service.  SVALBARD is 6,300 tons full load displacement with a maximum speed of 17.5 knots.  She only operates a medium (NH-90) helicopter which is one of the Canadian modifications (our MH are much larger).  She cost approximately $90 Million USD (plus CSE fit) in 2002.  Part of the reason for the $3 billion AOPS budget is the switch to accrual accounting methods for capital purchases.  It is also worth noting that the AOPS programme stated that "There is currently insufficient infrastructure in both Esquimalt and Halifax to berth the AOPS.  As a result, some additional jetty infrastructure renewal would be required.  The project will also establish a docking and refuelling facility in Nunavut.  These infrastructure costs - estimated at approximately $274 million - will be included in the AOPS budget."  I don't think that purchasing a 30+ year old design such as the CCG Medium/River icebreaker is necessarily a better approach than AOPS nor will it prove any cheaper.

There is a similar thread at the Canadian Naval Review website that is worth reading: http://naval.review.cfps.dal.ca/forum/view.php?topic=2

 

[Colin Parkinson]

One of the issues with “river class” icebreakers is that they are designed with more longitudinal strength than horizontal, Ocean class breakers need the horizontal strength to avoid being crushed by shifting ice flows. That being said the Larson and the 1100 class are pretty much the last dedicated icebreakers we have built since 86-87. I don’t think Canada has the institutional knowledge to build them anymore and certain not up on the current technology. That expertise can be imported both through purchasing proven designs and bringing SME’s from other shipyards and design firms. While having a hull built offshore is faster and cheaper, it’s not likely politically doable.
As for manning them, well the first couple of months in the Arctic is rather exciting, after that……
Oldgatedriver, If I recall the drive in minesweeping tech was to make it modular, so the equipment was supposed to be able to be moved from ship to ship as required, is/was that the case, did they succeed or are there technology choke points to cause problems?     

 

[Oldgateboatdriver]

Colin:

Minesweeping gear is pretty well modular. We have a limited number of kits and they can be moved from one MCDV to the next fairly easily. Minesweeping is not high tech and has not changed much since it was conceived at the end of Victorian times. However, sweeping only deals with moored (or tethered) mines. offensive mine warfare has evolved passed that and we now have to deal with bottom mines. These you have to "hunt", and the hunting is technology driven.

Basically, think of hydrographic surveying: you are trying to derive a picture of the bottom of the water in sufficiently rough details that you can point out where the "bumps" on the bottom and general slopes are. In mine hunting, using similar techniques,  we are trying to pin point objects in realtime that are from the size of a barrel down to the size of a bankers box on the sea floor that look like they do not belong there to start with.

In Canada, I'll say it again here, the MCDV were acquired to deal with ONE mine warfare threat: deep anti-submarine mines. This is because at the time we developed the MCDV's concept of operation, we were in the middle of the acquisition program for six to eight nuclear submarines. Such submarines were sufficiently high value assets to warrant an attack by deep sea mines.

The MCDV's were to deal with such mines in two ways: Moored mines would be team swept with mechanical EDATS gear (Extreme Depth Armed Team Sweep). Dealing with the bottom mines was different : in "peace" time, extremely detailed route surveys of the routes would be taken by the MCDV's using side scan sonar. Anything unusual revealed by these surveys would be identified by divers or ROV and catalogued. In case of increased tension or suspected mine attack, the route survey would be re-taken and compared to the original one. Anything new would be considered a mine and re-identified or destroyed by divers/ROV again. So here is a first technological choke point: The volume of data that needed to be stored, then compared for discrepancies - with the attendant "noise to signal" problems, not to mention "matching of data: did the ship go over exactly the same ground, were the sonar angles the same, is this a different rock, or the same rock which shifted a bit or was not measured from the same position, etc. I do not know (as I have been out for a while) if we ever managed to make it work. I know we had not when I retired.

Just think of the expeditions that go looking for important warship sinking sites: They have a good idea of where the ships sank because navies keep pretty good navigational records and they are looking for a six to nine hundred foot ship. Still they search for weeks, months and sometimes fail to find their prey. You are looking for something very small that may or may not be there and never know what your search area will be exactly until you start finding mines. That is why, for the shallower area where regular mines are used against surface ships we need mine hunters that have two important assets: 1) every possible and conceivable measure of self protection possible, and 2) the single most advanced computing system for realtime analysis of data, the Mk1 human eye/brain computer.

For this type of mine hunting work, modular systems are more problematic: First, it is difficult if not impossible to know the exact boundary of the mined area, and thus cannot come up with a safe standoff distance for any Craft of opportunity that would receive the modular package. Such craft does not have self protection measures built-in and losing it and the modular package before even starting is not the best scenario. Moreover, it would have to be stand off technology. We are slowly getting there and the latest generations of machines are getting better, but such technology has to work in nature and, whether  you have an umbilical control or radio control (more complicated as you still need something connecting the underwater system to the surface antenna) search system, it is affected by under water currents, the way it is driven by the operator, the distance off you are (time delays) and the effect of the weather on the surface mother ship. So if you are in a hurry, you can miss things or easily fail to  maintain proper attitude or lose contact with the system or fail to realize the actual position of the object you are inspecting more closely, etc.  In all cases, the safety of your craft of opportunity  has now been compromised. 

As you can see, while the technology is improving, we are not there yet and mine hunting is still a craft that requires people going in harm's way in the mine field relying on their experience and the safety of the self-protection measures built in the craft they use.

Sorry if I bored some people with mine warfare 101.
 

