14 Nov 12: Israel Launches Operations in Gaza

[The Bread Guy]

Not sure what this means but, apparently, a mob has just (last hour?) set fire to the Al Jazeera TV studio, which is very near Tahrir Square in Cairo. Is Al Jazeera too biased for the Arab street?

Like many other media outlets, considered fair and balanced right up until they consistently run with stuff counter to the street's master narrative/story line/spin.

 

[GR66]

There are very few options for a long-term solution to this bloody mess.  I think that any attempt at a solution will ultimately have to come from Isreal.  On the hardline Islamist side there is no incentive to try and find a political solution as the total destruction of Isreal is the ONLY objective.  Many Islamists may also feel that demographics are on their side in the long run anyway.  I would argue that it is in Isreal's long-term best interest to try and find some type of (even imperfect) solution as soon as possible while they still clearly have a very strong hand.

In my opinion the best course for Isreal would be to unilaterally declare an independant Palestinian state and recognize the Palestinian Authority as the de facto interum government of that new country.  They would have to make major concessions in order to make Palestine a truly viable state...most/all of the West Bank, a land link between Gaza and the West Bank, hand over control of utilities, freedom to conduct trade, possibly even some type of access to East Jerusalem, the whole 9 yards.  The entire purpose of that action would be to recast the characterization of the conflict of Isreal being an occupying power keeping freedom from the poor, oppressed Palestinians.  The Palestinians would be given what they've been asking for...their own country.  They would have the control required to try and shape their own future. 

Any attacks against Isreal afterward could then be characterized as attacks by one nation against another and deserving of retaliation.  The moderate Palestinians would then have a choice...allow the extremists to continue their attacks and risk being characterized by the rest of the world as extremists themselves and seeking to wage a war of aggression against the Jewish people.  Isreal would be in the novel position as being re-cast as the victim after they made the big concession of "giving in" to the Palestinian's initial demands in the first place.  The other option for moderate Arabs would be to turn their backs on the extremists and try to build their new nation into something worthwhile.

It's certainly no ideal solution.  Isreal would be giving up much for no immediate gain in return.  The extremists would still be extremists and attacks on Isreal would continue (at the very least for the short term).  Palestine would still be pittied by many in the West until they eventually start to get on their feet economically and socially.  But at least the narrative would have the chance to change for Isreal which is more than they have on the plate at the moment.

 

[GAP]

A Sudan Surprise
Hamas militants may have received new weapons from Iran through Sudan, experts say
http://freebeacon.com/a-sudan-surprise/
Y: Adam Kredo November 21, 2012

Sudan has played a key role in arming Hamas militants with sophisticated Iranian-made rockets, experts said.

The Israeli Defense Forces’ (IDF) principal objective in Gaza is to rid Palestinian terrorists of sophisticated Iranian-produced rockets that are capable of striking deep into Israel’s heartland, including Jerusalem and Tel Aviv.

These rockets originated in Sudan and were then smuggled into Gaza with Iran’s help, sources said.

The existence of these advanced Fajr-5 rockets reveals the deepening ties between Iran and its terrorist proxies in Gaza and Sudan, where the rockets were housed before shipment.

“To put it simply, it was Iranian-made Fajr-5s, imported via Sudan, that prompted this war,” said Jonathan Schanzer, vice president for research at the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies. “Iran’s fingerprints are all over this.”

Hamas terrorists in Gaza were provided around 100 Fajr-5 rockets by Iran. The rockets are capable of travelling nearly 50 miles, putting both Jerusalem and Tel Aviv within their reach. These missiles differ drastically from the crude rockets typically fired by Hamas terrorists.

The Fajr-5 missiles are believed to have been smuggled from Sudan into Gaza via Egypt’s porous Sinai region.

Sudan, a longtime ally of Iran, acted as a “key transit point” for these weapons, Schanzer said.

“[Sudanese capital] Khartoum has long been a transit point for Iranian-made rockets to Gaza,” he said. “The smuggling route goes up through Egypt and across the Sinai [desert] into the tunnels and into Gaza.”

Israel was the prime suspect after a weapons facility in south Khartoum mysteriously exploded in late October. The Jewish state’s attack on the Yarmouk military manufacturing facility was preventive in nature, experts said.