 

[Colin Parkinson]

Not boring at all, even though I knew a fair bit of it. As for the mapping issue, the ability to map bottom terrain is increasing both through the GPS acquisitions, ability to store and read data and multi-beam sonar. The future of that kind of mine warfare likely lives in AUV's operating ahead of the ship to sweep the area. I worked with the Underwater Research Lab from Simion Fraser University where they where working on AUV's and in fact I am taking a small ROV out for field inspections next week  http://www.videoray.com/products/10-pro-3-e

One option I can see is that when the minehunter detects a target either directly or remotely, they deploy a ROV sled which carries the AUV to the vicinity. The AUV detaches from the sled and investigates the target, sending real time video to the sled, which is then relayed back to the ship. This will reduce the AUV's biggest handicap which is transmitting complex data through the water column. If the target is identified as hostile, then the AUV or a specialized ROV destroys it.

These guys have been working the AUV angle for quite sometime and I have seen their AUV being tested in Indian Arm, there larger one was on a direct heading for our vessel which it detected and altered course for, quite interesting stuff.
http://www.ise.bc.ca/auv.html

 

[Nfld Sapper]

Canada's navy cuts coast patrol fleet in half
Last Updated: Thursday, May 13, 2010 | 12:50 PM AT
CBC News

HMCS Saskatoon and the other coastal patrol ships were built in the mid-1990s. (DND)

A shortage of money and sailors is forcing Canada's navy to mothball half of its fleet of coastal patrol vessels.

Canada's 12 Kingston-class ships, based in Halifax and Esquimalt, B.C., are operated by the navy reserve. The 55-metre vessels are used to patrol the Arctic, Atlantic and Pacific ocean coasts.

In a statement to CBC News, the navy says it made the tough choice to leave several ships at dock and strip them of their crews because it doesn't have the resources to operate all 12.

The navy says the move is necessary to continue the primary mission of defending Canada.

"Upon close examination of resources and priorities, this was deemed necessary to safeguard and optimize our operational capability, both now and in the future," wrote Denise LaViolette, a navy spokeswoman.

Three ships will remain on each coast. The others won't be scrapped, but they will be put in long-term storage.

No financial details given
The navy has not said how much money it would need to keep the whole fleet active, or how much it will save by reducing the fleet by half.

The Kingston-class ships were built in the mid-1990s to hunt for mines that could block Canadian ports. They are lightly armed and can be converted to carry a small underwater robot or even platoons of soldiers.

LaViolette said that, despite the navy's actions, the federal government is providing "stable and predictable" funding. She said the navy continues to modernize its frigates and refit its submarines.

 

[SeanNewman]

For too long, good-old-fashioned Canadian soldier creativity has kept the mission going at all costs no matter what constraints were placed on him.

The problem is that nobody ever notices there's a problem when you get the job done.

Kudos to the people in charge here for not saying "okay now we'll man these ships with 10 people and we'll train by firing one bullet per year out of the cannon".  It's not about playing hardball, but saying "Look, this is what we can effectively do and if you need more I need X, Y, and Z".

And the proof is in the media responses.  People are now forced to take notice, instead of those 12 becoming 11 which would become 10, etc.

 

[Nuggs]

...and three frigates, HMCS Montreal, St John's and Vancouver will now be conducting domestic and continental missions to a "limited degree"...

Anyone care to speculate on what exactly that means?

I take it as, cancel all plans of crossing the pond.

I only ask as I'm posted in 3 weeks 

 

[Ex-Dragoon]

Anyone care to speculate on what exactly that means?

I take it as, cancel all plans of crossing the pond.

I only ask as I'm posted in 3 weeks 

Don't speculate it only contributes to making things seems worse then they might otherwise be.

Milnet.Ca Staff

 

[Nuggs]

Don't speculate it only contributes to making things seems worse then they might otherwise be.

Milnet.Ca Staff

Point taken  :nod:

 

[NavyShooter]

There was some interesting reading that came my way the other day, and consider this (with respect to ship capabilities being supported.)

Why would we spend money to maintain systems that are, quite literally, at the end of their service life due to the HCM project?

Should we spend a limited budget on systems that are being phased out through the life of the project?  Or should we transfer the parts to the ships that are doing the missions, and let those ships that aren't doing much more than low or standard readiness tasks go with what they have until they get the brand-new gear through HCM??

Do we want to invest $$$$$$$$ in SPS-49 radar parts when there's not going to be a single SPS-49 in the fleet in 5 years? 

Or, do we want to invest that money into a 3D radar system that will be taking the CPF's into the future through the next 20 years?

Yeah, it sucks that we're tying up platforms, and that some ships are losing capabilities, but in the near term, how much will that affect us? 

In the longer term, Halifax is headed for HCM, and her "old" parts will be available for the other 11 ships to use...and as more ships head into the ditch, their "old" systems will be available to support the other pre-HCM ships.

If we do that instead of buying new parts for the old systems, we'll keep most of the capability, with a fraction of the cost, and the money can go to the new gear, which is, where it really needs to go.

YMMV, but it's a hard choice that's had to be made, depending on your perspective, you can see why the decision had to be made.

NS

 

[jollyjacktar]

NS, you better watch yourself.  You're making sense.

 

[MarkOttawa]

E.R. Campbell:

Either sinks MacKay.

I cannot see the prime minister making the minister walk the plank over the matter--esp. after Guergis/Jaffer.

Just before all this blew up, never never land words from Mr MacKay:

Navy renewal proceeding
http://www.thestarphoenix.com/business/Somnia/3021815/story.html

...
Our defence blueprint is providing the navy what it needs to serve on our three coasts and internationally. We are modernizing our frigates and refitting our submarines, and are set to invest tens of billions in building a several large vessels.

The soon-to-be finalized National Shipbuilding Procurement Strategy will set the way ahead for the fleet. On the personnel front, an increasing number of skilled and dedicated people are joining the navy...

Mark
Ottawa

 

[stealthylizard]

I love the shouts of criticism from the opposition parties.  Did they forget the "decade of darkness" already?