“I am convinced that the October bombing of an IRGC weapons factory in Khartoum was part one of this operation,” Schanzer said. “The Israelis learned of a large cache of Fajr-5s and destroyed it there.”

“But it appears that around 100 of them had already made it into Gaza,” he added. “This prompted the Israelis hunt down the Fajrs during this latest round of fighting.”

 

[The Bread Guy]

We have a ceasefire coming - this from the IDF Info-machine ....

A short while ago, a ceasefire agreement regarding the fighting in the south, came into effect. Following eight days of operations, the IDF has accomplished its pre-determined objectives for Operation Pillar of Defense, and has inflicted severe damage to Hamas and its military capabilities.

As a result of IDF operations, the command and control apparatus of Hamas was significantly struck, beginning with the targeting of the commander of the military wing of Hamas, Ahmed Jabri, continuing with the targeting of broad terrorist infrastructure, facilities and military bases, as well as the destruction of dozens of smuggling and explosive tunnels.

During the operation, the IDF damaged and destroyed significant elements of Hamas' strategic capabilities, among them. Amongst those capabilities were long-range (over 40 km) and hundreds of short- and medium-range rocket launchers. These actions have severely impaired Hamas' launching capabilities, resulting in a decreasing number of rockets being fired from the Gaza Strip. The 'Iron Dome' defense system has accomplished high rate of successful interceptions (84%) and Hamas' accuracy with regards to hitting populated areas within Israel remained below 7% ....

.... and from mainstream media:

A ceasefire is set to go into effect at 9 p.m. local time Wednesday in Gaza, putting an end to eight days of shelling between Hamas and Israeli forces that has injured hundreds and and inflamed tensions ....

Understanding Regarding Ceasefire in Gaza Strip

1.a.Israel shall stop all hostilities on the Gaza Strip land, sea and air including incursions and targeting of individuals.

b.All Palestinian factions shall stop all hostilities from the Gaza Strip against Israel, including rocket attacks, and attacks along the border.

c. Opening the crossings and facilitating the movement of people and transfer of goods, and refraining from restricting residents free movement, and targeting residents in border areas and procedures of implementation shall be dealt with after 24 hours from the start of the ceasefire.

d. Other matters as may be requested shall be addressed.

2. Implementation Mechanism:
a. Setting up of the zero hour for the Ceasefire Understanding to enter into effect.

b. Egypt shall receive assurances from each party that the party commits to what was agreed upon.

c. Each party shall commit itself not to perform any acts that would breach this understanding. In case of any observations, Egypt - as the sponsor of this understanding - shall be informed to follow up.

 

[brihard]

Hamas and Israel can achieve ceasefire in under two weeks, yet the NHL is still on strike...  :facepalm:

 

[Journeyman]

Hamas and Israel can achieve proclaim ceasefire in under two weeks....

You'll understand if I don't rush out to book a 'Sandals Resort Gaza' beach-front holiday just yet. 

 

[Jarnhamar]

Ceasefire will last long enough for Gaza dudes to get more rockets and start firing them.

 

[dapaterson]

You'll understand if I don't rush out to book a 'Sandals Resort Gaza' beach-front holiday just yet. 

You're just upset about that "Damascus discount getaway" you booked last month.

 

[jollyjacktar]

You're just upset about that "Damascus discount getaway" you booked last month.

You know though, there were places in Syria I would have been interested in seeing before they blew the hell out of the place.  Now?  I doubt it would ever be worth the effort in my lifetime.

 

[tomahawk6]

Bias doesnt mean accurate. Bias usually is favoring one side over another. But I have to say that al Jazeera is more even handed than during OIF. Anytime an al Jazeera office is sacked and burned by an angry arab mob is an indication that someone isnt happy with the reporting. ;D

 

[Edward Campbell]

It looks, to me, as though there is one big "winner" in this ceasefire: Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi.

I'm guess that he won, in some large part, because Israel wanted him to win, an Egyptian victory, more important a Morsi victory is in Israel's long term interests. My suspicion is that by agreeing to what appear to be unbalanced ceasefire terms Israel is:

1. Extending the hand of friendship to President Morsi; and

2. Strengthening Morsi's hand in the region.

I'm also guessing that Israel expects something in return.

Going back to one of my recurring themes: if Mohamd Morsi is the winner then, given that the "balance of influence" in the region is a zero sum game, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan is the loser.

 

[cupper]

He may begin to have internal security problems though, if the road he is moving down starts to piss off too many of the populous.

Egypt’s President Morsi takes sweeping new powers

http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/egypts-president-morsi-takes-sweeping-new-powers/2012/11/22/8d87d716-34cb-11e2-92f0-496af208bf23_story.html?hpid=z2

CAIRO – Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi declared extensive political powers for himself Thursday, taking broad and sweeping control of his country a day after he won international praise for fostering a cease-fire in Gaza.

Under the terms of Thursday’s decree, Morsi said that all of the decisions he has made since he took office — and until a new constitution is adopted — were final and not subject to appeal or review. He declared the retrial of high officials accused of the deaths of protesters during the country’s 2011 revolution, a measure that appeared targeted at former leader Hosni Mubarak. And he dismissed Egypt’s Mubarak-era prosecutor general, immediately swearing in a new one.

The announcement, which was read on state television by Morsi’s spokesman, Yasser Ali, late Thursday afternoon and broadcast repeatedly, appears to leave few if any checks on the president’s power. The military, not long ago a powerful weight against the executive branch, was sidelined in August in a similarly sudden decision when Morsi fired the top ranks in a single sweep. And Egypt’s short-lived parliament was dissolved by the country’s top court shortly before Morsi, a political Islamist, took office.

Some commentators on Egyptian television quickly began bandying about words like “dictatorship.” Protesters were massing in Tahrir Square, some with posters containing split images of the faces of Mubarak and Morsi. Meanwhile, a group of Morsi supporters from his Muslim Brotherhood movement gathered elsewhere in central Cairo to show their support for the decision.

“If a danger arises that threatens the January 25 revolution,” the proclamation read, the president “can take any procedures and preparations that he sees necessary to face this danger.”

 

[Edward Campbell]

Yes, but he also gets $4.8 Billion in loans from the IMF as a reward.

He may be a tyrannical thug ~ but what Arab leader is anything else? ~ but he can, for the moment, pay off his bond holders.

And, as we always say: "Now he's our tyrannical thug."

 

[GAP]

Gee....sure sounds like the same kinda stuff that went on in Iran when the Ayatollahs came to power

 

[Edward Campbell]

Gee....sure sounds like the same kinda stuff that went on in Iran when the Ayatollahs came to power

It is, and it's the same kind of "stuff" that went on when "we" (US CIA and UK SIS) put the Shah of Iran back in power (1953) and when we (the Brits) put the the Hashemites on the thrones of Iraq (Faisal) and Jordan (Abdullah) during/just after the World War I. "We" tend to buy the (always only temporary) "loyalty" (if that's what you want to call it) of various kings, sheiks and presidents rather than actually trying to teach the Arabs democracy or good governance, which are not the same thing at all (George W Bush's foolish dreams to the contrary).

 

[cupper]

Yes, but he also gets $4.8 Billion in loans from the IMF as a reward.

He may be a tyrannical thug ~ but what Arab leader is anything else? ~ but he can, for the moment, pay off his bond holders.

And, as we always say: "Now he's our tyrannical thug."

But the question is for how long? Even though he fired all of the generals who were previously "Loyal" to the old regime, and replaced the old judges with his own people, it wouldn't take much to set off the powder keg. There was plenty of discussion after the elections that the younger generations and more moderate Islamist elements were not happy with the outcome, and felt marginalized by the senior more conservative members of the Brotherhood. The PR looks good to those Arab allies outside Egypt, but the power grab and crackdowns that will surely follow could well hurt his place within the country.

 

[GAP]

The Brotherhood moved to far too quickly, especially after kicking Mubarak out......they should have done it gradually.....

 

[cupper]

The Brotherhood moved to far too quickly, especially after kicking Mubarak out......they should have done it gradually.....

True that they moved to far too, but they did sit on the sidelines during the start of the protests, and only became involved after the Army took over. Waiting to see which way things would fall.

 

[Edward Campbell]

But the question is for how long? Even though he fired all of the generals who were previously "Loyal" to the old regime, and replaced the old judges with his own people, it wouldn't take much to set off the powder keg. There was plenty of discussion after the elections that the younger generations and more moderate Islamist elements were not happy with the outcome, and felt marginalized by the senior more conservative members of the Brotherhood. The PR looks good to those Arab allies outside Egypt, but the power grab and crackdowns that will surely follow could well hurt his place within the country.

True that they moved to far too, but they did sit on the sidelines during the start of the protests, and only became involved after the Army took over. Waiting to see which way things would fall.

And that's what I'm doing: waiting to see how the various situations develop. I don't even pretend to understand Arab politics.

 

[Edward Campbell]

Here, reproduced under the Fair Dealing provisions of the Copyright Act from Foreign Affairs is an interesting analysis of why we just had this eruption of violence in Gaza. The key seems to be that Hamas was morphing into a legitimate government but was unwilling to reign in terrorists within its borders and, as the article says, "Israel would not let Hamas shirk responsibility" for what was being done my more radical groups in Gaza:

http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/138435/barak-mendelsohn/hamas-miscalculation?page=show

Hamas' Miscalculation
Why The Group Thought It Could Get Away With Striking Israel

Barak Mendelsohn

November 18, 2012

The escalation in the fighting last week between Israel and Hamas caught many observers by surprise. Operation Cast Lead, Israel's 2008 campaign against Hamas, had led to an uneasy calm between the warring sides. And last year's release of Gilad Shalit (the Israeli soldier who had been kidnapped by militants in 2006) in exchange for a thousand Palestinian prisoners had even given observers hope that Israel and Hamas had found a way to manage their conflict. But then, Hamas attacked an Israeli mobile patrol inside Israeli territory on November 10 and Israel retaliated by assassinating Ahmed Jabari, Hamas's military chief. This time, the violence that has followed has not faded quickly; indeed, the fight is still intensifying.

Given the destruction wrought by Israel and Hamas' last major conflict, Hamas' calculations in the lead-up to this round of fighting are especially puzzling. The typical explanation is that Hamas ramped up its rocket campaign earlier this year in an effort to break Israel's siege on the Gaza Strip. Under fire, Israel had to retaliate.

That answer, though, is unsatisfying. In many ways, the siege had already been broken. True, the Gaza Strip is tiny, densely populated, squeezed between Israel and Egypt, and dependent on both countries for the passage of people and goods. And all of that makes it a rather claustrophobic place. Yet Israel's efforts to tightly control the area's borders, which started after Hamas won elections there in 2006, had gradually wound down. After the public relations disaster that followed Israel's 2010 mishandling of the Gaza-bound Turkish aid flotilla, the flow of goods over the Israeli border into Gaza increased substantially. Moreover, the tunnels under the Egypt-Gaza border, through which most of the goods coming into Gaza are smuggled, became so elaborate that they resembled official border crossings. In fact, the volume of trade that travels through the tunnels could be up to $700 million dollars a year.

To some extent, Hamas had a political interest in perpetuating the siege idea, which could be used to foment anger against Israel and drum up popular support. Further, it made sense for the movement to preserve some limitations on the movement of goods into Gaza, since the smuggling industry lined its coffers. Thus, although life in Gaza might not have been all that pleasant for Gazans, Hamas wanting to break the siege is not a compelling explanation for its renewed violence against Israel.

In fact, two factors pushed Hamas to ramp up its bombing campaign: competition from Salafi groups and Hamas' belief that its strategic environment had improved in the wake of the Arab Spring. Since Hamas was elected, it has found the Salafi groups in Gaza especially difficult rivals to manage. Fatah, Hamas' main competitor before it pushed the group out of the area in 2006, was never such a challenge: with the Oslo peace process discredited and Israel's retreat from the Gaza Strip largely attributed (at least in the Gazan psychology) to Hamas' militant activities, the remnants of Fatah just couldn't compete. The small jihadi outfits, though, embodied the fighting ethos. And unlike Hamas, they were free from the constraints that governing puts on ideological purity.

Under pressure, Hamas repeatedly tried to quell the Salafi threat, and it did not shy from using brute force to do so. The clearest demonstration came in August 2009, when Hamas killed the leader of Jund Ansar Allah, a Salafi group that had openly challenged Hamas' authority, and a number of its members. But short of using extreme violence to suppress Salafism in Gaza, which would have been too costly for Hamas, Hamas could not eliminate the Salafi challenge. It watched with worry as new Salafi groups emerged and strengthened throughout the strip.

The pressure on Hamas only increased in the wake of the 2011 Arab uprisings. The Egyptian revolution and the subsequent chaos in the Sinai Peninsula were a backwind in the sails of Gaza's Salafis. The collapse of authoritarian regimes in North Africa unleashed a flood of weapons and fighters, which Salafis channeled into the Sinai Peninsula. With the Egyptian military unable to control the area, Gazan Salafis turned the peninsula into a staging ground for attacking Israel. They believed (correctly) that Israel, anxious not to kill its peace accord with Egypt, would not dare to respond directly.

Indeed, Israel resorted to thwarting attacks emerging from Sinai and the Gaza Strip as best it could by preventing Gazans from getting to Sinai in the first place. On a number of occasions, Israel preemptively targeted Salafi leaders in Gaza. The Salafis responded by lobbing rockets back at Israeli's southern towns. Periods of quiet between rounds of violence became shorter and rarer.

The new regional order presented Hamas with a serious dilemma. As the ruler of Gaza, it could not sit on the sidelines while Israel targeted territory under its control. But it was unable to fully rein in the Salafis without proving once and for all that it was no longer a resistance movement. For Hamas, then, the only choice was to tolerate the attacks. It portrayed them at home as a way to preserve the struggle against Israel. Abroad, it refused to acknowledge any role in them at all to reduce the danger of a backlash. Over time, pressure from Hamas rank and file led the organization to take a more active role in each round of violence.

The flaw in Hamas' logic, though, was that it assumed that Israel would cooperate and not retaliate. Israel would not let Hamas shirk responsibility, though, and demanded that Hamas assert its authority over the radical factions. To reinforce the message, this year, Israel carried out a number of strikes on Hamas targets. Once it became a target itself, Hamas was even less able able to show restraint. It eventually resumed carrying out its own strikes on Israel, a move that was cheered by the Hamas rank and file, who, without such attacks, might have defected to the more radical groups.

Another of Hamas' miscalculations was expecting Egypt to be supportive of its actions, which, when combined with Israel's fear of alienating the regime in Cairo, would allow Hamas to escalate the conflict without it spinning out of control. The hope was not off base. In August, Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi had retired the military's top brass and taken full control of Egypt's foreign and security police. The development was particularly significant given that the Supreme Military Council, which had maintained close relations with the United States, was not as interested in helping Hamas. But, the group was wrong again. Hamas' closer ties with Egypt did not discourage Israel from fighting back.

Simply put, Hamas' strategic environment was not as favorable as it thought. When it tried to push Israel's boundaries, Israel pushed back. Now the group is in a bind. It needs a face-saving resolution to the fighting, one that would allow it to claim some achievement worth of the devastation inflicted this month on Gaza. Even after that, the group will still face the same old tension between its ideology of resistance and the responsibilities that come with governing. And all the while, its Salafi challengers will be lurking, challenging its commitment to the struggle against Israel. If Hamas wants to avoid future such escalations, it will need to crack down on these groups. But that would come with a price -- in popularity and legitimacy -- that Hamas seems unwilling to pay. Hamas must also finally make the transition from resistance movement to normal political party. It will probably take a push from Cairo for that to happen. Hamas' alliance with Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood offers the group some of the cover it needs to make the much-needed transition. And the Muslim Brotherhood is a good model for Hamas to follow, besides. Absent Hamas' political transformation, no cease-fire with Israel will hold for long. The next round of violence awaits, just over the horizon.

BARAK MENDELSOHN is Assistant Professor of Political Science at Haverford College and the author of Combating Jihadism: American Hegemony and Interstate Cooperation in the War on Terrorism.


I think, actually just guess that Prof Mendelsohn's last paragraph sums it up.